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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the reconceptualisation of war as risk management. It is suggested 
that recent wars exhibit repetitive patterns revolving around the central concern of 
managing systemic risks to security in an age of globalisation. It implies continuity where 
one might expect discontinuity in US and British campaigns over Kosovo, Afghanistan 
and Iraq from 1998-2003, given the different US Administrations and strategic contexts 
involved. The challenges it poses relate to ‘classical’ notions associated, rightly or 
wrongly, with war such as ‘noble’ heroic purposes, to decisive outcomes in the form of 
surrender ceremonies. Such notions have hampered a proper appreciation of the various 
forms war can take. Furthermore, the predominant International Relations (IR) approach 
relating to war and security - Realism- appears to contribute incomplete explanations to 
these wars. The alternative perspective developed here is based on ‘risk management’.
Underpinning this study is what sociologists call the Risk Society where risk 
management has emerged as an axial organising principle. Social science disciplines, 
notably sociology and criminology, have incorporated these theories into their research 
agendas, yielding richer perspectives as a result. Yet, IR has largely not done so in a 
concerted way, despite its inherently cross-disciplinary nature and increased prominence 
of risk in the strategic context. The framework informing this study is thus adapted from 
recent theorising on risk management strategies in the wider social sciences. The purpose 
is to systematically analyse using the theoretical framework developed herein, how 
concepts of proactive risk management such as active anticipation, the precautionary 
principle, ‘reshaping the environment’ and appreciating ‘non-events’ can be usefully 
applied to understanding contemporary war and IR.
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CHAPTER ONE 
The Problem at Hand
‘When I was coming up, it was a dangerous world and we knew exactly who the they 
were. It was us versus them and it was clear who them was. Today we’re not so sure who 
the they are, but we know they’re out there somewhere’. -  George W. Bush, 2000 ^
Introduction
To what extent is war itself becoming a ‘risk management’ strategy? This thesis is a 
study of emerging patterns of contemporary warfare. It seeks to put in broader 
perspective recent wars waged by Washington and supported to a lesser degree by 
London, between 1998-2003 that are in some important aspects not yet fully understood 
in their entirety. The need for rethinking aspects of war has materialised in particular 
events which have not been amenable to satisfactory explanation in ‘traditional’ terms. 
This project can be seen as a general response to such events. Three puzzles motivated 
this study.
Firstly, George W. Bush’s sentiments quoted above encapsulated the conundrum 
that he and his predecessor Bill Clinton faced in guiding the greatest military machine in 
history without the previous Cold War template to go by, and even more so after the 
September 11 2001 terrorist attacks (hereafter 9/11). America’s defence budget by 2003 
exceeded the next eight powers combined. Yet wars were still being fought without 
overarching doctrines of containment and deterrence against dangers, made exponentially 
more amorphous and ill-defined by systemic changes such as globalisation and the end of 
Cold War constraints.
Frank Bruni, ‘The 2000 Campaign: the syntax’, New York Times, 23 January 2000
Secondly, conventional ‘maximalist’ notions of war such as noble ‘heroic’ 
purposes, decisive battles, and clearly defined outcomes such as surrender ceremonies do 
not quite live up to contemporary wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq.
Lastly, leading Realists such as Henry Kissinger and John Mearsheimer have 
maintained a notably hands-off approach to these wars as will be discussed later in this 
chapter. If realism, normally associated with questions of war and security cannot or does 
not seek to explain these wars, what can?
Two closely-related questions and hypotheses flow from these puzzles:
i) Firstly, the primary focus of this study is, given the lack of existential survival
threats, can Washington’s rather frequent wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq 
from the late 1990s to the turn of the millennium be constmed as ‘risk 
management’? Thus, the main hypothesis to be assessed is that under specific
circumstances and parameters, these wars bore hallmarks consistent with ‘risk
management strategies’ in terms of impetus; manner of implementation and 
justifications given; and criteria for evaluating success.
ii) The secondary related hypothesis to be examined suggests that these risk
management features suggest a better ‘fit’ with contemporary wars than the 
‘conventional’ notions outlined above.
The goal of social science, argued Stephen Walt, is to develop relevant knowledge to 
understanding important social issues. It should be guided by criteria of precision, logical 
consistency, originality and empirical validity.^ This opening chapter, and indeed the 
thesis as a whole, aspires to meet the above criteria. I begin by setting out the problem at
 ^ Stephen Walt, ‘Rational choice and international security’ in Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote Jr, Sean 
Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller (eds), Rational Choice and Security Studies: Stephen Walt and his critics, 
(Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2000), p.8-9. Precision means identifying boundaries and assumptions to 
avoid misapplying theory in unsuitable circumstances. Logically consistent theories have conclusions that 
flow logically from initial premises. Originality means theory should help researchers see familiar 
phenomena in a new way and tells us things we did not originally know. It imposes order on phenomena 
previously hard to understand and addresses conceptual or empirical problems that earlier theories could 
not adequately explain. Empirical Validity determines usefulness of a theory by comparing it against 
appropriate evidence.
8hand and the need for new ways of conceptualising the age-old concern of war. The 
chapter then proceeds to signpost research parameters more precisely, to avoid theory 
being misapplied where it is not suitable. The final section outlines the selection and use 
of case studies to assess empirical validity and logical consistency of theories developed 
here.
L Old wine in new bottles?
For much of the 20^ century, ‘major war’ between Great Powers was most feared and 
analysed, culminating in concerns about nuclear Armageddon. This type of war now 
appears obsolete.^ The West was still in the ‘war’ business but the business at hand had 
changed significantly. Wary of the changing forms of war, even military historian John 
Keegan refrained from defining war in his 1998 BBC Reith Lectures. He would only 
define it minimally as ‘collective killing for collective purposes’.T h is  thesis certainly 
does not take up this monumental challenge of defining war but more modestly seeks to 
explore how war has changed.
Contemporary wars over Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq have raised issues going 
to the heart of what we normally understand by ‘war’ that remain to be systematically 
explored. Although NATO forces were taking and returning fire, the main lesson in 
Kosovo for Tony Cordesman was ‘that war can no longer be called war’.^  Supreme 
Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Wesley K. Clark claimed the operation 
was ‘not really a war’. Clark felt the air operation violated all known principles of war as 
we know it.^ What was it then? By the 2001 Afghan campaign, US Defence Secretary 
Donald Rumsfeld was calling for a paradigm shift in conceptualising a new type of war 
with unseen successes and no clearly defined end-points, although Washington had
 ^ See John Mueller, Retreat from  Doomsday: the obsolescence o f  major war, (New York; Basic Books, 
1991); Michael Mandelbaum, ‘Is major war obsolete?’. Survival, Vol. 40 No 4, Winter 1998-9 
 ^ See text o f the lectures published in John Keegan, War and our World, (London: Hutchinson, 1998), p72. 
Many definitions o f war exist which I do not address in detail. Hedley Bull’s The Anarchical Society 
defined war as organised violence by political units against each other for a political purpose. Raymond 
Aron’s Peace and War defined ‘perfect’ war as between two states recognising each other but there are o f  
course many forms o f war. Clausewitz’s famous definition o f course is that war is a controlled, rational 
political act: ‘War is not only an act o f  policy, but a true political instrument, a continuation o f  political 
discourse, carried out with other means’. Karl Von Clausewitz, On War, translated and edited by Nfichael 
Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p.75
 ^Anthony Cordesman, Lessons and non-lessons o f  the Kosovo Air War, (Washington DC : Centre for 
Strategic and International Studies, July 1999) Executive Summary, p.9 
 ^Wesley Clark, Waging M odem  War, (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), p. xxiii, 418, 423
already embarked on that war in August 1998 with cruise missile strikes at terrorist 
infrastructure- Operation Infinite Reach. America’s first full-scale ‘pre-emptive’ war on 
Iraq in 2003 stoked massive controversy over the lack of an imminent threat- a ‘smoking 
gun', neglecting similar protests over Operation Desert Fox in December 1998.
Rather than simply anomalous occurrences, these examples taken on the whole 
suggest a need for an overall explanatory framework to rethink conventional notions 
often associated with war. The need arises from the fact that long-held mental models of 
war imply incontrovertible grounds for war as a response to aggression or clear well- 
defined threats; willingness to sacrifice for ‘heroic’ purposes, rapid decisive battles, 
visible successes and clearly distinct end-points.^ Yet these traditional images cannot be 
easily reconciled with contemporary warfare from the Kosovo campaign to Afghanistan.* 
Conflicts like World War Two are the most cited Western analogies for war. Perceptions 
are shaped partly by such earlier monumental events, even in supposedly ‘new’ 
circumstances of any war.^ Such a conceptual orientation towards a different operational 
environment of the industrial age does not match contemporary reality. War is not a 
constant but a dynamic and diverse concept and adhering too tightly to conventional 
notions described above hampers researchers from properly grasping its ability to change 
forms. After all, as Holsti pointed out, ‘the forms of warfare have diversified to the point 
where we can no longer speak of war as a single institution of the states system’. The 
point here is simply that war is not singular but a multifaceted phenomenon that can 
manifest in various forms and one of its contemporary forms is that of risk management.
 ^Admittedly the notion that wars do not have decisive ends is not new. The 1950-3 Korean War for 
example has technically not ended after 50 years, being in a state o f  ‘temporary’ armistice. It also involved 
no victors or vanquished. Nonetheless, the point remains that most perceptions o f  war revolve around 
surrender ceremonies like those ending World War Two clearly separating victors and defeated. See an 
analysis o f these notions o f war in Christopher Coker, ‘How wars end’. Millennium, Vol. 26 No. 3, 1997, 
0.615-629
Although an argument could be made that defending ‘others’ in far-away places like Kosovo is an heroic 
purpose in itself, this is far fi-om universally accepted nor vindicated by the way events unfolded in the air 
campaign.
 ^See Martin Evans and Kevin Lunn (eds). War and Memory in the twentieth century, (Oxford; Berg, 1997) 
Kalevi Holsti, Peace and war: Armed Conflicts and international order 1648-1989, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 272.
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An alternative perspective
Various discourses have been applied to studying war. Relevant literature will be 
addressed in Chapter Two. At this point it is sufficient to note none have examined war 
through the specific prism of systemic ‘risk management’ of dangers relating to 
globalisation and the end of Cold War constraints. Even where ‘risk’ is discussed, much 
literature pertains to ‘tactical’ issues of risk-averse warfare : fears about casualties and 
collateral damage- Edward Luttwak’s ‘post-heroic’ war being the most cited. This hardly 
broached the broader questions. As then-Commander of US Pacific Command Admiral 
Dennis C. Blair complained, ‘I look longingly at the foreign affairs intelligentsia, but no 
one is addressing the cosmic issue; everyone’s going tactical. What’s the United States 
going to do with its superpowerhood? It drives me crazy’.In d e e d , Colin Gray has been 
scathing about what he saw as widespread mistakes by theorists confusing tactics with 
strategy. Rather than add to this already extensive debate on ‘tactical approaches’ to 
risk-averse war, this study addresses the broader question of strategic approaches to war 
as risk management.
War has changed substantially in recent years, not least due to changes in the 
international structure and society at large. Complex issues have emerged such as WMD 
proliferation, ethnic cleansing and trans-national terrorism. The distinctiveness of the 
issues concerned required an innovative approach more sensitive and attuned to the 
broader context in which governments, society and the international system have 
evolved.
In his magnus opus On War, Karl von Clausewitz emphasised historicist notions 
in the need to understand historical contexts. He wrote, ‘each age has its own kind of 
war...its own limiting conditions...using different methods and pursuing different 
aims... Each would therefore also keep its own theory of war’. Rather than ‘anxious study 
of minute details’, to understand war we require ‘a shrewd glance at the main features... 
in each particular age’.^  ^ Thus, 18^ century wars to maintain the balance of power 
reflected a Newtonian fascination with mechanistic structures, and more generally.
Quoted in Dana Priest, ‘A Four Star Foreign Policy? US Commanders wield rising clout, autonomy’, 
Washington Post, 28 September 2000 
See Colin S. Gray, M odem  Strategy, (New York; Oxford University Press, 1999)
Clausewitz, On War, Book VHI, 6B, p.586-93, (edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter 
Paret, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976)
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secular calculability of cause and effects characterising that age/"^ Philip Windsor argued 
that the Cold War was a particular historical epoch dominated by its own particular mode 
of strategic thinking/^ What features of the contemporary era should we be sensitive to in 
understanding implications for war and strategic thinking?
In October 2002, Washington Post columnist Robert Samuelson presciently 
observed that snipers stalking Washington, terrorism, economic uncertainties and war on 
Iraq were stark ‘metaphors for the defining characteristic of our new era...It is risk' 
Since 1945, the West has steadily emphasised safety over other concerns: ‘The only 
acceptable risks, to our modem way of thinking, were those we deliberately courted 
ourselves’.'^ Extending this mindset to IR, this study contends that recent wars reflect a 
logic of thinking about the world in terms ôf managing systemic risks involuntarily 
imposed on the West.
Examining closely official justifications employed when explaining wars over the 
past five years, together with policy documents, a pattern began to emerge- stretching 
across two very different US administrations and strategic circumstances- of evidence of 
a broadly similar underlying premise. Policymakers employed the catch-all phrase ‘the 
risks of inaction outweigh the risks of action’ from Kosovo to Afghanistan. A fixation 
with uncertainty and ‘risks’ rather than concrete ‘threats’ permeated major American and 
British defence guidelines from the UK’s 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR) (updated 
in 2002 after the September 2001 terrorist attacks), NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept, to 
the 2001 US Quadrennial Defence Review. The 1998 SDR for instance shifted its focus 
from ‘threats’ towards ‘risks and challenges’ such as WMD proliferation, regional 
instability, massive humanitarian suffering, rogue regimes and terrorism. The 
‘challenge... was to move from stability based on fear to stability based on active 
management of these risks’. By 1999, while the Kosovo campaign was ongoing, 
NATO’s new Strategic Concept reaffirmed that ‘the security of the Alliance remains 
subject to a wide variety of military and non-military risks which are multi-directional
Jeremy Black, Why wars happen, (London: Reaktion Books, 1998), p.87
Mats Berdal & Spyros Economides (eds), Strategic Thinking: An introduction and farewell Philip 
Windsor, (London: Lynne Rienner, 2002), pi 72-77 
‘Rediscovering Risk’, Washington Post, 23 October 2002 
’’‘Put Risks in Perspective’, New York Times, 19 October 2001 
UK Ministry of Defence, Strategic Defence Review, July 1998, Cm 3999, paras 40 and 54, and Chapter 
1 ‘A Strategic Approach to Defence’.
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and often difficult to predict. These risks include uncertainty and instability in and around 
the Euro-Atlantic area and the possibility of regional crises at the periphery of the 
Alliance, which could evolve rapidly.’’^  The MoD’s February 2001 report, The Future 
Strategic Context o f Defence advocated a ‘forward thinking’ approach, describing an 
international environment with ‘new and more diverse risks, challenges and 
opportunities’. What is lacking so far in scholarly analyses of recent wars is due 
recognition of the role of ‘risk management’ in its impetus, prosecution and outcome 
evaluation. Highlighting the presence of these features in a systematic manner, it is 
suggested here, enriches our understanding of contemporary war.
The difficulty remained in terms of distilling firom these statements and official 
documents in an intellectually engaging manner the evidence I needed.^® Theory was 
needed to help explain patterns and problems. The key appeared to lie in the fields of 
sociology and criminology. The very fact that one is a student of strategy, declared Colin 
Gray, means one is ‘at least interested in the ways societies provide for their security. 
Currently, ‘risk management’ strategies appear to be prevalent in crime control and wider 
society as a whole. Indeed sociologists claim that the international system itself has 
become a global risk society. Propounded by sociologists Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, 
Niklas Luhmann and others, the theory of Risk Society highlighting ‘risk management’ 
as a key organising principle has been widely studied in criminology and sociology but as 
yet remain largely sidelined in IR.^  ^ In particular, the possible implications of these 
societal and broader systemic changes for war remain unexplored.
There is no off-the-shelf ‘risk management’ theory and the method employed here 
thus seeks to explicate a theoretical ‘key’ from these non-IR sources, and apply it to 
contemporary IR cases. I alter the original focus of these largely sociological, 
criminological analyses while adhering as close as possible to the theories themselves. If
The Alliance’s Strategic Concept agreed by the Heads o f State and Government participating in the 
meeting o f the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C., 23'^ '* and 24“* April 1999, available at 
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm
This approach is hardly novel and indeed similar to Andrew Bacevich’s American Empire, (Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press, 2002), Preface.
Colin S. Gray, Strategic Studies and Public Policy, (Lexington, Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 
1982),pl84
A brief sample includes Les Johnston, Policing Britain: Risk, Security and Governance, (Harlow: 
Longman, 2000); Pat O’Malley (ed). Crime and the Risk Society, (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, 1998); 
Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a new modernity, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992)
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as Anthony Giddens observed, risk illuminates core elements of modernity, this study 
explores what risk management reveals about contemporary warfare. Compelling and 
useful theoretical insights highly relevant to IR’s new concerns can be drawn from these 
seemingly unrelated fields. Such a theory, it is argued, can provide a useful mode of entry 
for investigating new features of war, helping plug loopholes in current knowledge. The 
concept has not yet been applied systematically to strategic studies although some 
attempts have been made in security studies and critical geopolitics. The typical focus 
was on reconstructing NATO’s security policies or the ‘securitisation’ of risk rather 
than a specific analysis of contemporary warfare. More concerned with global ecological 
and technological risks, and addressing security risks only after 9/11, Beck’s writings 
even then had little to say about war and these will be explored in more detail in the next 
Chapter.M uch of the debate on Risk Society has taken place at the level of what Beck 
called *bold theories' rather than empirical exploration attempted here.
Risk Society and Risk Management
Risk Society, broadly speaking, is organised in significant ways around the concept of 
risk. Preventively managing risks to calm widely felt anxieties has supplanted the 
previous concern with producing and distributing goods. The complexities of this 
theoretical framework are not discussed in detail at this stage but one should stress that it 
is neither particularly attuned to IR, nor is it solely derived from the work of Ulrich Beck. 
While Risk Society provided the overall context and ethos within which risk management 
has become prominent. Beck did not provide in-depth study of the idea of ‘risk 
management’. Thus, in consolidating what Beck and other sociologists did say about risk 
management, theories and strategies have also had to be derived from ‘policing’ concepts 
in criminology and more specific risk management textbooks. These issues posed 
obstacles to utilising the theories for IR purposes. Furthermore, the associated concepts 
are so broad that it is impossible to assess all various claims advanced. Even defining the
Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, ‘Reflexive security: NATO and International Risk Society’, Millennium, Vol. 
30 No.2, 2001, p.285-310; Johan Eriksson (ed). Threat politics: new perspectives on security, risk and 
crisis management, (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2001); also Gearoid O’Tuathail, “ Understanding 
Critical Geopolitics: Geopolitics and Risk Society’, Journal o f Strategic Studies, Vol. 22 No. 2/3, June/Sep 
1999, p. 107-124
Ulrich Beck, World Risk Society, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), pp. 8; Ulrich Beck, ‘The terrorist 
threat: World Risk Society revisited’. Theory, Culture and Society, Vol. 19 No. 4, August 2002, p.39-56
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slippery terms of risk and risk management itself is a matter of debate to be discussed in 
detail in Chapter Three. What can be attempted here however is to flag and identify a 
group of principles and concepts that collectively define ‘risk management’, as the term 
is understood in this study based on an analysis of textbooks on the issue. This approach 
aids in the systematic analysis of empirical evidence, alerting us to the presence of 
similar features in war. Presented in greater detail in Chapter Three, the following 
themes, as per the hypothesised question, guide analysis:
i) The impetus for military action arose from systemic risks related to globalisation 
and end of the Cold War. ‘Risk’ components of probabilities and consequences 
are increasingly relevant, in addition to existing ‘threat’ components of 
capabilities and intent.
ii) In implementing risk management, the not-yet event is a stimulus to proactive 
measures. ‘Active anticipation’, and consideration of counter-factuals is the key to 
preventive policy designed to avert ‘potential victimhood’ in a probabilistic 
insecure culture where concerns about victimhood are prominent. The 
Precautionary Principle helps in managing ill-defined risks. Surveillance serves to 
obtain information as a contributor to preventive action. More modest utilitarian 
goals like trying to prevent the worst and avoid harm, are emphasised over 
attaining something ‘good’ like justice, serious nation-building or grand historical 
narratives. ‘Reshaping’ the environment reduces opportunities for incurring harm 
rather than focusing on morality of individuals identified as posing risks, or the 
rehabilitation of failed/failing states. Managing risks is a patient ongoing process 
which should be as routine as possible.
iii) In outcome specification, researchers must bear in mind the minimalist aim of risk 
management is not to eliminate problems or provide perfect solutions, but more 
modestly to reduce risks and prevent hypothesised future harm from occurring. 
Non-events are thus indicators of success, but risk managers must beware the
15
‘boomerang effect’ where action to manage initial risks can create new
unintended ones in the process. The process is cyclical without clear end-points.
The goal here is not to reify any ‘risk management’ model or Beck’s works in 
particular. Rather it provides, like all theories, simply the conceptual lens through which 
recent military actions can be systematically analysed where the goal is to uncover and 
grasp a deeper understanding of its dynamics. No in-depth comparison or critique of 
contending theories and explanations is attempted. Rather, short comparisons below, 
where appropriate, serve to highlight the relative advantages of the risk management 
approach.
Contending explanations
An alternative discourse is the Realist paradigm, usually associated with war and 
security. Realism (as the broad overarching approach here subsuming neo-Realism as 
well) covers such broad grounds that it is impossible to rehash every single precept or 
subtle differences nor is it the purpose to do so here.^  ^ Briefly, the key points are a 
anarchic self-help world exists where states seek to maximise power and influence in 
pursuing their national security interests. States are concerned about relative gains in 
comparison to others. This certainly still endures in the geopolitical map after 9/11. 
Russia and China cooperated with the war on terror in their own interests. ‘All the 
players, main characters and walk-ons’, argued Colin Gray, ‘have followed a realist 
script’. Realism was not ‘revealed to be conceptually deficient in its satisfactory 
explanatory power’.^  ^ All states are differentiated only by their relative capabilities and 
it is these capabilities we have to watch out for. Military capabilities largely determined 
the survival of states. International order is still dependent on military commitment by the 
hegemon, while Realism had certainly worried about security implications of 
globalisation before 9/1. The Bush Administration was additionally of a more Realist
There are o f course differences between Neo-realism and Realism such as varying emphases on issues of 
morality, human nature and the agency-structure debate (system or state). The key neo-Realist text is 
Kenneth Waltz’s Theory o f International Politics, (Boston: Addison-Wesley, 1979)
Colin Gray, ‘World Politics as usual after September 11: Realism vindicated’, in Ken Booth and Tim 
Dunne (eds). Worlds in Collision: Terror and the future o f global order, (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2002), p.227
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bent than Clinton’s. It focused on traditional security concerns (rogue states, 
proliferation) rather than new ones (environmental degradation). Its Realist view saw 
states as the main actors, and trans-national terrorists ultimately still needed state support 
to operate from.^^
However, a key chink in Realism’s explanatory armour is that its leading lights 
want to have nothing to do with, and even disavowed the wars in question. Realists 
rightly seek to use force sparingly and only for vital interests. Henry Kissinger opposed 
war over Kosovo, claiming it did not pose a direct threat to US interests, traditionally 
conceived. Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer criticised war in Iraq for distracting from 
the hunt for A1 Qaeda and causing regional repercussions. Realists broadly supported war 
in Afghanistan but John Mearsheimer admitted state-centric Realism had little to say 
about trans-national terrorism.^^ The Kosovo and Afghan campaigns were also not about 
maximising power and influence but minimising systemic risks from ethnic cleansing or 
terrorism. Realism is weak on issues other than survival. The West hardly faces Cold 
War-equivalent survival threats, not even from terrorism. Realist emphases on ‘threat’ in 
terms of a state’s military capabilities and intentions were also misplaced when hijackers 
with simple boxcutters can topple the Twin Towers. This classical ‘net assessment’ 
model has been undermined,^^ Realism as a policy-relevant theory is limited, and even 
reckless with John Mearsheimer’s prescription for Germany to acquire nuclear 
weapons.Furthermore, prominent realists like Barry Posen, and Stephen Van Evera 
weren’t being solicited in Washington either.^  ^ Without survival threats and concrete 
military capabilities of state actors to assess, could risk management focused on 
probabilities and elusive dangers explain more than the realist paradigm can?
David H. Dunn, ‘Myths, motivations and ‘misunderestimations’: The Bush Administration and Iraq, 
International Affairs, Vol. 79 No. 2, April 2003, p.284 
The opinions of these writers will be discussed in the context of specific case studies.
A fact acknowledged by the US National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, (Washington D.C.: The 
White House, February 2003), p. 16. For further discussion of the concept, see John Mearsheimer, Barry 
Posen & Eliot Cohen, ‘Reassessing net assessment’. International Security, Vol. 13 No. 4, Spring 1989, 
p.128-179
John Mearsheimer, ‘Back to the future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War’, International Security, 
Vol. 15 No. 1, Summer 1990 
For a lengthy analysis of what realists would say about recent wars, see Nicholas Lemann, ‘The war on 
what? The White House and the debate on who to fight next’. The New Yorker, 09 September 2002
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II. Research Parameters
In setting its analytic and conceptual boundaries, this thesis distinguishes between what 
Colin Mclnnes termed the ‘Transformation of war’ debate and the ‘Revolution in 
Military Affairs (RMA) debate’. Set squarely within the former, this study analyses 
how broader changes in the international system and society relate to war, rather than 
technological innovation. As such it is not a ‘guns and bullets’ approach to strategic 
studies. This thesis shares a further similarity with Mclnnes, in its attempts to discern 
trends, regularities and patterns in recent military campaigns that reflect these changes. 
These will be outlined in Chapter Two. As with all generalisations, the view of war 
propounded in this study requires qualification.
Risk management assumes fundamentally that it is ‘feasible’ and ‘desirable’ to 
reduce risks through proactive action. This has become feasible to the extent it never was 
in the Cold War without bipolar constraints and concerns about nuclear escalation. This 
general assumption of ‘feasibility’ underpins this study. It does not claim universal 
applicability. Thus, Iraq was ‘manageable’ to the extent North Korea was not, given 
Pyongyang’s more advanced nuclear and conventional capabilities.^^ Managing risks 
entails multiple means and methods. While diplomacy, poverty and development 
programs and other non-military means are equally important, the focus here is on 
military force. The notion of security risks and thinking in terms of the concept of ‘risk’ 
has gained credence in a Risk Society peculiar to material and historical conditions in the 
West, No paradigm is eternally valid. This study thus addresses only specific case studies 
from 1998 to 2003 - a crucial caveat to theories applied here.^ "^  Given the temporal 
proximity to events in question, caution also needs to be sounded when analysing events
Colin Mclnnes, ‘A different kind of war? September 11 and the United States’ Afghan war’. Review o f  
International Studies, Vol. 29 No. 2, April 2003, p. 165 
A similar line of thought is revealed in Tony Blair’s musings. When asked why focus on Saddam but not 
Robert Mugabe or the Burmese junta, the PM replied: ‘Yes let’s get rid of them all. I don’t because I can’t 
but when you can you should’. Of course the risks from Iraq were greater but the feasibility factor remains. 
See Peter Stothard’s Thirty Days: Tony Blair and the test o f history, (New York: Harper Collins, 2003).
While it is suggested that America’s wars of risk management are modest in scope, 1930s America also 
fought modest ‘small wars’ in Latin America. These were however within an overarching framework of 
noble goals, and as War Secretary Elihu Root earlier suggested in 1912, ‘obligations.. .of the highest 
character’. Quoted in Robert Tucker & David Hendrickson, The Imperial Temptation: The New World 
Order and America's Purpose, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1992), p. 149
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without the considerable benefit of historical hindsight. As Mao Zedong once remarked 
on the impact of the French revolution in 1789, it was still too early to tell.
Researchers need to manage expectations of what can and cannot he achieved in 
their analyses. Through the theoretical framework applied, this study inevitably 
underemphasised certain equally important aspects of wars such as decision-making 
models and domestic politics (media coverage, public opinion, casualty-aversion and so 
on). It highlighted others: risk-related concepts such as ‘reshaping the environment’, the 
precautionary principle, active anticipation and surveillance. Thus, it is admittedly 
susceptible to the charge of oversimplifying reality in what is a hugely complex issue. 
But for theory to be useful and tested, parameters and limits have had to be set within the 
‘laboratory’ conditions of a PhD. The issue is not whether theory can explain everything 
but whether it can explain selected things better. The main purpose here is not to critique 
existing literature but rather to assess an original angle to a significant problem in IR. The 
aim is simply to bring to attention in an intellectually engaging and coherent manner, the 
relevance of risk management to our understanding of war. This study does not claim that 
it was somehow ‘right’ to fight the wars in question or whether it was even the ‘right’ 
option. Nor does it seek to investigate whether risk management was a coherent 
consciously constructed choice or simply stumbled into on an ad-hoc basis. I do not 
undertake detailed decision-making analysis of policymakers-makers or their risk 
perceptions. This has already been done through formal Rational Choice models, Bruce 
Bueno de Mesquita’s game theory modelling, and the more socio-cognitive Prospect 
Theory.^^ Many decisionmaking approaches abound and no purpose is served here 
scrutinising these with a fine comb.^^ Instead, the goal is a broader one, to determine if
See Rose McDermott, Risk-taking in International Politics: Prospect Theory in US Foreign Policy, (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998); Rose McDermott and Jacek Kugler, ‘Comparing Rational 
Choice and Prospect theory analysis: The US decision to launch Operation Desert Storm’, Journal o f  
Strategic Studies, Vol. 24 No.3, Sep 2001. Recent debates on Rational Choice can be found in Michael E. 
Brown et. al (eds). Rational Choice and Security Studies: Stephen Walt and his Critics, (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 2000). A rational actor model suggests a conscious level of calculation, rationality and full access to 
information to weigh up cost-benefit. However, responses to risk are not necessarily conscious or ‘rational’ 
nor is full information and calculability assumed.
For good surveys see Michael Clarke and Brian White (eds) Understanding Foreign Policy, (Aldershot: 
Edward Elgar, 1989); Irving Janis, Groupthink, (London: Houghton Mifflin, 1982); Graham Allison, 
Essence o f Decision, (New York: Longman, 1999), 2"^  ed
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certain repetitive patterns of recent wars, fall within a conceptual framework of ‘risk 
management’.
The theory of risk-management, it is conceded, may not resolve comprehensively 
all anomalies and contradictions in policies. Ultimately no single overarching factor can 
explain particular intricacies and idiosyncrasies. One cannot ignore the pressure of 
domestic constituencies or public opinion, bureaucratic politics and inter-agency tussles, 
or personalities, misperceptions and desire of leaders to leave a ‘legacy’ or fulfil God- 
given ‘visions’. Effects of the Internet, policymakers and media misreading public 
aversion to casualties can also set parameters of action.H ow ever on the whole and 
more consistently than the other factors outlined above (and it certainly is not the 
intention here to assess relative importance of these factors), a ‘risk management’ 
framework developed in this study is able to explain recent wars. Furthermore, as with 
social science theories, it is unrealistic to claim with one hundred percent certainty that 
the results constitute incontrovertible evidence of a ‘one size fits all’ model. The more 
modest aim here is to advance the ‘transformation of war debate’ by providing a richer 
framework for discussion, transcending IR’s disciplinary boundaries to raise new 
perspectives and questions.
Furthermore, this study acknowledges that London and Washington do not 
necessarily share all common premises and assumptions. While Bush’s America adopted 
a more Realist/Hobbesian approach to security; Blair’s Britain preferred a more Kantian 
one to bring justice, and democracy. Nonetheless, it is possible to utilise a risk 
management perspective to demonstrate the similarities both allies share. After all, 
undertaking five military operations (Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, twice in Iraq) 
in six years, often in coalition warfare with both Clinton and Bush, Tony Blair has 
assumed the mantle of the most interventionist post-empire British Prime Minister. 
Although analysis is inevitably skewed towards the American perspective as the ‘senior 
partner’, sentiments in London are incorporated to the fullest possible.
See Steven Kull, Misreading the Public, (Washington D C: Brookings Institution Press ,1999). For recent 
scholarship on media and war, see Susan Carruthers, The Media at war, (Basingstoke, Macmillan,2000); 
Philip Taylor, War and media: Propaganda in the (Manchester: Manchester University Press,
1998)
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An inter-disciplinary approach
This thesis is also a response to the influence and high profile of ‘risk management’ in 
contemporary society and the wider social sciences. It argues that International Relations 
should take stock of possible theoretical links with these developments. Hoping to be 
policy-relevant, and at the same time academic in nature, it thus combines 
interdisciplinary approaches in a real-world context to strike a balance between 
empirically rich case studies guided by theoretical premises.
IR is an essentially eclectic discipline. IR’s subfield of strategic studies is best 
studied from an interdisciplinary perspective.^* Relying on arts, sciences and social 
sciences for ideas, many big hitters have come from elsewhere: Herman Kahn was a 
physicist, Thomas Schelling an economist. Notable theoretical advances in IR have also 
come through ‘borrowing’ from other social sciences. Kenneth Waltz’s Theory o f 
International Politics utilized concepts from microeconomic theory. Irving Janis’ 
Groupthink built on ideas from social psychology. In light of new developments in theory 
and the international structure, Chris Brown argued International Relations will benefit 
through re-connecting with the wider research agenda of general social sciences and 
social knowledge.*^ The development of IR theory, after all, is a product of developments 
in the world, debate in the subject itself and influence of new ideas within other areas of 
social science. This thesis thus seeks to import new concepts of risk management into the 
IR discourse.
Risk studies itself is integrating interdisciplinary approaches and developing new 
ideas. There have been calls to further extend the scope of risk management to issues like 
chronic diseases, crime, and ecosystem.^® Indeed, the debate has recently expanded from 
its original focus on health, personal and environmental risks to risks associated with 
genetic and cybernetic technologies but the field has not yet extended to international 
security risks." '^ While Beck’s Risk Society placed risk on the sociological agenda, the IR
38 See John Baylis and James J. Wirtz, ‘Introduction’ in Strategy in the Contemporary World: An
introduction to strategic studies, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002)
Chris Brown, Chapter 12 ‘Conclusion: New Agendas’, Understanding International Relations, (2"‘* ed), 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001)
Ortwin Renn, ‘Three decades of risk research: accomplishments and new challenges’. Journal o f Risk 
Research, Vol. 1 No 1, 1998, p55 
See Barbara Adam, Ulrich Beck and Joost Van Loon (eds). The Risk Society and Beyond, (London: Sage 
Publications, 2000)
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agenda in particular strategic studies, has yet to do so fully. As Johan Eriksson observed, 
since ‘risk’ currently dominates and legitimates our politics, it would ‘definitely be an 
achievement’ if specialised scholars in their own sub-fields were able and ready to cross 
disciplinary boundaries through theoretical cross-fertilisation.'^^ This thesis seeks to do 
that sort of academic bridge-building, between thematically related but academically 
dissociated fields of study such as international relations, sociology and criminology. 
This only reflects a wider trend where policymakers are also engaged in idea-harvesting. 
Bill Clinton for instance was a ‘naturally gifted politician’, who ‘appropriated a few 
ingredients picked up firom the marketplace of ideas and kneaded it into something he 
could proudly claim was his own creation’. I f  politicians and academics are both open 
to new ideas and concepts, of course with the caveat that these have a fully-examined 
theoretical grounding, this bodes well for inter-disciplinary approaches to IR.
A brief note on sources
With the advantages accrued to researchers by the Internet, most official reports have 
been relatively accessible electronically. Obviously, secret files and briefings have yet to 
be declassified. This is a significant obstacle for IR researchers on contemporary topics 
who do not have the same access as historians do to declassified files, although on 
occasion leaked documents such as the US 2001 Nuclear Posture Review were widely 
available on the Internet.
For ease of academic access and scrutiny, the primary sources consulted here are 
publicly available open-source official statements and speeches, interviews given by key 
policymakers to the media, declaratory policy documents such as the American National 
Security Strategy and British Strategic Defence Review, and press briefings by official 
spokespersons. This researcher recognises that statements by key officials cannot always 
be taken at face value, especially on such contentious issues as war. They could simply 
be using carefully crafted words to advance other agendas than their own views or simply 
depict themselves in a more appealing manner. Careful, systematic and rigorous analysis 
is thus required. This is another reason why statements from different sets of officials
Eriksson, ‘Conclusion’, in Eriksson (ed), Threat Politics,, ip.224-5
Andrew Bacevich, American Empire, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2002), p89-90
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from different US administrations from 1998-2003 pertaining to the same case study 
were relied on and examined within an overarching basic theoretical framework to 
demonstrate conceptual consistency in approaches to war. Official websites such as the 
UK Parliament’s Hansard, Ministry of Defence, and Number 10; NATO, the White 
House, State Department and Defenselink provided all key transcripts of major speeches 
and information presented here.
Of course, it is unwise to rely too heavily on primary sources providing only raw 
information without detailed analysis. Thus, the resort to secondary sources which helped 
augment primary information, including learned academic journals such as Foreign 
Affairs and the Review o f International Studies. Numerous articles and books which 
supplied more reasoned and cogent analysis were consulted especially where they 
analysed new developments and sources. Keeping to the inter-disciplinary ethos of this 
study, I have also delved in-depth into sociological and criminological literature to help 
in understanding risk management. These supplied necessary theoretical background 
especially since this is an under-researched sector of strategic studies with hardly any 
relevant IR literature to consult. Newspapers of repute such as the Washington Post and 
the Times o f London, and Internet news portals such as the BBC served as other sources 
of secondary information. Fast changing events, especially towards the end of writing this 
study, made it imperative to keep pace with ' developments which might undermine or 
enhance arguments presented. This made researching more tedious but every effort has 
been made to ensure evidence presented is updated.
in. Case Studies
To determine the empirical validity of theories developed, a case study method of 
analysing recent historical episodes is preferred over constructing formal mathematical 
models. Mathematics cannot capture adequately the complexity of human behaviour, and 
can be too complicated to grasp when the aim should be making research as accessible as 
possible. Each case study opens with a short historical primer, and addresses conceptual 
issues pertinent in terms of unsatisfactory explanations so far provided and new features 
of war which risk management can address. I then utilise a structured comparison 
approach to all cases applying a common set of structured questions to key issues.
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assessing if outcome and results match predictions. This is not infallible as sometimes 
outcomes may be driven by independent variables left out of the study, or other 
incomparable aspects of cases. Theory obviously cannot explain all things at all times but 
it can try to make sense of a pattern of regularities and repetitions. That is the more 
realistic goal here. The danger of extrapolating too much from case studies certainly 
exists. The aim here is not to produce claims pertaining to all possible scenarios but to 
develop contingent generalisations and patterns, within parameters stated in the previous 
section. Furthermore case studies analysed do not cover all aspects of events in question, 
only those relevant to the research agenda. The abundance of secondary material led 
down the wrong research path occasionally. Nevertheless, utilising the basic framework 
developed in this study, best efforts have been made to ensure case studies were as 
consistently analysed as possible.
To assess the broad applicability of the risk management paradigm, case studies 
covered different strategic circumstances (before and after 9/11) and geographical 
regions, across different US Administrations. The Blair government, in office throughout 
the period in question, served as a usefiil constant in the analysis. Case studies were 
selected where there was sufficient documentation to analyse and controversies 
surrounding them were most illustrative of the new security environment: globalisation, 
destabilised states, rogue states and terror networks based in failed states. Kosovo and 
Afghanistan in particular occurred beyond the traditional strategic focus of US planners 
on Western Europe, East Asia and the Persian Gulf. These implications have yet to be 
clearly sketched. Case studies also posed systemic risks related to globalisation, 
probabilistic worst case scenarios, and dramatic media-enhanced consequences of a 
possible catastrophic scale- criteria that risk theorists suggest would gamer significant 
policymakers’ attention.
The Kosovo campaign of 1999 introduced useful variables into the analysis, 
undertaken by a different US administration under President Clinton in greatly differing 
circumstances. Analysis involved a destabilised state racked by internal strife rather than 
a rogue state or terror networks. One can also assess applicability of the risk management 
paradigm prior to 9/11, where risks are not as inter-connected as fraq and Afghanistan 
were in terms of terrorism. The concerns about ethnic cleansing and humanitarian
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intervention are of a somewhat different strategic mould but still fall within the rubric of 
systemic risk. Yet it shared similarities with Iraq in 2003, being launched also without 
explicit UN Security Council authorisation. Would events in Kosovo belie the 
expectations of theory developed here?
Events in Iraq from 1998-2003 contained significant implications for concepts of 
war. The overlapping time frames spanning the Clinton and Bush administrations 
complicated analysis but it also strengthened the analysis presented here by introducing a 
longer-term perspective rather than a stand-alone one focused only on immediate events. 
Methodologically, Iraq posed significant challenges to the hypothesis examined here, 
introducing a powerful set of different variables into the equation. It involved two wars 
spanning two Administrations- firom Desert Fox through the no-fly zone skirmishes, to 
regime change in 2003. It concerned more strategic than humanitarian motives of 
Kosovo; attracted much less legitimation than the 2001 Afghan campaign, and involved a 
far narrower coalition. Most significantly. Bush moved further along the ‘escalation 
ladder’ towards regime change that could nullify what is being claimed here since 
elimination is not normally part of the risk management repertoire. How would theory 
fare in light of these developments?
Afghanistan was selected not simply because it formed part of President Bush’s 
‘first war of the 2U* century’, where Donald Rumsfeld and America’s top soldier General 
Richard Myers called for ‘new thinking’. For methodological purposes, as a control 
mechanism it also introduced different variables to the equation to see if this would alter 
predicted outcomes. It was more or less sanctioned by UN Security Council 
authorisation, had broad international political, legal and military support, in response to 
a direct attack on the US homeland. Afghanistan seemed to be more a war of ‘no choice’ 
than a ‘war of choice’ than Kosovo and Iraq. Yet results predicted by the theory of risk 
management are broadly similar. Afghanistan had also been target of cruise missiles 
before in 1998 under President Clinton and this again provided some historical 
perspective to more recent events.
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Summary Findings
In emphasising features of risk management manifest in recent wars, this study has 
sought to provide an alternative approach, casting events in a somewhat different light. 
The following count among the key findings of this study, again divided roughly into 
impetus for war, implementation and outcomes:
i) The evidence suggested that stimulus for recent wars stemmed firom systemic 
risks such as ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, terrorism in Afghanistan or WMD 
proliferation/terrorism in Iraq. Probabilistic thinking based on risk 
components has come to supplement specific threat-based approaches focused 
on enemy military capabilities or intentions, despite official protestations to 
the contrary about a pressing threat firom Iraq and a relatively clear menace 
from A1 Qaeda.
ii) There was a transition from ‘reactive’ to more ‘proactive’ military stances in 
all three case studies, based on anticipating and averting risks. Evidence also 
suggests that the Precautionary Principle guided wars launched on less than 
absolutely concrete evidence. Iraq and Kosovo especially involved ‘false 
positives’ where risks turned out less severe than originally thought. 
Surveillance served as an instrument of managing risks by providing 
information and early warning to aid in military action, especially in Iraq 
before 2003, and Kosovo. Rather than noble ‘heroic’ goals, there was more 
minimalist ‘reshaping the environment’ to reduce opportunities of harm being 
inflicted on the West, especially in Afghanistan. War aims were increasingly 
utilitarian and modest. ‘Nation-tending’ to simply keep risks managed was 
preferred over ambitious ‘nation-building’, particularly in Afghanistan. 
Dictators and terrorist leaders posing risks were demonised in all three cases. 
Yet wars ended up managing them, more concerned with reducing risks than 
bringing them to justice, especially with Slobodan Milosevic. At this writing, 
regime change in Iraq appeared as an unnecessarily drastic exception to this 
developing feature of risk management in light of post-war revelations about
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missing WMD and premature elevation of the actual risks Baghdad posed into 
an urgent threat.
iii) Non-events and negatively defined ‘invisible’ successes were helpful in 
evaluating wars especially in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Outcomes from Desert 
Fox were similarly ill-defined. Even with more visible ‘perfect solutions’ such 
as regime change in Iraq, a non-event - Saddam’s missing WMD and collapse 
of his forces- vindicated the risk management process towards Baghdad over 
the years which had kept Iraq weak. War as risk management should be seen 
as a cyclical and ongoing process rather than a linear activity with clearly 
defined end points. This could be attributed to the ‘boomerang effect’ 
whereby actions to reduce an original risk created new risks in the process, 
notably in Afghanistan.
CHAPTER SUMMARIES
Chapter Two begins with a brief sketch of the contemporary security context in 
comparison to that of the Cold War, providing the necessary background to this study. 
The second section surveys the current state of knowledge with major works on war and 
strategy in the post-Cold War era. The task is to distil themes and ideas driving analysts, 
and identify aspects which my research can then consolidate.
Chapter Three introduces the reader to the methodological and theoretical 
framework applied in this study. It starts with a definition of key terms and proceeds to 
investigate the major theoretical disputes, namely the relative merits and flaws of various 
approaches to risk. The second section outlines main tenets of the ‘Risk Society’ 
paradigm developed so far from sociologists such as Ulrich Beck and how it has been 
utilised by criminologists such as Richard Ericson. It then describes core features of ‘risk 
management’ strategies which have become prominent in a ‘Risk Society’. The final part 
of the chapter details the key features of the framework adopted in this study.
Chapter Four develops the concept of ‘risk management’ in practice through a 
case study on the Kosovo campaign in 1999. It is broadly divided into three sections: 
identifying systemic risks as stimulus for action; implementation of risk management and 
justifications given; and evaluating outcomes. Applying a thematic matrix of structured
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questions to determine the extent to which empirical evidence unearthed was congruent 
with predicted results, this case study assesses the explanatory prowess of the model 
being developed here.
Chapter Five seeks to map the presence of ‘risk management’ concepts again in 
three sections: identifying systemic risks, implementation and outcome specification. By 
means of a case study of Operation Enduring Freedom- the war launched in Afghanistan 
after the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks- it gauges the validity of the theoretical 
framework in matching empirical evidence with theorised results.
Chapter Six is the final case study in this thesis. Once again, the same set of 
thematic structured questions on risk identification, implementation and evaluation is 
applied to ascertain the applicability of the framework in explaining certain aspects of 
recent military actions towards fraq: Operation Desert Fox in December 1998 through to 
Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003.
The concluding Chapter Seven draws some summary observations from cross­
comparison of case study results, analysing where they have fallen short and where they 
have proved fruitful. It then identifies analytical guideposts for future research avenues 
and other perspectives on war which have not been covered but might prove productive. 
A brief discussion of rhetorical ‘wars’ on AIDS and drugs, and a mini-case study of 
‘social netwars’ waged by trans-national NGO campaigns, both serve to expand the 
analysis undertaken here and suggest theoretical enhancements. Finally, some policy 
prescriptions and cautionary lessons are drawn from the findings of this study.
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CHAPTER TWO
The State of the Art: War and emerging strategic principles
Introduction
The aims of this chapter are twofold. One, to provide historical grounding and establish 
the strategic context for this thesis. Two, to examine important themes, ideas and 
concerns that have been raised by scholars in discussing war. The objective here is not to 
critique existing literature in a negative fashion but rather build on aspects where an 
alternative investigative approach may be undertaken, yielding potentially new insights 
and richer explanations. This alternative framework to be developed in the next chapter, 
will then be applied in Chapters Four, Five and Six.
In this chapter, the first section briefly discusses Cold War strategic principles, in 
order to facilitate comparative analysis with emerging notions of risk management. It 
injects historical caution and background to what are normally considered ‘novel’ 
features of the contemporary strategic landscape. The next section outlines contours of 
the post-Cold War international environment, highlighting the presence of ‘risk’ within 
that context. These include a shift from ‘reactive’ containment and specific ‘threat-based’ 
approaches, towards ‘preventive’ policies and more ambiguous ‘risk-based’ scenarios. 
The final section of this chapter reviews selected major works on the transformation of 
warfare and strategy relating to themes outlined in the context described above. This brief 
sketch of the genre serves to demonstrate how war is understood today. In so doing, it is 
possible to draw out shortcomings, and relevant themes relating to ‘risk’ which have 
emerged so far but require more systematic elaboration.
I. Cold War strategic assumptions
This is not the place to examine in detail Cold War history. What follows is simply a 
short, and necessarily crude, summary. The task here is to compare and contrast concepts 
of ‘risk management’ with doctrines of containment and deterrence, and to stress that 
certain aspects of risk management do have historical precursors. Familiarity resulting 
from this brief discussion of risk management also helps ensure a deeper understanding 
of the concept at a later stage of this thesis.
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The Cold War was essentially a purposeful historical struggle between competing 
ideologies. George Kennan, the father of containment, felt diplomacy and the ‘City on 
the HilT example of American social systems could sway Soviet thinking on IR and 
‘regime change’ would come about eventually and peacefully. The Truman Doctrine thus 
described contests between ‘alternative ways of life.’ President Truman himself preferred 
the term ‘democracy’ over ‘anti-communism’ to show he stood fo r  something.^ The 
Nixon-Khrushchev ‘kitchen debate’ bizarrely highlighted the competing nature of social 
systems involved. John Kennedy’s New Frontier; Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society all 
provided grand visions for the American polity. To be sure, by the 1960s Daniel Bell’s 
The end o f ideology suggested that disillusion and appeal of affluence had eclipsed idea- 
oriented rhetorics. However, former Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s memoir Present 
at the creation described an unavoidable challenge from Moscow. Noted Cold War 
analyst Raymond Garthoff similarly concluded that the Cold War’s fundamental 
underlying cause was a mutual belief that confrontation was inevitable between 
alternative sets of universal ideologies, imposed by history.^ As Isaiah Berlin once noted, 
‘Faith in universal, objective truth...of perfect and harmonious society... is an ideal for 
which more human beings have sacrificed themselves than perhaps any other cause in 
human history’.^  Such ideals were certainly not limited to the Cold War but seemed to 
infuse the American polity throughout much of the 20^  ^century’s wars. Woodrow Wilson 
took America into World War One, seeking to end the ‘German feudal system’ and 
Prussian militarism as a ‘modernising project’.'* In 1942, many in the American 
establishment ‘seemed to salivate at the prospect of building a better world’. As a writer 
for The Nation enthused right after Pearl Harbour, ‘it is the hour for elation. Here is a 
time when a man can be what an American means, fight for what America always meant- 
an audacious, adventurous seeking for a decent earth’.^
Notwithstanding President George W. Bush’s late conversion to moralistic tones 
after September 11 (hereafter ‘9/11’), today in 2003 we talk the more modest, utilitarian, 
even negative dystopian language of risk and precaution unsupported by utopian 
ideologies. Media reports on Bush’s first National Security Strategy focused on ‘pre-
 ^John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies o f  Containment: A critical appraisal ofpostwar American National 
Security Policy, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982)
 ^Raymond Garthoff, A Journey through the Cold War. (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 
2001), p l5
 ^Quoted in Robert G. Patnam, Security in a post-Cold war world, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), p274 
See L. Gardner, A Covenant with Power: American and the World Order from Wilson to Reagan, (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1986), p .l l
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emption’, rather than its more idealistic sections protecting freedom and civilisation. 
Bush’s January 2003 State of the Union address described ‘Great causes’ consisting of 
eliminating ‘unbalanced dictators’,‘scattered networks of killers’, AIDS and the ‘Healthy 
Forest Initiative’. These are laudable goals but hardly comparable to John F. Kennedy’s 
stirring pledge that America will ‘pay any price, bear any burden’ to defend freedom and 
democracy.
Yet in a way, there is nothing new really about today’s more minimalist approach 
to war and strategy. After all, nuclear weapons had previously introduced some 
minimalist tones. As Bernard Brodie mused, while the previous aim of strategy was to 
win wars, now it was to avoid them. The major post-war security document NSC-68 also 
sought not unconditional surrender, but tolerable coexistence and to modify Russian 
psychology. Conventional definitions of victory were also not employed in the Vietnam 
War for example. John McNaughton, then assistant secretary of defence, defined victory 
as ‘demonstrating to the Vietcong that they cannot win’. For General Westmoreland, 
victory was persuading the enemy that he would lose, rather than destroying his forces.^ 
Recognising the constraints of the overarching Cold war and South Vietnamese domestic 
political context, the US sought not to lose rather than win. Thus a negative definition of 
victory is certainly not unique to the international environment of 2003.
That said, at least in the Cold War, there were clear overriding constraints to 
seeking a clear-cut military victory. Ideological conflict, the Soviet Union and its nuclear 
arsenal dominated almost every strategic issue. What is different now is an anxious ethos 
associated with a ‘risk age’ well-aware of its limits, where constraints are in part self- 
imposed, although of course political and strategic restraints do remain. Although 
toleration was preferred to annihilation, each side in the Cold War was nevertheless 
prepared to decimate mankind if necessary.^ This led Philip Windsor to warn that 
humankind and survival itself lost all meaning when humans begin to even consider 
annihilating the human race to ensure their own values and historical purpose.^ In a post- 
ideological world, a ‘safety-first’ mentality rather than historical narrative is firmly 
entrenched as the basis underpinning risk management’s minimalist outlook.
^See David Brooks, ‘A modest little war’, The Atlantic Monthly, February 2002
 ^James W. Gibson. The Perfect War: Technowar in Vietnam, (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2000), 
p.97
John Lewis Gaddis, The long peace: inquiries into history o f  the Cold War, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1987), p236-7
® Mats Berdal & Spyros Economides (eds). Strategic Thinking: An introduction and farewell Philip 
Windsor, (London: Lynne Rienner, 2002), p i65
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How did the Cold War system function and how is it different now? Competition 
was channelled through arms control, bloc discipline or extra-European regional contests. 
Bipolar certainties, nuclear deterrence and satellite reconnaissance were major regulating 
instruments. In the post-Cold War world, neat bipolar symmetries have now been 
replaced by ‘strategic uncertainty’ in US policy documents without specific ‘threat- 
based’ approaches.^ That said, one should not exaggerate the relative clarity of the Cold 
War. Precise assessment was elusive, and as now, we also tended towards worst case 
scenarios. (Bomber Gap, Missile Gap, ‘windows of vulnerability’). In fact, there was 
much more indeterminacy and an ‘American tendency to exaggerate’ th re a ts .A t least in 
the Cold War, there were more concrete enemies embodied in a physical territory and 
real material military threats. Now both are more elusive as we focus on probabilistic risk 
scenarios.
Deterrence and containment of the Soviet threat were unsurprisingly major 
reference points for Cold War strategic policy but what was the nature of these policies? 
Stressing strong military forces to deter and defeat cross border attacks, deterrence was a 
largely reactive strategy involving calculation by adversaries of possible nuclear response 
to aggression.^' Despite containment’s numerous mutations, its essence was clear. 
‘Containment’, argued leading Cold War historian John Gaddis, ‘implied a defensive 
orientation, reacting to rather than initiating challenges’.'^ Kennan first described 
containment as, ‘a long-term, patient but vigilant containment of Russian expansive 
tendencies...with unalterable counter-force at every point where they show signs of 
encroaching.’'  ^ Eisenhower’s ‘massive retaliation’, Kennedy’s ‘Flexible Response’ or 
Nixon-Kissinger’s Détente were mostly reactive in nature.'"'
However, suggestions in 2003 of a complete break with reactive policies in favour 
of proactive ones are historically inaccurate. Much as we discussed ‘anticipatory self- 
defence’ in 2003 against rogue states like Iraq, this had also been invoked previously 
before by Washington justifying the blockade of Cuba during the 1962 Missile Crisis.
 ^See for exairqile America’s latest Quadrennial Defence Review, (Washington D C: Department of  
Defence, September 2001)
Robert Johnson, Improbable dangers: US conceptions o f  threat in the Cold War and after, (New York: 
St Martin’s Press, 1994), p2
" Berdal & Spyros Economides (eds). Strategic Thinking: An introduction and farewell Philip Windsor, 
p54, 168
John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies o f  Containment: A critical appraisal o f  postwar American National 
Security Policy, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), Preface viii. (italics added)
George Kennan, American Diplomacy 1900-1950, (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1951), p99, 
104 (italics added)
Gaddis, Strategies o f  Containment, p. 147
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Raymond Garthoff revealed that ‘preventive war’ in the Cold War’s early stages against 
Moscow before it became strong enough also had some credence/^ John Kennedy also 
seriously considered destroying nascent Chinese nuclear facilities/^ Moscow and Beijing 
were major powers seeking to retool an existing system and could pose serious threats. 
Today’s tinpot dictators, rogue states and terrorists however do not menace foundations 
of the whole system; rather they pose systemic risks to be managed. As Michael 
O’Hanlon noted, pre-emption is not entirely novel within a broader historical perspective. 
Strategic Air Command in the 1950s had planned pre-emptive nuclear strikes against 
Moscow. The Grenada and Panama campaigns were partly justified on pre-emptive 
grounds although in response to past provocations. The 1998 cruise missile strikes 
against Afghanistan, and the 1999 Kosovo campaign were all examples of pre-emptive 
action in varying degrees. Pre-emption has been around for years, employed by both 
Republican and Democrat Administrations.^^ The conceptual differences between 
‘preventive’ and ‘pre-emptive’ war will not be discussed at this stage. It is sufficient to 
bear in mind that these ‘proactive’ ideas do have historical precedence. What is different 
as noted in Chapter One, is that without the Soviet Union’s nuclear deterrent to fear nor 
an overarching global strategic competition to consider, these concepts are now more 
feasible and ‘actionable’ on a larger scale.** This is a key assumption.
Over time, the process of containment obscured the original objective o f changing 
Soviet concepts of JR. In Vietnam especially, as Kissinger famously remarked, ‘we 
would not have recognised victory.. .because we did not know what our objectives were.’ 
The Cold War implied unlimited duration, for its ideology supported a ‘permanent war 
economy’ with no defined condition of termination. World War II in contrast had a 
definable end, with a formal surrender treaty.^ ** Similar dangers lurk for risk 
management: success is defined by vague criteria of ‘non-events’ and avoiding harm. It is 
an ongoing process without clear end-points. At least the Cold war had ideology to
See Raymond Garthoff, A Journey through the Cold War, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution 
Press, 2001), p i5
Recently declassified US documents support this view. See William Burr and Jeffrey T. Richelson, 
‘Whether to “strangle the baby in the cradle”: The United States and the Chinese nuclear program 1960- 
64’, International Security, Vol. 25 No.3, Winter 2000/01, p.54-99 
Michael E. O’Hanlon, ‘The Bush Doctrine: strike first’, San Diego Union-Tribune, 14 July 2002 
Grenada and Panama were relatively small-scale campaigns that occurred in America’s own backyard. 
Recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are a different matter altogether in terms o f force structure, power 
projection capabilities and firepower deployed.
 ^Gaddis, Strategies o f  Containment, p.238; Kissinger quoted in Berdal and Economides, Strategic 
Thinking, p. 143
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buttress flagging resolves. Its nebulous end however produced no winners, only losers^*: 
the US too suffered social and economic decay, while dubious interventions undermined 
its moral standing. Indeed, war won as it still endures in risk management mode.
II. The post-Cold War strategic context
As the late Gerald Segal once wrote, the ‘Great Book’ providing the ‘Great Explanation’ 
for the post-Cold War era still eludes us. The journal Foreign Policy offered cash prizes 
for a term to encapsulate this new age. In a sense this is not new: after World War II, 
there was no clear framework until NSC-68 of 1950. Without serious military or 
ideological challenges, foreign policy lacked a ‘strategic guidepost’.^  ^Arguably, the 9/11 
attacks have given America a new sense of direction but even the serious challenges of 
catastrophic terrorism, argued neo-Realist Kenneth Waltz, were hardly equivalent to 
overwhelming survival threats posed by the Soviet Union.
Modernity and the Enlightenment had once ‘projected human perfection into the 
future’. War became a proactive historical instrument to bring that perfection about.^^ 
Today, grand narratives and utopian visions are conspicuous by their absence amid 
exhaustion of ideological universalism. A clearly identifiable Soviet threat replaced by 
diffuse dangers only produced insecurity on the victor’s part. America now wielded 
power globally without a project, it simply managed problems.^"^ Without meaning, 
responsibilities are measured only in utilitarian cost terms which the notion of risk 
management recommends itself to. Recent wars from Kosovo to Afghanistan have been 
justified on such utilitarian rather than grandiose terms: of simply avoiding future harm. 
As part of this broader pattern of recognising limits, European responses to African crises 
have also shifted from long-term development aid, towards simply managing conflicts 
and providing humanitarian aid. Failed and underdeveloped states are no longer seen as 
possessing potential for progress and development, but in terms of the risks they posed
Seymour Melman, The Permanent War Economy: American capitalism in decline, (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1974), p. 16
An argument made by Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein’s We all lost the Cold War, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993)
Emily Goldman & Larry Berman, ‘Engaging the world: first impressions o f the Clinton foreign policy 
legacy’ in Colin Campbell & Bert Rockman (eds), The Clinton Legacy, (New York: Chatham House 
Publishers, 2000), p252 
Philip K. Lawrence, Modernity and war, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), p i3-14, 19 
Zaki Laidi, A World without meaning: Crisis o f  meaning in International Politics, (London: Routledge,
1998), p.109
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from epidemics, refugees, terrorists and war/^ However, Bob Woodward noted in his 
study of Bush at War, President Bush liked ‘casting his mission and that of the country in 
the grand vision of God’s master plan’/^  Notwithstanding, ‘hardly anyone in Congress 
talks about foreign affairs as a contest of values and ideals...we no longer go into wars 
enthusiastic about opportunities to spread democracy and freedom afterward.. .we go in 
with resolve but obsessively aware of the limits of what we can achieve.. .the modesty of 
our war aims are surpassed only by the timidity with which we conclude them’.^  ^ The 
lack of ‘confidence in America’s ability to improve the world’ characterises the ‘modest’ 
wars it currently fights.^^ The obsession with ‘minimising footprints’ and exit strategies 
exemplifies this paucity of ambition which ‘minimalist’ risk management is well-placed 
to explore.
Two key drivers most relevant to this thesis, characterised the new strategic 
context by 1999, and still do: uncertainty associated with the end of the Cold War, and 
security risks associated with globalisation. Without overarching everpresent threats like 
the Soviet Union, Colin Powell warned in 1992 in his then capacity as Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, ‘the real threat we now face is the threat of the unknown, the 
uncertain’. T h e  Pentagon spawned ‘Uncertainty Hawks’ who now deemed any remotely 
possible danger worthy of attention.^® CIA Director James Woolsey provided another 
memorable description: the US had slain the Soviet dragon but now faced a jungle of 
poisonous snakes. As President Clinton noted, NATO was now oriented towards 
providing security to members from insecure and unpredictable conditions, rather than a 
hostile bloc.^' In 1999, then US Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki called for a 
shift in thinking from ‘traditional enemies’ to what he called ‘complicators’ such as 
terrorists and weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, 9/11 only confirmed this trend. The 
nature of security problems had changed and so too should approaches towards tackling
See Gorm Rye Olsen, ‘Europe and Africa's Failed States: from development to containment’ , Paper 
presented to conference on The global constitution o f failed states: the consequences o f a new 
inqjerialism?, University o f Sussex, 18-20 April 2001; also Paul Rogers, Losing Control: Global security in 
the 27" century, (London: Pluto Press, 2000), p.60 
Quotes cited in Ben MacIntyre, ‘Bush fights the good fight with a righteous quotation’. The Times, 08 
Mar 2003
David Brooks, ‘A modest little war’. The Atlantic Monthly, February 2002 
Brooks, ‘A modest little war’
Quoted in Robert Johnson, Improbable Dangers, (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1994), p47 
See Carl Conetta & Charles IGiight, ‘Inventing Threats’, Bulletin o f  the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 53 No. 2, 
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Remarks by President Clinton and others at NATO/Russia Founding Act signing ceremony, Paris,
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these problems. Such shifts can be incorporated by the concept of risk management, 
which acts specifically in uncertainty domains.
Globalisation and security
The security dimension of globalisation has also concerned policymakers and 
academics.^^ Tony Blair observed in his famous speech on the Doctrine o f the 
International Community, that rather than the clarity and simplicity of the Cold War, ‘we 
now have to establish a new firamework. No longer is our existence as states under 
threat.. .furthermore the world has changed in a more fundamental way’ through 
globalisation. But he warns ‘globalisation is not just economic. It is also a political and 
security p h en o m en o n .M an y  domestic problems, he went on to note, are caused by 
issues the other side of the world: Balkan conflicts also created more refugees for Britain 
and America. Globalisation, thus declared Thomas Friedman, is not just a trend or fad but 
‘the new international system that has replaced the Cold war s y s t e m . B y  December 
2000, the US National Intelligence Council report. Global Trends 2015, described 
globalisation as a key driver that will shape the world of 2015. Although Clinton noted 
that globalisation had historical precursors in the pre-World War One era, he also warned 
that ‘everything from the strength of our economy to safety in our cities now depends on 
events not only within our borders but half a world away. There is a danger that deadly 
weapons will fall into the hands of a terrorist group or outlaw nation.’ Clinton saw great 
challenges in ensuring ‘our people are safe fi*om dangers that arise perhaps halfway 
around the world- dangers fi’om proliferation, terrorism, fi'om drugs, fi*om multiple 
catastrophes that could arise from climate change’. T h e  December 1999 US National 
Security Strategy was unequivocal: ‘globalisation also brings risks’. T h i s  document, 
often seen as the clearest indicator of an Administration’s strategic approach to the world, 
went on to describe risks from globalisation in the form of ethnic conflicts threatening 
regional stability, weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, diseases and environmental 
degradation. NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept talked of these same uncertain ‘security 
risks and challenges’. These very risks are the object of this study.
Lynn E, Davis’s Security Implications o f  Globalisation, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003) for exan^le 
highlights terrorism, ethnic cleansing, WMD proliferation, and infectious diseases.
Prime Minister’s Speech, Doctrine o f the International Community, Economic Club o f Chicago, 24 April 
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Thomas Friedman, ‘A Manifesto for the Fast world’. New York Times Magazine, 28 March 1999, p.42 
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It appeared that in an age of globalisation of insecurity, the issues that America 
needed to contend with had extended to infectious diseases and environmental concerns. 
The US Defence Intelligence Agency even commissioned a report into water hyacinths in 
Africa’s Lake Victoria which, according to the predominant probabilistic thinking and 
worst-case scenarios, could trigger a chain-reaction of negative events leading to state 
collapse. Indeed, some scholars suggested that if the ‘answer to question of whether 
everything is a security issue depends on how nervous you are...a fulsome concept of 
security must surely include whatever presents us with an apparent insecurity’.^  ^ With 
globalisation and the advent of an insecure risk age, managing the planet had in a way, 
become a matter of security.
Events such as September 11 2001, and ethnic cleansing in Kosovo thus came to 
be seen as part of the globalisation motif. Globalisation might have been largely a US 
initiative and benefit but also exposed it to risks by providing the infrastructure for 
possible harm to befall the West. Indeed, the term ‘proliferation’ has now been 
expropriated to describe almost any danger that can spread, such as ethnic instability, 
terrorism, crime and disease quite apart from its original meaning relating to WMD.^^ 
What currently animates the West’s security agenda and its anxieties is the need to 
combat such ‘security risks’. In an interdependent world, even the most powerful is 
invulnerable as September 11 showed. The nation-state will be replaced by what Philip 
Bobbitt called ‘market states’ which ‘maximise opportunities’ for their citizens in the 
global marketplace. Rather than maximising opportunities, this study argues states 
‘minimise risks’ in the global risk society the international system has become.
Furthermore, in an age of globalisation, instantaneous flows, and porous 
boundaries, there is ‘profound resentment against bearing the consequences of victory in 
responsibility for day to day administration of conquered lands’. B a r e  bones ‘lily pad’ 
bases rather than huge ones like Ramstein Air Force Base in Germany, are now touted for 
troops rotating to parts of the world requiring management action. This has implications 
for the consequences of military action. Rather than ‘nation-building’, there is minimalist
A National Security Strategy fo r  a New Century, (Washington DC.: The White House, December 1999), 
Chapter I, p. 1
Hugh Dyer, ‘Environmental security and international relations: the case for enclosure’. Review o f  
International Studies, Vol. 27 No. 3, July 2001, p.441-3 
David Mutimer, ‘Reconstituting security? The practices o f proliferation control’, European Journal o f  
International Relations, Vol. 4 N o.l , March 1998, p.99-129
39 Zygmunt Bauman, Society Under Siege, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002), p. 100
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talk instead of ‘nation-tending’- simply to ensure security risks justifying intervention in 
the first place remain sufficiently reduced/^
By 2002, another key factor was tacked onto the strategic equation: the spectre of 
failed states has concerned policy documents on both sides of the Atlantic. The US 
National Security Strategy released September 2002 and the UK MoD’s Joint Doctrine 
and Concepts Centre report Strategic Trends published in March 2003, both identified 
failed or failing states as primary security dangers in an age of globalisation. President 
Bush explains: ‘America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by 
failing ones...Weak states like Afghanistan can pose as a great a danger to our national 
interests as strong s t a t e s F o r e i g n  Secretary Jack Straw, speaking at Birmingham 
University on 06 September 2002, introduced the ‘at risk’ concept, ranking states 
according to ‘risk factors’ of how likely they are to collapse such as public service 
provision. Especially after Sep 11, preventing states from failing and resuscitating failed 
ones qualified according to Straw as ‘one of the strategic imperatives of our time’. Just as 
multinationals and medical practitioners practise risk assessment. Straw contended that 
‘governments now need to put similar calculations at the heart of their foreign policy’. 
This ‘risk’ concept implied a strategy of ‘management’ through development and 
diplomatic tools, sanctions and military force if necessary. Whereas ideology in the Cold 
War and Great Power competition determined which nominally unimportant territory 
attracted strategic interest, now it is concern about risks. Clearly, the ‘risk concept’ has 
come to policymakers’ attention.
From threats to risks
The conventional Realist ‘net assessment’ model of ‘threat’ in IR that guided the Cold 
War depended on two components: intentions of the Soviet Union and measuring 
capabilities in actuarial terms counting tanks and military hardware. The groundbreaking 
post-war US security document NSC-68 of 1950 after all described a quite specific 
‘threat’ from Moscow in terms of its hostile designs/intentions and formidable 
capabilities. Even with détente, ‘threat’ always remained because it was defined as
See a description o f ‘nation-tending’ in Jeffrey Record, ‘Collapsed countries, casualty dread and the new 
American way of war’, Parameters. US Army War College Quarterly, Vol. XXXII No. 2, Summer 2002 
National Security Strategy o f  the United States o f  America, (Washington D C: The White House, 
September 2002), Introduction. This document brought to the centre the focus on failed states which was 
first discussed in security documents o f the late Clinton years.
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‘capabilities’ rather than ‘intent’/^ At least the threat during the Cold War was more 
estimable, material and the logic behind the balance of terror ensured it was relatively 
calculable, according to means-end rational rules of deterrence/^ Through touting 
‘perfect solutions’ to threats, such as the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), America was 
to be made invulnerable to the dangers states have historically faced from military attack.
Contemporary security problems are no longer addressed solely in terms of 
concrete capabilities and intentions.' '^^ President George W, Bush’s resurrection of the 
Clinton term ‘rogue nations’ effectively obviated the notion of ‘threat’, removing ‘any 
need to evaluate the political motivation or actual capabilities of states placed in this 
category’ Instead, a combination of a militarily pre-eminent America, a globalised 
world without clear military threats and porous borders led to an emphasis on ‘risk’ 
components: probabilities and consequences.^^ We lack what Anthony Giddens called 
‘ontological security’. We lack adequate knowledge of what to expect. In contrast, both 
sides during the Cold War at least had some ontological security."^  ^ ‘Living in an age of 
constructivism’, the future is viewed in terms of probabilistic scenarios of what may 
potentially transpire."^® We consider counter-factuals and alternative courses of actions 
when dangers are vague and ill-defined. Risk is becoming the key operative concept of 
Western security.
The notion of post-Cold War America besieged by elusive dangers hard to define 
and defend against, bore the fingerprints of the Clinton administration and carried over 
into the Bush White House. Bush warned of ‘car bombers and plutonium merchants, 
cyber terrorists and unbalanced dictators’- ‘sentiments that could have been lifted directly 
from the web site of the Clinton White House’. N A T O ’s first post-Cold War Strategic
Raymond Garthoff, A Journey through the Cold War, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 
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Concept issued in November 1991 is worth quoting at length, illuminating the new 
environment o f ‘risks’ not ‘threats’. It described ‘Security Challenges and Risks’ where:
‘the threat of a simultaneous, full-scale attack on all of NATO’s European fronts 
has effectively been removed.. .in contrast with the predominant threat of the past, the 
risks to Allied security that remain are multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional, 
which makes them hard to predict and assess... Risks to Allied security are less likely to 
result from calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies, but rather from the 
adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social 
and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are 
faced by many countries in central and eastern Europe.. .a great deal of uncertainty about 
the future and risks to the security of the Alliance remain.’^
By 2002, President Bush’s first National Security Strategy crystallised this shift away 
from measuring concrete military capabilities: ‘enemies in the past needed great armies 
and great industrial capabilities to endanger America. Now shadowy networks of 
individuals can wreak great havoc and chaos on our shores for less than it costs to 
purchase a single tank’.^ ^
Strategic planning in the Cold War largely focused on either repelling Soviet 
armoured thrusts through the Fulda Gap or nuclear deterrence. Now, rather than a 
specific ‘threat-based’ approach focused on the Soviet Union, Donald Rumsfeld 
envisioned a ‘paradigm shift’ towards addressing risks ‘we can’t identify by country’. 
Since no one knows what dangers will arise, US capabilities must be developed to handle 
a full range of likely future challenges.The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review described ‘a 
situation where the United States might face multiple potential opponents, but we’re not 
sure who they might be’.^ "^  Accordingly, ‘we don’t do countries’. We do ‘uncertainties’.^  ^
The Pentagon’s 2002 Annual Defence Report now argued, ‘contending with uncertainty 
must be a central tenet in US defence planning.Furthermore, there is no way of totally 
insuring from globalised dangers: back in 1998, ‘twenty first century threats know no
The Alliance's Strategic Concept agreed by the Heads o f  State and Government participating in the 
meeting o f  the North Atlantic Council, Rome, 08 November 1991, available at 
http://www.nato.mt/docu/basictxt/b911108a.htm. A second Strategic Concept was later issued in 1999 
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boundaries’ warned Madeleine A lb r ig h t .T h e  December 2002 National Strategy to 
Combat Weapons o f  Mass Destruction warned that the United States must ‘undertake 
every effort to prevent states and terrorists from acquiring WMD’ but acknowledges ‘we 
cannot always be successful’. A f t e r  9/11, Paul Wolfowitz declared, ‘the era of 
invulnerability is over’.^  ^ Perfect security is a chimera in an age of globalisation and 
uncertainties. It is only possible to manage risks and insecurity.
Reactive versus proactive strategies
How are we going to manage risks? ‘For more than 50 years, we were constrained by a 
bipolar rivalry with a superpower adversary,’ observed then Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs General John Shalikashvili in 1997, ‘to deal with such a world we relied on a 
strategy of containment and designed our military forces to react in case the strategy 
failed’. A s  discussed earlier, containment was essentially reactive. In contrast. President 
George W. Bush’s watershed National Security Strategy, formally crystallised the 
proactive calculus of risk. Declaring the obsolescence of a ‘reactive posture’ of 
containment and deterrence, it plumbed instead for anticipatory actions ‘even if 
uncertainty remains as to time and place of the enemy’s a t t a c k . C o l d  War deterrence, it 
argued, was effective against a status-quo enemy who viewed nuclear weapons as last 
resort. It fails against an enemy seeking wanton destruction and martyrdom. A security 
stance based on proactively addressing ill-defined risks is somewhat distinct from 
traditional security policy reacting to more immediate concrete threats.^^ The term ‘pre­
emptive’ and actions associated with it however are not unique to the Bush 
Administration. In December 1993, then Defence Secretary Les Aspin, unveiling the 
Defence Counterproliferation Initiative, was widely seen as suggesting that Washington 
could deal with rogue states in either a ‘reactive’ or ‘pre-emptive’ mode.^^ Clinton’s last
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years in office were also spent lobbing cruise missiles at Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kosovo 
to varying degrees of pre-emption, without UN approval- just as Bush has done.
Official documents such as the still-classified 2001 Nuclear Posture Review 
reflect this proactive logic. Judging from snippets leaked to the media, it appeared to be 
pondering more scenarios for first-use of new low-yield ‘bunker-busters’. During the 
Clinton era, it was already being suggested that nuclear weapons could be used to deny 
states with only ‘prospective access’ to WMD.^"  ^ In the post-Cold War world. Mutually 
Assured Destruction no longer applies between Washington and potential proliferates. 
This removed many constraints on military action and the RMA made war usable as a 
political instrument again without fear of nuclear escalation.^^ The Clinton 
Administration ‘believe(d) it has a good chance to deny proliférants rudimentary second- 
strike capabilities through force without paying an unacceptable p r i c e L o o s e n i n g  
nuclear use was not initiated by the Bush Administration. While counter-proliferation 
previously emphasised diplomatic and political measures such as the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty, Washington is now considering proactive risk-based military strategies.
Washington also aimed to proactively ‘shape the international environment’, 
although this officially did not mean military force. This catch-all phrase first coined by 
the Clinton Administration in the mid-1990s, formed the bedrock of the 2000 National 
Security Strategy and 1997 Quadrennial Defence Review. The aim according to Defence 
Secretary William Cohen was to : ‘shape other people’s opinions about us in favourable 
ways. To shape events that would affect our livelihood and our security’.^  ^ The 1998 
Annual Defence Report to Congress outlined the key goals in an interdependent world of 
‘fostering an international environment where critical regions are stable, at peace; in 
which democratic norms and human rights are widely accepted; in which the spread of 
nuclear, biological and chemical and other potentially destabilising technologies is 
m i n i m i s e d . T h i s  previously meant defence diplomacy, port visits, and joint training 
exercises. However, Andrew Bacevich observed that the post-9/11 American reliance on 
using military force and technology implied ‘fresh opportunities to ‘shape the
See Martin Kettle, ‘US strategy on nuclear war’, Guardian (UK), 09 Dec 1997 
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environment” .^  ^ US military might after all has been crucial in ‘reshaping the 
international environment’ over the past 5 years: Kosovo in 1999, Afghanistan in 2001, 
and Iraq in 2003.^° In 2002, Geoff Hoon noted in the New Chapter to Britain’s Strategic 
Defence Review that expeditionary operations from the Balkans to Afghanistan had 
‘enabled the UK to have a key role in shaping the international security environment’.^  ^
These cases are the subject of later chapters of this study. More interestingly, as we shall 
see in Chapter Three, ‘reshaping’ environments is a similar risk management strategy 
practised in criminology.
III. Academic perspectives
What follows is an examination of selected major works on security and the broader 
‘transformation of war’ debate by IR academics, former high-ranking politicians and 
military analysts. These will be addressed in relation to various sub-texts raised in the 
contemporary strategic context described earlier and also themes which testify to the 
possible advent of trends anticipated by Ulrich Beck’s writings.
These include:
• Systemic changes comprising the globalisation of risks, the rise of rogue 
states, and strategic uncertainty rather than concrete military threats to 
survival fi'om Great Power rivalry or peer competitors
• Societal trends such as managing risks for minimalist purposes rather than 
grand causes and emphasising victimhood over heroism
• An emphasis on preventive policies
It will be shown how these themes, to varying degrees, have been raised in the discourse, 
as well as why an analysis based on Beck’s Risk Society and associated notions of risk 
management is pertinent within this context. Indeed, these concepts suggest a novel way 
of illuminating questions of war in the contemporary strategic context.
Andrew Bacevich, American Empire, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2002), p.242
Peter Riddell, ‘America must share its imperial burden’. The Times, 24 April 2003
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Systemic changes
As previously discussed, policymakers have recognised that globalisation and the end of 
the Cold War have introduced security risks to the West. There is a similar broad 
consensus among academics. Some interesting policy prescriptions relating to ‘risk’ 
concepts have been suggested. However, unresolved issues from these studies pointed to 
an apparent lack of a theoretical framework within which to situate a response 
comprising war as a tool of risk management.
Ulrich Beck
Risk Society, the book providing much background to this thesis by German sociologist 
Ulrich Beck, was first translated into English in 1992.^  ^The key themes raised included:
i) The management and distribution of risks and ‘bads’ now superseded the 
previous emphasis on production of ‘goods’ in an industrial society. The 
concept of risk is prominent.
ii) We now sought to ‘prevent the worst’, fearing ‘victimhood’ and harm of 
all sorts rather than attain something good through ‘heroic’ endeavours. A 
‘heroic’ myth as the ‘eternal truth’ central to modernity no longer exists. 
Society is aware of its limits and no longer embraces heroism but aims to 
monitor, avert risks and manage, distribute them.
iii) Society is disillusioned with grand ideas of linear progress and suspicious 
of historical purpose after the consequences for the environment and 
human health had been highlighted by the Chernobyl disaster for example.
iv) A ‘minimalist’ utilitarian ethos revolving around probabilistic worst-case 
scenarios drives society focused on preventing ‘bads’ from occurring.
Beck was mainly concerned with the risks involved in nuclear power,
radioactivity and environmental concerns. Risk Society was predominantly a sociology
Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a new modernity, (London: Sage Publications, 1992) (trans, Mark 
Ritter)
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thesis relating to theories of ‘reflexive modernisation’ and a new modernity, and 
ostensibly had nothing to add to our knowledge of war and security. Its contents and 
concerns were largely not examined in detail by IR theorists or cited in most ER literature 
for much of the 1990s. In fact, Risk Society merits much closer scrutiny which will be 
provided in the next Chapter. Beck suggests himself to this study because he deliberately 
cast the question of society in the post-Cold War world in terms of ‘risk’ and this actually 
provides much-neglected insight into the complex interplay of ‘risk’ and ER. If Beck is 
correct in asserting that ‘risks’ now define the post-Cold War world, the critical question 
that arises is whether war too is being reconfigured as risk management in the process? 
However, it should be noted that this study does not rely completely on Beck although he 
provides a key theoretical cornerstone. It instead incorporates a wider body of literature 
on risk and risk management. Beck’s is simply the more prominent one highlighted here 
to provide themes to facilitate the literature review.
It was only much later in 1999 that Beck’s World Risk Society and his 2000 effort 
What is Globalisation? related more closely to IR.^  ^ In these works, he sought to show 
how the post-Cold War world was moving from one of clearly identifiable enemies, to 
one of dangers and risks to fill the enemy vacuum. The principal claims made were:
i) As a consequence of globalisation and systemic risks, a new frame of 
reference and a paradigm shift is needed. The idea of linear progress, 
certainty, controllability and security of early modernity has collapsed, 
replaced by fear of risks.^ "^
ii) The theory of World Risk Society highlighted the limited controllability of 
the risks we face and raised the crucial question of how to deal with them 
since traditional control mechanisms and institutions are now insufficient. 
One cannot insure against or eliminate incalculable global risks eluding 
traditional time-space limitations such as global economic recession, or 
nuclear meltdown. These can only be managed and there are no ‘perfect 
solutions’.
Earlier works on IR could include Ulrich Beck, Democracy without enemies, (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1998) where he also discussed the lack o f a grand consensus creating ambivalence and doubt without 
ever-present enemies. However this work was less geared towards IR than his later writings.
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Beck dwelt mainly on the systemic shift to a global ecological and financial Risk 
Society, and the implications for démocratisation, politics of risk-definition, the state, and 
decision-making processes within a society, rather than international security risks. More 
concerned with positive notions of risk rather than war to manage the negative 
downsides. Beck concluded a ‘cosmopolitan manifesto’ uniting the world was needed. 
‘Risk communities’ should now form around a theme of risk uniting disparate areas of 
international and trans-national politics fi'om human rights to the environment.^^ In its 
focus on globalisation, this was perhaps an archetypal text of the period although Beck 
still adopted a rather more sociological perspective. He initially stopped short of the next 
logical step : to analyse negative aspects of his paradigm despite having already 
identified refugee flows, trans-national terrorism, and WMD proliferation as new 
systemic risks.^^ The ‘dangers of military confi*ontation between states are compounded 
by newly emerging dangers of fundamentalist or private terrorism’ with access to WMD 
broken out of Cold War security structures, aided by globalisation. This will become a 
‘new source of d a n g e r B e c k  emphasised the interaction between risks; ‘there are no 
limits to the nightmare scenarios of how the various dangers could all come together’. It 
is ‘precisely this which the diagnosis of a world risk society is meant to a d d r e s s Y e t  
Beck’s prescription of transnational cosmopolitanism is premature with his unconvincing 
assumption that global risks serve integrative functions where nations negotiate rather 
than fight.^^
9/11 provided the stimulus for Beck’s first concerted foray into analysing 
international security risks, with contributions to a collection of essays edited by the 
Foreign Policy Centre in London and an LSE public lecture on the topic. Beck now 
considered global terror one of three ‘axes of world risk society’ besides ecological 
conflict and financial crises.^® Yet even then, he did not address the negative side of his 
paradigm where force might be used to manage risks. Instead, he continued to argue 
globalised terror created possibilities for a new era of cooperation, a cosmopolitan state
Ulrich Beck, World Risk Society, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), p.2-3, 69
Beck, World Risk Society, p.5. In particular he ascribes a crucial role to trans-national NGOs. This issue 
will be taken up in more detail in the Concluding chapter.
Beck, World Risk Society, p.3
Ulrich Beck, What is globalisation?, trans, Patrick Camiller, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), p,40 
Beck, What is globalisation?,, p,41.
Beck, World Risk Society, p,14
Ulrich Beck, The World Risk Society Revisited: the terrorist threat?’, LSE Public Lecture, London 14 
February 2002; Terror and solidarity’ in Mark Leonard (ed). Re-ordering the world, (London: The 
Foreign Policy Centre, 2002)
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sharing solidarity with foreigners inside and out, addressing causes of terror. This, 
according to him, was the last bond in a world where God, nations and historical purpose 
are increasingly disavowed. This laudable goal is however a long-term one. It is 
regretfully inadequate and even somewhat naive against urgent risks posed by A1 Qaeda 
who cannot be negotiated with but only fought. These types of risks require new control 
mechanisms involving war as a risk management strategy. Beck’s paradigm of World 
Risk Society suggests potentially significant implications for IR to be explored.
IR Perspectives on systemic risks from globalisation and end o f  the Cold War 
Several writers such as Robert Cooper and Paul Rogers have also emphasised the risks 
globalisation posed and the need for a strategic framework as the West’s response. But 
both came to different and somewhat unsatisfactory conclusions. Tony Blair’s onetime 
foreign policy guru. Cooper warned that in an age of globalisation, failing states in the 
pre-modem world may foster terrorism, crime and drugs menacing post-modern states. 
Military intervention may be necessary if risks for the West become intolerable.^^ More 
concerned with the idea of 'postmodern imperialism’, Cooper neglected developing the 
wider implications of his model for war. Paul Rogers similarly observed that the ‘overall 
security paradigm’ was one where globalisation created new and diverse vulnerabilities 
but a pre-eminent America had necessary military capacity to cope.^^ Rogers concluded 
the core requirement is sustainable development to tackle fundamental causes. Both 
authors alerted researchers to globalisation risks but did not particularly focus on war.
The few focused analyses of globalisation and security risks in relation to Beck’s 
paradigm were undertaken by Christopher Coker and Mikkel Rasmussen. While both 
produced cogent analyses, the role war had to play in managing these risks was 
underemphasised. In his Adelphi Paper Globalisation and Insecurity in the Twenty-First 
Century: NATO and the Management o f Risk, Coker addressed NATO’s role in managing 
the security dimension of globalisation from landmines to migration. While his subject 
matter is closely related to this thesis within the wider framework of risk, Coker appeared 
more concerned with the definitions and dialectics of globalisation that obstruct the 
transformation of NATO into Beck’s concept of a ‘risk community’.
Robert Cooper, The Post Modem state and world order, (London: Demos, 2000), p.41; ‘Why we still 
need Empires’, The Observer, 07 April 2002 
Paul Rogers, Losing Control: Global security in the 2 P ‘ century, 2”** ed, (London: Pluto Press, 2002), p60
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Rasmussen - juxtaposing Beck’s idea of ‘reflexive’ rationality with traditional 
means-end rationality- analysed how NATO is re-conceptualising post-Cold War security 
in terms of ‘risks’.B orrow ing  from constructivist security studies in social construction 
of dangers, Rasmussen’s focus predictably lay more in how to ‘spot’ risks rather than my 
concern with managing them. His constructivist approach had certain warnings for 
researchers, in particular the problems of subjectivist risk perceptions and the common 
mistake of confusing ‘risk’ and ‘threat’ concepts.^"  ^ Chapter Three will discuss these 
methodological problems of utilising ‘risk’ concepts in detail. Solely relying on Beck’s 
theories and not to mention. Beck’s unsatisfactory definition of ‘risk’, Rasmussen also 
undervalued the wider body of literature on risk that this thesis incorporates in its 
theoretical framework which would have made for a much richer set of explanations. 
Rasmussen rightly concluded that managing transformation of the post-Cold War 
European system now replaced clearly defined ends as indicators of success. The more 
intriguing question left unanswered is how to tackle security risks such as terrorism that 
Rasmussen acknowledges require ‘management’. Indeed, Beck has noted there are two 
sides to his work: Realists stress the risk aspect, while constructivists emphasise how 
risks are constructed and new relations forged.This  constructivist side has already been 
analysed by Rasmussen. The risk aspect remains relatively unexplored, in particular how 
war has been reinvented in managing systemic risks.
Rogue states in the now infamous ‘Axis of Evil’ also constituted post-Cold War 
systemic risks posing probabilistic dangers to the international order suggested by various 
scholars. Yet no consensus exists to the same extent as containing the Soviet Union and 
whether force is to be used. Facing a post-Cold War ‘threat blank’, Michael Klare argued 
that like containment, the Rogue Doctrine eventually provided a policy compass in an 
uncertain environment which as we have already seen, lacked concrete threats. Rogue 
states ‘posing risks’ now come into their own ; previously they were seen as derivatives 
of the Soviet threat which imposed some constraints on both their behaviour and how 
they were addressed.However, Robert Litwak concluded that political motives in 
lumping states such as Iraq, Iran and North Korea into this category created strategic
Mikkel V. Rasmussen, ‘Reflexive Security: NATO and International Risk Society’, Millennium: Journal 
o f  International Studies,, 2001, Vol. 30. No.2, p.285-310 
For a rather unsatisfactory critique o f Rasmussen, see Shlomo Griner, ‘Living in a World Risk Society: A 
reply to Mikkel V. Rasmussen’, Millennium, 2002, Vol. 31 No, 2, p. 149-160 
Ulrich Beck, World Risk Society, (Cambridge: Pohty Press, 1999), p.25
Michael Klare, Rogue states and nuclear outlaws: America’s search fo r  a new foreign policy, (New  
York: Hill & Wang, 1995), p21, 204
48
inflexibility. It nevertheless struck a chord in official lexicon and public discourse 
because of concern about systemic risks involved rather than any intrinsic capabilities or 
fundamental survival threat they might pose. Litwak suggested a variety of tools existed 
for ‘comprehensive containment’ of rogue states- sanctions, diplomacy to use of force- 
although opinions varied on which were best. Indeed, in a chapter contribution entitled 
‘Managing Risks in International Relations’, Jacob Bercovitch and Patrick Regan 
suggested it was better tackling such states through international institutional 
enforcement (such as institutional membership to entice, peacekeeping, negotiations and 
third-party mediation).^^ The concept of ‘managing risks’ has been raised all too briefly 
in relation to rogue states or so-called ‘risky states’ in Bercovitch and Regan’s parlance, 
but not so much the use of force.
Preventive policies
Proactive policies as we have seen, have been gaining attention in major recent strategy 
documents. Prevention is also a key sub-text of Risk Society as we become active today 
to prevent the risks of tomorrow. The ability to ‘anticipate dangers and deal with them 
has assumed increased i m p o r t a n c e ‘Anticipationism’ is thus integral to risk 
management. Globalisation and the lack of an everpresent enemy has led several IR 
writers to similarly emphasise prevention but again outstanding issues remained in terms 
of systematically incorporating these preventive policies into the use of force.
William Perry and Ashton Carter, two former senior officials in the Clinton 
Administration turned academics, suggested ‘Preventive Defence’ in the absence of 
imminent clearly-defined Cold War threats, addressing more amorphous concepts like 
'Danger'.^^ Such ‘dangers’ should not be mismanaged and allowed to develop into full- 
scale threats. ‘Preventive defence’, they added, employs all policy instruments- 
diplomatic, economic, military and political- to forestall such dangers before they require 
drastic remedies or war. Sharing a similar view, John Steinbrunner suggested that huge 
disparities in military force and globalisation mean more refined concepts are needed. As 
dangers stem from diffused processes rather than traditional premeditated aggression.
Robert S. Litwak, Rogue states and US foreign policy: Containment after the Cold War, (Washington 
D.C: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 2000)
Jacob Bercovitch and Patrick Regan, ‘Managing Risks in international Relations’, in Gerald Schneider 
and Patricia Weitsman (ed s), Enforcing Cooperation: Risky states and intergovernmental management o f  
conflict, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), p. 187 
Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a new modernity, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), p.76
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strategies of ‘prevention’ are more suitable than ‘reaction’.^ * The previous organising 
principle of international security was military deterrence against an over-arching ever­
present threat. Now, contagion effects from state collapses fuel weapons proliferation, 
terrorism and drugs with global implications.^^ Steinbrunner concluded diffuse issues 
such as environmental decay and diseases require continuous monitoring, and prevention 
since it is difficult to identify a particular agent to react against.
From the brief survey above, ‘prevention’ and ‘monitoring’ has clearly emerged 
as a key theme in IR. Yet, the notion of ‘prevention’ has largely remained a traditional 
one: it involved largely non-military means such as monitoring, preventive diplomacy or 
deployments as an alternative to military force. As Francois Heisbourg recently pointed 
out, preventative actions now actually entailed military force to avert undesirable 
outcomes or stop another party from developing a threatening military capability. 
Indeed, ‘monitoring’ now also contributed to preventative military actions. This was seen 
most explicitly in Iraq and also to varying degrees in Kosovo and Afghanistan. It is also 
this aspect that war as risk management most clearly addresses with its emphasis on 
preventing some hypothesised future harm from occurring.
The transformation of war debate and changing war forms
Broader changes in the international system and society have given added currency and 
impetus to the vigorous ‘transformation of war’ debate which has been ongoing for much 
of the 1990s, generating countless books and articles in the process. Furthermore while 
the modem era was characterised by war or the threat of war, as Michael Clarke 
observed, the ‘Western world has a real problem with the concept of war these days’.^ "^  A 
selection of these works will be discussed below but at this writing, none have seriously 
addressed the idea of war as a tool to manage uncertain systemic risks rather than 
compelling security threats based on enemy military capabilities. Major selected issues 
that emerged from these studies revolved around ‘humanitarian intervention’; the validity
Ashton B. Carter & William J. Perry, Preventive Defence: A new security strategy fo r  America, 
(Washington D C: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), p.8
John Steinbrunner, Principles o f  Global Security, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 
p. 195
 ^Steinbrunner, Principles o f  Global Security, p. 146
See Francois Heisbourg, ‘A Work in Progress: the Bush Doctrine and its consequences’, Washington 
Quarterly, Vol. 26 No.2 , Spring 2003. Also see a short description in Richard Haass, Intervention: the use 
o f  American military force in the post-Cold War world, (Washington D C: Brookings Institution Press,
1999), p.51
Michael Clarke, Review Article: ‘War in the new international order’. International Affairs, Vol. 77 No. 
3, July 2001, p.663
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of the Clausewitzian paradigm and associated concepts of war. Speculation about a new 
‘American way of war’, or ‘Third Wave’ war was also integral to the debate. These 
suggested useful themes for this study to pick up on, as well as highlight the stimulus 
behind the growth of this body of literature.
Tactical Risk-Averse war
The predominant focus on technology by many writers actually provides only limited 
insight to the wider transformation of war debate which is the concern of this study. 
What is somewhat relevant however is how the existing Revolution in Military Affairs 
(RMA), debates on non-lethal weapons (NLW) and precision-guided munitions (PGMs) 
serves to minimise tactical risks of casualties and collateral damage such as harming the 
environment: after all an important sub-text raised by Beck.^^ Indeed NATO’s Defence 
Capabilities Initiative after the Kosovo campaign emphasised the requirement to conduct 
air operations that minimise collateral damage through PGMs. This type of risk-aversion 
is crucial in gaining legitimacy especially when NGOs, civil society and individual 
citizens can now monitor operations through real-time media, 24-hour news cycles or the 
Internet. This also explains the strict demarcation made by politicians and generals 
between ‘regime’ and ‘society’ targets to be spared. As Alvin and Heidi Toffler noted, 
‘one of the foremost objectives in the development of new weaponry should be the 
reduction or total elimination of human risk’.^  ^ Such is the context within which wars 
must now be fought as ‘a fundamental societal transformation is the intolerance of 
casualties’ according to Edward Luttwak.^^ The concern with tactical risks and RMA 
technologies has been well-documented in academic discourse. While tactical risks do
short sançle includes George and Meredith Friedman, The Future o f  war: Power, technology and 
American world dominance in the 2 P ‘ century, (New York: St Martin’s Griffin, 1996); Robert Bateman 
(ed). Digital War: a view from the front lines, (Novato: Presidio Press, 1999); Michael O’Hanlon, 
Technological Change and the future o f  warfare, (Washington D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2000). For 
an especially techno-centric approach, see James Adams, The Next World War: Computers are the 
Weapons and the Front line is everywhere, (London: Hutchinson Press, 1998)
On environmental concerns, see Jay E. Austin and Carl E. Bruch (eds). The environmental consequences 
o f  war: legal, economic and scientific perspectives, (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
On the political appeal o f non-lethal weapons, see Brian Rappert, Non-Lethal weapons as legitimising 
forces: technology, politics and the management o f  conflict, (London: Frank Cass, 2003)
Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-war: Making sense o f  today ’ s global chaos, (London: Warner 
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influence approaches to war, the main concern of this thesis is managing broader 
systemic risks resulting from globalisation and end of the Cold War.^^
Lawrence Freedman’s Adelphi Paper The Revolution in Strategic Affairs, rightly 
warned that attention must be paid to the impact of political change rather than just 
technology. RMA technologies developed from Cold War needs for usable non-nuclear 
weapons now matched contemporary concerns about casualty-aversion.^^® The revolution 
in strategic affairs, concluded Freedman, was driven more by uncertain political 
conditions and endless permutations of enemies than technological advances. Chris 
Hables Gray similarly emphasised the need for understanding war’s wider discourse 
system rather than just t e c h n o lo g y .T h i s ,  he situated within ‘postmodemity’, 
concluding that we are witnessing ‘post-modern war’ given the prevalence of paradoxical 
situations and contradictory trends. Gray recognised that war was trying to survive 
coherently by reconfiguring and reinventing itself amidst immense changes in technology 
and politics of conflict. Indeed, the inadequacies of focusing on the RMA alone have led 
writers to focus on the wider international and societal trends influencing war. 
Technology and information flows play important parts in contemporary war but it is the 
nature of security concerns today and the way we cope with them that are primary drivers 
for changes in concepts of war.
Post-Clausewitzian war and changing war-forms
The recent resurgence of interest in war derives from broader systemic and societal 
changes previously outlined. When discussing war, the predominant image or concept of 
war in the West has been the Clausewitzian model focused on: 1) the importance of 
decisive battles; 2) ‘noble’ purposes widely backed by moral determination, public 
enthusiasm and contests of will; 3) heroism and courage; 4) speed, momentum and mass; 
and 5) titanic struggles between state actors, mainly Great Powers. With these features, 
the Clausewitzian model derived largely from Napoleonic wars of the modem era, could 
be seen as the ‘maximalist’ counterpart to a more ‘minimalist’ late modem world of the 
insecure anxious Risk Society fighting modest inconclusive wars more concemed with 
averting victimhood than heroism, great causes or decisive battles. Furthermore as Beck
^  I will discuss the interplay between tactical and systemic risks in more detail in Chapter Three.
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suggested, we no longer face clearly defined dangers from Great Powers or peer 
competitors in a Clausewitzian context of states, but more ill-defined enemies and risks. 
What have academics been saying about the Clausewitzian paradigm and has anything 
related to ‘minimalist’ themes of Risk Society been raised that could be developed 
further? Indeed, several authors within the ‘transformation of war’ debate such as Mary 
Kaldor and Martin Van Creveld have suggested the Clausewitzian paradigm is now 
outmoded and in need of replacement.
Kaldor for one believed ‘new wars’ in economically-weak regions are best 
understood in the context of globalisation as a contradictory process of fragmentation and 
in tegra t ion.These breached Clausewitz’s Trinitarian mould in the following respects: 
non-state actors like trans-national NGOs, diasporas, and criminal networks replaced 
state armies, diluting the political essence of Trinitarian war. ‘Identity’ politics replaced 
the ‘geopolitical’ or ‘ideological’ goals of earlier wars. ‘New’ wars also avoid decisive 
battle, targeting civilians instead. In a similar vein but taking a broader historical context, 
Martin Van Creveld discerned a new epoch of ‘non-Trinitarian warfare’, of Low Intensity 
Conflict (LIC) since 1945 at l e a s t . T h e  end of the Cold War further transformed the 
concept of war itself. With terrorists, mercenaries, drug-smugglers motivated less by 
professionalism than religious or ethnic loyalties or individual gain, the idea of state 
actors fighting ‘for’ some noble cause might also become inapplicable. Both authors 
indicated to researchers that wars are fought not so much within traditional contexts of 
inter-state Great Power competition but elusive more complex problems that are non­
state or internal in nature such as terrorism and ethnic cleansing, further complicated by 
globalisation. Van Creveld in particular emphasised that Trinitarian war was not war with 
capital ‘W’ but merely one of many forms war has assumed throughout history and thus 
needs reconfiguring.
Kaldor and Van Creveld are not alone in their dissatisfaction with the 
Clausewitzian paradigm, given the changing international system and societal impacts on 
war. Indeed, Great Powers previously would have exploited the Yugoslav crises to 
maximise influence and power rather than shun them.^®  ^ To Edward Luttwak, ‘post-
pl49. A similar view is expressed in Philip K. Lawrence, Modernity and War, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1997), Chapter 3
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heroic’ wars have no great national purposes suggested by the Clausewitzian paradigm, 
arousing no public enthusiasm. As Michael Clarke similarly noted, the Western world 
was confused. It had far more superior militaries but was convinced their publics do not 
allow them to take risks. ‘Yet it had interests to protect and consciences to salve’. 
Without offering one, Luttwak suggested that only a new post-Napoleonic and post- 
Clausewitzian concept of war could fully exploit and explain any slow cumulative form 
of combat over Napoleonic concepts of mass, momentum, and quick decisive results. 
This would require a patient and modest approach to appreciate partial results when 
doing more would be too costly but doing nothing would hurt world order. Luttwak 
exhibited particularly clearly the need expressed among scholars for more ‘minimahst’ 
approaches to war than the ‘maximalist’ Clausewitzian one. Indeed, viewed collectively, 
according to Andrew Bacevich, the cruise missile strikes in 1998 against Afghanistan and 
the endless policing of no-fly zones over Iraq in fact ‘signified a radical departure from 
past practice’ of overwhelming force and decisive outcomes. As ‘bombing became 
routine, it also became non-controversial’. When it came to military force, post-Cold War 
America ‘followed particular routines. Preferences repeatedly exercised became 
something like habits’. W a r  had become minimalist, more modest in purpose and even 
‘routine’ with little public enthusiasm, without decisive outcomes that have to be 
appreciated rather than heroic successes.
While not necessarily critiquing Clausewitz, these ‘minimalist’ themes also 
resurfaced in Christopher Coker’s Waging War without warriors, where he addressed 
two themes raised by Luttwak and Van Creveld: the end of heroism and erosion of ideas 
of fighting for some ‘noble’ cause, both of which characterise a Risk Society. According 
to Coker, war is no longer about heroic warriors but technicians emotionally detached 
from conflict. The nature of war practised by the West had become more utilitarian and 
instrumental, rather than the previous idea of war as all-encompassing, existential or 
expressive of one’s purpose. ‘Utility is now more important than the act’ and this, argued 
Coker, had an impact of the ‘heroic’ warrior spirit.
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Whether Clausewitz’s writings on war remain valid cannot be resolved 
conclusively given the complexity and broad spectrum of the so-called Clausewitzian 
universe, nor is it the intention here to do so. What is clear from this brief survey 
however is that some ‘maximalist’ Clausewitzian notions of war, be it decisive battles 
with clear starting and ending points, or a great national purpose no longer apply clearly 
as Luttwak and Kaldor have suggested. An alternative more ‘minimalist’ framework 
incorporating notions of Risk Society can thus help to reconceptualise war, which as Van 
Creveld observed, can take many forms. Yet, in Modem Strategy, Colin Gray- 
Clausewitz’s staunchest defender- argued ‘nothing vital to the nature and function of war 
and strategy changes, in sharp contrast to the character of war’.*^® Political goals have 
always been central to war despite the different ways we fight. Clausewitz’s emphasis on 
the holistic analysis of war and historicism also certainly stands the test of time. Such an 
holistic approach would not be complete without incorporating one of the foremost 
concerns of the age: risk. Indeed, Clausewitz’s most quoted statement that war is simply 
the continuation of politics by other means still rings true. War now served as the 
instrument for political goals of risk management. This instrumental view of war would 
also extend Coker’s thesis that war was now increasingly utilitarian.
Conventional meanings of ‘war’ also changed over the second half of the 20^  ^
century. The late 19^  ^ century version meant clear starting points with formal hostilities 
states, followed by peace treaties with neat endings. This is a common perception of what 
war should appear, how it is organised and fought. By the late 20^  ^ century, irregulars 
within states fought ‘war’, while peace agreements like that ending the Gulf War are only 
elements in an ongoing military struggle.^These changes served as a useful starting 
point for the analysis of new features of war as risk management. As suggested so far, 
strict conventional notions of war cannot appreciate the characteristics of recent wars.
While authors within the transformation of war debate such as Van Creveld and 
Kaldor chose to address the Clausewitzian paradigm, others not writing specifically about 
Clausewitz also reached the same conclusion that war was being transformed amidst 
wider changes in society and the international system. Beck’s theme of more complex 
dangers for instance has been reflected in futurists Alvin and Heidi Toffler who 
suggested that rather than a ‘singular threat’ of nuclear war and competition between
Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p i 
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states, we now faced ‘multiple niche threats’ from ethnic cleansing and WMD 
proliferation. To address these dangers, the Tofflers claimed a transition to ‘third wave’ 
knowledge economies now generated distinctive ‘third-wave’ war-forms based on 
information, de-massified destruction, and smart ‘niche soldiers’ such as Special 
F o r c e s . T o  understand how we fought war, they insisted, we needed to understand how 
we made wealth. Despite its overly broad and underdeveloped theoretical nature, the idea 
of a Toftlerian transition generating new war-forms suggests potentially useful insights. 
Does a shift from Industrial Society to Risk Society also herald a new war-form based on 
risk management?
Without wars of survival and, as Beck suggests, no clearly defined enemies but 
risks and dangers, war seemed to be more about ‘policing’ the international order against 
potential disruption from non-state actors, diffused processes such as environmental 
degradation or failed/rogue states, than traditional concerns about Great Power rivalry. 
Even China appeared more intent on joining the system than radically reshaping it. 
Jeremy Black for example concluded war still existed albeit in different forms as 
globalisation increased possibility of conflict with anti-globalists, Islam or rogue states. 
Although military action against rogue states was labelled ‘policing’, war in that guise, 
may become more common in f u tu r e .B la c k  left unanswered the crucial question he 
himself posed: how can states control dissident groups and attain security in such an 
uncertain world? Paul Hirst similarly suggested that the unfair economic structure and 
transformations in technology and economic conditions benefited only advanced states, 
and together with environmental degradation, created potential for dissident forces to 
grow. This meant more wars in future. War, Hirst suggested with more historical insight, 
was also being redefined, as legitimate only against those interfering with free trade, 
reverting to the Liberal era.^ "^^  Hirst and Black suggested to researchers that war was 
perhaps being redefined to rein in disturbances from anti-globalists or rogue states to the 
international order, free trade and globalisation. Yet, as Hirst concluded, these dissident 
forces are presently incapable of replacing the rich, only disturbing them. In other words, 
they posed systemic risks to be managed rather than existential threats.
Toftler, fVar and Anti-war, p .l06. ‘First wave’ war was based on agricultural production, ‘Second 
Wave’ based on industrial means.
Jeremy Black, War in the New Century, (London: Continuum, 2001), p3
Paul Hirst, War and Power in the 2P' Century: The state, military conflict and the international system, 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002)
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In light of such vague dangers, the ‘policing’ metaphor in IR and war is 
increasingly prominent. Richard Haass for example described Post-Cold War America as 
the Reluctant Sherijf, managing the world to allow more benign norms to f lourish.^No- 
fly zones over Iraq were also called ‘policing operations’. These are open-ended 
‘damage-limitation’ operations in a quasi-hostile environment designed neither to defeat 
opposition nor solve underlying problems but simply to make the situation a bit more 
tolerable.^ The Kosovo campaign was seen by Howard Caygill as an example of NATO 
acting as international ‘police’ in its new post-Cold War role managing a ‘condition of 
turbulence’ that might endanger security interests rather than a clearly identifiable enemy 
normally associated with war.’^^  The ‘police’ concept is thus not particularly directed at 
a particular goal or grand narrative, and actually avoids Clausewitzian-style ‘decisive 
battle’. ^ S u c h  emerging concepts of war blurred with ‘policing’ operations are much 
less maximalist than those implied in a Clausewitzian paradigm and perhaps more suited 
for an age of risks rather than clearly defined enemies and Great Power rivalry.
With the changeover from total wars of the past, war was furthermore becoming 
something removed for the West in Colin Mclnnes’ recent Spectator Sport War. The 
central idea that total war has been replaced by spectator sport warfare related to systemic 
and societal changes: post-Cold War operations are no longer plagued by fear of nuclear 
escalation. Societies at large spectate like sports fans through the media instead, with 
different levels of engagement from temporary involvement to obsession, but experience 
is nonetheless removed and disengaged. While wars of survival within the West are 
effectively obsolete, localised wars of choice with the non-West still occur no longer 
subsumed within a previous overarching global contest. Enemies are no longer states, 
societies or even hostile forces but regimes, leaders or individuals, while overwhelmingly 
superior Western forces are expected to suffer no casualties. Wondering if  the Afghan 
campaign was really the ‘new’ type of war it was claimed to be, Colin Mclnnes writing 
later in the Review o f International Studies, concluded that in fact ‘the Afghan campaign
Richard Haass, The Reluctant Sheriff: the United States after the Cold War, (New York: Council on 
Foreign Relations, 1997); and a more recent re-appraisal by Fraser Cameron, US Foreign policy after the 
Cold War: Global hegemon or reluctant sheriff?, (London: Routledge, 2002)
Haass, Intervention, p.60
Howard Caygill, ‘Perpetual Police? Kosovo and the ehsion o f police and military violence’, European 
Journal o f  Social Theory, Vol. 4 N o .l, February 2001, p.74 -76 
Caygill, ‘Perpetual police?’, p.76 
' Colin Mclnnes, Spectator Sport War, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), p2
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bore many hallmarks of Western military operations in the 1990s’ and was not 
fundamentally different from those features he first identified in Spectator Sport War}^^
The analysis of repetitive patterns in war across various cases in combination with 
systemic and societal changes has also proved a fruitful research endeavour for several 
writers. Jeffrey Record, Eliot Cohen and Andrew Bacevich, among others, now suggest a 
combination of societal factors in exaggerated casualty-aversion, and changes in the 
international system where failed/failing states now posed the main source of insecurity 
rather than great power rivalry and existential threats, together with long-range low-risk 
precision technology available for aerial assaults, is in fact creating a ‘new American way 
of war’ in places of previously secondary interest- Somalia, Kosovo to Afj^anistan.^^^ 
Cohen and Bacevich suggest Americans had an ‘unsubtle strategic culture’ and do not 
like such murky causes and war against such second-order or third-order interests, but 
prefer clear ‘noble’ objectives and enemies- a ‘conventional’ notion of war as I have 
suggested. Yet, there were security risks to be managed and this led to US 
‘interventions on the cheap’.
What all these prominent writers share, despite their varying perspectives, is 
considerable broad agreement that war has changed, propelled by transformations in 
society and the international system. These include a society lacking enthusiasm for wars 
or grand purposes, and the notion that we now face not clear military threats from Great 
Power competition but ill-defined dangers which have implications for security interests 
and war. It is precisely these changes that make the transformation of war debate so 
dynamic and multi-faceted. The key sub-texts of Beck’s Risk Society were implicitly 
reflected in the process but not addressed specifically. There is clearly an evident desire 
for articulation of a more subtle ‘minimalist’ approach to war in the post-Cold War era, 
in particular a replacement for ‘maximalist’ Clausewitzian approaches to war
Colin Mclnnes, ‘A different kind o f war? September 11 and the United States’ Afghan war’, Review o f  
International Studies, Vol. 29 No.2, April 2003, p. 178
Jeffrey Record, ‘Collapsed countries, casualty dread and the new American way o f war’. Parameters, 
Vol. XXXII No. 2, Summer 2002, p.4-23. Also Andrew Bacevich and Eliot Cohen (eds). War Over 
Kosovo: Politics and Strategy in a Global Age, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001). Max Boot 
also touched on this issue but appeared more interested in ‘tactical’ approaches than a ‘strategic’ approach 
to war with his focus on military hardware such as UAVs. Max Boot, ‘The New American Way o f War’, 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82 No.4, July/August 2003. Others drew parallels with the ‘British Way o f Warfare’ 
championed by Liddell Hart in the 1930s. Economic sanctions, and surgical operations by mobile, 
technologically superior forces policed a colonial world without close competitors, only local or regional 
rogues. Azar Gat, A History o f  Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to the Cold War, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), p.828
Stephen Biddle, ‘ The new way o f war’. Review Article, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81 No.3, May/June 2002, 
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20020501faessay8063/stephen-biddle/the-new-way-of-war.html
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incorporating systemic and societal changes. It is these issues which this thesis seeks to 
explore through the prism of World Risk Society and associated concepts of ‘risk 
management’.
Humanitarian wars and tentative wars o f  choice: from threats to risks?
Refugee flows and ethnic cleansing constituted key systemic risks relating to 
globalisation in Beck’s World Risk Society paradigm. Beck also highlighted the lack of 
clearly defined enemies but ambiguous risks instead. Furthermore, as discussed earlier, 
policy documents such as NATO’s latest Strategic Concept in 1999 have identified such 
ill-defined risks rather than overwhelming threats from the USSR, as the main security 
challenges in an uncertain world. Indeed, security dangers now stem not from Great 
Power rivalries and state competition but ‘risky’ situations such as ethnic cleansing. 
Unsurprisingly, many writers have addressed this theme of humanitarian intervention as a 
new variant of war which Michael Ignatieff claimed, was now the ‘chief raison d’etre for 
Western armies’. W a r  in the West, according to Christopher Coker, is also being re­
valued with humanism as reasons for waging war and the risk-averse conduct of it due to 
deeper shifts in society’s moral, philosophical and social basis. Making wars more 
humane by minimising suffering on both sides is now the ‘great project in a post­
metaphysical, post-Christian era where we hold ourselves accountable not to God but to 
one another
However as Coker also observed. Western interventions appear tentative and 
uncertain about the real stakes involved, even lacking in moral conviction on a 
supposedly highly-charged moral issue. Although humanitarian objectives may also be 
considered noble and just, these do not evoke the will to sacrifice blood and treasure. 
There is less glory and even fewer heroes in such operations. Victims are highlighted 
instead, from victims of ethnic cleansing to interveners shot down as victims of war. 
These were after all not wars of survival against clear specific threats but more wars of 
choice against ambiguous security risks in an uncertain strategic and societal context.
The tentative nature of humanitarian intervention is manifest in several works and 
highlights the difficulties of the human rights discourse in war. Ignatieff thus sought to 
illuminate why nations never more immune to risks of war should remain so unwilling to 
run them. ‘Virtual’ aspects of war over Kosovo, to Ignatieff, permeated the conflict, from
Michael Ignatieff, Virtual War, (London: Chatto & Windus, 2000), p. 162-3 
Christopher Coker, Humane Warfare, (London: Routledge, 2001), p.4
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how ‘virtual’ RMA technologies mitigated death for both sides to ‘virtual’ ‘victory’, with 
no final political s e t t le m e n t /‘Virtual war’ without sacrifice had dangerous potential for 
ignoring the bloody reality of war. Values are not worth much, lamented Ignatieff, if 
impunity is necessary before they are defended. A similar conclusion is reached in James 
Der Derian’s Virtuous War, where technology works in the service of virtue, with the 
ethical imperative to inflict violence fi’om a distance with no or minimal casualties. 
Violence is sanitized by promoting humanitarian hygienic wars where death is out of 
sight. Der Derian raised important concerns about whether virtuous war is replacing the 
reality of war by killing without responsibility. The support of moral values apparently 
again stopped short of incurring casualties.
Other recent contributions highlighted the theme of humanitarian intervention and 
its problems. Without the ‘Soviet threat’ and not limited by the Soviet deterrent, argued 
David Chandler, war was increasingly situated within the discourse of humanitarian 
interventions and human rights, given the apparent demise of ideological or structural 
explanations for conflict. Chandler suggested that talk of human rights from Kosovo to 
Kabul was simply a fig leaf for Great Power domination over weaker states, gravely 
undermining sovereignty and international law. However he was perhaps too quick to 
dismiss structural causes for conflict. In fact, globalisation and its associated security 
risks, as we have seen, has been a key shared theme in these recent wars. It is true 
however that previous ideological explanations for war are no more. This partly 
explained why intervention was undertaken in a context of casualty intolerance on the 
part of interveners, as pointed out by Colin Mclnnes. Airpower was the appropriate 
instrument in this political context yet it would prove largely ineffectual against events on 
the ground and cannot act alone without the threat of ground forces or wider diplomatic 
efforts. The overall picture that emerges is again one of tentative interventions where 
means selected did not quite match desired ends or rhetorical proclamations.
The discourse of ‘human rights’ is one angle to approach war but while important, 
it does not adequately explain recent wars against Afghanistan and Iraq and not even the 
ostensibly humanitarian intervention in Kosovo as the writers surveyed above
Ignatieff, Virtual War, p. 138
James Der Derian, Virtuous War: Mapping the military-industrial-media-entertainment network, 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001), xv
David Chandler, From Kosovo to Kabul: human rights and international intervention, (London: Pluto 
Press, 2002)
Colin Mclnnes, ‘Fatal attraction? Air Power and the West’, in Colin Mclnnes and Nicholas Wheeler 
(eds). Dimensions o f  Western military intervention, (London: Frank Cass, 2002)
60
demonstrated/^^ The debate on Iraq for example revolved around ‘risk’: the risk of 
Saddam acquiring WMD or allying with A1 Q aeda /R em oving  the Taliban and terrorist 
sanctuaries in Afghanistan served to reduce the risk of further terror attacks. Human 
rights rhetoric in both cases were tacked on apparently only as an afterthought. 
Furthermore, the works of Coker, Der Derian and Ignatieff revealed their shared concern 
that recent Western interventions were hesitant about the real interests involved despite 
high-sounding rhetorics. Coker summed up it well: humanitarian wars lacked moral 
purpose associated with imperialism that could justify losses and indefinite occupation. 
The West intervened not for grand historical purposes or metanarratives but to manage 
problems with minimal casualties. Humane warfare is thus unsustainable since we remain 
reluctant to sacrifice too much for it.^ ^^  It was purely utilitarian. Der Derian in particular 
feared that the Pentagon was more concemed with the condition of ‘uncertainty’ and 
‘virtual enemy’ than any clearly defined enemy or t h r e a t . T h e  Serbs after all were only 
‘virtual enemies’ according to Ignatieff since insecure Western societies did not seek 
mass démonisation to bolster their already weak convictions on the issue.
Rather than clearly defined existential ‘threats’, this lack of an identifiable enemy 
suggested that society was not only lacking in conviction but also we were more 
concemed about a condition of uncertainty and amorphous systemic ‘risks’ instead. 
Uncertainty is ultimately concemed with risk components of probabilities and 
consequences, of what might happen if no action was taken, rather than Cold War-style 
evaluation of an enemy’s concrete military capabilities and intentions posing an 
existential ‘threat’. This has been underemphasised in the discourse.
IV. Conclusion
This chapter has described both the emerging strategic context associated with 
globalisation, and explored major works on war in the post-Cold War world according to 
themes raised in the wider intemational environment and also Ulrich Beck’s works. It
Ignatieff later suggested that despite humanitarian rhetoric, the Kosovo cançaign, the Afghanistan and 
Iraq wars after 9/11 shared an overall ‘imperial’ framework. Michael Ignatieff, Empire-lite: nationbuilding 
in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, (London: Vintage, 2003). This ‘empire’ discourse will be addressed in the 
Conclusion
A point grasped also by Robert J. Samuelson, ‘Rediscovering Risk’, Washington Post, 23 October 2002 
Christopher Coker, Humane Warfare, (London: Routledge, 2001), p.l28. And Clarke, ‘ War in the new 
intemational order’, p.668
James Der Derian, ‘Global events, national security and virtual theory’. Millennium, Vol.
30 No. 3, December 2001, p.676-677, 680 
Ignatieff, Virtual War, p. 138
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was suggested that globalisation brought with it security risks such as ethnic instability, 
WMD proliferation, failed states, and trans-national terrorism among others. 
Furthermore, the end of Cold War constraints, which might have helped keep these issues 
in check, complicated the risks in question. As classical ‘net assessment’ of threats in 
actuarial terms of capabilities and intentions is increasingly untenable. Uncertainty and 
probabilistic risk scenarios rather than the overwhelming Soviet threat now prompt 
precautionary action in a strategic context of globalised risks. Today policymakers 
contemplate proactively ‘shaping the environment’ rather than ‘reactive’ strategies of the 
past such as containment.
Although less prominent in IR, Beck’s World Risk Society thesis provided 
considerable explanatory power for this new globalised environment even before 9/11 
and especially after. Just as Beck emphasised preventive approaches to risk, IR writers 
such as Carter, Perry, and Steinbrunner have prescribed preventive policies. Cooper and 
Rogers also warned that globalisation carries risks but both did not give due recognition 
to the role of war in managing these systemic risks. The ‘risk’ concept has cropped up 
intermittently in literature surveyed and also in the broader strategic context, but no 
scholars (not even Beck) have so far adopted ‘risk management’ as the centrepiece of an 
attempt to understand war and our world. Several writers have incorporated ideas and 
concepts related to ‘risk’ but only Coker and Rasmussen have so far adopted a rather 
more systematic approach to understanding the implications of Beck’s Risk Society 
paradigm in IR. Yet even they did not investigate in detail the key concepts of ‘risk 
management’ in relation to systemic risks and warfare, nor incorporate the wider richer 
body of literature on ‘risk’ beyond Beck’s sociological works that will be explored next 
in Chapter Three. Other scholars have drawn attention to the prominence of ‘risk’ in 
warfare but chose instead to highlight the importance of RMA technologies for example 
in managing tactical risks such as casualties or collateral damage
That war is changing is not a new notion as the wider ‘transformation of war’ 
debate has been ongoing for the past decade ft-om Van Creveld’s 1991 effort The 
Transformation o f  War to Kaldor’s New Wars and Old Wars in 1999. As Ignatieff, 
Mclnnes and Der Derian also show, war for the post-industrial West has been reinvented 
either as, humanitarian intervention, ‘spectator sport’ war or ‘virtuous war’. Observers 
from the Tofflers to Chris Gray agree war has reconfigured itself and simply assumed 
different war forms, based on observations of broad transitions in society and the 
intemational system. The accounts offered above are compelling in their own right and
62
reveal different aspects of contemporary war. Authors such as Chandler and Ignatieff 
have raised questions about the ‘humanitarian intervention’ discourse on war where 
actions did not quite match humanitarian rhetoric and indeed cannot adequately explain 
the wars in question from Kosovo to Iraq. Furthermore, Luttwak and Van Creveld have 
suggested more ‘maximalist’ Clausewitzian concepts of war- ‘noble’ purposes, heroism, 
speed, mass, momentum and the importance of decisive victories with clear-cut ends - are 
now in need of replacement. Yet Clausewitz’s emphasis on historicism and holistic 
analyses of war remain relevant as Colin Gray argued. In particular, Coker realised the 
need for security in a post-metaphysical age which lacks will and purpose.
One promising avenue of inquiry that might suggest answers to these concerns 
and themes raised has been largely passed over in the literature reviewed above: risk 
management. More modestly managing systemic risks for utilitarian purposes and 
appreciating cumulative partial results, instead of achieving unequivocal victories guided 
by grand historical or even moral narratives such as human rights is a more accurate 
representation of recent wars. This study undertaken here, is to the best of my knowledge, 
the first to analyse war specifically through the prism of World Risk Society and ‘risk 
management’ in an age of globalisation and end of Cold War constraints. Concepts of 
risk management in fact increasingly guide the West’s wars and it is thus to the 
theoretical framework employed in this study that we now turn to in detail in the next 
chapter.
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CHAPTER THREE 
Risk management, IR and war
Introduction
Having previously highlighted the prominence of risk concepts, the crucial task of this 
chapter is to delve deeper into the wider theories relating specifically to Risk Society 
and risk management and in so doing provide a working framework to facilitate 
systematic analysis undertaken in the following chapters. This is not only an essential 
part of understanding the concepts involved but also because this discussion can go 
some way towards answering the question of how risk management concepts help 
meet the need for a more ‘minimalist’ concept of war highlighted in the previous 
chapter.
To attain some precision in the theory developed, the first section sets 
conceptual parameters to avoid circumstances where this theory would not apply. It 
then proceeds to discuss definitions of key terms. For conceptual clarity, I explore the 
limits and difficulties of operationalising an ambiguous concept like ‘risk’ for 
analytical purposes in IR. After demonstrating how scholars have addressed, or more 
commonly neglected this issue, a working definition of ‘risk’ encapsulating its core 
characteristics is offered, although an ideal definition admittedly is impossible. The 
third part of the chapter provides the inter-disciplinary theoretical background to this 
study by integrating a broad range of thematically related yet academically dissociated 
literature. Sociology and criminology in particular have placed risk and risk 
management prominently on their research agendas. The Risk Society thesis of 
sociologists Niklas Luhmann, Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and others, provides a 
core but by no means totally exclusive, conceptual fi*ame for understanding 
implications for comparative trends in strategic studies. I also utilise the observations 
of other risk theorists such as John Adams and Mary Douglas who do not necessarily 
fall within the Risk Society school. Late-modem criminology has also experienced 
contemporaneous paradigmatic shifts towards ‘New Penology’ and proactive risk 
management strategies in policing that warrant exploration in the theoretical 
fi'amework developed here. The final section addresses specific nuances and
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complexities of risk management the concept itself, and two features that may be 
relevant to this study: surveillance and the precautionary principle.
Rather than furnish a water-tight methodology, the dual purposes here are to: 
firstly highlight the limits of applying an inter-disciplinary study of risk to IR; and in 
so doing derive a reasonably consistent thematic matrix fi’om sociology and 
criminology to examine aspects of war through the prism of risk management.
1. Risk Management, not Perception
In the study of risk, risk perception and assessment have attracted most research 
attention. John Adams categorised everyone as a ‘risk expert’ because individual 
backgrounds and experiences influence risk perceptions. Perceptions also depend on 
how risk is shaped and occasionally misrepresented by NGOs, media, politicians, 
‘talking head’ experts, and a country’s political culture.^ Mary Douglas and Aaron 
Wildavsky claimed there is in fact no increase in real risks, only in perceived risks 
because very influential social actors claimed so.^ This is a complex debate which I 
will not go into much detail. The politics of risk definition has assumed utmost 
importance, as successfully asserted definitions are a ‘magic political wand’ to which 
most resources and policies must flow.^
There are ample IR works and the Copenhagen School’s ‘securitization’ 
approach demonstrating how risks are socially constructed through Ole Weaver’s 
‘speech act’. Rasmussen’s constructivist analysis of how NATO defined its post-Cold 
War threats is another."  ^ This study does not address nor contribute to this body of 
knowledge but acknowledges such approaches exist. It should be stated unequivocally 
here that research presented here is not predominantly about constructivism, risk 
perception or assessment. Instead, as a theoretical effort in strategic studies, it 
concentrates on providing a coherent conceptual fi'amework to analysing use of 
organised military force for political purposes of managing risks. Indeed, as I have 
suggested in Chapter Two, Rasmussen’s work has addressed the constructivist aspect 
of Beck’s works. This study focuses on managing the risk aspect.
' See an analysis o f the various societal actors involved in defining risks in Stuart Allan, Barbara 
Adam, & Cynthia Carter, Environmental Risks and the media, (London: Routledge, 2000)
 ^See the discussion o f Douglas in Deborah Lupton, Risk, (London: Routledge, 1999) p38 
 ^Ulrich Beck, What is globalisation?, trans. by Patrick Camiller, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), plOO 
 ^See Johan Eriksson (ed). Threat politics: new perspectives on security, risk and crisis management, 
(Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2001); Mikkel Rasmussen, ‘Reflexive security: NATO and 
Intemational Risk Society, Millennium:Journal o f  Intemational Studies, Vol. 30 N o .2 ,2001, p.285-310
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Nonetheless, this study accepts that risk is culturally constructed, and 
subjective perceptions vary among and within societies. It is impossible to ignore this 
fact. Ulrich Beck appeared to incorporate both a realist and weak constructivist 
approach- there are objective ‘real’ risks but the nature of risk is conceptualised 
differently in the West compared to earlier eras and other societies.^ Furthermore, 
risks do not simply exist ‘in themselves’. They become a political issue also when 
people are made aware of them, strategically defined by media or politicians.^ This 
thesis thus adopts a ‘Realist constructivist’ perspective, recognising that some 
dynamic interplay exists between material and cultural factors. Risks are socially and 
culturally predicated as far as we choose and define which risks to address. Its focus 
however is Realist in that it is concemed with questions of war and security, and how 
policymakers apply definitions of the situation in dealing with the world.
As the executive director of America’s Federal Commission on Risk 
Assessment and Risk Management commented, ‘many reports have been written about 
how to improve risk assessments, but very few addressed what you do with the risk 
assessment, which is the point. The goal after all is risk reduction, not developing 
quantitative descriptions of risk’.^  Ultimately, Beck concedes the question of how and 
whether a risk is constructed or real is irrelevant. What matters is the actualisation of 
risk in policymakers minds, how it is responded to and acted upon.* I share this focus.
The conceptual language of risk is increasingly a discursive framework within 
which responses to problems are conceived, designed and legitimated. As a Cabinet 
Office Strategy Unit report noted, ‘the language of risk is now used to cover a wide 
range of different types of issues’ from terror attacks to BSE, and railways.^ While 
cognisant that vested interests may employ the language of risk as a fig leaf to 
legitimate policies, analysis undertaken here centres only on information available in 
the public record, not hidden agendas or conspiracy theories which by definition are 
difficult to verify. As with all wars, there are multiple reasons for war. The suggestion
 ^For this view, see Lupton, Risk, p. 59-60
Ulrich Beck, World Risk Society, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), p.22 
’ Quoted in Amy Charlene Reed, ‘Federal Commission Proposes Risk Management Framework’, 
RiskWorld News, http://www.riskworld.com/NEWS/96Ql/nw5aa010.htm. 13 June 1996
* See Barbara Adam & Joost Van Loon, ‘Repositioning Risk: the challenge for social theory’, in 
Barbara Adam, Ulrich Beck and Joost Van Loon (eds), The Risk Society and Beyond: Critical Issues 
fo r  Social Theory, (London: Sage Publications, 2000), p.24
 ^Cabinet Office Strategy Unit, Risk: improving government’s capacity to handle risk and uncertainty, 
November 2002, London, available at:
http ://www. strategy, gov.uk/2002/risk/risk/report/report/summary/summary .htm#bkOO 1
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that managing risks could be one certainly does not preclude other possible 
justifications.
This study suggests that the rise of war as risk management can be understood 
in light of similar social, political and economic trends studied in sociology and 
criminology. Information presented will thus be analysed within an inter-disciplinary 
fi'amework, assessing how far certain concepts of risk management can have 
empirical relevance to contemporary warfare. The methodology combines deductive- 
theoretical tools with an inductive empirical approach using case studies in recent 
real-world contexts. It seeks ‘a parallel demonstration of theory’ by explicating a 
particular theory, then demonstrating and interrogating its utility applied to case 
studies .While many current concerns could benefit firom this approach, constraints 
of space and time dictate that only a few are studied in detail.
II: Risk and its nuances
The Problem of Definition
Risk is the ‘defining characteristic of our age’, and one of the most powerful concepts 
in contemporary life.^  ^ It is broadly applicable, yet riddled with complex subtleties. 
‘Risk’ remains an imprecise and slippery concept despite rapidly growing literature on 
it. It manifests in varying ‘risk domains’ firom economic investment, accounting 
scandals to food safety, nuclear energy and terrorism. Furthermore, risk has acquired 
multiple meanings fi'om probability (risk of terrorism), to consequences (risks to 
security produced by ethnic cleansing), to describing perilous situations. (Saddam 
Hussein ‘poses risks’ or is a ‘risk to peace’) Risk can form part of a strategic 
calculation, exist materially on its own or often overlap between the two. It can be a 
normative concept implying the desirability of avoidance actions or a purely 
descriptive one. When policymakers warn ‘we face new risks’ they are simply 
describing a situation, or they can argue ‘the risks of inaction outweigh the risk of 
action’ in justifying decisions. Where possible throughout this thesis, it will be 
indicated whether risk is used as a descriptive term, normative one or combination of 
both. Mostly it involved a combination of both. This thesis does not believe a rigid
See Rose McDermott, Risk-taking in intemational politics: Prospect Theory in US Foreign Policy, 
(Ann Arbor: University o f Michigan Press, 1998), p9
" John Adams, Risk, (London: UCL Press, 1995), p. 180
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usage of risk will be helpful to understanding various real-life conditions where it has 
been employed. Instead, it strives for a measure of conceptual precision by defining 
essential components of the concept as theoretical guideposts while employing the 
multifaceted concept in a broad manner reflecting its complexity and richness.
Fortunately, IR has always dealt with what W.B. Gallie called ‘essentially 
contested concep ts 'such  as ‘National Interest’, and ‘Power’. IR has thrived partly 
because it used general observations that stoke debate. Arnold Wolfers’ article 
'National Security as an Ambiguous symboV warned the concept of ‘security’ ‘may 
not have any precise meaning at all’; Barry Buzan noted ‘security’ is a ‘weakly 
conceptualised but politically powerful concept which can provide a useful 
perspective to IR’.^  ^ These are as imprecise as they are influential concepts that 
deserve study, requiring additional analysis to identify boundaries of application, 
internal contradictions and relevance of new developments. Ulrich Beck appeared 
more intent on understanding the implications and political significance of risk than 
defining the concept. However, it is worthwhile dissecting the concept in some detail. 
Although precise definitions are elusive, this study suggests one not hoping it will 
gamer universal agreement (an impossible task) but simply as a foundation stone for 
my theoretical framework. By providing reasonably clear markers of risk and refining 
its various forms and meaning within specific IR contexts, lack of an overall 
definition should not preclude theoretical enterprise or empirical verification
Risk: historical connotations
Humankind has always faced danger and uncertainty about the future panics in the 
past could be situated within magic or a Christian context of Bible, judgment and 
apocalypse. These provided the West conceptual and behavioural means of coping 
with dangers such as demons, death and disease. The original meaning of risk fell 
within this context.
Risk is not a new concept with origins dating to at least the Renaissance, 
supposedly deriving from the Italian ‘risico’ meaning dangers of maritime voyages 
from storms and rocks. The concept of risk then excluded ideas of human fault but 
was largely attributed to acts of God or force majeure. People saw the world in terms
W.B. Gallic, ‘Essentially contested concepts’, in Max Black (ed), The importance o f  language, 
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1962), pl21-46  
Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear, (2“** ed), (Hemel Hençstead: Harvester, 1991), p.3
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of fate, luck or random events beyond control. Personal decisions assumed less 
significance than it currently does. Changes came with modernity and science, 
rational thinking, progress and order. Risk became probabilistic and scienticised 
where all probabilities were technically calculable and controllable, confident in the 
powers of rationalisation. By the 19^  ^ century, it extended to human conduct and 
society.
Contemporary risk however focuses on what Beck called incalculable 
‘manufactured risks’ as outcomes of science and technology. These are uncontrollable 
and unknowable and can no longer be transformed into rationalised calculable risks. 
In the West where control over one’s life is paramount, ‘risk’ replaced older ideas 
about causes of misfortune such as sin, and even more secular notions of ‘accidents’. 
More importantly, ‘risk’ now assumes human responsibility as causes of risk, and that 
something can be done to avoid harm.*^ This focus on risk suited an increasingly 
secular culture. To Beck, risk can be a modem notion that unanticipated results may 
occur due to our own activities or decisions, rather than fate or nature. But 
increasingly, we confi*ont globalised high-intensity risks such as nuclear meltdown, 
remote firom personal choice but a result of someone’s actions. Global risks are now 
the focus rather than more personal ones of early modernity. These are of 
unprecedented scale which can no longer be delimited spatially or temporally. This 
fuels even more motivation to manage involuntary risks.
The world faces the same old risks and many new ones. An important 
distinction is that of human responsibility. Even ‘old’ risks such as disease, famine 
and floods are no longer seen as acts of God but traced to avoidable human activities. 
The Ebola virus was attributed to human logging. Cancer and AIDS are not about 
‘divine judgments’ but failure to manage risks. The previous no-fault paradigm of 
disease has been replaced by the at-fault paradigm. Potential victims have 
responsibility to self-manage risks. It is their fault if they fail to act preventively. In 
extreme cases, ‘pre-emptive’ surgery is suggested to avoid high-risk cancers.
Risk has increasingly displaced words like danger, hazard or threat. It has 
gained new uses and political prominence. To Mary Douglas, ‘risk’ resonated with 
political claims in vogue, ‘the language of risk is reserved as specialised lexical
Lupton, Risk, p.3
‘Surgery is best option for high-risk cancers’, The Times, 28 Sep 2002; also M Greco, ‘Psychomatic 
subjects and ‘duty to be well’. Economy and Society, Vol 22 No. 3, 1993
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register for political talk about undesirable o u t c o m e s ‘Risk’ legitimates or 
discredits policy, and can be a political weapon to blame others for bads that happen. 
Politicians declaring something ‘at risk’ are more likely to get attention by sounding 
quasi-scientific rather than simply being ‘concerned’. Douglas argued that ‘risk’ 
replaced ‘danger’ also because it formed part of a complex of new ideas, globalisation 
and heightened vulnerability to dangers. Governments have to provide new forms of 
protection especially in a litigious culture. What was passively accepted as inevitable 
is no more. Accidents like children being run over or failures in cancer screening are 
seen as ‘avoidable failures’, and the ‘system’ blamed for not managing risks.
The idea of being ‘at risk’ is now equivalent to being ‘sinned against’. We 
adopt the role of ‘potential victim’, threatened by risks imposed by others or one’s 
inactions, rather than previously bringing retribution to oneself through one’s ‘sinful’ 
actions. Ribbons now indicate empathy with victimhood such as red ribbons for 
AIDS awareness. Rather than flag waving for ‘heroic’ soldiers fighting a noble cause, 
we don yellow ribbons and lay wreaths outside bases. The politics of victimhood 
trumps old-fashioned patriotism. The ‘Unknown Victim’ now has a memorial much 
like the ‘Tomb of the Unknown Soldier’.
Some suggested definitions
Little is precise about ‘risk’ and no commonly accepted definition can exhaust its 
meaning and usage. However, all risk concepts share one common element: the 
distinction between reality and possibility.^^ Risk is thus associated with the 
possibility that an adverse state of reality may occur as a result of natural events or 
human action. Risk would be irrelevant if the future was fated or independent of 
human action. It implies contingent losses resultant from contingent events. These 
consequences are, more importantly, viewed from a non-fatalistic viewpoint, so they 
can theoretically be altered through either modifying the initiative activity or 
mitigating its impacts.^®
Mary Douglas, Risk and Blame: essays in cultural theory, (London: Routledge: 1992), p. 14, 24 
Douglas, Risk and Blame, p.24
Mick Hume, ‘Are they heroes or victims? We’re tying ourselves in knots with yellow ribbon’. The 
Times, 31 March 2003
Andreas Klinke and Ortwin Renn, ‘Precautionary Principle and discursive strategies: classifying and 
managing risks’, Journal o f  Risk Research, Vol. 4 No. 2, April 2001, p 159 
See Ortwin Renn, ‘Three decades of risk research: accomphshments and new challenges’, p,50 and 
Eugene A. Rosa, ‘Metatheoretical foundations for post-normal risk, p.28 Journal O f Risk Research, Vol 
1 No 1, Jan 1998', Frank Furedi, The Culture o f  Fear, (London: Cassell,) 1998, p l7
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Frank Knight in the 1920s distinguished between uncertainty and risk. The 
classic technical meaning of risk lay in formal probability theory within the domain of 
economics and decision analysis. It depended on conditions in which probability 
estimates of an event and all possible outcomes are known. But this is only one 
meaning of risk. In many other cases assigning probability figures is impossible such 
as ‘social risks’ or ‘security risks’. Uncertainty meant immeasurable probabilities 
since theoretical and empirical basis for assigning probabilities were unknown. 
Uncertainty meant not knowing the odds or outcomes, while risk meant knowing the 
odds and possible outcomes but not exactly what would happen. ‘Risk’ and 
‘uncertainty’ were nominally and formally separate ideas but each is now associated 
with the other. This is a ‘fundamental difficulty in the narrow risk approach’ which is 
strictly compartmentalised. The colloquial synonymous usage of ‘risk’ and 
‘uncertainty’ created confusion as their strict formal definitions has become largely 
obscure.^^ The formal distinction between risk and uncertainty now appeared 
untenable and made no practical sense as applied throughout this study to ambiguous 
and linquantifiable security risks.
The previously neutral concept of ‘risk’ used in economics and marine 
insurance incorporated probability of both losses and gains. Risk comprised two 
dimensions: a positive element of investment decisions, financial gains or 
psychological thrill-seeking; and a negative element endangering security and safety. 
Lacking its previous positive connotations, risk now means simply unacceptable 
‘danger, and negative outcomes’, without the original number-crunching of 
probability multiplied with magnitude of losses and gains.^^ Rather than narrowly 
scientific definitions of risk as quantifiable probability, John Adams adopts a broader 
definition of risk as unquantifiable ‘danger, hazard, exposure to mischance or peril’. 
Risk in this sense embodies the concepts of probability and magnitude found in 
quantified technical definitions of risk but does not insist they be precisely knowable, 
an impractical proposition.^^ In lay parlance, ‘risk’ is now used to describe 
phenomenon that has potential to deliver substantial harm, regardless of whether 
probability of harm is estimable.^"  ^This definition is adopted here.
Tim O’Rlordan, James Cameron and Andrew Jordan (eds), Reinterpreting the Precautionary 
Principle, (London: Cameron May, 2002), p77 
Mary Douglas, Risk and Blame: essays in cultural theory, (London: Routledge: 1992), p.22 
Adams, Risk, p.26-27 
Lupton, Risk, p9-10
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Types of risk and their characteristics
Risks comprise:
i) socio-political risks from internal or external foes
ii) economic risks
iii) natural risks from ecological dangers
iv) technological risks from science.
These often overlap. Human behaviour can combine technology and WMD. Social 
risks include negative externalities from choices and actions of one party creating 
risks for others. Terrorism and drunk driving are common externally imposed risks.^^ 
Beck’s narrow definition of ‘manufactured risk’ discussed later, fails to capture the 
complexity of the concept. Some risks are knowable and perceived through scientific 
knowledge (using a microscope to see bacteria). Others can be perceived directly such 
as rock climbing. The last and most controversial are ‘Virtual Risks’ ( ‘risk of a risk’ 
or ‘unknown unknown’) where experts cannot agree or do not know enough. These 
include BSE, global warming, mobile phones and terrorism. The figure below 
demonstrates the often interlinked nature of risks.^^
Fig 1 : Risks Perceived through 
cience
Perceive
Directly
Virtual 
Risk
Royal Society, Risk: Analysis, perception and management, (London: Royal Society, 1992), p. 13, 
p.135
John Adams, ‘Frameworks for thinking about risk’. Paper presented at Goodenough-Chevening 
Conference on Risk, 11 April 2002, Goodenough College, London,
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Approaches to risk
There are differing approaches to risk. Cognitive psychologists focus on perception; 
professional risk assessors and insurers prefer quantitative approaches; sociologists 
study the broader significance of risk. An institutional approach addresses rules and 
norms and how organisations manage risk. There is no ‘correct’ approach to risk. The 
emphasis placed on particular aspects varies according to concerns of analysts and 
inherent limits of case studies.
Britain’s Royal Society in 1992 witnessed such disagreement about the nature 
and meaning of risk- ‘scientific’ risk, and ‘perceived’ risk- that its report on risk was 
issued not in the Society’s name but a ‘study group’. As Paul Slovic argued, where 
experts describe ‘real’ or ‘scientific’ risk in ‘objective’ narrow quantitative ways 
through formal technical mathematical models, the public has a more complex 
qualitative approach to ‘perceived risk’. There is no ‘single correct perception of risk’. 
Slovic, the father of risk perceptions, outlined three dimensions of risk:
i) the dread factor (emphasising lack of control, catastrophic potential, fatal 
effects, unfair distribution)
ii) the unknown factor (risk tends to be overestimated if  it is novel, 
unobservable with relatively unknown consequences)
iii) scale of risk (the number of people exposed).
Risks due to human action or novel technologies are especially feared such as 
weapons of mass destruction. This ‘contextualist view of risk’ is subjective, value­
laden and multi-dimensional.^^ It embodies not only traditional risk parameters of 
probabilities and consequences but also takes into account individual or collective 
risk, catastrophic potential, voluntariness, dramatic coverage and so on. A narrow 
definition of risk confined to numerical models is sufficient only if probability and 
consequence are well-known. Risks such as terrorism are now incalculable or hard to 
predict compared to earlier calculable risks such as earthquakes, subject to private 
insurance. We now face ‘hard-to-manage risks’ rather than ‘quantifiable risks’.^  ^
After September 11, the private insurance sector ‘cannot insure risks that are infinite
Howard Kunreuther and Paul Slovic, ‘Science, values and risk’, in Howard Kunreuther and Paul 
Slovic (ed). Challenges in risk assessment and risk management: Special Volume, The Annals o f  the 
American Academyof Political and Social Science, Vol. 545, May 1995,p.l22 
Ulrich Beck, World Risk Society, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), p31
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and impossible to p r i c e T h i s  thesis adopts a qualitative social science approach to 
risk rather than quantitative ‘scientific’ approaches and formal mathematical tools.
A taxonomy of risk could look like this:
More acceptable risks Unacceptable risks
Voluntarily undertaken Involuntary
Individual control, ‘extreme 
sports’
Loss of individual control
Naturally occurring risks Man-made, a result of human 
activities or science and technology
Latent, slow-developing or 
ongoing long-term harm of 
low impact such as car 
accidents
Catastrophic potential, sudden and 
dramatic such as terrorism
Reversible impacts Irreversible impacts
Source: Professor Rod Smith, ‘Risk And Society- Is science dangerous’, Imperial 
College and LSE Joint Lecture Series, 11 March 2002, London School of Economics, 
London
It is essential to specify carefully what risks are addressed in this thesis since risk is 
complex and multi-faceted as we have seen. The risks in question possess some 
‘tombstone-ability’: the capacity to produce deaths or victims through dramatic 
catastrophes that command media coverage and focus public opinion. Tragedies 
provide ‘policy windows’ for policy changes.^^ Security risks to be studied were 
selected based on criteria viewed as most unacceptable to society and attract 
policymakers’ attentions:
i) high levels of incertitude on probability of occurrence
ii) dramatic and catastrophic potential outcomes
iii) involuntary and imposed, collective rather than individual
‘US Securities and Insurance industries: Keeping the promise’, Hearing o f the House Financial 
Services Committee, 107* Congress, 1®‘ session, 26 Sep 2001 
Christopher Hood, Henry Rothstein and Robert Baldwin, The Government o f  Risk: Understanding 
Risk Regulation Regimes, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 140
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iv) irreversible harm, difficult to control
v) adverse consequences for which decisionmakers think they will be held 
accountable
vi) where future outcomes are novel and hard to predict, risks that are 
analogous or uppermost in decisionmakers' minds might be extrapolated to 
the original risk in question.
Throughout this thesis, 2 sets of risks are discernible: systemic risks posed by 
problems such Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, terrorism and ethnic cleansing; and tactical 
risks posed by a policy remedy including allied or civilian casualties. These risks are 
dynamic and can evolve in intensity according to circumstances. As discussed in 
Chapter Two, tactical risks have solicited most attention. In a recent classified study 
done for Donald Rumsfeld by Richard Schultz, Tufts University expert on 
unconventional warfare, even US Special Forces Command was found to be 
hamstrung from aggressively hunting A1 Qaeda by a culture of ‘risk-aversion’ and 
safety. An ostensibly ‘tactical’ risk such as incurring friendly or civilian casualties 
could evolve into ‘strategic’ impact in terms of policymakers losing public support 
and political office.
Nonetheless, this thesis is largely concerned with what Ulrich Beck and 
Blair’s Cabinet Office Strategy Unit termed ‘systemic risks [which are] now high on 
the agenda of many countries’. ‘Systemic’ risk, arises from peculiarities of the 
international structure where ethnic tensions, terrorist flows, destabilised or rogue 
states have broken free of Cold War control systems. Globalisation, greater 
connectedness of infrastructure, and media coverage also mean that citizens are aware 
and potentially more vulnerable to economic crises and indirect impact of civil wars 
half a world away, diseases and terrorist networks. NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept 
cautioned against the ‘spilling over’ of ‘serious economic, social and political 
difficulties’ in countries ‘in and around the Euro-Atlantic area’. With globalisation 
and instant media, risks ‘proliferate’ to the West easily. An ostensibly marginal
See Ulrich Beck, ‘The World Risk Society Revisited; the terrorist threat’, LSE Public Lecture, 13 
February 2002,London ; Cabinet Office Strategy Unit report. Risk
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location like the Balkans can become symbolically strategic with images of genocide 
and instability broadcast through global media.^^
‘Risk’,’ Threat’ or ‘Hazard’?
These terms are used interchangeably and loosely by policymakers and scholars, 
further complicating what is already a complex subject matter. ‘Hazard’ is often used 
in health and safety and the environment. ‘Threat’ is often associated with security. 
‘Hazards’ or ‘threats’ may be ‘physical entities, conditions, substances, activities 
capable of causing harm’, a ‘condition which introduces the possibility that loss, or 
damage will result’. In this sense, ‘hazards’ or ‘threats’ are objects of risk 
management to reduce the possibilities.^^
However there is no universal acceptance on terminologies described above. 
Some suggest that ‘threat’ implies an imminent well-defined danger very close in time 
and highly likely to strike but this definition is hard to support. Others such as Johan 
Eriksson, betraying some fiustration, argued that ‘threats, risks, dangers- or whatever 
they are called- are social constructions’.^ "^  Eriksson’s collaborators concurred that 
any difference between ‘risk’ and ‘threat’, is hardly of any practical importance. 
Technical definitions might not be understood in everyday language. So risk, hazard 
and threat, to them are synonyms, defined according to its everyday usage. Mikkel 
Rasmussen asserted ‘risks’ were post-Cold War ‘threats of the times’ without 
exploring in detail subtle differences between ‘risk’ and ‘threat’. Rasmussen further 
claimed that ‘in risk society, threats are often the consequences of one’s own 
actions’. T h i s  is a limited conceptualisation of risk where the more pertinent 
concerns are those dangers involuntary imposed on someone. Shlomo Griner’s 
response to Rasmussen picked up subtle conceptual differences, suggesting that ‘risk 
and threat are not the same’, but provided no convincing distinction. Griner narrowly 
conceived of risk as something one incurred through one’s own actions, suggesting 
incredulously that ‘terrorist activity surely entails a risk, but for the terrorists 
themselves’. He emphasized internalisation of risk where agency and responsibility
Gearoid O Tuathail, ‘Understanding Critical Geopolitics: Geopolitics and Risk Society’, Journal o f  
Strategic Studies, Vol. 22 No. 2/3, June/Sep 1999, p i 17-118 
Alan Waring and A. Ian Glendon, Managing Risk: Critical Issues fo r  Survival and Success into the 
2T ‘ century, (London: Thomson Learning, 1998), p.3-4 
Johan Eriksson, ‘Introduction’ , p.9 (itahcs added) and Lennart Sjoberg, ‘Risk perceptions: taking on 
societal salience’, p.21-2, in Eriksson (ed). Threat Politics 
Rasmussen, ‘Reflexive security?’, p.285
76
arise from internal processes, neglecting involuntary risks imposed by external 
‘others’. G r i n e r  misread the inherent complexity of the risk concept. There is a big 
difference between those who take risks or incur risks through their own actions or 
choices (this is the most common conception of risk), and those who are involuntarily 
victimised- or put at risk- by other risk-makers and fail to take preventive action. It is 
the latter category that the United States and Britain feel they fall within and need to 
take preventive action, which is my concern.
Yaacov Vertzberger and Mary Douglas both noted that risk in everyday 
language now simply meant ‘danger’, ‘threat’ or some unhappy event that may occur 
while formal definitions focus on quantified probabilities and outcomes. Deborah 
Lupton noted that for Beck also, ‘risk’ simply means ‘threat’ or ‘danger’. John Adams 
fiirther criticised Beck’s definition of risk (as ‘a systematic way of dealing with 
hazards, insecurities induced by modernisation itself), for creating ‘unnecessary 
misunderstanding’ given the common usage of both risk and hazard as synonyms.^^ 
Beck suggested the criteria for risk-threat distinction lay in regulatory systems. The 
‘operational criterion for distinguishing risk and threat’ is denial of private insurance 
protection. This implied ‘a presumed distinction between controllable consequences 
(risks) and uncontrollable consequences (threats) in industrialism. If risks that cannot 
be delimited spatially and temporally now elude the logic of private insurance and are 
no longer quantifiable, the boundary between ‘predictable’ risks and uncontrollable 
threats is b reached .Beck  here muddied waters even fiu^her, implying that ‘risks’ 
had simply become ‘uncontrollable threats’.
Risk’ is however more than simply an existence of a hazard or threat but a 
broader concept incorporating likely scale of unwanted consequences, probability, 
frequency and duration. Giddens argued that ‘risk’ should be separated from ‘hazard’ 
or ‘danger’. It entails much more action than simply a hazard that exists as a given 
and could lead to harm. Risk implies probability that an action or inaction may 
produce undesirable outcomes. Risk implies things where humans have potential 
control, the active assessment and management of future hazards as societies try to 
shape the future. Choice is also crucial to risk. There are no ‘risk-free choices, even
Shlomo Griner, ‘Living in a World Risk Society: A reply to Mikkel V. Rasmussen’, Millennium, Vol 
31, No. 1,2002, p .l57  
Adams, Risk, p i80; Lupton, Risk, p59-60
Ulrich Beck, World Risk Society, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), p55; Ulrich Beck, Democracy 
without enemies, trans. Mark Ritter, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), p25-26
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the decision not to decide. Avoiding active decision may entail more risk than making 
an active c h o ic e .R i s k ,  Beck admits, is ‘an intermediate state between security and 
destruction’ and is irrelevant when risk occurs."^  ^ This implied choice to avert harm. 
Niklas Luhmann further distinguished between ‘risk’ and ‘danger’, in that ‘risk’ 
involved potential loss as a consequence of decision or non-decision, invoking a 
concept of attribution. ‘Danger’ is something that occurs externally regardless of our 
decisions or non-decisions, actions and non-actions. The novelty of the ‘risk’ 
phenomena is that we are transforming more and more ‘dangers’ into ‘risks’ as an 
expanding array of threats like terrorism or technological hazards are attributed to 
decisions or indecisions."^'
To complicate matters further, what Barry Buzan described as threats can also 
apply to risks in terms of uncertainty and probabilities as the table below shows.
The intensity of threats
Low Intensity High intensity
Uncertain, difhise, 
latent processes rather 
than particular actor 
(terrorism, global 
warming)
Specific,immediate, 
with clear focus and 
source (Soviet nuclear 
arsenals)
Distant (time-space) eg 
pollution
Immediate,Close(time-
space)
Low probability and 
consequences
High probability and 
consequences
Source : Barry Buzan, People, states and fear, (2”** edition), (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
1991), p l40
39 For further discussions o f ‘risk’ and ‘hazard’ , see Waring and Glendon, Managing Risk, p.3-4; also 
Yaacov Vertzberger, Risk-taking and decision-making: Foreign military intervention decisions, 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), p25 
Beck, World Risk Society p3, p. 135
Niklas Luhmann, Risk: a sociological theory, (New York: Adline de Gruyter, 1993), trans Rhodes 
Barrett, p .22,46
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Threats, to Buzan, are highly complex unlike ‘a clear set of calculable, constant and 
comparable risks like those faced by players of chess’/^  Buzan assumes, as many do, 
that risks are calculable and constant when this is no longer so. He also brings the 
threat concept into probability domains : ‘probability has to be weighed against 
consequences as welT."^  ^ This thesis suggests that when addressing dangers in terms 
of probabilities and consequences, it is better conceptualised within domain of risk. 
Societies after all conceptualise dangers in different ways.
In Risk Society, dangers are considered at the level of their potentiality and 
riskiness, rather than immediate consequences or capabilities and intentions. The ‘risk 
management process begins by identifying hazards or threats and analysing them in 
terms of potential consequences through risk profiling’.'^  According to the US 
General Accounting Office (GAO), a threat analysis, the first step in determining risk, 
identifies and evaluates each threat on the basis of various factors, such as its 
capability and intent to attack an asset, the likelihood of a successful attack, and 
lethality. Risk management is then the process of understanding ‘risk’—the likelihood 
that a threat will harm an asset with some severity of consequences—and deciding on 
and implementing actions to reduce it."^  ^ Again, the GAO formulation of ‘risk’ and 
‘threat’ is by no means definitive. It merely indicates one way of approaching the 
problem. This study suggests that first analysing ‘threats’ based on capability and 
intent, as the GAO recommends, and then the likelihood of that threat occurring 
(risk), is being undermined. Increasingly we have neglected the first step of properly 
analysing threats, and are now focused simply on ‘risk’ in terms of likelihood and 
consequences. This is the logical consequence of a way of thinking about dangers 
dominant in a probabilistic culture characterised by the Risk Society. This is the main 
conceptual difference between the two concepts adopted in this study, which will be 
demonstrated next.
Barry Buzan, People, states and fear, (2“** edition), (Boulder, CO; Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), 
pl41
Buzan, People, states and fear  pl33-141 
Waring and Glendon, Managing Risk, p.S
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‘Threat' and ‘risk': conceptual components
Perhaps the best way to understand threats and risks is through their respective 
components Both imply different ways of conceptualising danger. ‘Risk’ emphasises 
the probability and magnitude of consequences. In IR under the ‘Old Security 
Paradigm’, the conventional notion of ‘threat’ was usually defined narrowly in terms 
of a military threat composed of assessing an opponent’s intentions and military 
capabilities. Strategic studies then was preoccupied with reducing very concrete 
military threats of nuclear confi*ontation with missiles facing off across Europe, and 
analysing impact of weapons systems like SS-20s on the strategic balance. Threat is 
defined by notions of power, power-resources and means of power rightly or wrongly 
perceived as overwhelming or not. ‘Without power, there will be no threat’."*^ 
Conventional Realist approaches see security as a derivative of power where the actor 
with the strongest power capabilities would feel secure. A Weberian means-end 
rationality approach normally assumed the realisation of a state’s interests depended 
on the balance of capabilities between that state and others."^ ^
A ‘New Insecurity Paradigm of Risk’ does not revolve on power capabilities 
but probabilities. Consequently, even powers with strongest capabilities feel insecure 
rather than secure. As the UK MoD’s March 2003 Strategic Trends report noted, 
greatest dangers stem not fi*om conquering states but failed and destabilised states 
posing risks through globalisation, terrorist and refugee flows, diseases. These 
dangers are conceptualised in terms of their probabilities and consequences, as risks 
since their material capabilities or intent are impossible to gauge or even non-existent. 
A Realist model sees war and security as a struggle for power determined by balance 
of capabilities. But war is no longer for these reasons but to minimise probabilities 
and risks. The 1997 US Presidential/Congressional Commission on Risk Assessment 
and Risk Management defined how risky a particular situation is, and its evaluation as 
a product of two factors: probability of occurrence of adverse event; and extent and 
magnitude of that consequence. Francois Ewald argued that rather than ‘danger’ or 
‘hazard’, ‘risk’ goes better with ideas like chance and probabilities."^^ To Niklas
See GAO, Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk assessments can help prioritise and target 
program investments, Report Number NSIAD-98-74,09 April 1998, Washington D.C 
Bertel Heurlin, The threat as a concept in international politics, (Copenhagen: The Information and 
Welfare Service o f the Danish Defence, 1977), p5, 6 
Rasmussen, ‘Reflexive Security’, Millennium,p.2S9 
‘‘^ Francois Ewald, ‘Insurance and Risk’, in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (eds). The 
Foucault Effect, (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1991), p. 199
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Luhmann, the present structural novelty means that since we cannot know the future, 
the future can only be ‘perceived through medium of probabilities to provide the 
present with some basis for decisions’. The popular usage of ‘risk’, contended Mary 
Douglas, reflected the impact of a late modem way of ‘probabilistic thinking’ on our 
culture, regardless whether this probability is quantifiable or not. Where risk is 
culturally constmcted, John Adams further observed, a previously deterministic 
rationality of science is replaced by ‘conditional, probabilistic rationalities’."^^
‘Risks’ have long been discussed under the guise of military ‘threats’ and 
‘new non-military threats’ but doing so dilutes the traditional essence of threat based 
on intentions and military capabilities. Christopher Dandeker suggested that the 
uncertain post-Cold war era is composed of ‘risk complexity’ where it is difficult to 
identify circumstances in which a ‘bewildering array of risks (defined as capabilities 
not matched to intent) might become identifiable threats’. W i t h  diminished security 
threats across Western Europe, armed forces were now geared towards diffuse risks : 
‘presumed or possible hostile intent not matched by capabilities or vice versa.’ These 
included terrorism, refugee flows, and WMD proliferation. Dandeker’s definition of 
‘risk’ is certainly more nuanced than most but is still derived from traditional 
benchmarks of capabilities and intents. This study suggests, it might prove productive 
to incorporate probabilities and consequences as well. NATO’s first post-Cold War 
Strategic Concepts suggested a further distinction between ‘threat’ and ‘risks’ in 
terms of probabilities and uncertainty: ‘the monolithic, massive and potential 
immediate threat’ of Soviet attack had gone. ‘In contrast to the predominant threat of 
the past, the risks to Alliance security that remain are multi-faceted in nature and 
multi-directional, which make them harder to predict and assess’.
Action-reaction dynamics
‘Threat’ and ‘risk’ also elicit different action dynamics. Richard Ulman defined 
national security threats as ‘an action or sequence of events that threatens dramatically
Niklas Luhmann, Risk: A sociological theory, (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1993), trans Rhodes 
Barrett, p.49; Mary Douglas, Risk and Blame: essays in cultural theory, (London: Routledge: 1992), 
p.39; Adams, Risk, Preface ix
° See Christopher Dandeker, ‘New times and new patterns o f civil-military relations’, in Jurgen 
Kuhlman and Jean Callaghan (eds). Military and Society in 21 ‘^ Century Europe: a comparative 
analysis, (Hamburg: Lit Verlag, 2000), p30
The Alliance’s Strategic Concept agreed by the Heads o f  State and Government participating in the 
meeting o f  the North Atlantic Council, Rome, 08 November 1991, available at 
http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b911108a.htm.
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and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life of a state’s 
citizens, or limits policy choices’/^  Ulman’s definition suggested threats present 
themselves to be ‘reacted’ to within a short time frame. Threats are crucial parts of an 
‘action-reaction’ relationship as an output of policy (making threats against others), or 
input upon policy to be reacted upon( threats from others). In strategic thinking, the 
‘threat’ concept is best described as a necessary reactive answer to aggressive actions 
from an adversary. The nature of ‘threat-avoidance’ policy normally saw threat as an 
impact on the polity coming from the outside to be ‘reacted upon’.^  ^ John Hertz’s 
‘Security Dilemma’ highlighted the ‘action-reaction’ dynamics involved in an 
anarchic system as states seeking to increase their own defence capabilities, incurred 
even more suspicion from other states who responded in kind. This manifested during 
the Cold War arms races but hardly applies when dealing proactively with terrorism 
or destabilised states. ‘Risk-management’ policy on the other hand is ‘proactive’ and 
‘anticipatory’.^ "^  Although we can also proactively address possible threats of the 
future, this study suggests that where this occurs, it falls largely within the risk 
discourse. The term ‘threat’ normally meant imminent and well defined to some 
analysts, which we have to react to.^  ^As Paul Wolfowitz suggested, ‘during the Cold 
War, our security environment had an appearance of predictability.. .in the 21^ 
century the threat is not nearly as clear’. I n d e e d ,  it is suggested here that risks are 
much more imprecise and uncertain, requiring ‘proactive’ management.
Fear versus anxiety
Threats generate fears; risks generate anxiety. This suggests a final subtle distinction 
between the two concepts. With huge social changes ranging from gender roles, and 
individualisation, ‘it is now a matter of sociological common sense to identify 
ourselves as living through a period of acute insecurity and high anxiety’. T o  Beck, 
‘threats to the future.. .cannot be perceived or explained because they do not exist yet
Richard H. Ulman, ‘Redefining security’ in. International Security, Vol.S No. 1, Summer 1983, p. 133 
Heurlin, The threat as a concept in international politics, p i 6-17, 21 
Christopher Hood and David K.C. Jones, Accident and Design: contemporary debates in risk 
management, (London: UCL Press, 1996), p. 10 
Ashton B. Carter & William J. Perry, Preventive Defence: A new security strategy fo r  America, 
(Washington D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), p.8 
Prepared Statement for the House and Senate Armed Services Committees: ‘Building a military for 
the 21*‘ century’, 3-4 October 2001 
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but they cause a n x i e t y . P u b l i c  controversies about health and environmental 
dangers create a ‘generalised climate of risk which for most people becomes the 
source of unspecific anxieties’.
Sigmund Freud suggested that in relation to dangers, there is a distinction 
between fear or anxiety. Fear requires a ‘definite’ object of which one is afraid and it 
tends to be more immediate, specific and focused. Apprehension (anxiety) implies a 
certain condition of expectation of danger and preparation. People experiencing 
anxiety generally tend to feel threatening uncertainty about the future and are troubled 
when the cause and nature of anticipated danger is unclear. It has a ‘quality of 
indefiniteness and lack of object’.^ ® Although the September 11 attacks killed less 
than 10 percent of annual highway fatalities in America, these risks aroused anxiety 
because they were dramatically reported by the media, unexpected and random, 
creating unfocused vulnerability. 2002 was an uneasy time of anxiety with snipers, 
repeated terror warnings, corporate scandals and Iraq; a sense of stepping into the 
unknown. Admittedly, in everyday language, it is hard to maintain a clear distinction 
between fear and anxiety. Yet it appears the key difference between them is the 
amount and quality of knowledge we possess about anticipated danger. Anxiety 
thrives on tension between knowledge and ignorance of fearful situations. Once we 
have fuller understanding, vague uncertainties of anxiety can be transformed into 
known objects of fear.^  ^ For Beck and Giddens, the significance of uncertain 
knowledge of risk lies in extent to which it engenders more uncertainty and anxiety 
about the future, undermining our sense of ontological security.
II: The ‘Risk Society’
Identification of risk occurs within specific sociocultural and historical contexts, 
rather than now largely discredited notions that some cultures are simply more fearful 
than others. Historical sociology of risk and the cultural construction of risk are 
equally important in understanding how risk is experienced. There is no particular 
consensus among sociologists, even between Giddens and Beck, on reasons behind 
the current preoccupation with at least 6 broad categories of risk: lifestyle.
Ulrich Beck, Democracy without enemies, trans. Mark Ritter, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), p38 
Anihony Modernity and Self-identity, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), pl09-143, 181-208
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environmental, medical, economic, criminal and interpersonal relationships. 
International security risks were largely neglected until recently. Although Beck and 
Giddens concur that the prominence of risks today is because of their global scale, for 
Giddens, it is also a result of increased vulnerability and ontological insecurity in a 
post-traditional society. Niklas Luhmann further raised pertinent questions about a 
society that understood misfortune in terms of ‘risk’ rather than magic, fate, or God. 
How does society cope with a future that is only more or less probable, and intensely 
concerned with extreme improbabilities?^^
What follows is a hopefully concise summary of main features of the Risk 
Society thesis drawn mainly from sociologists such as Beck, Giddens, Zygmunt 
Bauman, and Niklas Luhmann, which have been filtered for their relevance to this 
thesis. The complete Risk Society agenda incorporates a far broader agenda than my 
present concerns. Its overarching theories also had to be narrowed down or 
supplemented for IR purposes. Beck and Giddens, like any academic work, have their 
detractors and the focus here is not debating the validity of their propositions- this 
study actually disagrees with some of Beck’s conclusions, and definition of risk. 
Rather, my concern is applying their insights on risk and risk management. The Risk 
Society thesis encapsulates the current state of our world and supplies theoretical 
guidelines of potential use to IR researchers in conceptualising contemporary 
problems and dynamics. The following key concepts are flagged for discussion:
i) reflexive modernisation
ii) active anticipation
iii) manufactured insecurity and global risks
iv) Risk Society’s minimalist ethos
These should be read as interlinked notions, rather than strictly segregated ideas. 
While not all themes raised here are directly pertinent for our purposes, it was felt 
necessary to briefly discuss them to help provide clearer understanding.
Risk Society, broadly speaking, is organised in significant ways around the 
concept of risk and increasingly governs its problems in terms of discourses and
Niklas Luhmann, Risk: A sociological theory, (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1993), trans Rhodes 
Barrett, Introduction viii-ix
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technologies of risk.^^ Rather than postmodernism which sees politics as at an end, 
risk is a dynamic force for change and how we interpret risk, negotiate and live with it 
will structure our culture, society and politics for coming decades.^"  ^ Politics now 
takes on new meaning and subtleties in terms of risk. Risk assessment and 
management have assumed almost mythical status. Risk assumes a different 
significance from previous historical eras. Much contemporary public discourse 
appears geared to warnings about risks and possible catastrophes. In Britain, even 
gardening was called ‘the ultimate danger sport’ in March 2003 with gardening 
injuries reportedly soaring. What makes contemporary fears qualitatively different is 
we are not only more aware but new types of fears have emerged. Modernity 
produced fai* greater uncertainties and dangers, with globalisation of risk in terms of 
intensity(nuclear war) and more events which can affect whole populations such as 
global economic collapse or global warming, BSE, AIDS and SARS, terrorism. 
Human activity and technology have ‘manufactured’ risks such as mobile phone 
radiation requiring specialised scientific expertise, and cannot be directly observed. 
An increasingly affluent society with no obvious material needs, is no longer prepared 
to accept risks or side-effects tolerated in the previous struggle against scarcity.
According to Beck, the ‘entry into risk society occurs....when hazards now 
undermine or cancel established safety systems of the provident state’s existing risk 
calculations.’^^  It all began with the environmental issue as people started questioning 
the consequences of industrial processes. Risks used to be calculable. Yet 
contemporary risks such as environmental catastrophe or deterritorialised, de­
nationalised terrorism are incalculable because they elude time-space categorisation. 
‘Calculating and managing risks no one really knows has become a main 
preoccupation.’^^  Governments can no longer escape the ‘risk manager’s role, since 
the future looks increasingly threatening’.^  ^ There is another crucial difference in 
global risks. While ecological and financial risks are largely unintentional, terrorism 
intentionally produces bads.
See Pat O’Malley, ‘Introduction’, in Pat O’Malley (ed). Crime and the Risk Society, (Aldershot: 
Dartmouth Publishing, 1998)
^  Jane Franklin, ‘Introduction’ in Jane Franklin (ed). The Politics o f  Risk Society, (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1998), pi
Ulrich Beck, ‘Risk Society and the Provident State’ in Scott Lash, Bronislaw Szerszynski, & Brian 
Wynne, (eds). Risk, Environment and Modernity, (London: Sage, 1996), p31 
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Reflexive modernisation and risk-conscious modernity
Risk is also more prominent due to reflexive modernisation and the declining hold of 
tradition and trust. In post-traditional society, ‘social reflexivity’ means action is 
constituted by constantly renewing flows of new information than pre-given modes of 
conduct. Reflexivity arises because an agent regards its actions or inactions in terms 
of their potentially adverse consequences even before these have materialised.^^ Risk 
Society is characterised by ongoing reflexivity regarding risk assessments and 
management. Society becomes reflexive when it replaces earlier assumptions of 
controllability, linearity and progress, with the ‘self-endangerment argument’. The 
impetus for social transformation is no longer instrumental rationality but risks, 
dangers and globalisation.^^ ‘The discourse of risk begins where trust in our security 
ends and ceases to be relevant when the potential catastrophe o c c u r s .L o s in g  trust 
in traditional regulators, society manages risks in new ways. Previous faith in 
regulators of the international system too has been displaced, with new approaches 
proposed to new problems. We continuously assess security less in terms of what is 
but what may yet materialise with uncertain information.
Citizen groups are increasingly willing to raise their concerns. Subpolitics 
meant ‘direct’ politics, by active citizen groups or NGOs outside representative 
institutions of political systems.^^ Knowledge gained new political significance with 
Beck’s idea of ‘normal chaos of risk conflict’ describing experts and counter-experts 
dispensing contradictory facts.^^ The absence of what Anthony Giddens called 
‘ontological security’, -the certainty of knowledge- is characteristic of risk 
scenarios.^^ ‘Guardians of knowledge’ in early modernity assumed exclusive access to 
knowledge, their position bestowed on them morally based on tradition. In contrast, 
expert knowledge is fallible, susceptible to challenge. However, while ecological or 
economic risks involved purification of experts and counter-experts, this has been 
undermined by Governments’ unilateral definitions of security risks post-9/11. While 
‘subpolitics’ is largely not utilised here, its impact on societal structures and the 
pressures policymakers face fi-om domestic constituencies is recognised in a mini-case
Martin Woolacott, ‘The Politics o f Prevention’ in Franklin, (ed), The Politics o f  Risk Society, p i 22
See Anthony Giddens and Christopher Pearson, ^Conversations with Anthony Giddens \  (Canibridge: 
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study in the Concluding chapter on the role of trans-national NGOs in war and 
security.
Active Anticipation and Risk Society
Future-mindedness, claimed Susan Sontag, was as much the ‘distinctive mental habit 
of the 20^  ^ century, as history-mindedness, as Nietzsche pointed out, transformed 
thinking in the 19^  ^ century’ This future-mindedness that Sontag described had 
evolved so much so that especially by the late 20^  ^century, we were more concerned 
with averting possible negative futures than attaining historically driven futures and 
utopias. Calculations of the future once associated with linear notions of progress, 
have now morphed into dystopian nightmarish visions. As Beck put it, ‘the questions 
of development of technologies are now eclipsed by questions of ‘management’ of the 
risks’ involved.^^ Risk Society alerts us to centrality of concerns over insecurity, risks 
and their ‘management’, ‘how best to pre-empt any adverse outcomes, and a tendency 
to imagine problems that may occur in future’. T h e  British Medical Journal in 2001 
thus banned the word ‘accident’, claiming that even earthquakes are predictable and 
preventable events that governments should warn us to avoid.
Risk is a way of controlling or colonising the future. The ‘not-yet event’ is a 
stimulus to action as we become ‘active today to prevent, alleviate or take precautions 
against the problems and crises of tomorrow and day after’. The centre of risk 
consciousness lies in the future as ‘unknown and unintended consequences dominate 
history and society’. Risk Society ‘marks the dawning of a speculative age’.^  ^ We 
tend toward proactive actions especially when the scale of possible consequences is 
much higher. It means adopting a calculative attitude to possibilities of action or 
inaction. Risk Society identifies dangers before they materialise, not retrospective 
help offered by the old welfare state.^^ The NHS- initially providing retrospective 
treatment- now warns ‘preventively’ of smoking and alcohol risks.
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Manufactured insecurity and global risks
Risk Society’s principal dangers are produced by civilisation that cannot be delimited 
in space or time. ‘Reflexive’ and ‘manufactured’ risk are created by our industrial and 
scientific processes. Beck argued threats were previously constructed in terms of an 
enemy or foreign ‘Other’. I t  was God, nature or another human entity that was 
source of an ‘external’ risk. Perpetrator and victim become almost identical with what 
Beck called the ‘démocratisation of risk’. With MAD for example, the aggressor is 
also destroyed. However, this researcher disagrees, for often, anxieties about risk still 
tend to be projected onto ‘Others’ posing risks such as SARS. Such groups are then 
subject to surveillance, and precautions taken regarding their activities.^® Risk 
discourse positions social actors in two ways: those responding to risks identified as 
threatening them and undertaking risk management, or those known as risk-makers 
who cause risks and require surveillance and intervention.^* While Beck assumes the 
two now merge, a practical meaningful distinction still exists.
In this study, risk is largely attributed to someone else’s actions, and 
contingent events which we may alter to avoid harm. This clearly differed from 
Beck’s ‘manufactured risk’. I agree with Frank Furedi that Beck’s conceptualisation 
of risk as technologically manufactured is too narrow. Rather, to be ‘at risk’ is a 
condition of life, a ‘free-floating anxiety’ attaching to whatever danger is brought to 
public attention. This comprises non-technological concerns such as ethnic cleansing, 
crime and child abuse.Criminologists have also utilised the Risk Society thesis with 
its focus on risk management, without necessarily importing ‘manufactured risk’ 
which is even applied inconsistently by Beck, to issues from global warming to ‘post­
modern’ terrorism, WMD proliferation and cross-border refugee flows. The last three 
are only tangentially linked to technology. Rather than ‘manufactured’ risk, this study 
prefers ‘strategic’ or ‘systemic risk’ which has been outlined earlier.
The ‘minimalist’ ethos of Risk Society
The industrial society’s normative project was the ideal of ‘equality’ and eliminating 
scarcity. In Beck’s Risk Society, the ‘normative counter-project’, its ideal, basis and
See Woolacott in Franklin, (ed), The Politics o f  Risk Society, pl21  
Beck, World Risk Society, p.50 
Lupton, Risk, p i24-144 
Lupton, Risk, p i06
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motive force is ‘safety’. Strikes in autumn 2002 on the London Underground for 
instance were more concerned about safety cover than equal pay. Propelled by fear 
and anxiety, the focus is on developing new strategies of risk management to calm 
anxieties. Materially satisfied, the value system is largely negative, striving to prevent 
the worst, rather than obtaining something ‘good’.^  ^Industrial society concerned itself 
with production and distribution of goods. Risk Society is driven by managing and 
distributing dangers and ‘bads’. Consequently, the risk management approach that 
arises is based on a profoundly ‘utilitarian moral calculus that replaces other moral 
criteria such as generosity, guilt or fairness. By focusing on the avoidable, it does little 
more than perpetuate a negative if not dystopian out look .Giddens  called modernity 
the ‘risk culture’. To him, late modernity had a ‘double-edged character', no longer 
simply promising human progress and production of goods associated with ‘simple 
modernityIdeological  conflicts are replaced by the discourse of globalisation and 
managing associated risks. There is a notable absence of previous narratives of hope 
and progress; vulnerability defines the human condition.
East-West confrontation is replaced by doubt arising not from ignorance but 
from greater knowledge and questioning. People are no longer encouraged or willing 
to exert themselves to attain moral ideals. With moral ambivalence comes tolerance. 
Zygmunt Bauman argued that ‘modernity did not declare war on suffering, it only 
swore extinction to a purposeless, functionless suffering. Pain, if  it served 
purposes...could be, and should be in f l i c t e d .S u c h  purposes are now elusive. 
Historical thinking was one significant product of the Enlightenment, geared towards 
essentially positive purposive transformation of the human condition, rejecting the 
previous metaphysical system of divine revelation and God in favour of History and 
progress. In a risk age, the purposive transformation of humankind is replaced by the 
negative management of risks.
Typical of this is the changes in attitudes toward heroism. Early 20^  ^ century 
mass culture celebrated heroic deaths of soldiers with monuments. Late 20^  ^ century 
risk society views fatalities as unmitigated disasters. Risk society recognises 
limitations which undercuts the omnipotence of heroes. The Zeitgeist or ‘spirit of the
Beck, Risk Society, p49
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age’ is about victimhood, not heroism. A society that no longer embraces heroism 
aims to avert risks and manage, distribute them. A ‘heroic’ myth as the ‘eternal truth’ 
central to modernity no longer exists. The ‘heroic warrior’ and ‘imperial self have 
been replaced by the cautious ‘Minimal self Humankind has lowered its sights 
from grand historical purposes to immediacy of a preoccupation with the self. ‘Risk 
Society’s fear of victimisation seems to be the great equaliser. Society sees itself as 
survivors, victims or potential victims. Victims, not heroes enjoy moral superiority. 
There is loss of faith in humanly engineered progress based on scientific rationality, 
replaced by a shift towards ‘risks anticipating’ based on reflexivity’.^  ^Knowledge of 
risk no longer implied confidence in calculative reason assessing these risks but a 
recognition that limits impose a sense of foreboding doubts.
Concepts and concerns in Late-modern criminology
The following section details how criminology has employed the risk discourse to 
analyse changes in policing and crime control strategies, extrapolating possible 
implications for war. This ‘borrowing’ of concepts from criminology is not new. 
Howard Caygill has already demonstrated how it is possible to employ ‘policing’ 
concepts to studying war where the object of action is not so much a clearly 
identifiable ‘enemy’ but a ‘condition of turbulence and instability’ which ‘policing’ 
strategies address.^^ Similarly, President Bush and National Security Advisor 
Condoleeza Rice have both vowed ‘zero-tolerance’ towards Iraq, a term first 
popularised in crime control strategies. UK Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon, speaking 
at RUSI in July 2002, also promoted ‘upstreaming’- combating terrorists at source 
before they can hit us, an idea borrowed from the ‘war’ on drugs. What follows is a 
brief survey of contemporary policing and criminological concepts related to risk and 
risk management.
Richard Ericson and Kevin Haggerty contended in Policing the Risk Society 
that the centrality of risk assessment and management in policing strategies and legal
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norms reflected the institutionalisation of risk in modem s o c ie ty .A  ‘future-oriented’ 
probabilistic consciousness obsessed with safety and security, disillusioned with 
modernist notions of progress, contained in Risk Society is seen by criminologists as 
key to understanding the rise of risk management strategies in crime prevention.. 
Methodological caveats however exist. Some criminologists discern a New 
Prudentialism where responsibility for risk protection was distributed to individuals 
and community-based organisations with advice from Governments as the welfare 
state was whittled down. However, there is little individuals can do to directly reduce 
sources of systemic risks such as terrorism. After September 11, ‘suddenly, that state 
and politics should be replaced by the market seems unconvincing’.^ * Governments 
have largely retaken responsibility for risk management such as airport security. 
Criminology also tends to see risk in a Foucauldian sense of social regulation and 
control, whereas sociologists see risks resulting from macro-social trends. 
Nonetheless, both approaches share central views that risk is now the central 
operating concept and a probabilistic approach to problems. There is however no 
single correct risk management method: criminologists lean towards statistical 
aggregates while sociologists conceive risks as unquantifiable. It is up to the analyst 
to select research tools appropriate to case studies. In our case, a probabilistic 
approach is adopted, which need not be precisely quantifiable. What is important to 
note here is the proactive probabilistic ethos of criminology than a statistical one.
From dangerousness to risk
Robert Castel claimed new preventive social administration strategies have shifted 
from the notion of ‘dangerousness’ to that of ‘risk’. A concrete subject as the previous 
focus of an immanent internal quality(dangerousness) is now replaced by a 
combination of ‘risk factors’. This has important practical consequences. A risk thus 
arises not from a particular precise danger embodied in real attributes of an individual. 
Rather, risk is a combination of abstract factors and probabilistic aggregates which 
render more or less probable the occurrence of undesirable outcomes. This promotes 
new-style surveillance known as ‘systematic pre-detection’ where the main goal is 
‘not to confront a concrete dangerous situation but to anticipate all possible forms of
Richard Ericson & Kevin Haggerty, Policing the Risk Society, (Toronto & Buffalo: University of 
Buffalo Press, 1997)
Ulrich Beck, ‘The fight for a cosmopolitan future’. New Statesman, 05 Nov 2001, p33
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danger’. T o  be subject to intervention, it is enough to display whatever 
characteristics the experts responsible for defining preventive policies have 
constituted as risk factors.^^
The New Penology
‘Paradigm shifts’ are occasionally exaggerated: elements of the old often remain, 
intermixed with the new. ‘Zero-tolerance’ policing for instance combines old-style 
‘disciplinary’ enforcement with ‘risk-based’ surveillance and information 
processing.^"^ The role of ‘risk’ should also not be overstated- targeting high-risk areas 
may simply reflect a need to work more efficiently with limited resources.
Nonetheless, some emerging aspects of ‘New Penology’ merit discussion. 
‘Old Penology’ was concerned with responding to crime by diagnosis, intervention 
and rehabilitation of individual offenders, through concepts such as establishing 
responsibility, causes, morals, and guilt. Crime was seen as ‘deviant’ abnormal acts. 
Soaring crime rates, questionable results from rehabilitation, and declining budgets 
led to alternative strategies. The previous concern with ‘mind’ in terms of intentions, 
and motivation has shifted towards concern with ‘body’, altering physical and social 
structures within which individuals behave. We now manage environments, and 
populations rather than intervening and treating individual offenders.^^ Conceptions of 
‘risk’ displaced previous notions of ‘normality’ and ‘deviance’. T h e  new policy goal 
is identifying and managing risks as part of protecting the public rather than 
rehabilitative rhetoric. Government action emphasises risk management, utihtarian 
purposes over moral considerations. ‘Justice seems less important than ‘risk’ as the 
politics of safety have overwhelmed justice in the institutions of late modem 
politics’^ .^ Vocabulary of justice is overshadowed by risk in discussions about those 
deemed at risk of offending. In this context, there is ‘widespread recognition that at 
best crime, given its routine social normality and presence, may be better understood
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(eds). The Foucault Effect, (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1991), p.287-8 
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as a risk to be managed’.^ *
Crime is now seen as a ‘routine part of modem consciousness, an everyday 
risk to be managed and assessed in much the same way we deal with road traffic’. 
This new strategy seeks modest improvements at the margin, better management of 
risk and resources, reduction of likelihood of crime, better support for victims; all 
‘less than heroic objectives’ with little confidence to ‘solve’ permanently the problem 
of crime by reforming moral and pathological characteristics of ‘criminal’ man.'®® It 
assumes that crime occurs routinely because of criminogenic situations and 
opportunities. Addressing crime before it occurs, not afterward, situational crime 
prevention for example is a ‘pre-emptive approach’ that reduces criminal 
opportunities by ‘reshaping’ environments, not rehabilitation or improving society.'®' 
The focus is not on welfare needs of maladjusted social groups or individuals but 
reducing potential opportunities for crime, prevention rather than cure. The aim is not 
to eliminate problems or address causes, but reduce or redistribute the risks. It is 
managerial, not corrective or transformative.'®^
Rehabilitation, the idea that people can be changed or transformed for the 
better as the core of a modernist approach and metanarrative of ‘progress’, still 
endures but no longer expresses the overarching ideology. It is increasingly 
subordinated to less ‘heroic’ strategies to regulate groups, and manage risk. According 
to Gordon Hughes, ‘offenders’ are treated only to the extent it helps protect the public 
by reducing the risk. Rehabilitation is now seen as part of managing risks , rather than 
a purely ‘welfarist’ or ‘correctionalist’ project. Probation and parole have downplayed 
their social work functions in favour of risk-monitoring functions to manage risks.'®  ^
It has shifted from offender need and rehabilitation towards protecting the public.
Previously, crime was seen ‘retrospectively’ and individually to allocate blame 
and punishment. New criminologies tend to view crime ‘prospectively’ by calculating 
risks and preventive measures. There is a shift away from ‘deterrent penalism’ and 
‘reactive policing’ strategies responding quickly and decisively to crime, to
Gordon Hughes, Understanding Crime Prevention: Social control, risk and late modernity, 
(Buckingham: Open University Press, 1998), p.7 
David Garland, The Culture o f  Control: Crime and social order in contemporary society, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 446-7 
Garland, The Culture o f  Control, p.446-7 
Hughes, Understanding Crime Prevention, p60, 63
Pat O’Malley (ed). Crime and the Risk Society, (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, 1998), p234 
Hughes, Understanding Crime Prevention, p l4
93
‘proactive’ and ‘preventive’ policing which predicts dangers to be prevented. 
These policing systems are ‘symptomatic of a broader shift towards predicting and 
pre-emption of behaviours where knowledge of probabilities is key in assessing 
risks’. I t  is a future-oriented forward-looking view managing risks and preventing 
future offences rather than a backward-looking one focused on responding to past 
offences and punishing the individual. Les Johnston concluded, ‘commercial risk 
management is actuarial, proactive and anticipatory. The public police ethos is also 
shifting towards information gathering, anticipatory engagement, proactive 
intervention and systematic surveillance.’ Due to risk-orientated thinking, policing has 
become increasingly ‘proactive’. While ‘reactive’ post-hoc policing still occurs, 
information is collected for purposes of future risk assessment. Indeed, this could 
be seen as ‘reacting’ in a ‘proactive’ fashion. Rather than focusing on retrospective 
moral concerns such as retribution, correction, justice or revenge; the proactive, more 
utilitarian goal is simply to prevent repetition if harm has already occurred.
With victims routinely invoked to justify laws such as Megan’s Law in the 
US, it is politically imperative that victims and potential victims must be protected. 
Home Secretary David Blunkett argued we should be ‘rebalancing the whole system 
in favour of the victim, not placing the criminal at the top of the agenda’. P r e v i o u s  
principles of individual responsibility and rehabilitation are replaced by management 
and precautionary incarceration of potential offenders based on risk profiles. 
Dangerous and sexual offenders who pose a public safety risk can be imprisoned 
indefinitely, according to proposals by Blunkett in summer 2002. Britain’s new 
proposed Mental Health Bill replaces the ‘treatability’ criterion of an individual, with 
a single broad category of ‘high risk’ offenders who can be detained without 
committing any crime yet. Precautionary, probabilistic calculations have replaced the 
moral or clinical description of individuals.
This discussion of risk management ethos and strategies in policing and crime 
control bears directly on the questions posed in the Introductory chapter, namely is 
war becoming risk management? For policing strategies in this account, can be seen 
as illuminating any sets of similarities that might be exhibited in contemporary
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concepts of war to be explored in the case studies. It provides readers with a deeper 
understanding of the concepts involved and ethos behind it, as well as the wider 
application of risk management theories in society and social sciences.
Ill: Risk Management 
Government as risk manager
Risk management is increasingly politicised and institutionalised. In a ‘managerial 
age’, regulatory states set, monitor and enforce ever increasing rules rather than direct 
ownership of production or subsidies. We have ‘risk bureaucracies’ such as the Health 
and Safety Executive, Food Standards Agency, and the Civil Contingencies 
Secretariat. Most industries have safety watchdogs while consumer groups from Rail 
Safety Passengers to mobile phone users demand and monitor regulation, producing 
their own research reports. Organisations must be seen to do everything possible to 
protect the public. Even school trips now have ‘safety supremos’, while local councils 
and hospitals have ‘risk managers’.
In November 2002, Downing Street’s Strategy Unit published a study on risk 
and uncertainty, with a foreword from Prime Minister Blair emphasising his concern 
to manage risks better. It argued, ‘handling risk is increasingly central to the business 
of government’ and ‘explicit consideration of risk should be firmly embedded in 
government’s core decision-making processes’ Rising public expectations for 
governments to manage risk are set against a backdrop of declining trust, and 
increasing activism around risks amplified by the media. Furthermore, many risks 
such as terrorism are global and transnational rather than individual. With safety and 
well-being as top political imperatives in a Risk Society, there is ‘an increasing need 
to address the sub-discipline of risk management’.
The Royal Society noted that ‘governments are now seen to have a plain duty 
to apply themselves explicitly ...to remove all risk or as much of it as possible. 
Many government activities can be described as risk management- ‘some risks form
David Blunkett on BBC Radio 4 ‘Today’ Program, July 17 2002 
Cabinet Office Strategy Unit, Risk
Denis Smith & Steve Tombs, ‘Conceptualising issues o f risk management within the Risk Society’, 
in Eve Coles, Denis Smith & Steve Tombs (Eds), Risk Management and Society, (Dordrecht, 
Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), p.l
Royal Society, Cited in John Adams, Risk, (London: UCL Press, 1995), p .l 1
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the raison d’etre of government itself, the protection of persons and property from 
villains within nation and outside it’J^  ^ Security risks form an under-researched part 
of an expanding set of risks subject to government intervention from finance, GM 
food, transportation, environment, new technology like mobile phones to terrorism. 
Risk management policy can be ‘any government activity designed to reduce risk or 
reallocate it’. Strangely, ‘risk management is not generally viewed or studied as a 
fimction of government’. Relatively little is known about public risk management, 
compared to its private sector equivalent. Risk management policies are extensive but 
less tangible than other government fimctions such as building schools which are 
easily apparent. Governments possess special risk management qualities from its 
monitoring capacity to enforcement ability. Despite America’s laissez faire image, the 
Federal Government’s role as what David Moss called the ‘ultimate risk manager’ 
was crucial before and especially after September 11. With the November 2002 
Federal Terrorism Insurance Act, Washington served as ‘insurer of last resort’ since 
private insurers can no longer efficiently manage risks from catastrophic terrorism. 
Moss argued that since 1960, risk management dramatically expanded from 
businesses and workers, to protect all citizens from an ever-widening array of risks as 
‘imperatives of personal security rivalled and even perhaps exceeded those of 
economic growth in the United States.’ Moss concluded that as people became richer, 
‘most fascinating of all, risk management policy in the US reflects an unmistakable 
shift in priorities from economic growth to security over two centuries’.'*^
Definitions and Assumptions
Risk management is a complex subject with differing approaches to diverse areas 
from health and safety, business and finance, to terrorism and crime. There is no 
single generic widely-accepted definition or model of risk management, only broad 
principles and general methods. Empirical case study work, such as those attempted 
here, remains a priority in developing more generalised m o d e l s . T h i s  is especially 
so in IR where research on systemic risk management has hardly taken off. The US
William T. Stanbury, ‘Reforming risk regulation in Canada: the next policy frontier?’, in Laura 
Jones (ed), Safe Enough? Managing risk and regulation, (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 2000),pl97 
David Moss, When all else fails: the government as the ultimate risk manager, (Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 2002), p i-2 
' Moss, When all else fails, p9, 13
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2001 Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) described ‘Managing Risk’, as a central 
‘strategic tenet’/ I t s  risk-management framework however appeared geared toward 
organisational risk than systemic risks, balancing and mitigating operational force 
management, institutional risks and future cha l len g es /T h is  is too broad for our 
purposes, which is concerned with reducing systemic risks rather than balancing them 
against others.
An important assumption in risk management is that is it ‘both feasible and 
desirable...that risks are eliminated, reduced or controlled’. There has to be 
‘continuous striving to reduce risks to a level deemed tolerable or as low as can 
reasonably be achieved’. It can be defined generally as ‘a field of activity seeking to 
eliminate, reduce and generally control pure risks’. O n e  aim of risk management is 
to ‘act pre-emptively upon potentially problematic zones, to structure them in such a 
way as to reduce the likelihood of undesirable events or conduct occurring’.^  
Reducing likelihoods or probabilities is key to the concept. In criminology, risk 
management can take two forms: intervention to change and alter individual thinking 
and behaviour (now largely abandoned); and broader intensive strategies involving 
regular surveillance and intervening on factors which may result in undesirable 
o u t c o m e s .^ R i s k  management features competing world views between 
‘anticipationism’ and ‘resilience’. Anticipationism is ‘bound up with the 
precautionary principle’ as ‘proactive risk management is a standard part of the 
process’. T h i s  study prefers anticipationism over resilience. The latter is less 
desirable for significant harm has already occurred and addresses ‘consequence 
management’ issues such as first-responders.
Various processes, not necessarily clearly segregated or sequential as implied 
here for discussion purposes, are involved in risk management. Purely ‘anticipatory’
For good surveys o f the concept, see Eve Coles, Denis Smith & Steve Tombs (eds). Risk 
Management and Society, (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000; also Waring 
and Glendon, Managing Risk
Quadrennial Defence Review, (Washington D.C: DOD, 30 Sep 2001), pp. 13 
' Quadrennial Defence R e v i e w , 51
See Denis Smith & Steve Tombs, ‘Conceptualising issues o f risk management within the Risk 
Society’, in Coles, Smith & Tombs (Eds), Risk Management and Society, p.24; also Waring and 
Glendon, Managing Risk, Introduction; Christopher Hood and David K.C. Jones, Accident and 
Design: contemporary debates in risk management, (London: UCL Press, 1996), p.7
N.Rose, Powers o f  Freedom: Reframing political thought, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), p237
Hazel Kemshall, Risk Assessment and Management o f  known sexual and violent offenders, London: 
Policing and Reducing Crime Unit, Home Office, April 2001, p.39-45 
Hood and Jones, Accident and Design p. 10
97
strategies systematically scan the landscape for any risks to be managed providing the 
impetus for action. The UK MoD Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre report Strategic 
Trends released in March 2003, thus argued that ‘horizon scanning’ and ‘assessment 
of likelihood’ to understand future risks is increasingly recognised by governments as 
a ‘valuable tool to reduce or manage risks’. ‘Tombstone’-style strategies on the 
other hand manage risks which literally explode on the agenda with dramatic media 
coverage of catastrophic disasters like rail crashes, or terrorism. The goal is to avoid 
repetition. A clear distinction is untenable: ‘tombstone’ risks after Srebrenica were 
associated with Kosovo by ‘horizon scanning’, as was Iraq after 9/11. This is not easy 
with incomplete knowledge, often involving subjective perceptions and difficulty 
convincing those affected that an assessment is valid.
The second part of risk management involves options and implementation. 
According to the Royal Society, there are four basic methods to manage risk:
i) Providing information through forecasting, monitoring and the
Precautionary Principle
ii) Deploying resources
iii) Laying down regulations
iv) Through state organisations like armed forces, ‘direct action is always
important for handling some risks such as crime or terrorism’.
Strategies can include eliminating agents of loss, direct action to reduce, distribute or 
transfer risks, and feedback mechanisms. This involves considering whether any 
strategy may itself create new risks together with a reduction in existing risks. 
Continuous surveillance of risks is undertaken, and actions taken to reduce them if 
necessary. Good risk management will be proactive, and a ‘routine’ activity well 
integrated into general management activity.
Outcome specification is another crucial process. Successfully managing ‘pure 
risks’ means avoidance of loss such that ‘no harm results from a particular hazard or
Ministry of Defence, Strategic Trends, Introduction, March 2003, London 
For tombstone-style strategies, see Christopher Hood, Henry Hothstein and Robert Baldwin, The 
Government o f  Risk: Understanding Risk Regulation Regimes, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001), pl83
Royal Society, Risk: Perception, analysis and management, (London: Royal Society, 1992), p .l42- 
143
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threat’. T h i s  means it is difficult to quantify results. Non-events are indicators of 
success. Linear approaches to risk management separate assessment and management 
activities. However, a cyclical approach is preferred, emphasising the importance of 
feedback and monitoring mechanisms on how a particular risk evolves rather than 
static pre-set g o a l s .T h i s  is an ongoing process with no finite end because risks can 
only be minimised, not eliminated. Risk management can also create what Beck 
called the ‘boomerang effect’ where initial actions to manage risk created additional
127new ones.
The risk management process (Cabinet Office Strategy Unit, Risk: 
Improving government's capacity to handle risk and uncertainty, November 2002 )
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Surveillance
IR, in contrast to surveillance studies and risk theory, has largely ignored the 
increasing role of ‘monitoring power’. T h e  IMF seeks greater surveillance 
capacities; trade and environmental regimes contain power to inspect. The UN has 
been inspecting Iraq for much of a decade. This study focuses on surveillance as the
A recommendation by the New Zealand Society of Risk Management, 
http://www.risksocietv.org.nz/dealing.html. accessed 22 November 2002
Waring and Glendon, Managing Risk, Introduction xxii, p.5. On the other hand, ‘speculative risks’, 
in the entrepreneurial sense of calculating positive risks and returns, involve spectacular gains, or 
losses. This is associated with economics and finance where risk management normally meant 
diversification of portfolios.
Denis Smith & Steve Tombs, ‘Conceptualising issues of risk management within the Risk Society’, 
in Coles, Smith & Tombs (Eds), Risk Management and Society, p.25-7, 47 ; also R E. Hester and R.M. 
Harrison (eds). Risk Assessment and Risk Management, (Cambridge: The Royal Society of Chemistry, 
1998), p.6
A concept suggested by Ulrich Beck, Risk Society, trans. Mark Ritter, (London: Sage Publications, 
1992), p.37
See for example, Michael V. Deaver, Disarming Iraq: Monitoring power and resistance, (Westport: 
Praeger, 2001), p.5
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‘preferred vehicle of risk management’. S u r v e i l l a n c e  is crucial to obtaining 
knowledge that determines risk and aids risk management- the purpose of the 
National vCJD Surveillance Unit in Edinburgh. Indeed, ‘risk management is an 
increasingly important spur to surveillance’.^ ®^ According to the Royal Society, 
‘monitoring is the tool for investigating how things stand and a contributor to 
precautionary action in the face of uncertainty or i g n o ra n c e .E f f e c t iv e  risk- 
management needs to generate the necessary information on risks involved and 
account for how these risks might change over time.^^^
Surveillance here means not simply ‘spying’ on someone but systematic 
bureaucratised gathering of information for management of populations and 
monitoring behaviour. In Surveillance Society, the aim is not simply to watch every 
actual event but also to ‘plan for every e v e n t u a l i t y W h a t  was previously the 
domain of police and intelligence agencies has become routine as businesses monitor 
consumer choices everytime a credit card is swiped or internet site is visited, to 
ubiquitous CCTVs in British cities. This continuous monitoring is ‘embedded’ in 
apparent normalcy rather than a heavy handed Orwellian Big Brother. Surveillance 
has expanded with the rise of extensive computer coordinated technologies, together 
with contemporary demands to reduce uncertainties and control outcomes. All 
sections of society from credit agencies to consumer groups now seek to ‘pre-empt’ 
and manage risk by discovering as many risk factors as possible. September 11 only 
intensified these prevailing trends.
Surveillance is closely associated with Risk Society and the shift away from 
Old Penology. According to Richard Ericson and Kevin Haggerty, ‘Risk Society 
policing is fuelled by surveillance, the routine production of knowledge of 
populations useful for their administration... and to determine what is probable and 
possible for them’. Rather than retrospective knowing of a crime and then punishing 
wrongdoing or deterrence measures, it seeks knowledge through surveillance of who 
or what constitutes a risk and if necessary deploy police resources in advance of a
Pat O’Malley, Crime and the Risk Society, (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing, 1998), p l09  
'^°David Lyon, ‘Introduction’ in David Lyon (ed). Surveillance as social sorting: privacy, risk and 
digital discrimination, (London: Routledge, 2003), p8
Royal Society, Risk: Analysis, Perception and Management, (London: Royal Society, 1992), p.53 
Michael Crouhy, Dan Galai and Robert Mark, Risk management, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001), 
pp. 109
’  ^David Lyon, Surveillance Society: Monitoring everyday life, (Buckingham: Open University Press,
2001), p .2 ,47-49; also Christopher Dandeker, Surveillance, power and modernity, (Cambridge: Pohty 
Press, 1990), Preface vii
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possible crime. Supervision is increasingly ‘prospective’. W e  now sort people into 
suspicious and risky categories, using ‘pre-emptive and anticipatory surveillance’ to 
anticipate , pre-empt and prevent something from happening. We not only monitor 
past and present movements but also try to anticipate future flows. The ‘emphasis on 
risk makes everyone a legitimate target of surveillance. Everyone is guilty until the 
risk profile assumes otherwise’. T h e  anticipatory ethos of risk management entails 
monitoring activity as ‘basis of prognosistication to inform anticipatory measures’.
It can provide advance warning, estimate possible consequences, foretell possible 
occurrence of events by identifying circumstances that could lead to undesirable 
outcomes.
Classical forms of Benthamite Panoptic surveillance required physical 
proximity between watcher and watched. As David Lyon noted, 20^ century 
surveillance was limited to specific sites such as factory floors within nation-states. 
However with late 20^  ^century technologies, ‘surveillance went global’. Surveillance 
became ‘post-modern’, ‘distantiated’, ‘disembodied’, and even ‘post-Panoptical’ as 
abstract data and images replace embodied persons previously co-present with each 
other. Through satellites and trans-continental fibre optic cables, employers monitor 
workers simultaneously at different locations. According to Lyon, improved speed of 
searching, and collecting information at great distances is deemed the best way to 
monitor and pre-empt risks by indicating where a potential offender may strike next in 
a globalised world. The ECHELON system tracks specific words on the Internet, 
voice and fax communications. Such ‘coding’ supposedly contains the means of 
anticipating events like terrorism and crimes. Globalised, transnational policing now 
aimed to reduce risks through ‘knowledge-based risk management’.^ *^
The precautionary principle and risk management
As Beck wrote, ‘risks only suggest what should not be done, not what should be 
done. Doing nothing and demanding too much both transform the world into a series
Ericson & Haggerty, Policing the Risk Society^ p41, 55-58
David Lyon, ‘Surveillance as social sorting: Privacy, risk after September 11’, LSE Public Lecture, 
06 Nov 2002, London
David Lyon, ‘Introduction’ in Lyon (ed). Surveillance as social sorting'. Also see Clive Norris and 
Gary Armstrong, Maximum Surveillance Society, (Oxford: Berg, 1999), p.24 
Hood and Jones, Accident and Design, p. 15-6
See Lyon, Surveillance Society, p. 89, 104; David Lyon, ‘Chapter 1 ’ in Lyon (ed). Surveillance as 
social sorting, p24, 39
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of indomitable risks. This could be called the risk trap.'^^^ After all, the ultimate 
deadlock in Risk Society is the gap between knowledge and decision. No one really 
knows the global outcomes but nonetheless decisions have to be made. One oft-cited 
way out is the precautionary principle, which arose in the 1970s when environmental 
impact assessments revealed gaps between significant risks of serious harm and 
accuracy of scientific forecasts. It is now a recognised general principle of 
international law from the Montreal Protocol to the 2000 Cartagena Biosafety 
Protocol. The 1992 Rio Declaration is often deemed to enshrine the essence of the 
principle: ‘...a precautionary approach should be applied.. .where there are threats of 
serious or irreversible damage, lack of ftill scientific certainty shall not be used as a 
reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation 
taking into account costs and benefits of action or inactions.’ (although other 
definitions exist, suggesting that where uncertainty exists, do not act) There is a 
reversal of burden of proof away from those likely to be harmed by a possible action 
to those seeking to change the status quo, the creators of risk. People are thus inclined 
to take anticipatory action to prevent harm if something bad might happen. Precaution 
re-orders victim powerlessness towards emphasising new mechanisms of victim 
avoidance and favours would-be victims rather than beneficiaries of risk-related 
decisions.Opponents criticise this broad obligation, for stifling innovations.
While the principle remains linked to decisions taken under scientific 
uncertainty, there is widespread perception that it is a culturally framed concept as 
much due to changing patterns of governance, participation and values in a complex 
world as it is about.^ "^  ^ The principle has moved from environmental, scientific and 
legal realms to become a fully politicised phenomenon taking into account non- 
scientific public opinion and social values. Precaution became politically explicit in 
February 2000 with the European Commission’s noting it ‘is particularly relevant to 
the management of risk’ by decisionmakers. It stated that ‘absence of scientific proof 
of a cause-effect relationship.. .should not be used to justify inaction’, and ‘recourse to 
the principle presupposes that potentially dangerous effects deriving from a
Ulrich Beck, World Risk Society, p.139-141.
Hood and Jones, Accident and Design, p. 190
Poul Harremoes; David Ge; Malcolm MacGarvin; Andy Stirling; Jane Keys; Brian Wynne; Sofia 
Guedes Vaz (eds). The Precautionary Principle in the 2(/^ Century, (London: Earthscan Publications,
2002), Foreword xi, p.4-5; Tim O’Riordan, James Cameron and Andrew Jordan, ‘The Evolution o f the 
Precautionary Principle’, in Tim O’Riordan, James Cameron and Andrew Jordan (eds). Reinterpreting 
the Precautionary Principle, (London: Cameron May, 2002), p9
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phenomenon, product or process has been identified, and that scientific evaluation 
does not allow the risk to be determined with sufficient c e r t a i n t y 'T h e  Council of 
Ministers’ Nice Decision later that year went further by accepting precautionary 
action without proper scientific evaluation could be taken due to urgency of the risk. 
Sometimes it is argued Washington favours ‘precautionary approach’ over 
‘precautionary principle’, for fear of ‘principle’ being abused as a political rhetorical 
weapon stifling innovation and trade. The difference lies more in name than 
substance. The 1999 White House Declaration on Environment and Trade stated: 
‘precaution is an essential element of US regulatory policy given that regulators often 
have to act in absence of full scientific certainty.’ The President’s Council on 
Sustainable Development in 1996 noted: ‘even in face of scientific uncertainty, 
society should take action to avert risks where potential harm to human health or the 
environment is thought to be serious or irreparable’. US legislation has moved firom 
‘requiring evidentiary proof of actual harm, towards anticipation and preventing 
possible harm’.
Levels of incertitude, probability and catastrophic potential have significant 
implications for risk management strategies adopted. ‘Normal’ risks are defined by 
little statistical uncertainty and low catastrophic potential. According to Andreas 
Klinke and Ortwin Renn, a purely ‘risk-based’management strategy presupposes that 
probability of occurrence and extent of damage are relatively well-defined. This 
includes smoking and AIDS. More pertinent to our purposes are ‘intermediate’ and 
‘intolerable’ risks such as terrorism where certainty is contested, dramatic catastrophic 
potential may be great, with irreversible damage. Problematically, the new ‘riskiness 
to risk’ is such that it is even disputed whether risks exist at all. These ‘unknown 
unknowns’ lie outside traditional risk-benefit assessment, requiring further 
precautionary action to anticipate, and reduce ‘surprises’. ‘Precautionary-based’ risk 
management strategies are thus adopted where there are high levels of uncertainty 
about probabilities and extent of occurrence which are of catastrophic potential.
See John D. Graham, ‘A future for the precautionary principle?’. Journal o f  Risk Research, Vol. 4 
No.2, April 2001, p .109-110; European Commission, Communication from the Commission on the 
Precautionary Principle, Brussels, 02 February 2000, p.4
O’Riordan, Cameron and Jordan, ‘The Evolution o f the Precautionary Principle’, in O’Riordan, 
Cameron and Jordan (eds). Reinterpreting the Precautionary Principle, p27
Andreas Klinke and Ortwin Renn, ‘Precautionary Principle and discursive strategies: classifying and 
managing risks’. Journal o f  Risk Research, Vol. 4 No. 2, April 2001, p 162-168
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Risks vary in degrees of uncertainty. The precautionary principle does not 
apply where likelihood and severity of impacts are well-known since level of 
uncertainty is low. When the harm associated with risk is slight and occurrence very 
unlikely, little needs to be done. It is triggered only when harm is severe and 
irreversible. Even when harm is catastrophic with little uncertainty about its 
occurrence, the choice of action is straightforward. The problem arises in grey areas 
where harm is catastrophic with uncertainty about its occurrence: ‘a good deal of 
political decisionmaking is now about managing risks’. P o l i c y m a k e r s  have to 
bridge the gap between what analysis can provide and making a reasoned decision 
under uncertainty. The precautionary principle may provide that bridge.
It is important to distinguish between ‘false negatives’ (where agents or 
activities were considered harmless until evidence of harm emerged- asbestos) and 
‘false positives’ (where precautionary action was later proved to be unnecessary- the 
Y2K bug and war on Iraq). Contemporary blame is also divided into two types: blame 
for commission (such as polluters creating a risk) and blame for omission (for not 
managing the risk sufficiently). Policymakers thus see incentives to undertake 
precautionary action especially in a litigious age. Actions generate risks but inactions 
can sometimes generate even greater risks. There is a need to balance the risks 
involved. Applying the precautionary principle, we should not just focus on the 
‘risk of not acting without considering all the indirect risk and costs of action, and 
evaluating whether these consequences are worth avoiding the former consequences 
of the status quo’.'"^ * Considering pros and cons are however often difficult. The costs 
of preventive action are often tangible and clearly allocated while costs of inaction are 
less tangible, less clearly distributed and often long-term.
Anthony Giddens cited in Jane Franklin (ed), The politics o f  Risk Society, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1998),p.29
Mark Neal, ‘Risk Aversion: the rise o f an ideology’, in Laura Jones (ed). Safe Enough? Managing 
risk and regulation, (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 2000), p21
‘'‘^ Richard J. Zeckhauser and W. Kip Viscusi, 'The Risk Management Dilemma', in Howard Kunreuther 
and Paul Slovic (ed). Challenges in risk assessment and risk management: Special Volume, The Annals 
o f  the American Academyof Political and Social Science, Vol. 545, May 1996. p i 50
John D. Graham, ‘Decision-Analytic Refinements o f the Precautionary Principle’, Journal o f  Risk 
Research, Vol. 4 No.2, April 2001, p. 127
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IV. Conclusion 
A thematic matrix of risk management
The following three categories derived from the previous discussion of risk 
management will thus guide case studies through a structured comparison approach;
i) Identifying risks as impetus for war
Systemic risk
Was systemic risk highlighted in terms of globalisation and end of 
Cold War constraints? Did these arise from ‘anticipatory horizon- 
scanning’ or was it more a concern with avoiding repetition of 
‘tombstone-style risks’ or a combination of both?
Risk or threat?
Besides threat components of intentions and capabilities, did risk 
components in terms of probabilities and consequences help 
conceptualise dangers?
ii) Implementing risk management
Active Anticipation
Is society’s active anticipation of risks being transferred to the 
international scene? Did ‘potential victims’ adopt preventive victim- 
avoidance strategies? Was probabilistic thinking evident in heightened 
awareness of counter-factual consequences of action or inaction? Have 
we eschewed ‘reactive’ policies for ‘proactive risk management’ 
strategies?
The precautionary principle
How compelling was evidence? Were there ‘false negatives’ or ‘false 
positives’? Were policymakers concerned about blame for 
‘omission’(not taking precautions)? Was it purely ‘anticipatory’ or 
involved some desire to avoid repetition of ‘tomb-stone’ style risks?
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Surveillance
Were there continuous review processes through ‘anticipatory 
surveillance’ and ‘systematic pre-detection’ seeking to prevent dangers 
in advance ? Did long-term monitoring aid risk management actions?
Utilitarian less than heroic ’ strategies o f risk management 
Did a utilitarian moral calculus of safety-first override notions of 
justice or fairness? Did war become ‘routine’ instrumental activity 
against an everyday risk like crime to be managed? Did war ‘reshape’ 
environments to reduce opportunities, likelihoods of unwanted events, 
rather than rehabilitate ‘failed’ states or offending individuals? 
Consequently, are there parallels in IR where we prefer modest 
‘nation-tending’, rather than ambitious ‘nation-building’- doing just 
enough to reduce risks? '^^^
iii) Outcome specification
Non-events and minimalism
Were non-events the intangible minimal negative indicators of 
successful preventive action and victory? Was there recognition of 
limits? Were there ‘less than heroic strategies’ aimed at ‘simply 
preventing a bad’ rather than complete solutions to an underlying 
problem or grand historical narratives?
Cyclical open-ended processes
Was risk management patient, cyclical and cumulative, or linear and 
one-off? Did risks evolve and were new risks created while reducing 
original risks: the ‘boomerang effect’?
The following three chapters on case studies will be analysed through this 
thematic schema. It is to these that we now turn.
Jeffrey Record, ‘Collapsed Countries, Casualty Dread and the New American Way o f War’, 
Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly, Summer 2002, p4-23; Paul Schroeder, ‘The risks of 
victory: An historian’s provocations’. National Interest, No. 66 , Winter 2001-02, p31
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The Kosovo Campaign: 
War as a ‘risk management exercise’
‘We cannot turn our backs on the violations of human rights in other countries if 
we want to feel secure.’ -  Tony Blair, Economic Club of Chicago, 22 April 1999
Introduction
The rhetoric of humanitarianism and humanitarian intervention has dominated the 
discourse on the Kosovo campaign. However, as Michael Mccgwire rightly argued, there 
was more than simply humanitarian rhetoric; Adam Roberts also noted that as a 
‘humanitarian war’ Kosovo failed to live up to its billing.' As with the later ‘war’ on 
terrorism, policymakers and academics had difficulty categorising certain aspects of the 
Kosovo ‘war’. NATO even expunged the ‘war’ word from its vocabulary. Although a 
coalition operation, the chief military contributor was America and its actions dominate 
analysis.
This chapter adopts an alternative approach not yet attempted in academic 
discourse. At some risk of ascribing more coherence to Washington’s ‘strategy’ than 
demonstrated during the campaign, it assesses to what extent the Kosovo ‘war’ could be 
construed as ‘risk management’. Employing a set of common questions and predictions 
inferred firom the test theory developed in Chapter Three, the chapter asks if these 
predictions are congruent or incongruent with observed evidence presented to assess the 
theory’s empirical validity. The task here is to identify trends surrounding the Kosovo 
issue which have implications for developing the broader notion of war as a risk 
management exercise.
Firstly, systemic risks providing impetus for war had to be identified. Secondly, 
the paper explores how policymakers justified the ‘proactive’ aspects of their actions, and
' Michael Mccgwire, ‘Why did we bomb Belgrade?’, International Ajfairs, Vol. 76 No. 1, Jan 2000,p.l4; 
and Adam Roberts, ‘NATO’s Humanitarian war over Kosovo’, Survival, Vol. 41 No.3, Autumn 1999,
p. 102, 108, 120
107
implementation of risk management by examining the precautionary principle touted over 
Kosovo. Other questions explore if there was surveillance of risks, and whether Kosovo 
reflected a utilitarian ‘routine’ use of force to manage risks by ‘reshaping the 
environment’? The chapter finally evaluates outcomes from a risk management 
perspective of non-events, avoiding harm and less than perfect solutions as indicators of 
success. Unlike finite ends associated with ‘war’, it is a patient ongoing process without 
clearly-defined endpoints, exhibiting the ‘boomerang effect’.
Brief History
For much of the 1990s, under Ibrahim Rugova, the majority Kosovar Albanians largely 
adopted a non-violent strategy of passive protests and parallel administrative institutions 
after Belgrade withdrew its autonomy in 1989. This posed little concern to regional 
security. This appeared to have changed after the Dayton Accords in 1995 ignored 
Kosovo in the desire to get agreement on Bosnia. Milosevic also refused to discuss 
Kosovo then. To some Kosovars, the passive strategy had failed. Furthermore, the 
collapse of neighbouring Albania into near anarchy in 1997, led to widespread looting of 
army arsenals. These fell into the hands of the newly formed Kosovo Liberation Army 
(KLA). Significant new risks arose with the KLA and local support inflamed by brutal 
Serb responses. The complex historical background or possible reasons why Milosevic 
capitulated will not be analysed. Numerous other books have done so. The detailed 
negotiation positions, mistaken assumptions of both sides entering the war, are also not 
subject of discussion. What follows is simply a brief description of the immediate run-up 
to the air war and its conduct.
Diplomacy by October 1998 had secured a shaky ceasefire. Observers entered 
Kosovo and aerial surveillance by NATO proceeded under UN Security Council 
Resolution 1199 which warned of ambiguous ‘further action’ if agreements were flouted. 
After the collapse of last-ditch talks at Rambouillet to end renewed fighting. Operation 
Allied Force was launched on 24 March 1999. Ethnic Kosovar Albanians soon started 
flooding into neighbouring Albania and Macedonia. The stated goals of the air campaign 
were: demonstrate the seriousness of NATO opposition to Belgrade, deter Milosevic 
from continuing attacks on civilians and create conditions to reverse ethnic cleansing, and
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degrade Serbia’s capacity to wage war against Kosovo in the future or spread the war to 
neighbours? Relying on airpower alone, and explicitly renouncing ground troops was 
hardly a well-thought out ‘strategy’. Clinton chose the best ‘among a bunch of bad 
options’, having rejected both ground troops, and walking away after putting NATO 
credibility on the line. Hopefully, this ‘bomb-and-pray’ strategy would work.^ Milosevic 
eventually signed up to a Military-Technical Agreement in June 1999 and Serb forces 
withdrew from the province.
The Kosovo campaign: conceptual issues
Much has been written criticising the motives, legality and wisdom of NATO’s recourse 
to war: for example Noam Chomsky’s polemical The New Military Humanism' and Ted 
Galen Carpenter’s NATO’s empty victory- a less polemical but still far firom satisfactory 
analysis. The ethics and moral defensibility of risk-free war from afar also generated 
much discussion. Sometimes, the debate degenerated and ‘fragmented into a series of 
mini-arguments about details and episodes’.^
This chapter thus addresses the Kosovo issue from a broad thematic risk 
management perspective rather than an episodic chronology which has been well 
documented elsewhere. Kosovo recommends itself as a case study for several reasons. It 
was NATO’s first major sustained combat operation without UN endorsement and most 
intense use of military force in Europe by the West since 1945. Besides being the longest 
US combat operation since Vietnam, it also ‘revealed the distinct attributes of a new 
American way of war’, and arguably has ‘important things to tell us about how developed 
countries will wage war in the future’ and ‘holds the key to understanding the decade that 
has just passed’ and the changing international security environment.^ Indeed, Stephen
 ^Secretary of Defence William S. Cohen & Chairman of the Joint Chiefs o f Staff Henry Shelton, ‘Joint 
Statement on the Kosovo After-action Review’ , presented before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
14 October 1999, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Octl 999/b10141999_bt478-99.html 
 ^Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO’s war to save Kosovo, (Washington 
D C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), p.99, 209 
See Paul W. Kahn, ‘War and Sacrifice in Kosovo’, Philosophy and Public Policy, Spring-Summer 1999; 
see Christopher Cviic, ‘A victory all the same’, Survival, Vol. 42 No.2, Summer 2000, p i74 
 ^Andrew Bacevich and Eliot Cohen (eds). War over Kosovo: Politics and Strategy in a Global Age, (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2001), Introduction
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Biddle suggested that ‘this curious little war had important implications for US military 
policy in the three years since’.^
Much like Iraq in 2003, the Kosovo campaign also heralded great change in the 
foundations of international relations. Michael Ignatieff concluded that humanitarian 
intervention is now the ‘chief raison d’etre’ for Western armies’^ . Tony Blair in his 
famous Chicago speech, argued that the campaign shifted the balance between human 
rights and state sovereignty. Timothy Garton Ash called Kosovo the first ‘post- 
Westphalian’ war in nearly three centuries where neither the nation nor state had a major 
role. Instead, it was fought not for territory but for foreigners, the first ‘humanitarian 
conflict’ in history.® As Vaclav Havel put it, ‘the bombardment of Yugoslavia... elevated 
human rights above the law of states’.^  There is a growing acceptance of war as ‘lesser 
evil’ to address ‘human wrongs’. With the end of the Cold War and decline of ideological 
and structural explanations for war, David Chandler felt ‘war came to be defined through 
human rights discourse’. K o s o v o  was thus the first ‘humanitarian war’ where direct 
threats to vital national interests were lacking. In fighting ‘humanitarian war’. President 
Clinton chose the most appropriate means, ‘immaculate coercion’.^  ^ Clinton understood 
that in such wars, political support was sustainable only if it was bloodless. This was not 
a blanket aversion to casualties. According to Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
(SACEUR), General Wesley Clark, the Army preferred showdown on the Korean 
Peninsula or the Gulf.^  ^ Such interventions serving US national interests resulting in 
casualties could be tolerated, an important caveat to analysis presented here.
Yet, to Krauthammer, ‘humanitarian war’ had no future because it was a 
contradiction of bloodless war, no vital interests were engaged and rewards were hardly
 ^Stephen Biddle, ‘ The new way of war’, Review Article, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81 No.3, May/June 2002, 
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20020501faessay8063/stephen-biddle/the-new-way-of-war.html 
’ Michael Ignatieff, Virtual War: Kosovo and beyond, (London: Chatto & Windus, 2000), p. 162-3 
 ^Timothy Garton Ash, ‘Round Table: the global order in the twenty-first century, Prospect, 
August/September 1999, p. 50-8
 ^cited in S. Zizek, The Fragile Absolute: Or why is the Christian legacy worth fighting for?, (London: 
Verso, 1999), p.56
David Chandler, From Kosovo to Kabul: Human rights and International Intervention (London: Pluto 
Press, 2002), p. 17, 168
” Charles Krauthammer, ‘The Short unhappy life of Humanitarian War’, The National Interest, Fall 1999, 
No.57, p6
Wesley K. Clark, Waging modem war, (Oxford: Public Affairs, 2001), p. 166-7
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satisfying.*^ The post-war independent International Commission on Kosovo concluded 
that the international community willed a humanitarian end, without willing sufficient 
means: what Michael Ignatieff called ‘our madness’.*"* Indeed it was rumoured that one 
Milosevic residence escaped bombing because it allegedly held a Rembrandt work. 
Michael Ignatieff wrote, ‘This is one measure of our madness that we allow a Rembrandt 
to save a criminal- but to us it is a necessary madness, since the truth is that we are more 
anxious to save our souls than to save Kosovo.’*^  The tentative ‘minimalist’ nature of the 
campaign was clearly evident.
Furthermore, the Kosovo operation failed to meet the Westphalian and UN 
legalist model of using force only in response to international aggression, or more 
practical military requirements of the Powell doctrine advocating clearly identifiable vital 
interests and ends achieved with overwhelming military force. Although the Powell 
doctrine was eventually validated on overwhelming force (more than 1000 warplanes 
were deployed by June 1999), clear vital interests and endgames elude easy definition. 
Andrew Bacevich was however adamant that Kosovo was an ‘imperial management’ 
strategy. Rather than protecting Kosovars, its purpose ‘had been to sustain American 
primacy on a continent of vital importance to the United States, one that had advanced 
the furthest toward the openness and integration defining the ultimate goal of American 
grand strategy’.*^
This chapter suggests that ‘risk management’ rather than ‘imperial management’ 
or ‘humanitarian intervention’ was the main purpose. While Kosovo may have been the 
last ‘humanitarian war’ by Krauthammer’s calculation and seemed to overturn many 
conventional legal and practical military requirements for understanding war, it fulfilled 
many criteria for risk management.
Yet, NATO participants in Kosovo were not allowed to call it ‘war’. Some 
commentators suggest NATO’s operation was not really a ‘war’ but perhaps a ‘police’
*^  Krauthammer, ‘The Short unhappy life of Humanitarian War’, p.7 
Independent International Commission on Kosovo. ‘Conclusions’ , www.kosovocommision.org: Michael 
Ignatieff, ‘A post-modern war’. Time, 12 April 1999 
Micheal Ignatieff, ‘ A post modem war’. Time, 12 April 1999, p.78
Andrew Bacevich, American Empire, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2002),p.l96
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operation to manage a ‘condition of insecurity’/^ Not for national survival, it was limited 
and carefully constrained under the media spotlight; victory was carefully defined. This, 
to Wesley Clark, was modem war/* In what BBC correspondent Jonathan Marcus called 
the ‘war that dared not speak its name’. President Clinton clarified that he ‘did not intend 
to deploy ground troops to fight a war’.^  ^ NATO Secretary General Solana was more 
emphatic: ‘Let me be clear: NATO is not waging war against Yugoslavia’.^ ® Three weeks 
into the campaign. Defence Secretary Cohen argued that, ‘we’re certainly engaged in 
hostilities; we’re engaged in combat. Whether that measures up to, quote, a classic 
definition of war. I’m not prepared to say’.^  ^British Defence Secretary George Robertson 
was less circumspect, ‘it is not a war’.^ ^
What lay behind these verbal gymnastics? This involved political and public 
opinion purposes but also legal reasons to do with war being largely prohibited by the 
UN Charter; the power of Congress in particular to formally declare war as well as 
discomfort with what NATO had in fact started.^^ At the same time, could the conceptual 
problem also have arisen since this type of war was new, where risk management was its 
purpose rather than ‘classic’ definitions of war as conventional inter-state contests with 
clear outcomes and peace treaties? Then NATO Secretary General Javier Solana 
repeatedly stressed, ‘we are engaged in this operation not to wage war against anybody 
but to stop the war (in K o s o v o ) Y e t  NATO was taking and returning fire on a 
sustained and large-scale basis, a war to most people. A year after the end of hostilities, 
NATO still clung to its guns: ‘This was not a war.^  ^ To General Klaus Naumann of 
NATO’s Military Committee, Milosevic ‘had accepted war but NATO had accepted just
Howard Caygill, ‘Perpetual police? Kosovo and the elision of police and military violence’, European 
Journal o f Social Theory, Vol. 4 No. 1, February 2001, p.74 
Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modem War, (Oxford: Public Affairs, 2001), p.l 1 
President Clinton, Address to the Nation, 24 March 1999, The White House 
Press Statement by Dr Javier Solana, Press Release (1999) 040, 23 Mar 1999, Brussels, Belgium 
Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 15 April 1999 
^ Quoted in Roberts, ‘NATO’s ‘Humanitarian War’ over Kosovo’, p.l 12 
See Benjamin S. Lambeth, NATO’s Air War for Kosovo: A strategic and operational assessment, (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), p51 
Press Conference by Secretary General Dr Javier Solana and SACEUR Gen. Wesley Clark, 25 Marc 
1999, NATO HQ, Brussels, Belgium,
Lord Robertson, ‘The aims o f the air campaign’ and ‘Could it have been done better?’ in Kosovo: One 
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an operation’. N e u t r a l  words like ‘operation’ and ‘disrupt’ suggested a purely 
utilitarian use of force rather than an emotive word like ‘war’. Even before hostilities 
erupted, when asked to comment on NATO’s upcoming ‘peacekeeping’ mission in 
Kosovo, General Sir Michael Rose pointedly noted that ‘you are imposing a political 
settlement which can only be done by force of arms. That is not a peacekeeping mission. 
That is war! Clearly, the concept of war needs to be refined in order to take account of 
these new situations which do not fit traditional notions associated with it.
Even more telling questions have been raised over whether the campaign was a 
war or coercive diplomacy. General Clark felt Kosovo was not a ‘war’ but ‘coercive 
diplomacy’. It was called a ‘war’ (by media, not officials) simply for ease of public 
understanding.^* Ignatieff also observed, ‘this sounded and looked like a war: jets took 
off, buildings destroyed, and people died... but this was not a war at all, but an exercise 
in coercive diplomacy designed to change one man’s mind’.^  ^Others such as New York 
Times columnist Thomas Friedman, wanted a ‘real air war’. Friedman found it absurd 
that Bel^ade held concerts while other Serbs rampaged in Kosovo. Richard Haass 
argued that in contrast to Desert Fox over Iraq in December 1998, at least air power over 
Kosovo was compellent, linked to a specified set of demands that Milosevic had to 
meet.^ ®
Thomas Schelling defined ‘coercive diplomacy’ as less heroic, less military, less 
impersonal than force used to militarily overpower an opponent.^ ^ Schelling 
distinguished between brute force and coercion. Brute force aims to deny enemy use of 
certain assets by their destruction. Coercion aims to compel enemy to do your will by 
threat of force, or limited use of force, with prospect of more to come as its most
cited in Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO’s war to save Kosovo, 
(Washington D C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), p i05 
Quoted from ‘Minutes of evidence’ given on 03 February 1999. in the House o f Commons Defence 
Select Committee Report, The Future o f NATO: The Washington Summit, 31 March 1999, p.48 
Interview with Wesley Clark cited in James Der Derian, Virtuous War, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview 
Press, 2001), p i92
Michael Ignatieff, Virtual War: Kosovo and beyond, (London: Chatto & Windus, 2000), p 3 ,110 
Richard Haass, Intervention: The use o f American military force in the post-Cold War world, 
(Washington D C.: Brookings Institution, 1999 revised edition), p i74-5 
Quoted in Donald C. F Daniel, Bradd C. Hayes, Chantai de Jonge Oudraat, Coercive Inducement and 
the Containment o f  International Crises, (Washington DC.: United States Institute of Peace, 1999), p22
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important component..However the distinction between the two is not always clear- 
cut.^  ^ Problematically Kosovo involved elements of both. The Americans and British 
were not totally united on the aims of bombing- there were subtle differences. Michael 
Clarke rightfully noted that while American statements sometimes seemed to imply that 
bombing was a coercive diplomacy strategy, the British took a more ‘managerial’ and 
instrumental policy of denial than coercion.^"* As Defence Secretary George Robertson 
argued, ‘objective here is not to get into his mind. It is to use strategic precision bombing 
on military targets to reduce his ability to order the kind of ethnic cleansing we have seen 
up to now.’^  ^The British position was thus more conceivably a risk management strategy 
than coercive diplomacy.
NATO’s approach to the Kosovo war involved a mix of escalation theory and hi- 
tech warfare. Washington never desired all-out war or the Air Force doctrine of ‘parallel 
warfare’ stressing simultaneity in attacking strategic targets and fielded forces. It opted 
for phased gradualism, expressing a desire to stop bombing and settle the dispute 
politically, rather than use military force for a military victory. What NATO fought did 
not resemble war as most military practitioners conceive it: ‘it was not fought using all 
combat arms, implemented tentatively without any shock or decisiveness or 
simultaneity.’^  ^ Herein lies the problem which this paper seeks to address: did Kosovo 
not fit traditional pre-conceived notions of war because it was a new form of war as risk 
management? While there are strong arguments that the Kosovo campaign was more 
coercive diplomacy than war, this paper assesses if risk management could provide 
another plausible explanation.
Two levels of risks are pertinent here. The first entails systemic risks of human 
rights abuses and the resulting conflagration destabilising its Balkan neighbours. The
Thomas Schelling, Strategy o f Conflict, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960); Arms and 
Influence, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), p2-3 
Colin Mclnnes, ‘Fatal attraction? Air Power and the West’ in Colin Mclnnes and Nicholas Wheeler 
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Michael Clarke, ‘British perceptions’ in Mary Buckley and Sally N. Cummings (eds), Kosovo: 
Perceptions o f war and its aftermath, (London: Continuum, 2001), p.80 
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Summit’, HC 39 , Evidence, P.147, Q.375 
Stephen P. Aubin, ‘Operation Allied Force: War or ‘coercive diplomacy’?. Strategic Review, Vol. 
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second applies on a more tactical level which attracted most attention/^ These include 
risks to allied personnel, collateral damage, and the environment. Concern with tactical 
risks and ‘force protection’ was all too obvious. Washington subcontracted to private 
company DynCorp to monitor ceasefires and NGOs to airdrop food; planes bombed from 
15000 feet, politicians promised to reduce the risks of unintended damage, Apache 
gunships were not used because of risks from Serb missiles. Sometimes these 
overshadowed the original concern with systemic risks. As SACEUR Gen. Wesley Clark 
later argued, occasionally even ‘insignificant tactical events’ (such as losing a NATO 
pilot) can have political or strategic consequences: a key characteristic of modem war.^  ^
Kosovo, especially the Task Force Hawk deployment of Apache helicopters and ruling 
out of ground troops, has been described as "Disjointed war’ despite current emphasis on 
modem joint military operations. Multiple objectives of minimising collateral damage, 
and avoiding friendly casualties were in contradiction.^^ General Clark’s memoirs 
revealed that the first requirement was to avoid the loss of any aircraft and NATO 
casualties, one of four ‘measures of merit’ he issued to guide Allied Force. This was 
necessary to maintain public support.'*'^  Unsurprisingly then, Kosovo was the first war 
conducted under ‘post-heroic’ mles: no casualties for fighting forces and no deliberate 
attacks on enemy populations."^  ^ Kosovo consolidated trends in warfare which targeted 
‘regime’ targets, not society. NATO repeatedly stated it was not ‘making war on the Serb 
people’. However, the concem of this paper is not so much tactical risks of casualties or 
collateral damage. Rather it is the systemic risks of ethnic cleansing triggering regional 
instability that NATO sought to manage, although the alliance was greatly constrained by 
tactical risks of execution.
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I. Identifying systemic risks
The first step in risk management is identifying systemic risks serving as impetus for 
action. However, risks are generally ambiguous and risk perception is inherently a 
subjective and culturally constructed process. Different actors may perceive a risk 
differently in terms of probability and consequences. The list of variables influencing risk 
perception is endless: firom international and domestic political structures, experiences in 
life, recent events, to factors such as cultural background, cognitive mindset of decision­
makers who might see in information only what they prefer to see and so on. Secretary of 
State Albright, who lived in Yugoslavia for some time and spoke some Serbo-Croatian, 
was known to drive hardline US policy: journalists dubbed the war ‘Madeleine’s War’ 
especially after the rigid manner she conducted Rambouillet made conflict more 
unavoidable. Albright repeatedly drew analogies to Hitler and past failures to act in 
Bosnia. Whether leaders believe in what they say has always been an elusive 
methodological issue for students to pinpoint. The gap between action and words can 
sometimes be huge. Furthermore, factors such as Tony Blair’s alleged desire to strut the 
world stage cannot be clearly separately considered fi-om issues of geopolitics, balance of 
power, history, ideology, bureaucratic infighting among highest levels of American 
government and military, differences with NATO allies, domestic politics especially in 
Germany with its Red-Green coalition, all of which interact in complex ways.
Nonetheless, data gathering and analysis of statements can provide a useful guide 
to patterns, regularities and outcomes to be analysed here."^  ^Furthermore, since the focus 
of this thesis is not explaining risk perceptions and other institutional or normative 
constraints in decision-making, it serves no purpose to elaborate further on complexity of 
risk perceptions. The aim here is more about understanding the chosen policy and its 
implementation/consequences, rather than detailed decision-making analysis of how that 
policy was chosen.
Risk is used here as a descriptive term to refer to a situation. The conflict in 
Kosovo entailed ‘risks of horizontal escalation’ spreading to neighbouring countries as 
well as ‘vertical escalation’ involving ever more savage attacks on civilians. The
Mary Buckley and Sally N, Cummings, ‘Introduction’ in Mary Buckley and Sally N. Cummings (eds), 
Kosovo: Perceptions o f  war and its aftermath, (London: Continuum, 2001), p.3
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concerns here are not so much balance of power in the past and jostling for interests and 
gains between great powers but simply avoiding risks of conflict spread/^ Historically 
speaking, Great Powers have always tried to contain Balkan conflicts much like today- 
from the Bosnian revolt of 1876, Macedonian uprisings in 1903 and the Balkan wars of 
1912-13. Despite Bismarck’s well-known comment that the Balkans were not worth the 
bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier at the Congress of Berlin in 1878, the region was 
to embroil Germany in World War One and more than a hundred years later over Kosovo 
in 1999. The main aim then, as now, was to prevent Balkan conflicts destroying 
international stability. It was never believed these conflicts could be fully resolved, only 
limited.' '^  ^While there is nothing new here( Benjamin Disraeli warned back in 1878 that 
50,000 crack European troops were necessary to maintain order in the Balkans), until 
1914 and a full-scale world war, the powers did not go to the extent as NATO did in 
going to war to support its interests or indirectly its favoured side. Mutual interests and 
rivalries then were also muted by considerations for the Balance of Power. Over Kosovo 
in 1999, most 19*^  century members of the Concert of Europe were on the same NATO 
side, except for Russia. There was hardly any significant concem for balance of power 
concepts, perhaps only on the Russian side.
What is more important now is the end of the Cold War, globalisation and 
associated systemic risks. The dissolution of Yugoslavia was very much related to the 
end of the Soviet Union and communism as forces previously holding the federation 
together came apart. Communist apparatchiks like Milosevic played the nationalist card 
to keep power. Some scholars argued the Kosovo campaign also marked NATO’s elision 
and blurring of its role from a military alliance into a ‘police organisation’ where its 
object was now to ‘manage turbulence that might affect security, interests of its 
members’ rather than exclusively directed against an identifiable enemy such as the
For this concept, see David McLaughlin, Managing Conflict in the Post-Cold War world, (Aspen, CO: 
The Aspen Institute, 1995),p.74-5 
Michael Howard, ‘Managing Conflict: lessons from the past’, in McLaughlin, Managing Conflict in the 
post-Cold War world, p.37
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former Soviet Union/^ Indeed, as Ignatieff noted, even the Serb people- ostensibly 
opponents of the West - remained ‘virtual enemies’ only/^
Subsequently the concept of globalisation came into play. Tony Blair candidly 
admitted, ‘twenty years ago we would not bave been fighting in Kosovo’. Speaking at the 
Economic Club of Chicago, the Prime Minister also noted that ‘globalisation is not just 
economic. It is also a political and security phenomenon’. He went on to describe bow 
‘we are all internationalists now. We cannot turn our backs on conflicts and the violation 
of human rights in other countries if we want still to be s e c ur e . B la i r  also referred to 
more than one million refugees in the EU from the Former Yugoslavia. The US National 
Security Strategy for a New Century in December 1999 was unequivocal: ‘globalisation, 
however, also brings risks. Outlaw states and ethnic conflicts threaten regional stability in 
many parts of the world’. T h i s  was a case of ‘anticipatory horizon-scanning’ of the 
strategic landscape for any possible security risks. However, it was also clear in the 
minds of policymakers like Blair and Albright that a desire to avoid repetition of previous 
‘tombstone-style’ risks such as Srebrenica motivated their actions.
Before Allied Force, hard-nosed Realist Henry Kissinger wrote that ‘proposed 
deployment to Kosovo does not deal with any threat to American security traditionally 
conceived’.In d e e d , new concepts of risk are more relevant. During the Cold War, at 
least there were clearer ideological, economic or security interests involved from Korea 
to Vietnam. Post-Cold War Kosovo seemed a most unlikely place for intervention.^^ 
Washington’s security interests in Kosovo in 1999 seemed even less important than those 
over Iraq or Osama bin Laden. The trigger was mainly risk of possible regional 
instability and of course risks to civilians being ethnically cleansed.
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Launching Operation Allied Force, NATO leaders repeated verbatim the purpose 
to avert a humanitarian catastrophe. Yet military means employed clearly were 
insufficient to attain the immediate objectives of halting ethnic cleansing. However, there 
are several ways of looking at the issue and it was not ‘purely a humanitarian intervention 
but engaged certain national interests of the major p o w e r s . . A d a m  Roberts argued that 
since Allied Force failed to avert a humanitarian disaster in the short term, it is a 
‘questionable model of humanitarian intervention’. The ‘motives for NATO military 
action included many elements which were not purely humanitarian’.^  ^ These ranged 
from guilt over earlier inaction on Bosnia, credibility, to reluctance to accept more 
refugees. The key considerations according to Roberts were humanity and credibility. 
Indeed as Dana Allin recently concluded, ‘NATO employed military force in the Balkans 
only when moral imperatives were reinforced by compelling interest in European 
stabil i ty.Blair  acknowledged as much, ‘the mass expulsion of the Kosovars demanded 
the notice of the rest of the world. But it does make a difference that this is taking place 
in such a combustible part of Europe’.^  ^ If not a model of humanitarian intervention 
which Adam Roberts dismisses, could it be a model of risk management?
The Pentagon’s Kosovo/Allied Force After-Action Report identified four key 
NATO interests in the campaign: stability in Southeastern Europe; human rights; NATO 
credibility; and maintaining a positive relationship with Russia which opposed military 
ac t ion .The  so-called ‘Christmas warning’ in 1992 by the first Bush Administration 
clearly identified a geopolitical ‘red line’ over the Kosovo issue as a strategic interest if 
the conflict in Bosnia spread south. Milosevic was warned that if Serbia started a war in 
Kosovo, Washington would feel obliged to act. This was repeated by the Clinton 
Administration. In 1993, Secretary of State Warren Christopher cautioned that Albania, 
Greece and Turkey could be sucked into any Kosovo conflict: ‘the stakes for the US are 
to prevent broadening that conflict to bring in our NATO allies, and vast sections of
William G. O’Neil, Kosovo: An unfinished peace, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner publishers, 2002), pi 7 
Adam Roberts, ‘NATO’s Humanitarian war over Kosovo’, p. 102, 108,120 
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Europe and perhaps a World War.’^^  Mark Danner argued that by autumn 1991 
Washington did not act in the first phase of the Balkan Wars because it judged that 
‘complete inaction did not pose the risks action did'/^ As then Secretary of State James 
Baker noted, ‘we’ve got no dog in this fight’. His deputy Lawrence Eagleburger believed 
the war posed risks only to those directly killing each other. NATO thus failed to act 
robustly until 1995 when the corrosive effect on trans-Atlantic relations and between 
NATO’s European members was becoming obvious. Missing from this sort of calculus 
over Bosnia was that inaction might entail its own risks detrimental to US interests.^^
This calculus became more apparent over Kosovo as will be shown. Kosovo and 
possible pan-Albanian nationalism, bordered by Macedonia, Albania, and Greece was 
deemed a different set of risks altogether. It posed more risks to regional security than 
the Bosnian conflicts. Apart from substantial human rights concerns, violence in Kosovo, 
a critical area at the heart of a combustible region could spread to neighbouring states, 
threatening NATO’s southern flank. Michael Mccgwire believed that the ‘Christmas 
Warning’ and fear of war spreading beyond Kosovo was the key to understanding resort 
to NATO military action.^' Despite Clinton’s argument that ‘we act to prevent a wider 
war... diffuse a powder keg in the heart of E u r o p e t h e r e  was in fact little real chance 
of triggering Great Power confrontation over Kosovo much like Sarajevo 1914. As 
Kissinger again commented, ‘Milosevic is no Hitler but a Balkan thug, in no position to 
threaten global equilibrium’.^  ^ Rather it was second-order and third order risks like 
destabilising Macedonia; NATO credibility and humanitarian concerns.
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Risk or threat?
This brings us to the capabilities and intentions of Milosevic in ascertaining 
whether he posed a threat, Milosevic’s Serbia hardly constituted a direct survival threat 
to Britain or America. UN sanctions since 1992 had crippled the economy and its 
population levels and GDP had dropped sharply. Despite constant emphasis on 
‘degrading his military capability’, Milosevic’s military hardly qualified as an existential 
threat despite being clearly primed for ethnic cleansing and Serb anti-air capability was 
certainly robust. As for the campaign itself, the Pentagon noted ‘this was not a traditional 
military conflict. There was no direct clash of massed ground forces. Milosevic was 
unable to challenge superior Allied military capabilities directly. His fielded forces were 
compelled to hide throughout most of the campaign’ Rump Yugoslavia certainly had 
no chance militarily against NATO, with 35 times its armed forces, annual defence 
budget 25 times larger, and 696 times its national wealth.^^ Furthermore, some contended 
that it is not the Serbs with expansionist motivations in the southern Balkans, but the 
KLA’s declared goal to achieve a Greater Albania though secession of Kosovo.^^ Even if 
Milosevic’s much touted Operation Horseshoe'mXQnàQà. to create many more refugees 
and destabilise the region, the intention could also have been to settle his own Kosovo 
problem once and for all. Intelligence assessments of how Milosevic would respond to 
threat of bombing were misguided. US intelligence agencies were ‘utterly divided’ on 
how to read his intentions and troop movements into Kosovo in early 1999: was it purely 
sabre-rattling or war preparations?^^
Instead we seemed to focus more on risks: based on probabilistic thinking and 
possible catastrophic consequences. President Clinton in a speech, presaging his decision 
to bomb, declared ‘the true measure of our interests lies not in how small or distant’ a 
place like Kosovo is. Instead ‘the question we must ask ourselves is, what are the
^  Department of Defence, Report to Congress: Kosovo/Allied Force after-action Report, 31 Jan 2000, 
Washington D.C., p.6
Figures from Stephen Biddle, ‘The New way of war?’. Review Article, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81 No.3, 
May/ June 2002
See for example Ted Galen Carpenter, ‘Bill Clinton, Aggressor’, CATO Institute Daily Commentary, 23 
March 1999
See Elaine Sciolino and Ethan Bronner, ‘How a President, distracted by scandal, entered Balkan war’. 
New York Times, 18 April 1999
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consequences of letting conflicts fester and spread’ Clinton’s White House Press 
Release argued on 26 Feb 1999, ‘there is clear national interest in ensuring Kosovo is 
where the trouble ends... if we don’t stop the conflict now, it will clearly spread. And 
then we will not be able to stop it, except at far greater cost and risk’. The components of 
risk were clearly present: the probability of not acting and undesirable consequences. 
NATO’s retrospective report Kosovo: One year on noted that the international 
community ‘became increasingly concerned about the human rights situation and its 
potential to spread instability to neighbouring countries in the r e g i o n T h e  Pentagon 
also noted the 'potential to exacerbate rivalries between Greece and Turkey’, NATO 
allies.^  ^ Furthermore, the catastrophic consequences emphasised by policymakers drew 
references to ‘genocide’ and the need to prevent another Holocaust. In the Western 
mindframe, few other stark catastrophic consequences come closer, although ‘genocide’ 
does not exactly describe what was actually ethnic cleansing and enforced population 
displacement.
In March 1998, the Council of the European Union identified Milosevic’s use of 
force against Kosovars as ‘unacceptable violation of human rights’, placing ‘the security 
of the region at risk’. The Contact Group similarly issued a statement that ‘the risk of an 
escalating conflict requires immediate action’. C o n c e m  operated on two levels: a 
humanitarian one and a security and stability factor on the other. Upon launching air 
strikes, President Clinton outlined two sets of ‘risks of failing to act’: one to the innocent 
people who might be killed or driven from their homes; the second related to risks for 
regional stabili ty.Prime Minister Blair’s statement to Parliament just before bombing 
began, stressed the primary aim to ‘avert what would otherwise be a humanitarian 
disaster in Kosovo.’ But Blair also raised security concerns, ‘if Kosovo was left to the 
mercy of Serb repression, there is not merely a risk but a probability of re-igniting unrest
Remarks by the President on Foreign Policy, San Francisco, California, 26 February 1999 
Lord Robertson, Secretary General of NATO, Kosovo One Year on. ‘Background to the crisis’, 
httD://www.nato.int/kosovo/repo2000/backgrou.htm. 21 March 2000, (Italics added)
Department of Defence, Report to Congress: Kosovo/Allied Force after-action Report, 31 Jan 2000, 
(Washington D.C.), p.3-4 
Common Position of 19 Mar 1998, defined by the Council on the basis o f Article J.2 o f the Treaty on 
European Union on restrictive measures against the Federal Republic o f Yugoslavia (98/240/CFSP), 
Brussels.; Statement on Kosovo adopted by the members o f the Contact Group, Rome 29 April 1998 
Statement by President Clinton on Kosovo, 24 March 1999, Office o f  the Press Secretary, White House, 
Washington D.C.
122
in Albania; Macedonia de-stabilised; almost certain knock-on effects in Bosnia, and 
further tension between Greece and Tur key .Th i s  sounded like a revived version of the 
Domino theory, only now it is couched in terms of risks, not communist expansionism.
The risk to NATO credibility of not acting also received wide attention. As 
Foreign Secretary Robin Cook argued, ‘Last October NATO guaranteed the 
ceasefire...What possible credibility would NATO have next time that our security was 
challenged if we did not honour that g ua r an t ee?NATO acknowledged in its report on 
Kosovo one year on, ‘If NATO had failed to respond to the ethnic cleansing, it would 
have betrayed its values and cast permanent doubt on the credibility of its institutions’.^  ^
As Michael Clarke rightly noted, NATO credibility was at stake after very publicly 
issuing its Activation Orders (ACTORDS) in late 1998.^  ^NATO’s leading members did 
not emerge with their reputations unscathed fi*om Bosnia and now Kosovo was a key test 
for NATO credibility, its continued relevance on its 50*^  anniversary and ‘out of area’ 
actions.
Geopoliticians argued that without a specific rationale prompting NATO 
involvement, ‘geopolitical imperatives’ were the explanation. The geopolitical concept of 
a Balkan ‘shatterbelt’ was to be transformed into a stable region by NATO actions.^^ 
However, the language of risk, rather than geopolitics dominated the new Strategic 
Concept which outlined the ‘complex new risks’ that face NATO. ‘Dangers of the Cold 
War have given way to more promising but also challenging prospects, to new 
opportunities and r i s k s T h i s  Concept has been criticised for a very vague definition of 
NATO’s geographical limits. Almost anything from stalled economic reform, terrorism.
Statement by the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, in the House Of Commons, 23 March 1999, Hansard( 
House o f Commons Daily Debates),
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cml99899/cmhansrd/vo990323/debtext/90323-06.htm 
House of Commons Debate on Kosovo, 25 Mar 1999, Hansard, cols. 537-53
Lord Robertson, ‘A just and necessary action’ in Kosovo: one year on, NATO HQ, Brussels, Belgium, 
Oct 2000
Micheal Clarke, ‘British perceptions’ in Mary Buckley and Sally N. Cummings (eds), Kosovo: 
Perceptions o f war and its aftermath, (London: Continuum, 2001), p.80
^ S^ee John Hillen & Michael P. Noonan, ‘The Geopolitics of NATO Enlargement’, Parameters: US Army 
War College Quarterly, Vol. 27 no. 3, Autumn 1998, p.21-34; and J O. Loughlin & V. Kolossov, ‘Still not 
worth bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier: the geopolitics of the Kosovo war 1999’, Political 
Geography, Vol. 21 No. 5, June 2002, p. 573-599 
The Alliance’s Strategic Concept approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the 
meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. on 23^ ** and 24“* April 1999,available at 
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm
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to ethnic instability could be considered a potential security issue. There is some truth 
that ‘new NATO is not focused on an enemy state but an enemy concept: instability’.^  ^
In NATO’s defence, this mindset is required in managing uncertain and unpredictable 
risks.
II. Implementing risk management
Active Anticipation
Risk management strategies are generally proactive since the locus of action is the future 
and avoiding negative outcomes. The notion of ‘risk’ allows potential victims to take 
avoidance action. In justifying NATO intervention in Kosovo, policymakers often sought 
to avert a ‘humanitarian catastrophe’ and regional instability, with clear ‘anticipatory’ 
aspects to it. At the same time, it is true that NATO also ‘reacted’ to events on the ground 
with fighting already underway in Kosovo. The key here is how NATO reacted in a 
‘proactive’ fashion. Its locus of action was future possible consequences and to prevent 
repetition of a Srebrenica-like situation, rather than seeking retrospective revenge or 
justice for victims of Milosevic. This is as predicted in the test theory and discussed in 
greater detail later. Risk here is not only a descriptive term but a normative one implying 
the need for preventive action. It also formed part of a strategic calculation.
NATO’s post-Cold War rationale essentially revolved around two issues: 
enlargement and proactive ‘out of area’ missions.*^ In various Strategic Concepts and 
negotiating the 1997 Founding Act with Russia, NATO emphasised that it was would not 
attack unless it was attacked. It was a reactive Alliance. However over Kosovo, NATO 
became a ‘proactive military organisation’.^  ^ As NATO’s original mission of collective 
defence against the Soviet Union disappeared, a more proactive role developed for 
dealing with a broad array of risks. The focus appears more on Article 4-type 
contingencies and ‘possible developments posing risks to members’ security’, than
Richard Rupp, ‘NATO 1949-2000: from collective defence toward collective security’. Journal o f  
Strategic Studies, Vol. 23 No. 3, Sep 2000, p. 172 
Ted Galen Carpenter, ‘Kosovo as an omen: the perils o f a new NATO’, in Ted Galen Carpenter (ed), 
NATO’s Empty Victory, (Washington D.C: CATO Institute, 2000), p i74-5 
Ted Galen Carpenter, ‘Relations with Russia and China’ in Carpenter (ed), NATO’s Empty Victory,pi^
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Article 5 events/^ NATO’s new Security Concept clearly envisions a more proactive 
approach: ‘an important aim of the Alliance is to keep risks at a distance by dealing with 
potential crises at an early s t a g e N A T O  did fail in preventive diplomacy in Kosovo 
despite numerous warnings throughout the 1990s but waged proactive war to forestall a 
full-blown crisis.
Even before the Kosovo war, then NATO Secretary General Javier Solana argued 
that ‘the challenges of the next century suggest that our security policies must become 
increasingly proactive... many problems and potential conflicts can be anticipated and 
many solutions devised, before it is too late.’*'^  After considering counter-factual and 
alternative course of actions, this proactive argument is reflected in how both President 
Clinton and Prime Minister Blair justified NATO action in Kosovo. This reflected a trend 
of policy statements employing similar proactive language that persisted to wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. Clinton on commencing air strikes observed,
‘this action is not risk-free. It carries risks... However, I have concluded that the 
dangers of acting now are clearly outweighed by the risks of failing to act- the 
risk that many more innocent people will die or be driven from their homes; the 
risks that the conflict will involve and destabilise neighbouring nations. It will 
clearly be much more costly and dangerous to stop later than this effort to prevent 
it from going further now.’ ^
Tony Blair warned similarly, ‘the potential consequences of military action are serious... 
but the consequences of not acting are more serious still for human life and peace in the 
long term...we have always been in favour of taking action sooner rather than later 
Kosovo could thus be seen as the first major experiment of a newly proactive NATO 
engaged in managing systemic risks, and averting ‘potential victimhood’ both for the
The Alliance’s Strategic Concept approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the 
meeting o f the North Atlantic Council in Washington D C. on 23^ ** and 24* April 1999,available at 
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/n99-065e.htm: also see David Yost. NATO Transformed: the Alliance’s 
new roles in international security, (Washington D C.: United States Institute o f Peace, 1998), pSO 
The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm 
Preparing NATO for the 21®‘ Century: Keynote address by Dr Javier Solana, Maritime Symposium, 
Lisbon, Portugal, 04 Sep 1998 
Statement by President Clinton on Kosovo, Office o f the Press Secretary, The White House, Washington 
D.C. ,2 4  Mar 1999
^ Statement by the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, in the House Of Commons, 23 March 1999, Hansard( 
House o f Commons Daily Debates),
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cml99899/cmhansrd/vo990323/debtext/90323-06.htm
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Kosovar Albanians and NATO’s credibility, and the alliance itself falling victim to the 
unwanted consequences of ethnic cleansing in the form of regional instability.*^ Indeed, 
the Clinton Administration’s December 2000 National Security Strategy fo r  a Global Age 
noted approvingly that ‘the United States has led the transformation of what were 
defensive entities into proactive instruments for meeting post-Cold War challenges’.** 
NATO action in Kosovo was cited as a successful example.
A war of precaution?
Recent rhetoric in 2003 about a new US security doctrine of pre-emption is actually not 
that novel. Some precursors were evident in Kosovo. It was a form of precautionary 
action designed to pre-empt worse atrocities and possible regional instability, further 
corrosive effects of another Srebrenica on the Alliance, and ‘damage Serb capacity to 
wage war against Kosovo in the future or spread the war to its neighbours’.*^  As Daalder 
and O’Hanlon argue, ‘a full-scale war in Kosovo between KLA and Serbia would likely 
have been particularly bloody; compounding the likely humanitarian disaster was the 
potential for refugees with consequences for stability across the region’.
How much did Western intelligence actually know about the infamous Operation 
Horseshoel Was there compelling evidence about Serb plans of massive ethnic cleansing 
to justify military action? Or was there some semblance of the precautionary principle at 
work here? Some evidence suggests action was taken in spite of uncertain and indefinite 
proof. As Tim Judah testified on the rationale for intervention, ‘at any time we could 
have had a new Srebrenica: how was one supposed to know that was not going to 
happen?’^  ^ A NATO spokesman tellingly argued in August 2000 after the International
The idea o f ‘victimhood’ was played out in fact on all sides of the conflict. The Kosovar Albanians 
portrayed themselves as victims o f Milosevic to attract NATO intervention, while Belgrade made itself out 
to be the victim of NATO bullying during the air campaign. See Lawrence Freedman, ‘Victims and 
Victors: Reflections on the Kosovo war’. Review o f  International Studies, Vol. 26 No. 3, July 2000 
National Security Strategy for a Global Age, Chapter 1, p.l (Washington D.C: The White House, Dec 
2000),
Michael O’Hanlon, ‘The Bush Doctrine: Strike First’, San Diego Union-Tribune, 14 July 2002; also Alan 
W. Dowd, ‘NATO After Kosovo’, Policy Review, Dec 1999, No. 98, Web-version, 
http://www.policyreview.org/dec99/dowd.html 
Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO’s war to save Kosovo, (Washington 
D C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), p.l (italics added)
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Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) failed to corroborate NATO claims of 
genocide in Kosovo, ‘the point is did we successfully pre-empt or not.. .We would rather 
be criticised for overestimating numbers who died than for failing to pre-empt’.C le a r ly  
there was concern about omission, for not taking precautionary action. During the 
bombing, NATO spokesman Jamie Shea suggested that Pristina football stadium had 
become a massive concentration camp. Inflated figures of those killed by Serb forces 
were provided. Before the war. President Clinton and Secretary Cohen regularly tossed 
out figures of 100,000 dead. The State Department even upped the ante to 500,000.
In the post-war period however, the figures dropped until by August 2000, the 
ICTY announced numbers below 3000. Atrocities alleged at Trepca mine where hundreds 
of bodies were said to be incinerated or thrown down the mineshafi, turned out to be false 
as nothing was found at all. Unsurprisingly, after the war, there were calls in Britain by 
Alice Mahon MP of the Balkans Committee for Foreign Secretary Robin Cook to answer 
questions that the Government deliberately misled the public, inflating scale of deaths to 
justify bombing. This became a case of ‘false positives’ inherent in the resort to the 
precautionary principle. The risk ultimately turned out to be less serious than initially 
suggested. This set a precedent for later wars in Iraq. Christopher Layne claimed that in 
fact there was no large-scale organised ethnic cleansing ongoing in Kosovo until NATO 
intervened. Albanian refugees were simply fleeing the fighting between Serb forces and 
KLA guerrillas. '^^
Refugee flows from guerrilla fighting or ethnic cleansing are similarly 
destabilising from NATO’s point of view. Milosevic had indeed adopted brutal tactics 
against Albanian villagers. Figures from the UNHCR Special Envoy for the region stated 
that on 23 March 1999 before NATO action, there were over 260,000 internally displaced 
persons (IDPs) within Kosovo, over 100,000 refugees in the region and over 100,000 
outside the region. 2000 had been killed by March 1999, mostly during KLA spring and 
Serb summer counter-offensives before OSCE monitors were deployed in October 1998.
^ NATO Acting Spokesman Mark Laity cited in Jonathan Steele, ‘Motivated to believe the worst’, 
Guardian (UK), 18 Aug 2000 
See Daya Kishan Thussu, ‘Legitimizing humanitarian intervention? CNN, NATO and the Kosovo crisis’, 
European Journal o f Communication, Vol. 15 No.3, September 2000, p73 
Christopher Layne, ‘Collateral Damage in Yugoslavia’, in Ted Galen Carpenter, NATO’s Empty Victory, 
(Washington D.C: CATO Institute, 2000), p51-52
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It may seem callous to call the Kosovo air war one of anticipation when in fact large 
scale human suffering had occurred. Would this count as a ‘humanitarian catastrophe’?
Despite extreme Serb brutality, in terms of casualties inflicted and individuals at 
risk, the violence in Kosovo was substantially less than what happened in Rwanda and 
not much greater than Bosnia previously. This was deemed by Michael Mccgwire 
‘unsubstantial’ and insufficient to justify in January 1999 summoning various parties to 
Rambouillet and the absolute insistence on KFOR under NATO direction. The real aim 
was thus actually to forestall a full-scale civil war.^  ^ Jonathan Chamey argued that the 
NATO action in Kosovo could only be understood as ‘anticipatory humanitarian 
intervention’ since the extent of human rights violations prior to withdrawal of OSCE 
observers was not ‘massive and widespread’. Such intervention in absence of proof of 
widespread violations, the argument went, allowed hegemonic states to use force against 
international law.^  ^ A somewhat more balanced analysis later conceded that strictly 
speaking, Belgrade’s earlier actions of summer 1998 was not ethnic cleansing but brutal 
counter-insurgency tactics.^^
But Jonathan Chamey and other critics of NATO intervention on this premise 
miss the point despite themselves raising the concept of ‘anticipatory humanitarian 
action’. Surely a more credible argument, as Daalder and O’Hanlon point out, can be 
made that despite such claims of relatively low-level violence and that Kosovo had not 
(yet) become a full-fledged humanitarian disaster, ‘there was good reason to believe that 
without intervention things would get much worse’ and ‘the death toll would not remain 
m o d e s t I f  events were allowed to continue unabated, a full-scale civil war with 
predictably dire humanitarian and regional consequences would occur. By then it would 
be no good intervening. NATO however failed initially to anticipate or prevent the 
intensified ethnic cleansing immediately after hostilities began. Over the past decade, 
military force on the side of ‘right’ against ‘wrong’ has a moral ring to it lacking since 
the colonial period. Even humanitarian NGOs like Medecin sans Frontières are lobbying
Michael Mccgwire, ‘Why did we bomb Belgrade?’, International Affairs, Vol. 76 No. 1, Jan 2000, p .l4  
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for pre-emptive humanitarian intervention by force. Its founder and later administrator of 
Kosovo, Bernard Kouchner, argued that Western states have the right to ‘intervene as a 
preventive measure to stop wars before they start and stop murderers before they kill’.^  ^
Most recently, various commentators have stated that, after passing several 
criteria and preconditions, ‘military action can be legitimate as an anticipatory measure in 
response to clear evidence of likely large-scale killing or ethnic cleansing’ within a 
state. The idea of anticipatory action is thus evident in the Kosovo campaign from a 
humanitarian and legalistic viewpoint. It was also indicative of a precautionary approach 
to reduce risks of humanitarian catasfrophe and wider regional instability. Having said 
that, NATO moved quicker than before perhaps learning from previous experiences in 
Bosnia. This is reflective of a ‘tombstone’ style approach to risk management, seeking to 
avoid similar dramatic disasters garnering media attention rather than a purely 
‘anticipatory’ s t a nc e .B la i r  warned ‘of masked irregulars separating out the men: we 
don’t know what has happened to them.. .recall that at Srebrenica they were killed’. 
There were historical precedents and somewhat less uncertainty than a purely 
precautionary approach would suggest. Nonetheless, the basic premise of ‘better safe 
than sorry’ encapsulated in the precautionary principle was reflected in NATO action.
Surveillance
Surveillance is the vehicle of risk management, collecting information on risks and 
assessing whether they require more management action. During the Cold War, NATO 
had mechanisms designed to provide advance warning of Soviet military moves. These 
consisted of ‘indications’ of steps an adversary had to take to prepare military action 
which could become visible to outside observers. This system focused largely on 
quantitative military developments and were based on more concrete capabilities. The
Cited in David Chandler, From Kosovo to Kabul: Human rights and International Intervention (London: 
Pluto Press, 2002), Foreword xiv
Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, ‘The responsibility to protect’. Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec 2002 , 
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For these two approaches to risk management, see Christopher Hood, Henry Rothstein & Robert 
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post-Cold War environment extended risks beyond that of traditional aggression to non­
military and unconventional ones like ethnic instability.
NATO normally obtains early warning through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership 
Council as well as internal NATO bodies like the North Atlantic Council and the Political 
and Military Committee. Additionally, a New Intelligence Warning System (NIWS) has 
been developed. The NIWS is a much more inclusive system developed to take account 
of risks such as ethnic cleansing identified in the Alliance’s 1999 Strategic Concept 
during the Kosovo campaign. It is based on the qualitative informed judgement of 
analysts as opposed to the more mechanistic quantitative approach of the Cold War. It 
continuously monitors and assesses a wide range of risk indicators not only for NATO 
but around the Euro-Atlantic area and periphery, rather than enemy military 
capabi l i t i es .As  predicted, a continuous review process of risks in now in place 
anticipating possible dangers, rather than more concrete indicators of observable military 
capabilities.
In the run-up to the Kosovo air war, there were already precursor surveillance 
operations in place. Together with unarmed OSCE monitors on the ground. Operation 
Eagle Eye, the NATO Air Verification Mission, aimed to verify Serb reduction of troop 
levels and compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1199, assess and report on 
developments. The Clinton Administration then subcontracted the high-risk task of 
monitoring Serb withdrawal to a private military company, DynCorp. This distributed 
risks away from American servicemen, taking the risk management ethos to its logical 
conclusion: even the tactical risks involved in monitoring systemic risk are to be 
managed. UAVs such as the Predator and manned surveillance platforms such as the U-2, 
RC-135 Rivet Joint, and RAF Canberras were involved. Such surveillance helped provide 
contributory information on the risks, and action which turned out to be necessary.
Verification flights ended on 24 March 1999 with the launch of Operation Allied 
Force, but surveillance flights continued to support NATO targeting and monitoring Serb 
ethnic cleansing in real-time. In Kosovo, the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles(UAVs) 
for surveillance avoided losses of manned aircraft without forgoing benefits of loitering
John Kriendler, ‘Anticipating Crises’, NATO Review, Winter 2002, No. 4, Web-version, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2002/issue4/english/art4.html
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and low-altitude flights. As one senior military officer noted, ‘the UAVs died for their 
country and no one moumed’.^®"^ On 01 April 1999, human rights groups and religious 
organizations gathered at Washington’s National Press Club to ask the Clinton 
Administration to release satellite and UAV imagery of atrocities to the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Washington, recognizing the public 
relations value, promptly released images of possible mass graves in Kosovo, including 
Glodane, Velika Krusa, Glogovac. The availability of satellite imagery to the public was 
unprecedented.'®^ It was also hoped, perhaps incredulously, that making the Serbs aware 
of such surveillance might help reduce the risks by discouraging ethnic cleansing.'®® Easy 
access to commercial satellite imagery in the future may help maintain public scrutiny of 
humanitarian risks where governments might not see the same value as in Kosovo of 
releasing satellite images. During the Kosovo campaign, satellite and unmanned 
surveillance monitored evidence of Serb atrocities. Tracking the civilian toll had high 
stakes in a war supposedly fought for moral values, as well as the broader risks of refugee 
flows destabilising neighbouring Macedonia and Albania. Further management action 
was then taken transferring displaced Albanians to countries like Germany to relieve the 
burden on Macedonia. As Paul Virilio observed, ‘we now have the Eye of humanity 
skimming over oceans and continents in search of criminals’, with satellite surveillance, 
manned and unmanned aircraft. After the formation of the National Imagery Agency in 
1996, the surveillance function is complete with NIMA’s ‘eyes’ complementing the 
eavesdropping Echelon network.'®^
Despite more than four years of UN administration, Kosovo remained subject to 
risk surveillance. From January 2002- May 2003, the UN Development Program’s 
Kosovo Early Warning System provided integrated assessment and forecasting capacity 
of factors that might affect Kosovo in the near future and to forecast potential crises and 
prevent them. Four risk areas were continuously monitored: socio-economic stability;
Quoted in Ralph Crosby Jr, ‘The path forward for NATO and EU defence capabilities: information 
dominance and precision strike’, World Systems Procurement Edition, Vol. 3 No. 1, January 2001, pi 21 
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political and institutional stability; ethnic community relations; and personal and public 
security.
After KFOR entered Kosovo, UAVs were re-tasked to force protection and area 
surveillance missions. The outbreak of fighting in Macedonia and increased levels of risk 
in March 2001 saw the despatch of more Predators to provide surveillance. A Florida- 
based private military company AirScan Inc, is also involved in monitoring security risks 
such as smugglers and terrorists trying to cross the border, locating weapons stashes and 
watching suspect premises. In March 2001, with increasing tensions in Presovo valley in 
North-east Kosovo, the OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje originally established 
in 1992, enhanced its activity along the Macedonia-Kosovo border to collect more 
information. As predicted by the test theory, every time a security risk in Kosovo from 
ethnic cleansing, terrorists and smugglers to ethnic tensions along the border is identified, 
surveillance and monitoring is undertaken to further assess it and action taken in advance 
of possible harm. Additionally, there was focus on anticipating possible risk scenarios 
and indicators rather than a concrete military danger.
Utilitarian ‘less than heroic’ strategies of risk management
‘Routine’ war
To some observers, war has became ‘a housekeeping arrangement, a series of more or 
less routine tasks’.*®^ Did such routine tasks extend to managing systemic risks? After all, 
risk management manuals tell us, good risk management should be routinely integrated 
into general everyday activity. Was ethnic cleansing seen, like crime, as everyday risks to 
be managed? War became routine in two senses: it became familiar, and also 
instrumental to manage risks. Kosovo did not engage the passions of the American 
people and instead the Dow Jones closed above 10000 for the first time ever. ‘Never 
during US involvement in a war had American stock portfolios fattened so generously 
and so q u i c k l y . A s  predicted by the test theory, the act of war had become an 
emotionally detached, utilitarian instrument to manage risks. Risk management in
Don DeLillo, ‘Human Moments in World War Three’, Esquire, July 1982.
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Kosovo helped keep the Balkan house in order through almost routine applications of 
force. By the late 1990s, naval deployments to the Eastern Mediterranean in support of 
Balkan operations exhibited a clear ‘routinisation of what would otherwise be 
legitimately known as crisis response’. A s  President Clinton argued when he 
announced air strikes, ‘we used diplomacy and force to end the war in Bosnia. Now 
trouble next door in Kosovo puts the region’s people at risk again’.^ ^^  So, the argument 
went, the same model of military force must be used against what seemed to be seen in 
Washington as an almost commonplace occurrence of the 1990s: the risks ethnic 
cleansing posed for Balkan stability.
We have grown accustomed to cruise missiles lifting off, often at night for 
dramatic effect; or cockpit gun camera footage. As Andrew Bacevich observed, since 
1993 from Somalia to Haiti to Iraq and Afghanistan to Kosovo, the Clinton 
Administration had ‘made the use of force routine’. U S  involvement in two 
simultaneous air wars -  one over Iraqi no-fly zones and now Kosovo- illustrated the 
thinking behind Clinton adapting preponderant American military power to the post-Cold 
War world: a Presidency with quasi-imperial prerogatives, ever expanding capabilities in 
air power, and eagerness to use force far removed firom traditional national security 
requirements. Such new requirements involved managing systemic risks. In the preceding 
6 months before Kosovo, the Clinton Administration had ‘managed’ three countries: 
cruise missile strikes against Afghanistan and Sudan; Operation Desert Fox against Iraq 
and the low-level air war over no-fly zones. This series of events and thinking behind 
them is revealing for it illuminates how force is being used to manage security risks in a 
‘routine’ manner. Kosovo was simply the latest in a line-up of risks to be managed.
Bacevich argues a new military doctrine no longer reliant on brute force, has 
developed in using precision-guided air power ‘to conduct carefully calibrated, long- 
range strikes’ at little risk of friendly casualt ies.Luttwak concluded such ‘largely one­
sided combat’ against enemies that could hardly react also meant it was more a
’ Thomas Barnett & Henry H. Gaffney, Jr, ‘Top ten post-Cold War Myths’, US Naval Institute 
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‘management’ challenge than war.*^ "* The vague language used of ‘degrading’, and 
targets ‘struck and restruck’ until NATO achieves desired levels of ‘degradation’,'*  ^
could of course as Andy Bacevich pointed out, simply be a face-saving tactic for the 
White House to simply declare victory without admitting failure. Such language also 
reflected risk management’s minimalist ethos which simply seeks to reduce risks, a less 
heroic strategy. Indeed, the Clinton Administration lacked a broader political vision on 
Kosovo. ‘There is no sense here, as perhaps there was among an earlier generation of 
idealists, that our liberal-democratic principles are of universal validity.’"^
Personifying risks
War as risk management should theoretically be managerial in nature, not correctional. 
As with recent developments in criminology, the focus should be utilitarian, and more 
modestly managing the risks posed by a person to a wider population, rather than trying 
to reform that person. It should also not be too concerned with questions of justice, right 
or wrong, or morality. Was there any evidence of this in Kosovo? Recent advances in 
airpower allowed for greater precision to target the enemy leadership, no longer the state 
or its society and citizens. Wesley Clark’s briefings constantly employed pronouns 
alluding personally to Milosevic in describing ‘his’ air defences, ‘his’ storage plants. The 
Serb leader was also indicted for war crimes at the Hague. While special envoy Richard 
Holbrooke negotiated with Milosevic in the run-up to the air campaign, some US 
Senators and the State Department had misgivings about lending legitimacy to the 
authoritarian leader. Yet there was no prospect of regime change and Holbrooke was 
convinced that Milosevic held the key to peace.
Milosevic was often identified as the root cause of the Kosovo conflict. NATO 
Secretary General Javier Solana stressed that ‘the person responsible for creating the 
humanitarian catastrophe has a name, and his name is President Milosevic, not NATO’. 
Secretary of State Albright had her spokesman James Rubin declare that ‘Milosevic is not
Edward Luttwak, Strategy: the logic o f peace and war, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
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part of the problem. Milosevic is the problem.’ A callous, ruthless political operator, 
the West over the years has 'alternated between vilifying him and finding him 
indispensable’.M ilo se v ic  did not actually create the problem and there are many other 
factors such as history and latent Serb nationalism; but he did exploit it for political 
purposes. Some such as Herbert London, John Olin Professor of Humanities at New York 
University complained that as long as Milosevic was in power, there was no ‘victory’ 
despite NATO achieving most of its goals. A Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty report 
found the war in Kosovo ‘disappointing’ because it resulted in a ‘Saddam Hussein peace’ 
after the 1991 Gulf War, similarly leaving Milosevic in power. Furthermore as Edward 
Luttwak observed, the paradox of strategic air power is such that the bombing may be 
precise yet ineffectual from the perspective of enemy leaders. Perhaps Milosevic saw air 
campaigns as useful or neutral in keeping him in power. Vastly superior NATO forces 
did not seek ‘regime change’ or battlefield defeat of the Yugoslav army (VJ). Instead, 
the goal was diminish and degrade its capabilities. This was perhaps a reflection of the 
limited and indirect security interests in the region as well as the fact that Milosevic was 
seen as potentially influential in ending the violence.
On the other hand, an ethos of risk management does not seek correctionalism: 
seeking Milosevic’s removal misses the point somewhat. Rather the goal is managerial 
and more modest. It is fimdamentally utilitarian. As long as the risks are managed to a 
sufficient degree, it is enough to stop hostilities. Compromise deals have had to be struck 
with him from Dayton to ending hostilities in Kosovo. Demonising Milosevic may have 
made the war easier to prosecute for public opinion purposes, but it diverted attention 
from the complex nature of the Kosovo problem and Serbia did indeed have some 
legitimate interests in Kosovo. While Western governments decided after the Kosovo
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campaign ended, to engineer Milosevic’s ouster through economic sanctions, diplomatic 
isolation, aid to opposition parties and democracy p r o g r a m s i t  was significant that the 
Kosovo war left him in power. Just as justice has been overshadowed by utilitarian risk 
management in crime control, this suggested that NATO apparently went to war not so 
much to seek redress for the thousands killed indirectly or directly as a result of 
Milosevic’s political agenda or capture him to face war crimes charges, but to manage the 
related systemic risks.
Reshaping the environment
Given that Milosevic was not apprehended or killed, reshaping the situation suggests 
another risk management tool to reduce opportunities for harm rather than focusing on 
individuals. Some analysts have called the Balkans a recently ‘reshaped region’ that 
served American ‘imperial’ i n t e r e s t s . T h i s  is inaccurate and ascribes a grander 
‘imperial’ vision to military action rather than the hesitant one exhibited in the campaign. 
NATO did not seek Milosevic’s removal or even conquest associated with previous 
notions of war but simply altered the conditions within which he operated, constraining 
his freedom of action. As President Clinton argued in his April 1 1999 speech at Norfolk: 
‘had we not acted, the Serbian offensive would have been carried out with impunity’. In 
explaining NATO’s inability to account for destroyed Yugoslav tanks. General Clark 
argued in his Kosovo post-strike assessment, that ‘air strikes forced heavy equipment into 
hiding, unable to conduct operations against Albanians. What we had been successful in 
doing was keeping it in hiding, under wraps, i n e f f e c t i v e N A T O  thus fought to 
‘establish conditions’ rather than ‘win’ in the classic sense’ of destroying the opponent’s 
military and an identifiable e n e m y . T h i s  meant managing the previous ‘conditions of 
turbulence and instability’ which triggered military action in the first place.
Thomas Carothers, ‘Ousting Foreign Strongmen: Lessons from Serbia’, Carnegie Endowment Policy 
Brief, Vol. 1 No. 5, May 2001
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NATO thus fought a ‘Goldilocks war’ -neither too hot nor too cold.^^° The initial 
worry was not causing too little damage to Serbs but that too much damage might help 
the KLA. This certainly was not ‘heroic’ all-out war. Lord Robertson reiterated one year 
after the campaign that ‘it was a careful operation designed to disrupt the Yugoslav 
campaign of violence in Kosovo....it was not designed to ‘militarily defeat 
Yugoslavia’. W a r  now meant simply reducing opportunities for violence rather than 
decisively attacking the enemy military. Had NATO not acted, argued Lord Robertson, 
‘the region would have been condemned to continuing warfare and instability for years to 
come’. Instead, ‘today we are helping to shape a peaceful f u t u r e T h e  Pentagon 
described the earlier preventive deployment in Macedonia as part of ‘Shaping the 
International Environment’ since it ‘lessens the conditions for conflict’. T h e  Clinton 
Administration’s final National Security Strategy described military actions over Kosovo 
as a good example of such ‘shaping’. T h e  campaign can be seen as Washington’s 
‘shaping strategy’ in action, although the original concept emphasised activities mostly in 
peacetime. By ‘reshaping’ the Balkans first in Bosnia and then in Kosovo, NATO in 
effect denied Milosevic opportunities to implement his nefarious plans, rather than 
removing him outright. This was predicted in the test theory.
Nation-tending
Old-fashioned imperialism could overcome the problem of human rights abuse by simply 
conquering and imposing ‘civilised’ standards. Yet victory and empire can no longer be a 
realistic goal in a post-imperialist age.*^  ^ Instead we have re-shaped situations, quasi­
protectorates and more minimalist ‘nation-tending’. For example, in February 2000, after 
attacks on American forces searching Serb parts of Mitrovica, US troops were no longer 
deployed outside their own secure sector. When French forces realised other NATO
cited in Ivo Daalder & Michael O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO’s war to save Kosovo, 2000, pl04  
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troops were avoiding effort and risk, they too stopped intensive foot patrols, causing 
‘post-heroic multinational troop degradation’.P re s id e n t  Vojislav Kostunica questioned 
whether NATO was a military or humanitarian organisation, being more concerned with 
simply protecting its own people, rather than disarm Albanian r e b e l s . T h e  UN Balkans 
human rights envoy also blamed KFOR for being ‘too timid’ and ‘not willing to risk 
anything to comply with its task’.^ ^^  NATO officials claimed America’s ‘body bag’ 
syndrome was hampering attempts to quell Balkan conflicts. A European officer 
complained that, ‘Because they (Americans) hardly leave their camps, when they do, it 
looks like the 1^  ^ C a v a l r y I n d e e d  the West’s response to Balkan crises has always 
been to seek the least risky and least costly approach.
Lacking an ‘imperial’ ethos, Washington especially under Bush has hot been 
enthusiastic about nation-building or peacekeeping and the air campaign itself certainly 
did not contain a grand conceptualisation for rebuilding Kosovo. US forces in Kosovo 
were dubbed ‘Ninja Turtles’, more concerned with force protection than peacekeeping 
and foot patrols. ‘Kosovo remains a non-state’, while Washington ‘appeared to lose 
interest in staying the course of post-conflict reconstruction’. I d e a l l y ,  as Zygmunt 
Bauman argues, ‘a globalising war’ fought in the name of a postulated international 
community and shuns territorial conquest would be a hit and run affair’ like nomadic 
warfare without taking responsibility for consequences.*"^  ^ This ideal situation cannot 
happen simply because to walk away could leave the original systemic risks that 
triggered intervention to bubble up again. Instead, we have uncertain ‘nation-tending’ 
efforts designed simply to keep the situation from boiling over without solving the 
underlying problem. Enmeshing NATO allies and the UN to provide administrators and 
legitimacy helped reduce the prominence of the US role. This might prove the best model
Edward Luttwak, Atlantic Unbound Roundtable: Picking a good fight’, April 11 2000, 
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for reconstruction by an administration famously averse to nation-building and a 
superpower ‘ill-suited for empire'
in. A victory... of sorts? Defining success
Non-events and the minimalist criterion for success: acceptance and patience
How would a war to manage risks end? Hypothetically, it would conclude with a 
reduction of risks and define success minimally with non-events such as avoiding risks 
occurring. Almost all the wars in historian A.J.P. Taylor’s How wars end concluded with 
a great peace conference to settle issues. But 20^ century wars have had a nasty habit of 
eluding neat conclusion firom the First World War to the Second. Yet, ‘we still like to 
think of wars with formal declarations, ending with peace treaties, clearly delineating 
victors fi"om defeated.
Unfortunately, this ideal state of events did not happen in Kosovo either. 
President Clinton was perhaps right that ‘this(Allied Force) is not a conventional thing, 
where one side is going to lose, one side is going to win’.^ '^ '^  The nebulous end to 
hostilities had both sides claiming victory. Milosevic retained power (initially), and kept 
Kosovo under formal Yugoslav sovereignty. Militarily, NATO launched some 38000 
sorties and dropped 26000 bombs or missiles with only 2 non-combat losses and about 20 
cases of collateral damage. Anthony Cordesman called this an ‘amazing tactical and 
technical achievement’.D e s p i te  later Battle Damage Assessment revealing that NATO 
exaggerated its battlefield success. Lord Robertson retorted that ‘relying on numbers 
misses the p o i n t . T h i s  was a concept of war where success is not measured by 
destroying the enemy military.
On the strategic and political side, the eventual KFOR deployment to Kosovo 
came as more of a relief than an ecstatic victory. General Clark noted, ‘it didn’t feel like a 
victory. There were no parades. Military and diplomats were simply relieved the
Joseph S. Nye, ‘Ill-suited for empire’, Washington Post, 25 May 2003 
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operation was concluded, and were absorbed in the next mission, working on the ground 
inside Kosovo.’ This ‘empty’ feeling was alien to previous wars but would become 
commonplace as the West undertakes war as risk management. War had become more 
utilitarian rather than emotive. Victory meant being Kosovo’s guardian indefinitely, the 
‘most thankless and most pointless task imaginable’. Others think the only winners were 
the Albanian mafia fares criminal clans. The views of Michael Mandelbaum and 
Charles Krauthammer are not untypical. Mandelbaum saw a ‘Prefect Failure’ where 
consequences were all opposite of NATO intentions from exacerbating Kosovar suffering 
to alienating Russia and China. Krauthammer observed, ‘the ends of humanitarian 
intervention are also difficult’. It merely freezes the status quo, since the West is not 
prepared to brutally pacify and control anymore. Occupying dangerous regions peripheral 
to US strategic interests is the ‘reward’.
The only clear victory lay in returning refugees back to Kosovo ultimately and 
securing Serb withdrawal. Otherwise, much was ambiguous from the eventual 
‘settlement’ to the grand ‘prize’ of having Kosovo as de facto international protectorate 
indefinitely. As Ignatieff observed, ‘instead of Serb surrender, NATO contented itself 
with a Military-Technical Agreement which specified terms and timing of Serb 
withdrawal and entry of NATO troops, but left entirely undefined the constitutional or 
juridical status of the territory over which the war was fought’ in the first place. The 
ambiguous ‘victory’ was ‘virtual’, producing no regime change or final political 
settlement. Several important aspects were diluted in what has been described as a 
‘Rambouillet-lite’ accord: there was no more mention of KFOR’s ‘right to unrestricted 
passage’ throughout the FYR contained in Rambouillet’s Appendix B. There was also no 
reference to a three-year transition period or referendum on Kosovar independence. 
KFOR was deployed under UN, not NATO auspices. NATO did however gain the
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withdrawal of all Serb forces; this was not the case before. The tortured legal situation 
was such that in 1999, Washington did not recognise ‘rump’ Yugoslavia, yet Kosovo 
independence was opposed in favour of autonomy within this rump s t a t e . T h e  reasons 
given are largely negative- fear of secessionism or ideas of Greater Albania destabilising 
the region, (although there are some positive arguments that partition would undermine 
the European notion of multicultural, multiethnic states.) General Clark warily intoned, 
‘there is no peace settlement. The ultimate division of political power has not been 
settled’. I t  was not a perfect solution but a compromise one that sufficiently managed 
the risks. That is indicative of risk management’s more modest goal.
Why was such an ambiguous result- described colourfully as ‘the mother of all 
c om pr omi sesa ccep ted  despite overwhelming military odds in NATO’s favour and 
the ultimately impressive display of aerial firepower? The view encapsulated by the title 
of Daalder and O’Hanlon’s Winning Ugly is illuminating: ‘the outcome achieved in 
Kosovo, while hardly without its problems, represented a major improvement over what 
had prevailed in the region up to that point, and certainly over what would have happened 
had NATO chosen not to i n t ervene .Cl in t on’s final National Security Strategy in 
December 2000 defended NATO action as having ‘prevented the real risk that violence in 
Kosovo would create turmoil throughout the r e g i o n . T w o  of General Clark’s so-called 
‘measures of merit’ that guided the operation actually ‘focused not on achieving 
objectives but on preventing bad things from happening’.P re v e n tin g  a risk occurring 
and non-events alluded to above are precisely the minimalist criteria for assessing risk 
management. By this count, despite initially placing great strain on Albania and 
Macedonia ( admittedly a failure), that the region as a whole had not been destabilised 
was a success in itself. Leading US Senators lamented the prize of ‘winning’ : occupying 
Kosovo indefinitely at huge costs. If this was ‘victory’ what would defeat look like? Real
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defeat would have been much worse for NATO, the trans Atlantic security relationship 
and regional stability. The least bad outcome was thus defined as a victory.
The fudge on Kosovo created continued tension. Yet to do more than that itself 
risks encouraging further Albanian expansionism. The KLA’s declared goal of ‘Greater 
Albania’ comprised parts of Macedonia (including its capital Skopje), Greece, 
Montenegro and the fringes of southern Serbia. After all, Kosovo’s status had been 
ignored partly because a viable permanent solution such as partition or independence 
could destabilise the fragile inter-ethnic mix in the region. Ironically, after intervening on 
behalf of Kosovar Albanians, NATO now had to restrain their sentiments for 
independence and protect Serbs instead. Edward Luttwak argued that uninterrupted war 
without outside intervention would have created some sort of peace. Ceasefires and 
imposed ‘settlements’ only allow recuperation and prolong wars indef ini tely.This  
argument however ignores the systemic risks involved in letting wars bum themselves 
out. Rather than a perfect solution, the minimalist outcome is something NATO had to 
accept, given the prevailing conditions. Today, ethnic tensions are still high, with 
effective partition of cities like Mitrovica into Serb and Albanian halves. The myth of 
multi-ethnic administration remains elusive. In Serb enclaves in Kosovo such as Strpce, 
teachers and municipal workers draw salaries from both Belgrade and UNMIK. Yugoslav 
dinars continue to be used together with the official currency Euro. These dual stmctures 
serve little function other than to support Belgrade’s claim of sovereignty. Yet the 
international community refuses to confront the possible solution of partition. In 
August 2001, ‘UNHCR remains extremely concerned that more than two years after the 
entry of the international community, there is no freedom of movement; there is no 
guarantee of security for non-Albanian population’. N A T O ’s first air war ended with a 
damp squib than a bang, symptomatic of risk management. The ethos is minimalist, 
seeking to avoid rather than attain.
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An open-ended process
Problematically, public patience in the West wears thin quickly - the inevitable public 
‘wobble’ in any campaign. Much as President Bush two years later was to call for 
patience in Afghanistan, President Clinton during the Kosovo campaign reminded us, 
‘this air campaign is not a 30-second ad’. Senior officials warned there is ho ‘silver 
bullet’ to stop Serb aggression immediately. Worse still, war as risk management leads 
to open-ended operations which have to continually manage new risks or resurgent old 
ones. There is no clean end associated with traditional concepts of war. Instead, KFOR’s 
mission elided from military into a ‘perpetual police’ operation, with each role blurring 
into the o t h e r .S i nc e  risks cannot be totally eliminated, only reduced, risk management 
is best described as an ongoing cyclical process rather than a linear one towards a clearly 
defined end goal. Evidence suggests that at as long as there are low casualties, not 
concentrated in the spate of a few days, the American public can tolerate open-ended 
commitments. The foreseeable future will only see American soldiers on ‘near­
permanent’ sentry duty in the Balkans .Whi le  exit dates from Bosnia initially of one 
year were promised and then broken to Congress, the Clinton team avoided such specific 
deadlines for Kosovo. With the quandary over Kosovo’s ultimate political future of 
partition or independence unresolved, the most likely result will be a quasi-prptectorate 
for indefinite periods of time. Perhaps the commitment to stay is reflected by Camp 
Bondsteel at Urosevac- the largest US base built since Vietnam, housing 5000 troops 
with a helicopter base and all amenities of home.'
Despite KFOR’s entry, systemic risks were reduced but not eliminated. In March 
2001, patrols along the Kosovo-Macedonia border sought to manage fresh risks to 
Kosovo’s shaky peace as fighting flared between Albanian separatists and Skopje. NATO 
Secretary General George Robertson on launching Operation Essential Harvest to collect 
demobilised weapons argued in predictably proactive fashion, ‘there are risks involved...
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but the risks of not sending them are far greater’. I n  May 2001, Serb forces re-entered 
the Ground Safety Zone established as a buffer zone between Kosovo and Serbia. NATO 
troops unwilling to vigorously interdict Albanian separatists, dumped the task onto 
Belgrade. What was previously concern for regional stability and ethnic cleansing 
became, after September 11, considerations of ‘potential for terrorist activity emanating 
from the Balkans’. A l t h o u g h  there is no concrete evidence at present, the region 
exhibited risk factors: large numbers of Western troops in a largely Muslim land 
populated with many mujahideen fighters and porous borders in the region. KFOR will 
have to undertake continuous monitoring and management. In August 2002, Jane’s 
Intelligence Digest warned that ‘risk of far wider instability remains a key concern’ 
especially over the failure to resolve the so-called Albanian question of Greater Albania 
and its impact on Macedonia. Clearly the problem over Kosovo is by no means 
resolved; only the risks managed to an appropriate degree. Risks furthermore tend to 
evolve. Even three years after the entry of KFOR, risks remained for ‘Balkan instability 
retains the capacity to punish Western inattention’.'^  ^ Kosovo is still an ‘unfinished 
peace’.
Given that risk policies operate under conditions of high uncertainty, they create 
what Ulrich Beck termed the ‘boomerang effect’. An initial action to tackle a risk could 
generate more unintended consequences and risks. The Kosovo air war brought about 
new risks which themselves had to be managed: the tidal wave of refugees (which 
paradoxically strengthened NATO’s political will), strained relations with China and 
Russia; the KLA emerged with greater credibility and legitimacy than Rugova. As 
Michael Mandelbaum ruefully mused, although ‘every war has unanticipated 
consequences,... in this case virtually all the major political effects were unplanned, 
unanticipated and unwelcome’. D e s p i t e  being surprised by the intensity of Milosevic’s
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stepped-up ethnic cleansing after bombing began, NATO generally coped well with the 
refugee outflow which was the most visible unintended consequence. NATO bad 
prepositioned 13000 troops and humanitarian aid which then proceeded to build refugee 
tents. During the campaign, NATO would feed and shelter 850,000 people for three 
months. ‘Kosovo is the only case in modem history where a systematic removal of ethnic 
groups has been reversed .However  one could question the price: about 2500 people 
had died in Kosovo before NATO intervened. In 11 weeks of bombing, although precise 
figures may never be known, an estimated 3000 died, mostly Albanians killed by Serbs 
together with about 500 civilians killed in the air campaign.Depleted Uranium 
projectiles and unexploded cluster bombs remain, posing significant risks to 
peacekeepers, civilians and the environment which this paper will not go into. Generally, 
the ‘boomerang effect’ was relatively well-handled and NATO-Russian relations were 
back on an even keel soon afterwards.
IV. Conclusions
Although proponents of the Kosovo campaign think it could herald a new doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention, it might also well turn out to be a strategic anomaly in that 
respect. Despite some controversy classifying the Kosovo operation as ‘war’ or ‘coercive 
diplomacy’ or something else, what it does demonstrate is the extent to which war for the 
West is becoming a tool to manage risks.
Evidence presented in this case study demonstrates that characteristics of risk 
management such as anticipatory action and some tendencies toward ‘overestimating the 
worst’ latent in the precautionary principle (albeit not fully-formed) were present. 
Official rhetoric and documents clearly appealed to the need for proactive action on 
addressing risks. As predicted by the test theory, there was evidence of surveillance 
activity and continuous monitoring of risks as precursor to action. The utilitarian nature 
of war as risk management was also apparent. Andy Bacevich saw use of force over 
Kosovo as simply part of a ‘routine’ series of ‘housekeeping tasks’. Good risk 
management practices after all should be as routine as possible. Once again, as with
Alan W. Dowd, ‘NATO after Kosovo’, Policy Review, Dec 1999/Jan 2000, No. 98 , Web-version, 
http://www.policyreview.org/dec99/dowd.html
Human Rights Watch, Civilian Death Toll in NATO’s Air Campaign, Feb 2000
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Saddam Hussein in the 1990s, Milosevic personified the risks, yet he was managed by 
reshaping the environment in which he operated rather than removed from power. 
Managerialism trumped correctionalism or notions of justice.
In defining success minimally and through non-events such as avoiding regional 
destabilisation, a risk management perspective further allows better understanding of the 
ambiguous end of hostilities and the open-ended commitment involved in Kosovo. There 
was more earnest nation-building than nation-tending. This refuted predictions by the 
theoretical framework and was largely due to the multinational nature of the intervention. 
Taken together, these aspects allow reconceptualising war as risk management, further 
accentuating the West’s utilitarian, instrumental approach to war in the 21®* century. For 
an anxious democracy in a risk age seeking to manage systemic risks with minimal costs, 
the blueprint unearthed in Kosovo could recommend itself to future wars.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
The Afghan Campaign and the ‘war’ on terrorism: 
‘Risk management’ vindicated? ^
‘Risk managers face challenges of bracing for the unimaginable’ - New York Times, 
October 20, 2001
Introduction
After September 11 (9/11) attacks, policymakers have waxed lyrical about a ‘war’ on 
terrorism. In the West, it fuelled unrealistic public expectations. ‘War’ terminology 
spawned inaccurate comparisons with war in its ‘classical’ form rather than the more 
appropriate risk management variety suggested here. This chapter seeks to provide a 
more appropriate analytic prism for understanding a strange war where enemies are 
elusive networks, the aim is simply avoiding harm with no prospect of closure, and 
success is defined more by non-events rather than what can be seen.
The purpose of this second case study is to assess again the validity of the test 
theory developed in Chapter Three. Again, a common set of structured questions 
generated by the test theory guides analysis to see if predictions are congruent with 
evidence presented. The task is to identify trends surrounding the Afghanistan campaign 
om particular, and more generally the struggle against terrorism, which have potential 
implications for reconceptualising war as risk management.
Firstly, systemic risks concerned in Afghanistan are identified as the stimulus for 
action. The second section analyses implementation by examining the precautionary 
principle; and how policymakers justified the ‘proactive’ aspects of military actions. 
Other questions explore if there was surveillance of risks, ‘reshaping the environment’ 
and whether Afghanistan reflected a utilitarian ‘routine’ use of force. Finally, the chapter 
closes with an assessment of results. Non-events like simply avoiding harm are the
' An earlier version o f this chapter appeared as ‘Unravelling the war on terrorism: A risk management 
exercise in war clothing’, Security Dialogue, Vol. 33 No 2 , June 2002.1 am grateful for permission to 
reproduce certain sections o f the article.
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benchmark for successful risk-management, not perfect solutions. Outcomes will neither 
be apparent, or decisive as suggested by ‘war’. Would the ‘boomerang effect’ and 
cyclical, open-ended risk management also describe a protracted struggle where disrupted 
terror networks regroup and new ones constantly emerge? There is certainly no finite end 
normally associated with ‘war’.
A brief history
This chapter describes the Afghan campaign from a risk management perspective rather 
than a lengthy chronological narrative. Only a short historical primer is provided setting 
the general background. The Western intelligence community has long warned of 
security risks posed by terrorism. Terrorist sanctuaries in Afghanistan have concerned US 
administrations before. In August 1998, President Clinton launched Operation Infinite 
Reach , cruise missile strikes on terrorist facilities in Afghanistan after US embassies in 
east Africa were bombed, allegedly by A1 Qaeda. On September 21 1998, President 
Clinton told the UN General Assembly that terrorism should be on the ‘top of our 
agenda’.
This ominous warning rang true on September 11 2001, when terrorist hijackers 
crashed two planes into New York’s World Trade Centre, toppling the twin towers, and 
another into the Pentagon. A third crashed into a Pennsylvania field after passengers on 
board apparently wrestled for control with the hijackers. The horror and outrage invoked 
an unprecedented wave of solidarity with the US. UN Security Resolution 1373 
authorised action to combat terrorists endangering international security. On October 7 
2001, American and British forces launched Operation Enduring Freedom, the military 
phase of the ‘war’ on terrorism. The campaign’s opening stages had sceptics decrying a 
‘Kosovo Redux' with proxy ground forces while air power delivered ordnance.^ The 
campaign aims were initially unclear. The official stated aim was to ‘degrade and disrupt’ 
terrorist networks, and ‘prevent further terrorism’. At the onset, it seemed the Taliban 
were to be coerced into handing Bin laden over and expelling A1 Qaeda. Eventually the 
goal became regime change. US ground forces were also not inserted in large numbers 
initially, delegating ground combat to local allies like the Northern Alliance following the
See Max Boot, ‘This victory may haunt us’, Wall Street Journal, 14 November 2001
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Kosovo model. This allegedly allowed Osama Bin Laden to slip the dragnet at Tora Bora 
in December 2001 as well as many Taliban/A1 Qaeda in the Shah-I-kot valley in March 
2002’s Operation Anaconda. At this writing, sporadic skirmishes continue.
The Afghan campaign and the ‘war’ on ‘terrorism’: Conceptual Issues
Two levels of analysis are relevant here. The first comprises the rhetorical war against 
‘terrorism’ (a common noun) which by definition can never surrender, like ‘war’ on 
crime. Realists were right in this respect that Bush should not have declared war on 
‘terrorism’, but A1 Qaeda. Terrorism is more a concept, phenomenon or method of 
political violence, rather than a clear set of adversaries. It has no territorial boundaries, 
flags or capitals to be captured. Yet American Presidents since Johnson have declared 
‘metaphoric’ wars since the first one on poverty in 1964. It is militarily impossible to 
attack an ‘ism’. Terrorism the ‘concept’ cannot be physically combated but terrorist 
groups that pose risks can. In this way, the war on terrorism currently translates into war 
on trans-national A1 Qaeda networks.
The second level of analysis thus involves more concrete manifestations of 
warfare against A1 Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan: almost a ‘conventional’ war 
against states (a proper noun which can surrender). Yet, in Afghanistan capturing Bin 
Laden and destroying the Taliban have been sidelined in favour of less visible results and 
non-events such as preventing further terrorism generally. There were no surrender 
ceremonies either. The Afghan campaign has been subsumed within the war on terrorism 
so much so that little practical difference existed between the two. This chapter combines 
these two levels by extrapolating features of risk-management from military action in 
Afghanistan that might be relevant to the broader campaign against terrorism and vice 
versa.
America’s war on terror is open-ended, ill defined and lacks parameters. Although 
the ‘Bush Doctrine’ pursues ‘every terrorist group of global reach’, this chapter focuses 
on A1 Qaeda. US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld also accepted that eliminating all 
terrorism would be ‘setting a threshold that is too high’.^  A1 Qaeda’s agenda and reach is
 ^Quoted in Neil King Jr. and Jim VandeHei, ‘Allies hope antiterror effort won’t ignore local fights’, Wall 
Street Journal, 26 September 2001
149
exclusively global compared to ‘traditional’ terrorists such as the IRA. Furthermore, the 
dangers posed by A1 Qaeda far exceeds the IRA. The main aim of defeating A1 Qaeda 
should not be distracted by targeting other terrorist organisations not involved with it. ^
The ‘war’ on terrorism is an interesting case for reconceptualising war for several 
reasons. As Michael Clarke noted, this conflict was extremely unpredictable, had much 
potential for unintended consequences in the international system and we had to expect 
the unexpected.^ Breaking with precedents set in Kosovo, policymakers were quick to 
employ the word ‘war’. Yet explicitly using the word created more problems than 
answers. Susan Sontag decried the use of a phantom ‘war’ as a metaphor with no 
foreseeable end: ‘what kind of war is that?’^  Metaphoric wars have no definite endings. 
In late September 2001, Rumsfeld observed that the ‘war’ on terrorism was ‘very, very 
different 6om what people think of when using the word ‘war’ or ‘campaign’. We need 
to fashion a new vocabulary and different constructs for what we are doing’ This paper 
argues that the language of ‘risk-management’ serves the purpose of understanding 
George W. Bush’s ‘first war of the 21®‘ century’. Momentous change in IR was arguably 
in the works, with new ideas of sovereignty where states unable to rein in terrorists are 
liable to outside intervention. If other states fail to protest vehemently, ‘their behaviour 
could well constitute acquiescence in yet another change to customary international 
law’.® Many claimed Washington finally had its defining mission after ten years of drift. 
US forces established Central Asian bases for the first time ever, with Moscow’s tacit 
consent. Globalisation also reared its dark head, subverting conventional Realist 
calculations of material power capabilities as failed states thousands of miles away now 
posed risks, rather than powerful ones. We face the globalisation of insecurity in perhaps 
the first ‘major war in the age of globalisation’.^
A central difficulty of terrorism is defining the amorphous concept. Since 
attempts to do so are often inconclusive- ‘one person’s terrorist is another’s freedom 
fighter’- this chapter will not delve deeply into the issue. The US State Department report
Jonathan Stevenson, ‘Pragmatic Counter-terrorism’, Survival, Vol. 43 No. 4, Winter 2001-2002, pp.35-48 
 ^Michael Clarke, ‘Unpredictable’, World Today, Vol. 57 No. 11, November 2001, p. 7-9 
 ^Susan Sontag, ‘Real battles and empty metaphors’. New York Times, 10 Sep 2002 
’ ‘Department o f Defence (DoD) News Briefing- Secretary Rumsfeld’, 20 September 2001 
® Michael Byers, ‘Terror and the future of international law’, in Ken Booth and Tim Dunne (eds). Worlds in 
Collision: Terror and the future o f global order, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p i 24 
 ^Kurt M. Campbell, ‘Globalisation’s first war?’, Washington Quarterly, Winter 2002, Vol. 25 N o.l, p.7-14
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Patterns o f Global Terrorism defines terrorism as 'premeditated, politically motivated 
violence against non-combatant targets by subnational or clandestine agents, usually 
intended to influence an audience'. A1 Qaeda’s brand of terrorism however aims to 
destroy, not influence an audience. It is also not the purpose here to discuss the pros and 
cons of responding to terrorism as ‘war’.^ ° Terrorism is difficult to conceptualise purely 
as war and this is not a new problem. In August 1984 Robert Sayre, State Department 
anti-terrorism director, called terrorism Tow-level warfare’ but called it a police matter. 
George Shultz, then Secretary of State, more categorically insisted terrorism was ‘a form 
of warfare’. Part of the rhetorical campaign since the 1980s has been to call it ‘war’.
Combating terrorism involves political, military, diplomatic, financial, 
intelligence and police tools of statecraft. It is multi-faceted: addressing root causes, 
prevention and preparedness, and strengthening the international framework for 
multilateral action. Military force is admittedly a ‘blunt instrument’; its hierarchical 
structure unsuited for tackling ‘networks’. It might also be counterproductive, fuelling 
more hatred. Emphasising military tools may neglect also the equally important need to 
address poverty, political repression and inter-cultural dialogue. These are rather more 
long-term goals. However, this chapter is limited to addressing short-term urgent risks 
posed by A1 Qaeda where negotiation is impossible. As a former State Department 
counter-terrorism czar observed, ‘there’s no point addressing root causes with Bin Laden. 
He doesn’t like America. We are the root cause’. W e  face what Michael Ignatieff 
termed ‘apocalyptic nihilism’, where terrorism is not linked to political demands but 
simply ever-escalating violence. They ‘cannot be reasoned with. They can only be 
fought’.Furtherm ore, CIA chief George Tenet’s Congressional testimony in February 
2002 emphasized that ‘intelligence will never give you 100% predictive capability on 
terrorist events’. Where terrorists want to destroy, not bargain; and intelligence and 
diplomatic cooperation cannot be fool proof, the focus here is on military tools.
For this issue, see David Tucker, Skirmishes at the edge o f  empire: The United States and international 
terrorism, (Westport: Praeger, 1997)
' ' cited in Tucker, Skirmishes at the Edge o f  Empire, p34
Paul Pillar, Terrorism and US foreign policy, (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), p29 
Michael Ignatieff, ‘It’s war- but it doesn’t have to be dirty’. The Guardian, 01 October 2001
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Using the word ‘war’ normally implies spectacular military action against fixed, 
easily identifiable adversaries- preferably states, and a clearly defined end-point 
producing decisive highly visible results in a media age shaped by images of smart 
bombs in the Gulf War/"^ This conventional notion of ‘war’ contained drawbacks. Some 
prefer ‘police action’ to snatch Bin Laden. The context of modem war is traditionally 
between fixed enemies like states and massive armies. The war on terror first targeted the 
Taleban, hardly an established state, while A1 Qaeda is a loosely organised, trans-national 
network. There are no clear frontlines or massed troops. When states use force to destroy 
terrorist groups and those who harbour them, we may use the term ‘war’ in theory. But 
unlike conventional inter-state wars, this ‘war’ had no fixed set of clearly identifiable 
enemies even in Afghanistan. Fundamentally, the nature of victory is unclear, outcomes 
will be neither easily apparent nor decisive. There will be no prospect of closure with 
surrender ceremonies on the battleship Missouri. Instead success is defined by what does 
noi happen rather than what does. The language of war may serve as a semantic 
instrument for mobilizing public support but the vocabulary of risk-management better 
explains the ‘quirky character of this new war’. Furthermore, the context of war in the 
West has been shifting from inter-state Great Power conflict to intra-state and rhetorical 
‘wars’ on drugs, crime and now terrorism. Indeed, James Lindsay remarked that the 
campaign against terror ‘is more like the drug war’.*^  Instead of the dominant inter-state 
connotations outlined above, it makes more sense to use the word ‘war’ in this way to 
mean mobilizing resources against a dangerous activity, which can never be eliminated 
but reduced to a tolerable level.
While ‘old’ style terrorism is normally inclined to negotiations, ‘new’ terrorism is 
now seen as part of a ‘war paradigm’ adopted by terrorists.^* This takes a strategic 
campaign-oriented view of protracted violence rather than episodic efforts in the past. 
Unlike the ‘coercive diplomacy’ paradigm of terrorism, there is now no proportionate 
relationship between force employed and aims. It is less targeted at officials but
Michael Howard, ‘What’s in a name?: How to fight terrorism’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No.l 
January/February 2002, p.22-35 
Don Melvin, ‘Enemy, victory hard to define’, Atlanta Joumal-Constitution, 18 September 2001 
Quoted in Melvin, ‘Enemy, victory hard to define’, Atlanta Joumal-Constitution 
Michael Howard, ‘What’s in a name’. Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 2002, Vol. 81 No. 1, p.22-35 
Ian O. Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David F. Ronfeldt, Michele Zanini, Brian Michael Jenkins, 
Countering the New Terrorism, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999), p.46
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wholesale and indiscriminate. Although they still want a lot of people watching, they also 
want lots of people dead. Unrestrained by political concems, the aim is simply to inflict 
death. Indeed, terrorists have often declared ‘war’ on America before and considered 
themselves ‘armies’. President Clinton too invoked the imagery and language of war by 
describing military retaliation after the 1998 embassy bombings as the ‘first shot of 
protracted war’, although his actions were hardly sustained. This ‘war paradigm’ was 
relevant before 9/11 and it is disingenuous to claim a sudden paradigm shift in the nature 
of war and terrorism. If terrorists are adopting such a paradigm and becoming a major 
security concern, the targeted then need to adopt a ‘paradigm shift’ and make terrorism 
additionally a military problem rather than one simply for policemen and courtrooms.*^
Many theses have been put forth in IR to describe the ‘war’ on terrorism. Most 
interestingly, leading realist John Mearsheimer admitted that realism ‘has not a heck of a 
lot’ to say about trans-national terrorists, being more focused on Great Powers.^** To 
Mary Kaldor, it validated her ‘new wars’ paradigm of globalisation and non-state actors; 
James Der Derian saw ‘virtuous wars’ in action, while Lawrence Freedman wondered if 
this was the Third World War.^* Already strategists like Eliot Cohen have called this a 
‘strange war’, while counter terrorism experts like L. Paul Bremer have called for new 
strategies to fight ‘new terrorism’. A s  for the Afghan campaign itself, despite the 
‘Afghan model’ being touted as a new dawn in warfare, fortunately Colin Mclnnes 
reminded us that the decade before 9/11 already contained much talk of new trends in 
warfare. Mclnnes wondered if 9/11 merely confirmed these trends or was the Afghan war 
really new.^^ Although 9/11 brought war closer to the West than any other conflict in the 
1990s, Mclnnes concluded it didn’t change fundamentally the way subsequent military
Lesser et al. Counter the New terrorism, pp. 70; Daniel Pipes, ‘War, not crime: Time for a paradigm 
shift’. National Review, 01 October 2001; Caleb Carr, ‘Terrorism as warfare’. World Policy Journal, Vol. 
XIII, No. 4, (Winter 1996-97), p i-13 
‘Through the Realist lens: Conversation with John Mearsheimer’ , Institute o f International Studies, 
University of California, Berkeley, 08 April 2002;
http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people2/Mearsheimer/mearsheimer-con5.html 
James Der Derian, ‘9.11 : Before, After, and in between’. Social Science Research Council, 
http.V/www.ssrc.ors/sevtl 1 /essavs/der derian.htm: Lawrence Freedman, ‘The Third World War?’,
Survival, Vol. 43 No. 4, Winter 2001-2002, pp.61-88; Mary Kaldor, ‘Terror in the U S’, Fathom, September 
13 2001. http://www.fathom.com 
Eliot Cohen, ‘A strange war’, and L P Bremer, ‘A new strategy for the new face o f terrorism’, both in 
The National Interest, No. 65, 2001 
Colin Mclnnes, ‘A different kind of war? September 11 and the United States’ Afghan war’. Review o f  
International Studies, Vol. 29 No.2, April 2003, p.l 65-85
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operations were conducted: ‘the Afghan campaign bore many hallmarks of Western 
military operations in the 1990s’. Although not as localised as before with war possibly 
spreading to the ‘axis of evil’, the enemy was still a regime, not its people. Officials 
repeatedly stressed the Taliban ‘regime’ was the target, not the Afghan ‘people’. Tommy 
Franks exulted, ‘this was the most precise bombing campaign in history’ in avoiding 
civilian casualties. While tactical risks of casualties certainly constrained the campaign, 
this chapter focuses on analysing repetitive trends in managing systemic risks.
Stephen Biddle also saw more continuity than novelty in the Afghan campaign. 
Contrary to popular belief, close quarter ground combat was still needed to dislodge 
Taliban positions despite innovative embedding of Special Forces forward air controllers 
with Northern Alliance forces. ‘Much was new, much was not new ...continuities were 
as important as novelties in the outcome.’ In sum, the ‘Afghan war shows that even 
today, continuity in nature of war is at least as important as change’. A n d y  Bacevich 
similarly concluded that the Afghanistan campaign ‘bore the imprint of US military 
practice as it evolved during the previous d e c a d e T h i s  chapter does not pretend to 
offer a definitive interpretation of events but suggests Afghanistan also exhibited broader 
continuity with the earlier Kosovo campaign in terms of a strategic approach to war in 
reducing systemic risks.
I. Identifying Systemic Risks
Risk management involves firstly identifying systemic risks highlighted as impetus for 
war. This inevitably involves perceptions and factors ranging fi'om a country’s strategic 
culture, history, personal agendas to bureaucratic interests. However, this thesis is not 
about risk perceptions and it serves no further purpose to analyse cognitive or 
institutional constraints in decision-making over Afghanistan. Whether leaders mean 
what they say and whether words translate into action admittedly pose methodological 
hurdles. Nevertheless, systematic analysis of statements and data gathering matched with 
empirical evidence, examined within the basic theoretical framework devised in Chapter 
Three can provide a meaningful avenue of analysis of the systemic risks involved.
Stephen Biddle, ‘Afghanistan and the future of warfare’. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82 No.2, March/April 
2003, p .32,46
Andrew Bacevich, American Empire, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2002), p.236
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Afghanistan has been subject of Great Power tussles before, the infamous ‘Great 
Game’ and later Cold War struggles. The rise of the Taliban and initial neglect of the 
country by the West related to the collapse of the Soviet Union and systemic changes. 
Not much strategic interests now remained in that country after Moscow withdrew, 
creating chaos and a failed state posing risks as a terrorist haven. After 9/11, a power with 
hitherto no colonial history in the region intervened. The US did so for purposes of 
managing globalisation and its associated systemic risks, rather than colonialism.
As President Clinton declared in 1998, terrorism had a ‘new face in the 
1990s...the new technologies of terror and their increasing availability, and the 
increasing mobility of terrorists, raise chilling prospects of vulnerability to chemical, 
biological and other kinds of attacks, bringing each of us into the category of possible 
v i c t i m . 9/11 highlighted the oft-neglected dark side of globalisation- what Paul 
Wolfowitz called ‘the parallel globalisation of terror’ alongside economic 
interdependence^^ - as terrorists based in Afghanistan could strike at the US homeland. 
Terror was now ‘franchised’ by A1 Qaeda in its quest to ‘globalise terrorism’, relying on 
tools of globalisation like air travel, email and faxes, free flow of people, and electronic 
money transfers.^* A1 Qaeda, noted the US National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 
‘exemplifies how terrorists have twisted the benefits and conveniences of our 
increasingly open, integrated and modernised world to serve their destructive agenda’. 
To Vice Admiral Thomas Wilson, Director of the Defence Intelligence Agency, 
‘encouraging, furthering and consolidating the positive aspects of globalisation — while 
reducing and managing its downsides and defeating its enemies — may well be the 
civilized world's measure of merit for the next decade.
With the impact of 9/11 fresh in their minds, the desire to avoid repetition of 
similar ‘tomb-stone’ style risks clearly dominated policymakers’ concems. Risk
Remarks by the President to the Opening Session of the 53'** United Nations General Assembly, 21 
September 1998
Prepared Statement for the House and Senate Armed Services Committees: ‘Building a military for the 
21®* century’, 3-4 October 2001 
See David Martin Jones and MLR Smith, ‘Franchising Terror’, The World TodayNoX.Sl No 10, October
2001, p, 10-12
National Strategy fo r  Combating Terrorism, (Washington DC: The White House, February 2003),p.7 
Quoted in Jim Garamone, ‘Intelligence chief calls Sept 11 first move o f post-Cold War struggle, 
American Forces Press Service, 19 Mar 2002
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management literature terms this type of action the managing of ‘tombstone-style’ risks 
where the goal is to ensure no repetition of the mass slaughter of 9/11 but it also contains 
‘anticipatory’ aspects as well. These two aspects cannot be clearly seperated.
Risk is here largely used as a descriptive term to refer to a perilous situation. 
Risks now engulf seemingly everything: anthrax in the post, to hijacked planes or trucks 
crashing into nuclear plants and ‘dirty’ bombs. Terrorism is not ‘just what has happened, 
but also what might happen in the future’, a risk so to speak.^  ^ Deputy Defence Secretary 
Wolfowitz noted ‘we are in a new era, facing new risks’. To President Bush, A1 Qaeda or 
Saddam Hussein are ‘both risks. They’re both dangerous.Terrorism has been called a 
‘strategic risk’, prompting a new chapter to Britain’s Strategic Defence Review (SDR). 
The risks of attack have increased as 9/11 demonstrated the ease with which foreign 
terrorists can commit mass terrorism in the continental US. However shocking terrorist 
blows may be, they hardly undermine the basic foundations of their targets’ global 
domination.^"  ^ Kenneth Waltz also accepted that ‘although terrorists can be terribly 
bothersome, they hardly pose threats to the fabric of a society or seriously threaten the 
security of a s t a t e T h e s e  are dangerous times but not as dark as those of World War II 
or nuclear arms races when state survival was at stake. Perhaps ‘risk’ is a better 
description of the situation than existential ‘threat’.
Risk or threat?
International terrorism exhibits components of risk: probability and consequences. We 
were increasingly focused on risk components of high consequences, low probability 
attacks even before 9/11, rather than gauging more precisely threat components of 
capabilities and intentions of terrorists. This degenerated into limitless vulnerabilities, 
‘fact-free scaffold of anxieties’ and ‘apparent over-reliance on worst case scenarios
Paul Pillar, Terrorism and US foreign policy, (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), pl41 
Wolfowitz quoted in Linda D. Kozaryn, ‘Wolfowitz says NATO ties are essential’, American Forces 
Press Service, 02 Feb 2002; ‘President Bush, Colombia President Uribe discuss terrorism’. Office o f the 
Press Secretary, 25 Sep 2002 
UK Ministry of Defence, ‘Public discussion on the new chapter for the Strategic Defence Review’, 
http://www.mod.uk/issues/sdr/new chapter/glance.htm. London, February 2002 
Zygmunt Bauman, Society Under Siege, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002), p. 101
Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘The Continuity of international politics’, in Ken Booth and Tim Dunne (eds). Worlds 
in Collision: Terror and the future o f global order, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p349
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shaped primarily by vulnerability assessments rather than factors in technical 
complexities and motivation of terrorists'/^
A1 Qaeda admittedly poses an immediate serious threat rather than a risk: its 
intentions are clear (to cause catastrophic mayhem and death) as are its capabilities. Bin 
Laden has outlined his intentions clearly, acquiring WMD was a ‘religious duty’. A1 
Qaeda also clearly demonstrated its capability on 9/11 but this is hardly conventional 
military capability we are used to in conceptualising war. All it needed were simple box 
cutters, not sophisticated military hardware. Terrorism is after all a weapon of the weak 
rather than powerful states posing ‘threats’ in the conventional security paradigm. 
Indeed, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism acknowledges explicitly the 
difficulty of breaking down A1 Qaeda terrorism into its threat components: ‘the shadowy 
nature of terrorist organisations precludes an easy analysis of their capabilities or intent. 
The classic net assessment of the enemy based on the number of tanks, airplanes or ships 
does not apply to these non-state a c t o r s T h e  US National Security Strategy notes 
‘enemies in the past needed great armies and industrial capabilities to endanger America. 
Now shadowy networks of individuals can bring great suffering and chaos to our shores 
for less than the cost of a single tank’.^ ® The focus is no longer on conventional 
capabilities but according to the logic of risk, ‘weak states like Afghanistan can pose as 
great a danger to our national interests as strong states’.
In contrast, the Cold War nuclear threat was more material. People knew largely 
what to expect and it was more predictable. With mass-casualty terrorism, people are 
more anxious because they don’t know what to be afraid of, with so many possible 
doomsday scenarios. An increasingly risk-conscious and anxious society even before 
9/11, it is no surprise security in an age of terrorism is conceptualised in terms of 
probabilistic scenarios and all sorts of ‘what-if situations rather than more realistic 
evidence. In an ill-fated attempt to scour the marketplace for assessing the probability of 
terrorist events, the US Defence Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) plan
See Bruce Hoffman, ‘Terrorism by weapons o f mass destruction: A reassessment o f the threat’, in 
Carolyn W. Pumphrey (ed). Transnational Threats: Blending law enforcement and military strategies, 
conference proceedings, (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, November 2000), p.95 
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, (Washington DC: The White House, February 2003), p. 16 
The National Security Strategy o f the United States, (Washington DC: The White House, 20 September 
2002), Foreword
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called Policy Market Analysis envisioned online trading of futures in Middle East events 
and terrorism. Although the plan was scrapped, the focus on probability was evident in 
conceptualising the dangers from terrorism. CIA officials turned to Hollywood producers 
for doomsday scenarios. Even the foot and mouth outbreak in 2001 in Britain, it was 
argued, demonstrated vulnerability to bioterrorism. Absent the ability to clearly identify 
A1 Qaeda capabilities or even its members themselves, Michael O'Hanlon warned ‘there 
are an unlimited number of potential vulnerabilities’.^  ^ Homeland Security chief Tom 
Ridge conceded, ‘there is a universe of potentials we have to deal with’ and possible 
attacks might ‘come from anywhere at any time’."^® In Rumsfeld’s words, ‘prepare for the 
unknown, uncertain, the unseen and the unexpec t edBr i ta in ’s Homeland Security 
coordinator Sir David Ormand similarly argued ‘we have to be able to deal with low- 
probability, high-impact events’. T h e  June 2003 US government report to the UN 
Monitoring Committee on sanctions against A1 Qaeda warned of ‘a high probability’ of 
an Qaeda WMD attack in two years.'^  ^ Enqjhasising catastrophic consequences such as 
‘dirty’ bomb attacks causing mass casualties combined with ill-defined probabilistic 
scenarios situated us within the risk discourse.
II. Implementing risk management
Active Anticipation
Two approaches to terrorism exist. Antiterrorism involves steps and measures involved in 
to reduce the probability of a terrorist act occurring. It is the proactive, preventive stage 
and involves things like acting on intelligence and reducing vulnerabilities of 
installations. Counterterrorism on the other hand involves tactical actions taken in 
response to a terrorist incident, including legislative efforts and consequence
O'Hanlon quoted in Bill Miller, ‘Study urges focus on terrorism with high fatalities, cost’, Washington 
Post, 29 Apr 2002
Ridge cited in ‘US tries to guess next terror target’. Guardian Unlimited, 03 November 2001, 
http://www.guardian.co.Uk/uslatest/storv/0.1282.-1287584.00.html:
Rumsfeld quoted in ‘Terror prompts huge US military revamp’, BBC News Online, 01 February 2002, 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/americas/l 795102.stm 
Quoted in Peter Preston, ‘Return of Mr Unspecified-threat’, Guardian, 26 May 2003 
Quoted in Edith M. Lederer, ‘US rates chance of A1 Qaeda WMD attack’. Associated Press, 09 June 
2003
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management. However, there is no clear distinction. The war in Afghanistan could be 
seen as a response to the 9/11 attacks but also in anticipation of further terrorist strikes. 
Risk in this context of anticipation is used not only as a descriptive term referring to a 
potentially dangerous situation but also a normative one implying the desirability for 
avoidance action. It also formed part of a strategic calculation.
Risk-management is proactive, its locus of action situated in the future going 
beyond simply punishing and retaliating but preventing and averting as well. This 
involves considering counter-factuals and alternative courses of action. As President 
Clinton observed earlier, each of us is now a ‘possible victim’. As predicted by the test 
theory, this underlies the new security mantra of proactively averting ‘potential 
victimhood’. The centre of consciousness for combating terrorism thus lies in the future, 
reducing the risk of it occurring and becoming a victim in the process. Terrorism is 
unpredictable, dependent on the smallest whim of individuals and loosely strung groups, 
compared to the relatively static hierarchy of militaries that inter-state warfare implies. 
Planning should be based on several possible images of the future, not just a single one.^ 
President Bush observed that ‘our nation is preparing for a variety of threats we hope will 
never arrive. Yet the best way to fight these dangers is to anticipate them and act against 
them with focus and determination’.'^  ^ Although sometimes sensationalistic, discussing 
possible scenarios has been generally helpful in conceptualising alternate sets of risks.
Preventing terrorist actions has always been accorded a central place on the 
agenda. Indeed, ‘preventing’, ‘potentials’ and ‘future’ are key words in counter-terrorism 
documents. The National Commission on Terrorismes ‘priority one is to prevent terrorist 
attacks.. .Military force and covert action can often preempt or disrupt terrorist attacks’. 
Secretary Rumsfeld agrees ‘we must be preventative’.^  ^ The joint US Congressional 
report on 9/11 released in July 2003 concluded that atrocity was ‘preventable’ although 
there was no clear ‘smoking gun’. It focused on all sorts of ‘what i f  situations that could 
have prevented the attacks such as eliminating inter-agency turf struggles on intelligence. 
The onus in counter-terrorism is clearly now on preventive proactive actions.
^  Pillar, Terrorism and US foreign policy, p229 
George W, Bush, Weekly Radio Address, 15 February 2003, Office of the Press Secretary 
Report o f the National Commission on Terrorism, Countering the Changing Threat o f  International 
Terrorism, June 2000, http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/commission.html 
Remarks at Defence Ministers Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, Belgium, 06 June 2002
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The old approach to terrorism however viewed it as criminal, a law enforcement 
matter for the courts where terrorists or their state sponsors are retaliated against 
retrospectively after they committed terrorism. Some commentators argue that America 
should now dispense with higher levels of proof needed in treating terrorism as a crime, 
in effect waging war/^ For all the controversy over a supposed new doctrine of 
‘anticipatory self-defence’, the actual precursor can be traced back almost 20 years. In 
1985, after Libyan terrorists bombed the La Belle discotheque in Berlin, the US response 
came to be known as the Abe Sofaer Doctrine after the official who drafted the State 
Department memorandum."^^ This stated that the US had a right of ‘preemptory self- 
defence’ against future acts of terrorism, when a country aids or gives sanctuary to 
terrorists. This doctrine was invoked in the 1986 bombings of Tripoli and again during 
the 1998 cruise missile strikes against Afghanistan and Sudan. The difference now is that 
9/11 was much more grievous than those in the past.
Codenamed Operation Infinite Reach, cruise missile strikes on Afghanistan in 
August 1998 set significant precedent. President Clinton justified his actions in terms of 
self-defense against an ‘imminent threat of further terrorist attacks against the United 
States’ and the strikes were to ‘prevent and deter additional attacks’.^ ® Although Clinton 
cited specific intelligence of a terrorist meeting that day in Afghanistan, to justify an 
‘imminent’ threat, the real aim behind destroying the A1 Shifa plant in Sudan was ‘less 
retaliatory than preemptive, the first shot in a campaign to deny would-be terrorists 
access to weapons of mass destruction’.^  ^ Using military power now indicated that the 
US ‘intended to take a proactive a p p r o a c h . T h e  official proactive goals were to 
‘preempt future terrorist acts and disrupt the activities of those planning for them. While
Daniel Pipes, ‘War, not crime; Towards a new paradigm’, National Review, 01 October 2001 
Former State Department Legal Advisor Michael Scharf s contribution to ‘Is this a new kind o f war? 
September 11 and its aftermath’, 07 October 2001, Crimes o f  War Project, 
http://www.crimesofwar.org/expert/paradigm-scharf.html 
Text of a letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and President Pro 
Tempore of the Senate, 22 August 1998; http://clinton6.nara.gov/1998/08/1998-08-22-text-of-a-letter-on- 
afghanistan-and-sudan-strikes.html 
Andrew J. Bacevich, American Empire, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002), p.l 11 
Bacevich, American Empire, p. 153
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our actions are not perfect insurance, inaction would be an invitation to further horror.. .it 
is very likely that something would have happened had we not done this’.^ ^
After September 11, the stakes became too high to wait for terrorists to strike first, 
especially with WMD. The approach is similarly proactive. In October 2001, US 
Ambassador to the UN John Negroponte submitted a letter to the Security Council 
reporting US military action against Afghanistan. In it, he reserved the right in the future 
to ‘further actions with respect to other organisations and states...United States armed 
forces have initiated actions designed to prevent and deter further attacks on the United 
S t a t e s T h i s  letter taken together with other statements to act against ‘axis of evil’ 
states implied that ‘anticipatory self-defence’ appeared to be the justification. According 
to FBI Director Robert Mueller, the ‘the prevention of another terrorist attack remains the 
FBI’s top priority’.^  ^ Shifting from a reactive to proactive orientation, it now seeks to 
prevent and disrupt terrorist plans by being ‘predictive’, and to ‘anticipate attacks’.
Proactive risk-management is a standard part of the managing process. Terrorism 
expert Walter Lacquer observes ‘no society can protect all its members from attack but 
can reduce the risk by taking the offensive, keeping terrorists on the run rather than 
concentrating on defence alone’. T h e  October 2002 Council on Foreign Relations 
report America still unprepared, still in danger advised that ‘a proactive mindset is 
key’.^  ^It noted two strategic means to manage terror risks. While the Homeland Security 
Department reduced vulnerabilities and opportunities for terrorism by ‘hardening’ ‘soft’ 
targets, the Pentagon directly reduced risks overseas. Fighting terrorism more accurately 
refers to managing the risk that it can happen. Blair warned that ‘if we failed to act, the 
risk is simple and direct: more British lives lost through terrorism’. B l a i r ’s official
Press Briefing by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and National Security Adviser Sandy Berger, 20 
August 1998, http://clinton6.nara.gOv/1998/08/1998-08-20-press-briefing-by-albright-and-berger.html 
Letter dated 07 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the United States o f America to the 
United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2001/946 
Statement for the record on the War on terrorism, before the Congressional Select Committee on 
Intelligence of the US Senate, Washington DC, 11 Feb 2003 
See Walter Laqueur, ‘Left, right and beyond- the changing face o f terror’, in James F. Hoge & Gideon 
Rose (eds). How did this happen? Terrorism and the new war, (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), p81 
Gary Hart and Warren Rudman (Co-Chairs), America still unprepared, still in danger, Report o f an 
independent task force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, Washington D C., 22 Oct 2002, 
p.lO
Quoted in ‘Tackling terror in UK’s interest’, BBC News Online, 07 October 2001, 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/uk/1584000.stm
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statement on commencing Operation Enduring Freedom noted there are ‘dangers in 
acting, (but) the dangers of inaction are much higher.’
This sort of proactive probabilistic reasoning was reflected in military strikes 
against Afghanistan three years earlier. President Clinton warned then ‘the risks from 
inaction to America and the world would be far greater than action’. T h r e e  years later, 
Rumsfeld described pursuing terrorists as a ‘proactive’ policy since it was impossible to 
defend against terrorists everywhere everytime. He later stressed that actions such as 
O^ QXdiXion Anaconda were not ‘retribution’ or ‘revenge’ for September 11, but rather ‘to 
protect our country and people from further attack’: terrorists under fire in Afghanistan 
have less time to plan attacks.^  ^ Similarly, in August 1998, US Under-secretary of State 
Thomas Pickering emphasised that cruise missile strikes on Afghanistan and Sudan ‘was 
not retaliation; it was to prevent further attacks
Concern about averting adverse futures, rather than revenge, is indicative of risk 
management’s largely utilitarian ethos. As Michael O’Hanlon mused, ‘prevention rather 
than revenge should be the guiding principle for US military action’ since the central 
objective is to ‘reduce the probability and severity of future attacks’.P ro b ab ility  and 
severity are key indicators of risk concepts. The war on terrorism fulfilled not only a 
desire to hit back at terrorists but also reduced the risk of further terrorism. However, pre­
emption, legally speaking, is not really an issue here since Washington is simply 
engaging in traditional self-defence against an ongoing series of armed attacks, from the 
1998 Embassy bombings to September 11.^ "^  Furthermore, America was ‘reacting’ to the 
9/11 attacks. Nonetheless, what is more important, as we have previously seen in Chapter 
Three and from the examples cited above, is the ‘proactive nature’ of ‘reacting’ against
Prime Minister’s statement on military action in Afghanistan, 07 October 2001 
Address to the Nation by the President, 20 August 1998
See ‘Secretary Rumsfeld Interview with the Telegraph’, DoD News Transcripts, 23 February 2002; and 
Kathleen T Rhem, ‘Coalition turning up the pressure, but battle not over’, American Forces Press Service, 
06 March 2002
US Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs Thomas Pickering, US Information Agency Foreign 
Press Centre Briefing, Washington D.C., 25 August 1998 
Michael O’Hanlon, ‘The case for a careful military response’, Brookings Institution Analysis Paper 1: 
America’s response to terrorism, 25 September 2001 
Anthony Clark Arend, ‘International Law and the preemptive use of force’, Washington Quarterly, Vol. 
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terror with the focus on preventing repetition rather than retrospective concepts like 
demanding revenge or justice relating to past events.
Over the past 50 years, it was assumed that Washington would respond quickly 
and decisively to aggression but would not initiate attacks. The 2002 National Security 
Strategy argued this is outdated when terror groups operate outside control of 
governments and engage in symbiotic relationships with failed states. Aiming to inflict 
maximum death and destruction, and without any territory at stake, they appear immune 
to retaliation. It thus makes sense to strike first. During the Cold War, there also existed 
the constraining factor of the Soviet Union. This no longer exists, a crucial factor making 
anticipatory risk management plausible. UK MoD consultations on a new Chapter of its 
SDR similarly provided an inkling of emerging fiiture-oriented concepts in counter­
terrorism. There was to be ‘more emphasis on being proactive, pre-empting problems 
than waiting for them to come to us.’^^
Since 9/11 and the dawn of mass-casualty terrorism, this is serious because ‘there 
is no margin for error and no chance to learn from any mistake’ according to President 
Bush.^^ Clearly here we are talking about ‘anticipationism’ rather than a reactive 
‘resilience’ approach to risk management. Declaring that he ‘will not wait on events, 
while dangers gather’, the tone of Bush’s ‘axis of evil’ speech was proactive and 
anticipatory, indicative of a risk-manager’s mindset. Colin Powell’s strategy is that ‘we 
can reduce the likelihood of those (terrorist) incidents if we go after those terrorist 
organisations’.^  ^This is as clear a statement as any about proactive risk management to 
reduce the risks/likelihood of terrorism.
War and the precautionary principle
How much did Western intelligence actually know about A1 Qaeda’s role in 9/11? Was 
there compelling evidence, or are we increasingly resorting to the precautionary principle 
in responding to terrorism? Professionals in finance and economics who practise risk 
management now scramble to manage risks never thought possible before. Catastrophic
Michael Evans, ‘Forces take on anti-terror role’. The Times, 15 February 2002 
Remarks by President Bush, ‘President calls for quick passage of defence bill’. Office of the Press 
Secretary, 15 March 2002 
Jeremy Paxman interviews Colin Powell, BBC Newsnighi, 21 September 2001, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/events/newsnight/newsid_l 563000/1563074.stm
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terrorism eludes private insurance coverage. The US Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 
November 2002 thus requires the government act as insurer of last resort. However, 
‘terrorism is still an extremely difficult risk to predict’.^ * Preparing the nation for the 
worst is an act of prudence, not fatalism’, notes the report America still in danger, still 
unprepared.^^ After September 11, in the words of a World Health Organisation (WHO) 
spokesman warning about a terrorist smallpox attack, ‘the unthinkable is no longer 
unthinkable and we need to prepare for that.’^  ^ The challenge is to properly define and 
respond to risk and we seem to be erring on the side of caution. The WHO felt it 
‘prudent’ and not ‘alarmist’, to bring forward the release of its report on biological or 
chemical attacks.^^ A US-wide system of environmental monitors called Bio-Watch has 
been deployed ‘to prepare the country for whatever the weapon and whomever the culprit 
might be’.
Authorities do not know about terrorist cells or sleepers and their firequently 
changing tactics to assign clear probabilities, which is why precautionary-based strategies 
like those above are resorted to. These act amidst high uncertainty on risk potentials. It is 
difficult to ascertain attribution in terrorist incidents. Even if an organisation were to 
claim responsibility, how can we believe it or what if no one claims responsibility? No 
one has yet done so for the 9/11 attacks. Reliable sources are often lacking and the level 
of evidence is often different from that needed in a court of law or jury.^^ The UK 
government dossier on A1 Qaeda published on November 2001 conceded that it ‘does not 
purport to provide a prosecutable case against Osama Bin Laden in a court of law. 
Intelligence often cannot be used evidentially’.^ "^  Tony Blair however claimed to have 
seen ‘absolutely incontrovertible proof. NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson 
announced himself satisfied with the ‘conipelling’ and ‘conclusive’ evidence that
Elisabeth Bumiller, ‘Government to cover most costs of insurance losses in terrorism’. New York Times, 
27 Nov 2002
America still unprepared, still in danger. Report of an independent task force sponsored by the Council 
on Foreign Relations, Washington D C., 22 Oct 2002, p.32 
Anthony Browne, 'UN’s smallpox terror alert’. The Observer, October 21 2001 
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164
Washington presented to NATO councils. However, what was the evidentiary test 
required? Communications intercepts? The US claimed that A1 Qaeda and its Taliban 
supporters were responsible but failed to provide ‘sufficient factual evidence’. It only 
provided ‘conclusory reasons and not the factual basis for them.’^ ^
There was no direct information linking Afghanistan or terror groups based there 
to the 9/11 attacks. Evidence found in Afghanistan however suggested terrorist 
experimentation with goats and dogs using gas. Bin Alden’s infamous home video was 
also found, where he was shown gloating over the 9/11 attacks. The risks were indeed 
present and this meant the Afghan campaign was based relatively less on ‘false positives’ 
in resorting to the precautionary principle than the previous Kosovo campaign. Indeed, 
the precautionary principle applied only to the extent that information was not perfect but 
was considerably more concrete than normally assumed.
Yet, with so many terrorist scenarios, ‘uncertainty is the sea within which all 
experts are firantically swimming’. Homeland Security chief Tom Ridge cautioned that 
‘the information we have to work with is very vague’. Terrorism expert Daniel Benjamin 
notes ‘we are surrounded by a cloud of unknowing’ There will be an imperfect 
understanding of the risks involved and somehow making decisions to manage risks. 
Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz emphasised the ‘uncertainty’ of information about terrorist 
targets, aims and m e t h o d s D o n a l d  Rumsfeld told NATO Defence Ministers of the 
need for ‘taking decisions based on imperfect information’, that ‘absolute proof cannot be 
a precondition for a c t i o n G i v e n  the elusive nature of risks we face, the standards of 
proof demanded retrospectively for A1 Qaeda’s guilt might be dispensed with in future in 
favour of the precautionary principle.
Jonathan Chamey, ‘The Use of force against terrorism and international law’, American journal o f  
International law. Vol. 95 No 4, October 2001, p.836 
Quotes cited in David von Drehle, ‘Uncertainty is sea where all swim’, Washington Post, 16 Feb 2003 
See Jim Garamone, ‘No certainty from global war on terrorism’, American Forces Press Service, 18 Oct 
2002 .
Quoted in Ian Black, ‘Rumsfeld tells NATO to face up to terror danger’, Guardian, 07 June 2002
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Surveillance
Surveillance is crucial to risk management strategies, collecting information on risks and 
assessing whether they require anticipatory action. If necessary, this is implemented. 
While US surveillance assets during the Cold War monitored concrete Soviet military 
capabilities such as missile silos and nuclear submarines, now they shifted towards 
identifying who or what constituted elusive security risks. Declassified Keyhole-11 
satellite photos were used to brief media on 1998 cruise missile strikes on Afghanistan. 
According to Keith Hall, then Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, IMINT 
(image intelligence) ‘helps to reduce the terrorist threat. It can help to locate terrorist 
camps and facilities and provide other information that helps us to track terrorists’.^ ^
The US government invoked its ‘shutter control’ rights buying all images from 
the commercial Ikonos satellite during the 2001 Afghan campaign, fearing Taliban or A1 
Qaeda elements using such images to locate coalition forces. A public-private division of 
sorts emerged on risk surveillance. With advances in commercial technology, private 
companies such as Digital Globe contracted to provide not only an extra set of eyes, but 
also the big picture which more precise government satellites can complement. The 
Global Hawk strategic UAV made its operational debut while armed Predator 
surveillance drones made their combat debut. Satellites and surveillance planes are 
monitoring about 15 suspected cargo ships allegedly owned or used by A1 Qaeda. UAVs 
have been overflying the Horn of Afiica for similar purposes from bases in Djibouti. As 
White House spokesman Ari Fleischer commented: ‘we’re going to be on the lookout for 
them when they (terrorists) emerge’. R e p o r t s  suggested that Operation Anaconda was 
launched after months of monitoring Taliban/Al Qaeda regrouping. A1 Qaeda’s Yemen 
coordinator Qaed Sinan Harithi was assassinated by Predator drones after being under 
surveillance for months. ‘Risk makers’ displaying such risk factors require monitoring 
and intervention actions if necessary, according to theories of surveillance. This then 
reduced the likelihood of terrorist attacks. Such capabilities to launch precision strikes 
within a short sensor-to-shooter time frame have received prominence in the leaked 
Pentagon Defence Planning Guidance 2004-2009.
^^Remarks to the National Network of Electro-Optical Manufacturing Technologies Conference, 9 
February 1998, Tuscon, Arizona.
Press Gaggle by Ari Fleischer aboard Air Force One, 05 November 2002, Office o f  the Press Secretary
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After September 11, Beck noted the increased importance of ‘surveillance states’ 
to monitor terrorists. MIS’s preferred policy of ‘risk management’ involves monitoring 
terror suspects to gather as much intelligence as possible, although it has been prodded 
towards a ‘risk averse’ policy of arrests sooner rather than later.*  ^ The Pentagon runs an 
electronic surveillance program called Terrorism Information Awareness that seeks to 
forestall terrorism by scanning computer databases.*^ We also need more intelligence- 
based ‘prescreening and monitoring based on risk criteria’. T h e  National Commission 
on Terrorism also recommended the Secretary for Health together with the State 
Department, establish an international monitoring program to give early warning of 
infectious disease outbreak and terrorist experimentation with biological agents. 
Furthermore, the nature of risks evolves and needs open-ended monitoring. The UN 
Monitoring Group on terrorism was thus set up to assess measures taken against terrorism 
and issues regular assessments. As President Bush put it, ‘the war on terror will require a 
constant evaluation on progress.
As predicted in the test theory, security risks like terrorism require surveillance to 
assess it and take management action if possible. This war ‘requires constant vigilance 
and surveillance. Final success remains elusive’, rather than triumphal celebrations like 
V-E Day.^  ^ As predicted by the test theory, surveillance was very much in evidence in 
with continuous review processes and trying to forestall terrorism.
Utilitarian ‘less than heroic’ strategies of risk management
Routine war
The double-edged character of this war defies conventional categories. Drafts, 
mobilisation, rationing, or other sacrifices normally associated with war are not being 
considered. Exactly one month after 9/11, the American S&P 500 index was back to pre-
Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘Security services switch to early swoop policy’. The Guardian, 18 Nov 2002 
This controversial program was initially called Total Information Awareness until pressure from 
Congress banned it from spying on Americans and the Pentagon changed it to its present name.
Gary Hart and Warren Rudman (Co-Chairs), America still unprepared, still in danger, Report o f an 
independent task force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, Washington D C., 22 Oct 2002, p.3 
‘Plain speaking: the US President talks about plans for New Year, race and prospect o f war with Iraq’, 
US News and World Report, 13 December 2002 
‘Retaliation may be underway but victory is distant’, Boston Globe, 08 October 2001
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attack levels. Within a year of Pearl Harbour, millions of Americans were fighting and 
dying. Instead, the White House now urged Americans to go about their routines yet 
maintain heightened awareness. Accounting scandals and economic problems jostled for 
public and media attention. Was terrorism, like crime before it, about to become simply a 
commonplace risk to be managed routinely as predicted by the test theory?
War on terror in Afghanistan was becoming routine in two senses: it was 
becoming all too familiar, and instrumental rather than fervent. Before 9/11, Operation 
"Infinite Reach amounted to little more than a targeting exercise’. Unlike ‘real war’, in 
which adversarial interaction is full of uncertainty, the ‘fight’ if it could be called that, 
was on American terms, eliminating any possibility of enemy surprises.*^ By 2002, 
American air power over Afghanistan became largely an exercise in precision guidance; 
its pilots technicians fighting wars largely devoid of passion and danger. US squadrons 
waged war virtually unopposed- few squared off with SAMs-, doing the ‘Kabul-ki 
Dance’ waiting for targets to hit. ‘Combat has become a procedure, deliberate and 
calculated, more cerebral than visceral- even if it does still have its m o m e n tsT h is  not 
only reinforced the West’s existing instrumental approach to war, but also reflected risk 
management’s utilitarian ethos. The war against Afghanistan also assumed an all-too 
familiar almost ‘routine’ nature in Britain: it was the fifth time Tony Blair had used 
military force in his tenure, with the customary press briefings and cockpit imagery.
With such ill-defined goals and elusive enemies, by May 2002, US troops were 
gathered in formal ‘recommitting ceremonies’ to remind them of their mission. This 
would have been unnecessary in an heroic existential struggle. Instead, war quietly 
shifted into Phase 2 intelligence and police work, ammunition seizures and arrests, 
routine sweeps and preventing Taliban remnants regrouping. There is clear indication of 
‘routinisation’ of this war and soon counter-terror patrols will assume the routine nature 
of naval drug patrols in the Caribbean. By 2003, attacks on coalition forces, engagements 
with A1 Qaeda/Taliban elements were reported in low-key fashion, as the war appeared 
almost ‘forgotten’. ‘Americans will have to live with the risk of large-scale terrorist
Andrew Bacevich, American Empire, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 153 
See Mark Bowden, ‘The Kabul-ld Dance’, The Atlantic Monthly, November 2002
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violence’ for some years ah ead .T h e  ‘war’ on terrorism is going to become routine as 
terrorism comes to be seen as an everyday day risk, like crime or drugs, to be managed.
Personification of risk
A risk-management approach to terrorism is based on a profoundly utilitarian moral 
calculus that effectively replaces other moral criteria such as generosity, guilt, or evil. It 
is managerial, not corrective. It does not address problems or causes, or rehabilitate erring 
individuals but shapes the environment within which individuals operate, reducing risks 
to the wider population. As we have seen, the Kosovo campaign dwelt on the evils of 
Milosevic yet left him untouched. Similarly, while Bin Laden presently remains at large, 
the focus in Washington at least publicly has shifted firom the ‘evil one’ ‘dead or alive’, 
to simply managing the risks he posed.
Shrugging aside suggestions that Washington’s Afghan campaign had failed in its 
most important manhunt. National Security Advisor Condeleeza Rice stressed ‘the most 
important thing is to disrupt the capability of this network to operate’*^ . To President 
Bush, ‘focusing on one person’ misunderstood the ‘scope of the mission’; ‘terror is 
bigger than one person’ and Bin Laden was now ‘marginalised’.A d m ira l Robert Natter, 
commanding the Atlantic Fleet, felt that ‘the answer to this war is not that we have 
captured Bin Laden, but rather keeping them running’. I n  April 2002, General Richard 
Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), announced somewhat 
disingenuously, ‘the goal has never been to go after specific individuals, it was to dismpt 
the terrorists’. Echoes of this can be found in August 1998 after the first missile strikes 
against A1 Qaeda when White House Press Secretary Mike McCurry similar noted in 
response to a question whether Bin Laden was specifically targeted, said ‘there were not 
individual human targets; it was an organisation and infrastructure that were the 
targets’.
®*Daniel Byman, ‘Are we winning the war on terrorism?’, Brookings Institution Middle East Memo #1, 23 
May 2003
Rice cited in ‘Bin Laden search brings frustration’. Guardian Unlimited, 15 February 2002, 
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Furthermore, terror networks like A1 Qaeda can function without Bin Laden, It is 
a loose grouping of people around the world who use modem technology to coordinate. 
New networked terrorist groups are less affected by losing individuals. They cannot be 
decapitated in the traditional sense but can only be dismpted. Eliminating Bin Laden 
would only mean a ‘stuttering’, not a ‘pause’ in terrorist operations. He is only a ‘cog, 
albeit a large one, in a system that will outlast his demise’. F o r  this reason, Rumsfeld 
suggested it was ‘unwise’ to personalize the conflict as Gulf War I was.^^ Having said 
that, the Administration clearly downplayed the role of Bin Laden to mask its lustrations 
and failure at nabbing the biggest fish of all, shifting its war aims in the process. 
However, firom risk management’s negative utilitarian perspective, it is enough that risks 
are reduced suitably, even without dishing out justice to Bin Laden the individual as Bush 
initially promised.
As in crime control, utilitarian risk management now trumped notions of justice, 
as predicted in the test theory. Secretary Rumsfeld remarked on alleged ‘dirty bomber’ 
Jose Padilla, ‘our interest..is not law enforcement. It is not punishment.’ But simply to 
‘try to find out everything he knows so we can stop other terrorist acts’.^  ^Brian Jenkins 
concurred that ‘America’s goal is not revenge for the September 11 attacks. The goal is 
not even bringing individual terrorists to justice. It is the destmction of a terrorist 
enterprise that threatens American security’.^  ^ This certainly was a less than heroic, more 
utilitarian strategy. As with other rhetorical wars on crime for example, multi-tiered 
networks are the predominant form; singling out individuals will only divert scarce 
resources. Plenty of middle-level operatives can still inflict real damage or replace those 
killed. Many cells can plan operations without much guidance. The focus should thus be 
on disruption, not decapitation.
Lesser et al, Countering the New Terrorism, pp. 132; Walter Pincus, ‘A1 Qaeda to survive Bin Laden, 
panel told’, Washington Post, 19 December 2001; Paul Dibb, ‘The future of international coalitions: how 
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Reshaping the environment
Given the difficulties in decapitation and personifying risks, does the war in Afghanistan 
then manifest ‘shaping’ concems as predicted by the test theory in reducing opportunities 
for terrorism? The US campaign has certainly reshaped the environment substantially but 
only to the extent needed to manage systemic risks. It is a form of active military 
engagements, not always assuming the conventional shape of war. A Congressional bill 
of April 1996 dictates the president 'use all necessary means including.. .military force, to 
dismpt, dismantle, and destroy international infrastmcture used by international 
terrorists'.^^ Furthermore, more aggressive, international police and intelligence 
coordination have meant a less ‘permissive environment’ within which Al Qaeda could 
operate with im punity.U sing force and aggressive intelligence operations to reshape 
environments have curtailed opportunities for terrorists to plan and strike. Homeland 
Security Secretary Tom Ridge’s strategy is to ‘reduce vulnerabilities, to make it 
progressively more difficult for terrorists to attack successfully’.^  ^UK Defence Secretary 
Geoff Hoon has described his strategy of denying terrorists the ‘opportunity’ of surprise 
and hitting terrorists in their own back yards before they can hit us as ‘up-streaming’, a 
concept borrowed from the global fight against dmgs.'®° Wars are now into the business 
of denying terrorists opportunities through proactive action.
RAND counter-terrorism expert Ian Lesser argued that ‘environment shaping’ 
around the world can reduce terror r i s k s . I n  the context of Afghanistan, applying 
Lessor’s notion of ‘environment shaping’, we can ‘shrink zones of chaos and terrorist 
sanctuary’ by destroying terror infrastmcture and conditions there that make them 
conducive for terrorists and prevent new zones from forming. This concept is reflected in 
the US National Strategy for Combating Terrorism released in Febmary 2003, which 
described a ‘stmcture of terror’ where the ‘international environment defines the
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boundaries within which terrorist plans take shape’. The ultimate goal of US policy is to 
‘create an international environment inhospitable to terrorists and all those who support 
them by attacking sanctuaries, leaderships and command and control, disrupting their 
ability to plan.’ Terrorist infrastructure is important to terrorist training, argued Chair 
of the JCS General Myers, ‘and so we’re going to deny them the opportunity to continue 
to use them.. .we are trying to set the conditions inside that country that terrorism will no 
longer be supported’. Secretary Powell noted the goal is to ‘make it far more difficult for 
such organisations to exist.
War now meant denial of opportunities and making environmental conditions 
inimical to terrorists, not just militarily defeating them in the conventional sense of a 
‘heroic’ war against a clearly identifiable enemy or a discrete subject. As then US 
commander of Combined Joint Task Force(CJTF)-180 Lieutenant-General Dan McNeill 
observed on ongoing operations in late June 2002, ‘I don’t have a particular name affixed 
to what I’m going up against’.D is r u p t io n  means targeting a terrorist organisation by 
not only stopping one of its particular operations, but rendering all its activities more 
difficult. US Colonel John Campbell, commander of forces in southern Afghanistan 
remarked in late February 2003, ‘my mission is to deny sanctuary to Taliban and Al 
Qaeda. Anytime we go in, we disrupt their communications and planning, and put people 
on the run or in hiding’.C o n s ta n tly  chipping away at Al Qaeda can at least curtail its 
ability to strike at will.
Further afield, the CJTF-Hom of Afiica mission statement sought to ‘deny 
opportunity for re-emergence of terrorist groups in the Horn of Africa’. T h e  Pentagon 
is already looking at bare-bones basing agreements in lawless regions in north and sub- 
Saharan Afiica which could be ‘potential havens’. As the European Command’s Director
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of Plans and Policy noted, ‘What we don’t want to see in Afiica is another Afghanistan. 
That’s what we’re trying to prevent’.
The ability of networks like Al Qaeda to hijack weak states makes it more 
imperative to do so, although it is unclear what impact modem communication 
technologies have on the need for quasi-virtual organisations.^®* Indeed, Afghan terrorist 
camps were perhaps ‘now unnecessary’ as Al Qaeda operated as a ‘virtual entity’.^ ®® The 
only infrastmcture needed were safe houses. However, this obscured the importance of 
Afghanistan as a magnet attracting terrorists, a safe and secure location to train and 
recruit openly and select the best. Kurt Campbell and Philip Zelikow, leading the Aspen 
Strategy Group study on homeland security, emphasised that a principal achievement so 
far has been depriving Al Qaeda of its Afghan base and harassing its operatives 
worldwide.
Nation-tending
Washington is famously averse to nation-building, keen on exit strategies and ‘light 
footprints’. As Tommy Franks quipped in November 2001, ‘this is a conflict that 
probably has the easiest exit strategy in years..the destmction of terrorist networks with 
global reach, and in this case, the Taliban who harbour them...and provide support 
architecture.’ *^® Resisting the international peacekeeping force beyond Kabul, 
Washington’s overriding priority remained the hunt for terrorists rather than more 
‘heroic’ nation-building. Washington spends $10 billion a year on the 9,000 American 
troops chasing Taliban/Al Qaeda remnants in the eastern and southern Afghanistan but 
less than $1 billion on reconstmction since 2001, although Congress has authorised 
more.*** Britain’s top soldier Admiral Michael Boyce criticised America’s ‘single-
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minded aim’ of destroying Bin Laden in a ‘high-tech Wild West’ operation, ignoring 
‘rebuilding’
However, utilitarian concems in Washington overrode other moral reasons for 
reconstmction as Donald Rumsfeld’s main ‘goal in Afghanistan is to ensure that country 
does not again become a training ground for terrorists... trying to stop terrorists from 
committing additional terrorist acts is our first p r i o r i t y A s  a US diplomat reportedly 
quipped, ‘we go in, we hunt down terrorists, and we leave as if we’d never been there.’ 
US Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz maintained that, ‘we’ve got to deny the 
sanctuaries everywhere we’re able to’.^
After 9/11 states realised that reconstmction now involved greater national 
interest than previously thought. The 2002 National Security Strategy clearly stated 
‘America is now threatened less by conquering states that we are by failing ones’. 
There is however little talk here of nation-building in the conventional sense but what 
Michael Ignatieff called ‘nation-building lite’ to safeguard strategic interests at lowest 
possible cost.^^  ^ The American reliance on local warlords without substantial 
peacekeeping beyond Kabul has improved life marginally but promises of financial aid 
and reconstmction have not been met. Hamid Karzai’s writ does not run throughout most 
of Afghanistan still riven by feuding warlords. Most are used for humanitarian and food 
services, rather than reconstmction. This is clearly ‘nation-tending’ rather than ‘nation- 
building’.^ ^^  Just as classical rehabilitation in the modernist sense in criminology has 
given way to rehabilitation only to the extent it manages risks, this is paralleled in 
Afghanistan. The 2002 National Security Strategy noted it will rebuild Afghanistan ‘so it 
will never again abuse its people, threaten its neighbours and provide a haven for
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terrorists’.U t i l i t a r i a n  concerns about possible negative outcomes rather than 
addressing causes or rehabilitation dominate the debate. The Bush Administration 
belatedly deployed civil affairs specialists to help reconstruction.
Pentagon officials insisted Afghanistan is not nation-building simply for the sake 
of Afghanistan but security-building. President Bush ostensibly accepted at his October 
10 2001 news conference the need for ‘so-called nation-building’, but preferred calling it 
‘stabilisation of a future government’ to make it inhospitable to terrorists. This was a 
clear indicator of ‘nation-tending’. Strategically marginal Somalia was abandoned in 
1994 only for Washington to worry after Sep 11 it had terrorist bases. The Horn of Africa 
has been identified as another risky place. ‘Instability can be a breeding ground for 
terror’, noted Geoff Hoon. ‘It is now in our interests to stop these conditions developing 
or to change them when they have already emerged. It is far better to minimise risks to 
UK interests by being forewarned about them’.^ ®^ As predicted, Washington’s renewed 
interests in Africa are based on more utilitarian concerns to prevent terrorist sanctuaries 
rather than moral concerns seeking to rebuild weak or failed states.
in. Defining success
Non-events and the minimalist criterion for victory: acceptance and patience
How would a war to manage risks end? Hypothetically, it could conclude when the risks 
are reduced to a tolerable level with success defined minimally in non-events such as 
avoiding risks occurring. Success in conventional ‘war’ is normally defined by desirable 
outcomes like defeating a fixed identifiable enemy, taking its capital or surrender 
ceremonies. It has a visible finite point. Terrorism spawned from foreign countries has 
the best chance of being called ‘war’. But the practical aim of military action remains the 
same: more effective suppression indicative of risk-management, rather than total 
elimination evocative of ‘war’. As the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 
acknowledges, ‘in this different kind of war, we cannot expect an easy or definitive end
' The National Security Strategy o f  the United States, (Washington D.C: The White House, 20 September
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to the conflict’ Senior US officials like George Tenet have tried a ‘body count’ 
approach while President Bush reportedly keeps a ‘scorecard’ of major terrorist leaders 
arrested, disrupted or killed. Such an approach is appealing for it provides a concrete 
measure of success.
This can be misleading especially the majority of those arrested are low-ranking 
cadres and if A1 Qaeda is able to easily regenerate and replace even top planners like 
Khalid Sheikh Mohamed. It also does not reflect on the dispersed cells, fundraising skills, 
morale and residual ability of A1 Qaeda to strike which are almost impossible to precisely 
gauge. Even those who genuinely believe they are donating to A1 Qaeda-linked charities 
might not know they are indirectly supporting A1 Qaeda. ‘Serious data problems, put a 
more comprehensive and sophisticated approach to measuring success nearly beyond 
reach’.N o n e th e less , less than precise data is still better than relying exclusively on a 
‘body count’ approach. Chairman of the JCS Richard Myers warned of ‘old think’ and 
that ‘if you try to quantify what we’re doing today in terms of previous conventional 
wars, you’re making a huge mistake.’ Rumsfeld further noted that the Afghan campaign 
was ‘a notably different situation’ where success will not be defined by tonnage of bombs 
dropped as previous measures of success. Clearly ‘new thinking’ is required and this is 
provided by risk management criteria of non-events.
What would ‘victory’ look like? The only visible battlefield victory was ridding 
Kabul of Taliban and A1 Qaeda, yet this produced no prospect of closure. There were no 
grandiose victory parades. The Taliban collapse produced relief rather than rejoicing in 
Western capitals. Otherwise much was ambiguous. Mullah Omar and Bin Laden 
remained at large, and Taliban fighters simply disappeared. Struggling to define victory 
without surrender papers. Secretary Rumsfeld will hunt terrorists ‘until Americans can go 
about their lives without fear’ and ‘relative freedom’. W h e n  such a stage is attained is 
impossible to visibly gauge. Attorney General John Ashcroft in November 2001 
suggested that America had ‘emerged victorious in the opening battle in the war on
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terrorism’ simply because ‘two periods of extremely high threat have passed’ without 
another a t t a c k / A s  predicted, such are the non-events and negative indicators of success 
in this war. The absence of another terrorist spectacular on US soil so far, even during the 
Iraq war, was touted as success until the Riyadh and Casablanca bombings of May 2003.
Why were such minimalist outcomes defined as victory? The key benchmark of 
successful risk-management here is simply avoiding harm.: we want to prevent the worst, 
rather than attain something good, despite Bush’s invocation of ‘freedom’ in his 
speeches. The war is less about we stand for, but what we seek to avoid. We ‘reduce 
vulnerabilities’ and ‘minimise impacts’. As Condoleeza Rice observed, ‘perhaps most 
fundamentally, 9/11 crystallised our vulnerability’. T h e  language used has been 
overwhelmingly negative: ‘prevent’, ‘disrupt’, ‘deny’, ‘avoid’, ‘degrade’, ‘suppress’. By 
focusing on avoidable harm, the risk-management approach fosters a negative if not 
dystopian outlook, for the rhetorical war on terrorism is like the war on drugs, 
‘unwinnable’. Indeed, ‘terrorism as a phenomenon is so difhise with so many points of 
risk that 100 percent success in counter-terrorism is not realistic’.
What can be done is to make it more difficult for terrorists to operate. The least 
bad outcome was accepted as victory. Donald Rumsfeld accepts ‘that is not your 
preferred outcome but it is a better outcome than nothing... the goal is to have the 
terrorists not win’.’^^  ^ In September 2002, responding to suggestions that the war in 
Afghanistan had not been too successful lately, Rumsfeld again defined success in terms 
of non-events: ‘we may not be finding large numbers (of Taliban) but that’s because we 
have been successful, not unsuccessful. We’ve been successful in dispersing what large 
numbers there are, and what’s left are the bits and scraps. A traditional ‘events 
approach’ measures the number of terrorists incidents that occur to indicate whether 
terrorism is increasing. But it cannot be precise because fluctuations could be for various 
reasons: better precautions, disruption or simply because terrorists need more time to
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prepare a spectacular/Instead, as suggested by the test theory, we seem to be moving 
towards a ‘non-events’ approach in which any incident that does not occur is regarded as 
a success. Even Paul Wolfowitz accepted that ‘victory is going to be measured by what 
does not happen as opposed to what does happen.’
President Bush’s address to the Joint Session of Congress on 20 September 2001 
made clear, actions include dramatic strikes as well as covert operations, ‘secret even in 
success’. People aren’t going to see ‘exactly what’s taking place on their TV screens’. 
Yet visible results have been assumed to be the context of modem war especially since 
the Gulf War. The difficulty of measuring success in Afghanistan was exemplified by 
calls for Washington to produce numbers of enemy dead in Operation Anaconda. UK 
Defence Secretary Hoon noted that success of operations in Afghanistan ‘will not be 
measured by the number of enemy dead. It will be measured more by our ability to deter 
terrorists and dismpt the activities which support them’.^ ^^  So we have a new concept of 
war where success is not defined by defeating the enemy militarily. Success will be low- 
key, unpublicised, sometimes even unknown, disrupting and quashing of networks.
Events from Afghanistan suggest that counter terrorism is about ‘managing risks, 
not confronting certainties’.*^  ^Non-events like everyday that goes by without a terrorist 
outrage can be considered a triumph of risk-management. Success must be defined in 
terms of ‘reducing both the probability and consequences of further attack.’ Many 
successes will not be visible to the public eye and the benchmark of success will not be 
quantifiable. As predicted by the test theory, talk of risk components: probability and 
consequences locates us in the risk discourse where non-events are indicators of success. 
Attorney General John Ashcroft warned that ‘the potential for us to be hit again is a very 
real potential...but that we minimise the potential whenever we are alert.’ According to 
Secretary Powell, ‘success may never come in the form that there is never another
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terrorist incident. Success may well be in the form that we bring this under control and 
make it far more difficult for such organisations to exist.’. T h i s  is typical risk 
management language cognisant of limits, rather than those traditionally associated with 
war.
Yet, encouraged by the terminology of ‘war’, the prevalent strand of thinking 
about counter-terrorism is an erroneous tendency towards absolute solutions and quickly 
eradicating terrorism, rather than something to be managed and reduced over a longer- 
term p r o c e s s . I n  contrast, Europe’s long struggle with terrorism views the problem as 
an ‘inevitable and permanent feature of modem life. The French system thus seeks to 
manage and minimise the problem rather than to solve it.’^^  ^ In contrast, the idea of a 
‘war’ on terrorism implies it will end someday when the Afghan campaign at this writing 
shows no signs of conclusion. In fairness, US policymakers have urged lower 
expectations. As Bush noted in his weekly radio address of 16 Febmary 2003, ‘there is no 
such thing as perfect security against a network of hidden killers’. This mirrored 
Madeleine Albright’s acknowledgement in August 1998 that missile strikes at were ‘not 
perfect insurance’. D a n i e l  Byman agrees ‘no strategy guarantees complete security. 
The United States and its allies must accept the inevitability of a large, global movement 
bent on murder as a form of political e x p r e s s i o n T h e  National Strategy for Homeland 
Security admits ‘it is not possible or practical to eliminate all risks’. H o m e l a n d  
Security chief Tom Ridge insisted he doesn’t talk about fear. Instead, he was ‘more into 
acceptance. The acceptance that we cannot provide a perfectly secure environment and 
still remain an open society’. T h e r e  is a clear recognition of limits and no perfect 
solutions exist. Terrorism will soon seem, like crime, to be an everyday problem, and we 
can only at best manage the risks.
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An open-ended process: Tackling the Hydra effect
War as risk management, it is theorised, leads to open-ended operations to continually 
manage new risks or resurgent old ones. Was there evidence of this in Afghanistan? Tony 
Blair urged ‘patience’ and digging in for the ‘long-hauT as the customary public 
‘wobble’ emerged early in the campaign with no visible successes. President Bush’s 
warning that ‘this is not an instant gratification war’ resonates for the finishing line is not 
easily apparent when managing risks entails constant monitoring, taking repeated action 
if necessary. Despite taking Kabul, US-led forces have had to constantly attack 
regrouping A1 Qaeda and Taliban elements. In November 2001 and January 2002, the 
Zawar Khili cave complex was struck repeatedly. In March 2002, Operation Anaconda 
reminded the world the conflict was not over yet. Such actions suggest that the endgame 
is far from clear. Geoff Hoon described the deployment of Royal Marine Commandos to 
Afghanistan in March 2002 as ‘open-ended’. If AI Qaeda attempts to regroup, Bush will 
respond with a ‘sustained, tireless, relentless campaign’ to keep terrorists on the run, and 
‘we’re going to stay at it for however long it t a k e s . O n l y  in May 2003, almost 16 
months after the fall of the Taliban, was there a declared end to major combat. The vague 
criteria for measuring progress -  disrupting terror networks and keeping them running- 
leaves open the possibility that more action will follow assessments that terrorists once 
again are capable of causing harm.
By October 2002, CIA Director Tenet warned in Congressional testimony that 
despite a year’s worth of efforts A1 Qaeda was ‘reconstituted’ and ‘coming after us’, 
posing almost as serious a risk as 2001. The UN reported in December 2002 that A1 
Qaeda recruitment and finances remained robust. In May 2003, the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies’ Strategic Survey 2002/2003 proclaimed that AI Qaeda had 
‘reconstituted’ and ‘remains more insidious and just as dangerous’. The Afghan 
campaign and other efforts only ‘impelled an already elusive trans-national network to 
become even harder to identify and neutralise’. It further notes that ‘if minions were
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caught or killed, their spectacular demise.. .moved others to take their place. The process 
was, in theory, self-perpetuating’.^ "^^
The Afghan campaign suggests risk-management lessons. In risk-management, it 
is essential to constantly assess effectiveness of measures taken: a cyclical and ongoing 
process, rather than a linear progression. In sum, it lacks a finite point. Policy should not 
be gauged in terms of definitive endgoals but by way of an ongoing process of risk 
management. Perhaps we should see the ‘war’ on terrorism in light of other interminable, 
unwinnable rhetorical wars on drugs for example where a similar lack of clarity of 
mission and the ‘hydra effect’ predominate. With American forces deployed fi*om 
Georgia to the Philippines and talk of action against Iraq, calls were made both in 
Congress and the media for the Bush Administration to better define new missions, how 
long they will last and clarify objectives. However, counter terrorism should not be too 
obsessed with the flavour of the moment or specific timeframes, for there are always 
others about yet to appear and ready to replace Bin Laden- the so-called ‘Hydra effect’. 
President Bush suggested that ‘patience will be one of our strengths’, in a ‘task that does 
not end’.'^^
Managing terror risks has no clear endgame because of the need to constantly 
disrupt terrorist cells and deny safe havens. Noted terrorism expert Walter Lacquer 
suggested that there perhaps will be no discernible end to the war on terrorism in the 21®‘ 
c e n t u r y .B a c k  in 1998, President Clinton already claimed that the US was in a ‘long, 
ongoing struggle’ with t e r ro r i sm .A s  Tony Blair realised, this ‘does not have a finite
point’. Tom Ridge further warned that coping with A1 Qaeda would be a ‘permanent 
condition’. T h i s  sounds more like risk-management than war, which presumes at least 
a defined end point. While 9/11 fuelled new determination to end terrorism, history does
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not suggest optimism. The 9/11 attacks have been described as the ‘Fourth Wave' of 
terrorism. Even as the latest wave recedes, another cause will emerge unexpectedly. 
History tells us that terror groups can be eliminated and terrorism rendered less 
significant, but terrorists always invent new methods,^^^
Allied maritime patrols in the Mediterranean have only forced terrorists to use 
overland routes through north Africa. Apparent successes in Afghanistan dispersed A1 
Qaeda to lawless regions of Yemen, Somalia, Pakistan’s tribal areas and even South-East 
Asia the so-called Second Front. There are concerns A1 Qaeda is establishing new 
infiastmcture in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley with Hezbollah. This suggested a predicted 
‘boomerang effect’ where initial action to manage risks created more risks as a result. 
Paradoxically, due to the success of the Afghan campaign, scattered remnants and a more 
splintered decentralised command structure driven underground might also make it 
harder to monitor. There are also fears about relatively simple attacks by ‘Lone Wolves’ 
broadly sympathetic to A1 Qaeda but not part of it, or cells who plan without guidance. 
Thus, information about high-level leaders may turn out to be less important than before 
9/11. The risk simply evolved rather than disappeared. Indeed, A1 Qaeda had a 
‘remarkably protean nature’, constantly adapting.Removing leadership alone won’t 
eliminate A1 Qaeda. Furthermore, intelligence sources suggest A1 Qaeda is hardly a 
centralised, disciplined organisation like the IRA. Instead, it is a network of loosely 
allied local or regional Islamic groups. These include the Jemaah Islamiya behind the 
October 2002 Bali bombings, and the Salafia Jihadia allegedly behind the May 2003 
Casablanca bombings.
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IV. Conclusion
Many pointed to the Afghan campaign as a new form of war. The aim of this chapter was 
to assess instead the continuities with previous campaigns in Kosovo in terms of risk 
management. Despite conceptual difficulties related to ‘war’ terminology, what was 
clearer was the extent to which the Afghan campaign served to manage systemic risks 
according to themes identified in Chapter Three. Employing ‘war’ terminology focused 
attention on military actions against easily identifiable state enemies, attaining clear-cut 
decisive positive results at the end. None of these were observed in Afghanistan.
Despite the high profile of military force in Afghanistan, it exhibited more 
features of risk-management than conventional warfare: the philosophy of
‘anticipationism’ informed proactive military action against A1 Qaeda to prevent further 
attacks. Recourse to the precautionary principle however was weaker since America had 
been attacked first although there were inclinations to assume the worst. Continuous 
surveillance processes provided information on who or what constituted risks and taking 
preventive action where possible. In reshaping the environment, evidence suggested that 
the campaign goals indeed became denial of opportunities for terrorists to plan rather 
than win or fight concrete enemies in a military sense. Bin Laden, while demonised, was 
predictably sidelined in favour of disrupting the environment he operated within. In 
opting for ‘nation-tending’ than ‘nation-building’, there was more evidence of risk 
management’s minimalist mindset. War in Afghanistan became somewhat ‘routine’ in 
nature against an everyday risk of terrorism. As forecast, the war became an open-ended 
endeavour against Hydra-headed enemies where results are not easily apparent. Non- 
events were clearly the benchmark for success, while the ‘boomerang effect’ meant more 
risks were actually generated in the process. In sum, a risk-management approach 
explained these aspects of the Afghan campaign better than conventional ‘war’ itself.
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CHAPTER SIX 
Iraq : 
Textbook ‘risk management’ or flawed strategy? 
Introduction
Iraq alone among the case studies experienced two phases of sustained military action 
from 1998-2003 to be analysed. By 2003, ‘regime change’ under the Bush Doctrine of 
‘pre-emption’ arguably broke new ground in war and strategy. Yet unbeknownst to most, 
the Bush White House justified war in terms mirroring those of the Clinton national 
security team in the late 1990s. Washington, despite protests to the contrary, had in effect 
been warring with Baghdad since 1998 with the quickly forgotten ‘preventive’ Desert 
Fox campaign, followed by a little-noticed open-ended struggle over no-fly zones. This 
defied traditional conceptions of war as decisive and finite with dramatic successes. Any 
semblance of continuity crumbled underneath the rush to criticise Bush’s unilateralism 
and the maximalist goal of regime change. Yet, the criticisms of Bush (oil, personal 
revenge) were ‘unhelpfully vitriolic and unnecessarily public’, and unconvincing. There 
was ‘little understanding of the American approach, what motivates it... also little 
understanding of the continuities in US foreign policy that this approach represents.’*
In a similar vein, this final case study assesses the extent to which use of force 
towards Iraq from December 1998 to May 2003 exhibited continuities in terms of ‘risk- 
management’. It does not claim that Washington’s case is especially persuasive or 
justified nor does it pretend to offer a definitive interpretation. Rather it asks whether war 
is possibly addressed through highlighting the presence of risk concepts. Events are 
assessed thematically, not chronologically. The same framework of structured questions 
applied to earlier case studies is repeated. The task here is to identify trends surrounding 
the Iraq issue which might have implications for the notion of war as risk management. 
Would hypotheses generated by the test theory satisfy empirical evidence?
’ David H. Dunn, ‘Myths, motivations and ‘misunderestimations’: the Bush Administration and Iraq’, 
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The first section discusses whether systemic risks or imminent threats provided 
impetus for action. It then examines military actions for evidence of risk management in 
practice and official justifications provided. Was there future-oriented proactive 
anticipatory action and resort to the precautionary principle? Was surveillance undertaken 
and did utilitarian use of force through ‘routine’, patient operations reshape the 
environment? Finally, the chapter discusses whether policy was more appropriately 
evaluated on minimalist grounds of non-events and avoiding adverse outcomes, not 
perfect solutions. Rather than definitive endgoals associated with ‘war’, could one 
discern instead an ongoing cyclical process and a ‘boomerang effect’?
A brief history
In August 1990, UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 661 imposed comprehensive 
economic sanctions on Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait. These were to remain in place 
until UNSCR 687 of April 1991 was complied with, the certification that Baghdad had 
destroyed all its weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The International Atomic Energy 
Agency and UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) were charged with monitoring and 
implementing these provisions. However, Iraq repeatedly obstructed inspectors until their 
expulsion in 1998. Consequently, Britain and America launched a 70-hour air campaign 
Operation Desert Fox in December 1998 to ‘degrade’ Iraqi WMD facilities. UNSCOM 
was replaced by the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission 
(UNMOVIC) which returned for short-lived inspections from November 2002 to March 
2003. On 20 March 2003, the United States launched Operation Iraqi Freedom with a 
‘decapitation’ strike intended to kill Saddam Hussein. Shortly afterwards, coalition 
ground forces surged into Iraq and despite resistance from irregular Fedayeen, entered 
Baghdad on 09 April 2003.
The no-fly zones in northern Iraq above the 36^ *’ parallel (Operation Northern 
Watch) and southern Iraq below the 33"^  ^parallel (Operation Southern Watch), were set up 
by America, Britain and France somewhat haphazardly after the 1991 Gulf War to protect 
Shiites in the south and Kurds in the north from reprisals after their failed uprisings. The 
zones are not explicitly UN-authorised although the coalition cites UNSCR 688 of 5 
April 1991, which deemed Iraqi repression a ‘threat to international peace and security’.
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However the resolution was not passed under Chapter VII mandates. It became 
eventually clear that these zones served not only humanitarian purposes, but also to keep 
Saddam ‘in his box’ and constrain his actions. After the end of Desert Fox, low-key but 
active sorties continued in no-fly zones against Iraqi air defence targets which 
increasingly accosted coalition warplanes. Airstrikes had been carried out both for 
policing no-fly zones as well as punishing Iraqi non-compliance with disarmament 
provisions. These actions are part of a wider strategy of risk management.
Two phases are discernible here: the late Clinton/early Bush Administration and 
post-9/11. Initially there was no significant policy change which the new Bush 
administration promised, apart from ‘smart’ sanctions. Early tough talk about regime 
change was notable by its absence. Even Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, the 
Administration’s resident hawk admitted there was no plan in the works; ‘I haven’t seen 
it yet’.^  The Bush Administration gradually found itself ‘adopting the same Iraq policy 
pursued in recent years by the Clinton administration- a policy President Bush and his top 
aides previously condemned’.^  In December 2000, Secretary of State-designate Colin 
Powell seemed to endorse continuity: ‘we will continue to contain him, and then confront 
him, should that become necessary again’. President Bush described air strikes against 
Iraq in February 2001 as ‘part of a strategy, and until that strategy is changed, .. .we will 
continue to enforce them.’^  Nonetheless, these statements left room for change. Prior to 
September 11, both Administrations viewed Iraq largely in terms of proliferation risks 
and regional stability. Terrorism was seen as separate.
After 9/11, the two issues became intertwined rightly or wrongly, and not without 
precedent either. America’s ‘rogue doctrine’ by the late 1980s had already linked WMD 
and terrorism concerns to Third World states quite apart from their previous status as 
Soviet surrogates.^ After despatching the Taliban, on 11 December 2001, President Bush 
unveiled his ‘next priority’ was preventing terrorists acquiring WMD and ‘rogue states 
are clearly the most likely sources of such weapons’. Although Washington emphasised
 ^Testimony of Paul Wolfowitz, ‘Nomination of Paul Wolfowitz to be Deputy Secretary o f Defence’, 
Senate Armed Services Committee, 27 February 2001.
 ^ ‘Forging a new Iraq policy’, Washington Post, 04 March 2001 
 ^Colin Powell quoted in CNN, The Survival o f Saddam Hussein, 16 Jan 2001,
http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/gulf.war/unfinished/war/index4.html: Remarks by President George 
W. Bush and President Vicente Fox in Joint Press Conference, Office o f the Press Secretary, 16 Feb 2001 
 ^Michael Klare, Rogue states and nuclear outlaws, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995), p.26-7
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Saddam’s brutal regime, and refusal to disarm as more concrete issues, the possibility of 
him re-acquiring WMD or passing it to terrorists most animated policymakers. Bush 
shifted from Clinton’s policy of ‘containment plus’(containing Saddam in the short run 
through ‘smart’ sanctions, air strikes and aiding the opposition, overthrow in the long 
term) to overt regime change: ‘the Bush Administration’s approach has been 
characterised by a desire to meet threats head-on rather than manage them’.^  This posed 
significant challenges for risk management. Viewing fraq as part of the broader war on 
terror also created analytical difficulties for this study. It introduced new variables, since 
previous risks from Iraq could no longer be judged on their own basis.
Various factors account for this policy shift. These are discussed only in brief. 
9/11 reinforced existing cognitive perceptions and strengthened the hand of hawks like 
Paul Wolfowitz. Rightly or wrongly, policymakers drew analogies such as the need to act 
preventively. Iraq became ‘part of the insecurity we now feel’ argued Condoleeza Rice.^ 
That Iraq, an impoverished state wracked by sanctions for a decade, should cause concern 
appeared linked to this insecurity than any real concrete evidence. Furthermore, 
difficulties involved in destroying Iraqi weapons by air alone were considerable: 
Baghdad concealed its systems underground after Israel’s Osirak raid destroyed its above 
ground reactors, and knew American tactics well. The role of intellectuals in the Project 
for a New American Century such as William Kristol should however not be overstated. 
The ‘pre-emptive’ strike was the logical consequence of a way of thinking, especially 
post-9/11. It is also important to note subtle differences between London and 
Washington. Blair was careful to stress WMD and disarmament, not regime change or A1 
Qaeda links to the same extent that Washington did.
Iraq: Conceptual Issues
Iraq posed interesting and significant questions for understanding a category of war 
which defied conventional criteria. As Eliot Cohen observed in late 2002, ‘the Gulf War 
did not end in February 1991. For a decade now, we’ve been fighting this low-level war
 ^Dunn, in note 1, p294
Condeleeza Rice quoted in David Sanger, ‘Debate over attacking Iraq heats up, ~New York Times, 01 Sep 
2002, and also Avenging Terror, Channel 4 (UK), 31 Aug 2002
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without calling it such.’  ^ In December 1998, Britain and America had already attracted 
condemnation for using force against Iraq without explicit UN authorisation. Especially 
since 1998, British and American jets routinely forayed into Iraq, unleashing precision- 
guided munitions and getting shot at in return. War, broadly construed, described such 
sustained combat operations. Yet then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright insisted, 
‘we are talking about using military force but we are not talking about a war’.^  
Furthermore, between December 1998 and the end of the Clinton era. Southern Watch 
aircraft reported coming under fire some 670 times. More than 5000 combat sorties were 
flown from December 1998 to August 1999 in Operation Northern Watch alone. An 
‘inconclusive war of attrition thus resulted.. .unique in the annals of air combat’.^ ® This 
operation further lacked the guidance of the Powell doctrine which held that military 
campaigns should have clear goals. Many worried that a ‘lack of clear consistent Iraq 
policy deprives military operations of a guiding purpose or rationale’. T h i s  conclusion 
appears rather harsh if the operation is judged by standards of risk management.
In the run-up to regime change, the low-grade war over no-fly zones was 
ratcheted up to ‘shape’ the battlefield involving even B-1 strategic bombers, degrading 
Iraq air-defences and Ababil-100 surface-to-surface missiles. Later, it emerged that the 
no-fly zones operations actually involved a plan called Southern Focus which included 
striking the fibre optic networks Baghdad used for communications, radars and other key 
military installations. Coalition forces were thus able to launch ground offensives without 
extensive air strikes as 606 bombs had already been dropped on 391 selected targets. 
There was no clear distinction between outbreak of war or simply continuation of 
hostilities from no-fly zones. Michael Walzer noted that Washington was aheady fighting 
a ‘little war’ despite all the UN shenanigans for authority to fight a ‘big war’.^  ^ Can risk 
management provide perspectives to understand the preceding ‘little war’ and subsequent 
‘big war’?
® Quoted in Thom Shanker, ‘Wage war but don’t start one’, New York Times, 24 Nov 2002 
 ^Remarks at Tennessee State University, Nashville, Tennessee, 19 February 1998 
Andrew Bacevich, American Empire, (Cambridge, Mass; Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 152 
' ' Floyd D. Spence, ‘US policy toward Iraq’, Hearing before the Committee o f Armed Services, House of 
Representatives, 10 March 1999, H.A.S.C. No, 106-10, (Washington D.C: US government Printing Office) 
See ‘US air raids in ’02 prepared for war in Iraq’, New York Times, 20 July 2003 
Michael Walzer, ‘What a little war in Iraq could do’. New York Times, 07 March 2003
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By March 2003, Anglo-American resort to war again without UN approval 
created serious diplomatic rifts, despite policymakers being more forthright about using 
the term ‘war’. ‘This is the first hyperpower war’, noted Eliot Cohen, ‘where the 
dominant power in the system sees a huge problem that it is determined to resolve even 
with quite serious opposition of major players’. Y e t  explanatory discourses such as 
‘imperialism’ and even leading Realists had difficulty analysing such a major event in 
IR.^  ^This was also the first time Washington had launched full-scale preventive war and 
appeared to herald momentous change in the international system. The lack of a so-called 
‘smoking gun’ especially concerned many analysts who feared ‘sexed up’ dossiers about 
Iraqi WMD programs exaggerating the ‘imminent’ threat.
Despite widespread conspiracy theories, regime change in 2003 was furthermore 
largely not motivated by traditional markers such as economic or geopolitical advantages 
or even moral ones like revenge or justice for Saddam’s victims. Instead, it seemed a 
‘safety-first’ approach based on risk - of Saddam linking up with A1 Qaeda or acquiring 
WMD- was the most compelling answer. Even with the very visible success of 
capturing Baghdad in April 2003, there was no traditional end-game associated with war 
such as surrender ceremonies. Saddam was not captured or killed. These features can be 
addressed through the prism of risk management.
For all the hype over a ‘shock and awe’ campaign in 2003 utilising network- 
centric ‘effects-based’ warfare dramatically shrinking sensor-to-shooter times, age-old 
adages still endured in the ‘fog’ of war. Describing unanticipated resistance fi’om Iraqi 
militias, US Army V Corps General William Wallace commented, ‘this enemy is a bit 
different from what we war-gamed’. The dangers of ‘mirror imaging’ still persisted. 
Clearly, some continuity in war remained. Were there also any similarities with previous 
wars in terms of risk management? Military action against Iraq over the years, mirroring 
trends in Kosovo and Afghanistan, distinguished government structures (so-called 
‘regime targets’) from society per se. President Bush enthused at his St Louis speech on
Quoted in Dana Milbank, ‘For Bush, war defines presidency’, Washington post, 09 Mar 2003 
See Joseph S. Nye, ‘Ill-suited for empire’, Washington Post, 25 May 2003; John Mearsheimer and 
Stephen Walt, ‘Keeping Saddam Hussein in a box’, NewYork Times, 02 Feb 2003. David Dunn, in note 1, 
however noted the continued relevance of Realism in explaining Bush’s resort to war: security problems 
such as terrorism were embodied in traditional IR actors, rogue states like Iraq.
See Robert Samuelson, ‘Rediscovering Risk’, Washington Post, 22 October 2002
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16 April 2003, ‘by a combination of creative strategies and advanced technology, we are 
redefining war on our terms...In this new era of warfare, we can target a regime, not a 
nation.’ Strategists will doubtless note the precision targeting and ‘every possible care’ 
emphasised by politicians to avoid harming civilians (even dropping laser-guided 
concrete blocks to minimise shrapnel risks), both during Desert Fox, no-fly zones 
operations and Iraqi Freedom. Older Block 30 F-16s unable to fire Precision-Guided 
Munitions (PGMs) minimising the risk of collateral damage were not deployed to no-fly 
zones. Concerns over tactical risks to airmen meant no-fly zones tactics evolved fi*om a 
‘reactive to a pre-emptive approach’ of pre-planned strike packages to reduce the chances 
of an Allied plane downed over Iraq. British spokesmen argued that ‘every now and 
then we had to take action to manage the risk to our aircrew’.
This chapter however leaves such intriguing aspects of tactical risk-management 
to others. Here we are more concerned with systemic risks from Iraq, although tactical 
risks clearly constrained operations. Analysts have done impressive work evaluating 
policy toward Iraq since 1991 but none adopt a broad risk management approach. These 
focused on specifics such as finetuning sanctions policy, helping Iraqi opposition groups, 
and targeting pillars of Saddam’s regime such as the Special Republican Guard. The 
legality of war also preoccupied analysts.^ *^
I. Identifying systemic risks
Identifying risks that served as impetus for action is the first step in risk management. 
Risk is inherently subjective and constructed and Iraq constituted a perfect case study for 
constructivism: EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana observed that fimdamentally ‘there
Colonel Paul K. White, Airpower and a decade of containment Joint Force Quarterly, No. 27,(Winter 
2000-01), pp.38
MoD spokesman cited in ‘RAF jets bomb Iraqi targets’, Ananova, 10 Aug 2001, 
http://www.ananova.com/news/story/sm_372069.html?menu=
See Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, Confronting Iraq: US policy and the use offorce since the 
Gulf War, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000); Paul K. White, Crises after the storm: an appraisal o f  US air 
operations since the Persian Gulf War, (Washington D.C: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
1999). Recent contributions include Michael W. Isherwood, ‘US Strategic Options for Iraq: Easier said 
than done’, Washington Quarterly, Vol. 25 No.2, Spring 2002, p/145-160; William F. Donaher & Ross. B. 
Deblois, ‘Is the current UN and US policy toward Iraq effective?’. Parameters, Winter 2001-02, p.l 12-125 
Adam Roberts, ‘Law and the use of force after Iraq’, Survival, Vol. 45 No. 2, Summer 2003, p.31-57
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are different perceptions of risk on both sides’, between America and ‘old’ Europe.^^ 
Once again, this study is not about explaining different risk perceptions. Instead it is more 
concerned with understanding a chosen strategy rather than the various decision-making 
factors behind how that strategy was chosen. Admittedly, policymakers may not mean 
what they say with cognitive factors and bureaucratic tussles affecting policies. However, 
it is possible, using the theoretical framework developed, to analyse regularities of 
statements and patterns of action systematically to collate empirical evidence for 
assessing the hypotheses.
Were systemic risks then involved in Iraq? Risk here was used largely as a 
descriptive term to refer to a potentially dangerous state of events or situation. These 
included proliferation, clandestine WMD programs, cross-border aggression or alleged 
links to terrorists. The idea of a ‘rogue state’ posing systemic risks, as I have suggested in 
Chapter Two, now came into its own with the end of the Cold War. The ‘global trade’ in 
WMD, warned the 2002 US National Security Strategy, has become a danger to all 
nations of the world.^^ Previous Cold War constraints on WMD materials are much 
looser than before, creating proliferation risks posed by rogue states. Similar concerns 
were raised throughout Clinton’s security documents. Both Presidents Bush and Clinton 
warned of ‘plutonium merchants’ and ‘unbalanced dictators’. During the Clinton era, 
there were also suggestions that Iraq masterminded the first World Trade Centre bombing 
in 1993. Relying on now infamous crude forged documents, US and British intelligence 
claimed that Iraq sought uranium from Niger. UNSCOM also discovered covert 
transactions between Iraq and 500 companies from more than 40 countries between 1993- 
98. These allegedly sought out weapons components such as aluminium tubes. Like 
Clinton, Bush also worried that in today’s open world, Saddam could deliver a WMD 
with a modified L-39 trainer/UAV or short-range cruise missile smuggled off the US 
coast on a container ship, or a ‘suitcase nuke’. These probabilistic globalisation-linked 
scenarios of catastrophic consequences were certainly not unique to the Bush 
Administration. This was certainly a case of ‘anticipatory horizon-scanning’ of the 
strategic landscape for any possible security risks. However, the experience of Iraqi
Quoted in ‘For old friends, Iraq bares a deep rift’, New York Times, 14 February 2003
National Security Strategy o f the United States, (Washington, D.C: The White House, 2002) Chapter V
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aggression in the first Gulf War and - rightly or wrongly- that of 9/11 also led to a desire 
to avoid repetition of similar dramatic catastrophic ‘tombstone-style’ risks. As suggested, 
these two aspects of approaching risks cannot be clearly isolated.
Throughout the 1990s to 2003, the relative priority of risks shifted from 
containing Iraq, regional stability, to increasing concern about A1 Qaeda links, WMD and 
regime change.^^ This chapter sees policy not so much as a static coherent whole but an 
aggregation of actions evolving over time, sometimes haphazardly, sometimes 
purposefully. As Anthony Cordesman noted, ‘simple and consistent policy on paper is 
desirable but can rapidly fail under the pressure of even tsS t ra teg ies  implemented 
were hardly static too, responding to changes in strategic context.
Clinton’s policy towards Iraq initially was geared towards at least a reduction of 
WMD, limitation of proliferation, and regional security. The maximal goal, sometimes 
espoused, sometimes eschewed throughout the late 1990s was the removal of Saddam. 
Considering the difficulties throughout the 1990s involved in removing Saddam and the 
aftermath, it made sense to simply manage him as best as possible.^^ Lacking a viable 
policy, support of Arab partners, and Security Council mandate, the first Bush 
administration preferred to keep him isolated and militarily weak: a policy continued by 
Clinton for the same reasons. Washington largely preferred the minimalist option of 
Saddam in power over a fragmented Iraq causing regional instability. Then, the systemic 
risks were about regional security and proliferation. Containment through sanctions, 
inspections, no-fly zones and bombing was the risk management strategy adopted.
Having said that, it was under Bill Clinton that ‘regime change’ and the Iraq 
Liberation Act became US policy in 1998. The risks shifted towards emphasis on WMD 
and regime change, as sanctions faltered, inspections ended and the 1991 anti-Saddam 
coalition frayed. Richard Haass, now head of Policy Planning at Powell’s State 
Department, argued then that ‘the next Desert Storm will be far more difficult and costly 
if we confront an Iraq armed with WMD. There is also fear that Iraq would make its 
weapons available to terrorists. Depending on US threats of retaliation against such
Daniel Byman, ‘After the storm; US policy toward Iraq since 1991’, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 
115 No 4, Winter 2000-01, p495 
Anthony Cordesman, Iraq: sanctions and beyond. (Boulder, Colorado, 1997), pp.6 
^^Daniel Byman, Kenneth Pollack, Gideon Rose, ‘The Rollback Fantasy’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78 N o.l, 
January/February 1999, p.24-41
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actions by Iraq is far from ideal’. ‘Comprehensive containment’ of rogue states like 
Iraq involved multiple tools of statecraft: economic sanctions, diplomacy and coalition- 
building, intelligence gathering, supporting opposition movements and military force,^  ^
These are not necessarily exclusive, but the balance between them shifted over time. Oil 
smuggling, sanctions fatigue, humanitarian concerns and weak Iraqi opposition groups 
made no-fly zones and more aggressive military action the de-facto cornerstone of US 
policy by 1999. These military actions are analysed here, with the acknowledgement that 
multiple tools were also involved. Confronting Iraq evolved from a multilateral UN 
operation into a more bilateral one involving Washington, supported to a lesser extent by 
London. Nonetheless, invasion was not seriously contemplated before 9/11.
Advocates of containment supported regime change in 2003 because of the 
collapse of sanctions and unpredictability of Saddam’s reaction to deterrence. For 
Kenneth Pollack, the risk is not so much a Baghdad-Qaeda alliance but Saddam’s 
reckless decision-making and his crossing the nuclear threshold. September 11 also 
meant a sea-change in public opinion making invasion plausible. There was also risk to 
US credibility if regime change was not implemented. Others however disagreed that 
Saddam is irrational and undeterrable.^^ Sceptics argued Bush needed an easy victory 
because A1 Qaeda was more complicated. To realists such as Stephen Walt, lumping the 
two together may also obfuscate and undermine international cooperation on terrorism, 
just as Washington initially misread the Communist bloc as a monolithic entity.
But to President Bush, A1 Qaeda or Saddam Hussein are indistinguishable, 
‘they’re both risks. The danger is that they work in concert’.^ ® Bush further characterised 
Saddam as ‘a risk to peace... Tony Blair understands that Saddam is a risk’.^  ^ Rumsfeld 
observed that ‘what has changed is our experience on September 11. What has changed is 
our appreciation of vulnerability- and the risks the US faces from terrorist networks and
Richard Haass, ‘Containing Saddam, Washington Times, 10 November 1998
Robert Litwak, Rogue states and US foreign policy: containment after the Cold War, (Washington D.C: 
Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 2000), p. 105 
Kenneth M. Pollack, The Threatening Storm: the case for invading Iraq, (New York: Random House, 
2002)
John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, ‘Keeping Saddam Hussein in a box’, NewYork Times, 02 Feb 2003 
‘President Bush, Colombia President Uribe discuss terrorism’, Office o f  the Press Secretary, 25 Sep 2002 
‘New SEC Chairman sworn in - President’s Remarks’, Office o f the Press Secretary, 18 Feb 2003
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terrorist states armed with weapons of mass destruction’.^  ^ Clinton’s National Security 
Adviser Sandy Berger weighed in, ‘A nuclear-armed Hussein sometime in this decade is 
a risk we cannot ignore’, while Jack Straw warned Saddam ‘posed an intense risk’^  ^The 
language of risk is apparent but did policymakers in 2003 then confuse ‘risk’ with ‘threat’ 
in their loose usage of terms, as forewarned in Chapter Three? Furthermore, the grounds 
for war constantly shifted from terrorism to WMD to human rights.
Risk or threat?
‘Risk’ and ‘threat’ occupy different positions on a conceptual spectrum of dangers.This 
issue merits some analysis especially in 2002-03 where regime change can be construed 
as ‘threat elimination’ aggressively resolving problems, implying a powerful shift away 
from ‘risk management’. Did the drastic impatient means chosen mean the risk had 
somehow solidified into an imminent threat? According to Bush, ‘if we wait for threats to 
fully materialise, we will have waited too long. We must take the battle to the enemy, 
disrupt his plans and confront the worst threats before they e m e rg e .B la i r  similarly 
argued: ‘taking action in respect of a gathering threat or danger that is coming, may be 
more sensible than to wait for the threat to materialise and then take action’. T h e s e  
statements suggested that the vague danger remained a risk requiring proactive 
management to forestall it becoming a fully-formed threat, rather than an imminent one.
Yet in September 2002 Secretary Rumsfeld detailed to Congress the dangers in 
terms of ‘intentions and capabilities’ and concluded Saddam posed an inevitable threat. 
These two components normally form the basis of classical Realist ‘net assessment’ of 
‘threat’ in IR and as will be shown, proved inadequate in conceptualising the dangers 
from Iraq. Kenneth Pollack, contradicting Rumsfeld’s assessment, believed Saddam was
Prepared Testimony before the House and Senate Armed Services Committee regarding Iraq,
Washington D.C., 18-19 September 2002 
Sandy Berger, ‘Building Blocks to Iraq’, Washington Post, 01 Aug 2002; Jack Straw, BBC Radio 4 
‘Today’ Program, 22 Aug 2002 
I thank Christopher Coker for discussions on this issue. Also see research project on International Risk 
Policy at Otto Suhr Institute, Free University Berlin, Germany.
President Bush delivers graduation speech at West Point, Office o f  the Press Secretary, 01 June 2002 
Tony Blair, Transcript of evidence given to the House of Commons Liaison Committee, 16 July 2002, 
available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/cmliaisn/1065/106501 .htm 
Prepared Testimony before the House and Senate Armed Services Committee regarding Iraq,
Washington D C., 18-19 September 2002
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‘probably several years away from being an irredeemable danger. This is a matter of both 
capabilities and intentions’.^  ^Top US military officials believed in summer 2002, based 
on intelligence about Iraqi WMD capabilities, that Saddam posed ‘no immediate 
threat’. E v e n  unearthing a ‘smoking gun’ atomic bomb program cannot be proof for a 
crime not yet committed. Iraqi military forces remain weak, and several years away firom 
nuclear status. Paul Pillar concluded that ‘Iraqi terrorism has been limited more by 
intentions than capabilities’."^® Saddam has shown little inclination to use terrorism 
against the US since a botched assassination attempt on former President Bush in 1993. 
Even the CIA was unsure what Saddam’s intentions were regarding AI Qaeda. Bin Laden 
apparently met Iraqi intelligence (Mukhabarat) officials in Khartoum in 1996 but it is 
unclear if this developed further. Despite sharing a common enemy, top Qaeda planners 
in custody allegedly told US intelligence that Bin Laden had rejected an alliance.
Washington’s case for regime change is strong based on Saddam’s history of 
aggression and WMD use. However flaws rested with assuming Hussein’s future 
intentions- that he would develop WMD and slip one to terrorists to attack America and 
its allies. But Saddam could simply be seeking his own deterrent in a dangerous region.^^ 
Perhaps the fear was Washington itself might be deterred by a nuclear-armed Iraq. If 
Saddam’s foremost concern was regime survival, he can theoretically be deterred, unlike 
stateless terrorists. This however assumed ‘mirror imaging’ that Hussein shared 
Washington’s rationality and would not miscalculate. Intentions and capabilities thus did 
not quite reflect our concerns over Iraq.
Perhaps it might be more helpful to highlight ‘risk’ components in the equation: 
consequences and probabilities rather than classical ‘net assessment’ of ‘threats’. Post- 
9/1 1 America’s concern with mass-casualty terrorism led it to ‘focus on consequences 
rather than probabilities, the Bush team argued that the possibility that Iraq could use 
WMD or supply them to terrorists justified the pre-emptive or preventive use of force
Kenneth M. Pollack, The Threatening Storm: the case for invading Iraq, (New York: Random House, 
2002), pl48-149
Thomas E. Ricks, ‘Some top military brass favor status quo in Iraq’, Washington Post, July 28 2002 
Paul Pillar, Terrorism and US foreign policy, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 
p. 104
See Daniel Byman, ‘Iraq After Saddam’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 24. No. 4, (Autumn 2001) pp. 151- 
162
Strategic Survey 2002/03, (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the ESS, May 2003), p.65
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Although the ideological gap between Hussein and A1 Qaeda suggested such transfer was 
unlikely, Pollack argued Hussein was ‘not likely’ to do so but the ‘possibility cannot be 
ruled out.’^  ^Saddam could supply WMD to his ‘Palestinian connection’, if not A1 Qaeda. 
It is also extremely difficult to trace biological attacks as October 2001 anthrax mailings 
showed. Indeed, the ‘bulk on informed opinion coalesced not around probabilities but 
consequences...if cooperation took place, the risk to American populations would be 
unacceptable grave
This type of risk assessment seemed more relevant to the debate. America’s new 
security doctrine is now couched in terms of risk scenarios rather than an actual concrete 
and specific threat. Anxiety thrived on the tension between our knowledge and ignorance 
of risks like Iraqi links to terrorists. Policymakers seemed more concerned with 
possibilities, rather than correctly assessing intentions. Tony Blair’s speech to Parliament 
on 18 March 2003 argued that ‘the central security threat today... is not big powers going 
to war with each other... ’ Blair accepted the association between rogue nations seeking 
WMD and terrorism was ‘loose’ but the 'possibility of the two coming together is a real 
and present danger’. In the post-war furore over WMD, it emerged that the US Defence 
Intelligence Agency in September 2002 -when officials were claiming otherwise- 
reported that ‘although we lack any direct information, haqprobably possesses chemical 
agent in chemical munitions’ and 'probably possesses bulk chemical stockpiles’."^  ^
Increasingly we are going to war on such probables and possibilities.
Risk-oriented thinking allows us to comprehend the focus on probabilities and 
catastrophic consequences. Condoleeza Rice told CNN in September 2002 ‘we don’t 
want the ‘smoking gun’ to be a mushroom cloud.’ The 2002 National Security Strategy 
emphasised ‘the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries 
choice of weapons’.P res id en t Clinton similarly justified Desert Fox by arguing that ‘if 
we fail to act.. .he can do more to rebuild an arsenal of devastating destruction. Some
Pollack, The Threatening Storm, p i80
Toby Dodge & Steven Simon, Introduction, in Toby Dodge & Steven Simon (eds), Iraq at the 
crossroads: state and society in the shadow o f regime change, (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the 
IISS, January 2003), 14
See Dana Priest & Walter Pincus, ‘Bush certainty on Iraq arms went beyond analysts’ view’, Washington 
Post, 07 June 2003
National Security Strategy) o f the United States, Chapter V, (Washington D.C.: The White House, 
September 2002)
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day, I guarantee you he’ll use that arsenal’/^  Focusing on consequences and probabilities 
situated us within the risk discourse during the Clinton and Bush administrations. 
However as will be shown, Washington in 2003 employed impatient means of 
elimination. The lack of evidence and ontological uncertainty, suggested that elevating 
the risks to an imminent threat was somewhat premature. Perhaps to make the war sound 
more like one of necessity than choice that it actually was (and thus more acceptable to 
public opinion), the intelligence and the risks were hyped into an imminent direct threat 
rather than the potential dangers Saddam actually posed."^ ^
II. Implementing risk management
Active Anticipation
The West did not yet face a direct fully developed threat from Baghdad. The concern 
instead was possible security risks. If risk was not addressed immediately, it was not clear 
harm would definitely occur for much uncertainty existed. Yet, preventive action was 
advocated for not acting was seen as more risky. Using the notion of ‘risk’, Washington 
and London saw themselves as potential victims of some hypothesised future harm from 
Saddam. The idea of ‘risk’ also gave them the choice of taking preventive avoidance 
measures. Up to this point, in terms of active anticipation of risks, evidence matched 
theorised outcomes in terms of understanding rationales for action. Risk here is not only a 
descriptive term but also a normative one implying the desirability of avoidance action. It 
also formed part of a strategic calculation.
Contemplating counter-factuals and alternative courses of action that can shape 
the future, so prevalent in contemporary society, has jumped into security planners’ 
notebooks. After all, ‘proactive risk-management’ is a standard part of the process. 
Future events that might not even occur became the focus of present action.
Quoted in Andrew Sullivan, ‘Clinton talked a good war- Bush has to fight it’, Sunday Times, 09 March 
2003
See Tom Friedman, ‘The war over the war’. New York Times, 03 August 2003
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To Paul Wolfowitz,
‘the fundamental question is how to weigh the risks of action against the 
risks of inaction.. .the risk of the Iraqi regime using these terrible weapons or 
giving them to terrorists is unacceptably high...at the end of the day we are trying 
to judge what will happen in the future along different courses we might take’."^^
This certainly did not imply an imminent threat existed where no choice existed. Invading 
Iraq itself carried high risks such as significant American and civilian casualties, WMD 
attacks, terrorist strikes, firactured Iraq, regional instability, and higher oil prices. Not to 
mention, the long-term consequences for international institutions and law. Wolfowitz’s 
boss Donald Rumsfeld reminded us that ‘there are clearly risks to acting. But there are 
also risks in not acting. And those have to be weighed’. The penalty for not acting, was 
another September 11 The catastrophic consequences and potentially being a ‘victim’ 
were prominent. This could arguably be seen as a ‘reactive’ response to past events like 
9/11. But the key point here is not so much backward-looking concepts like justice or 
retribution, but rather the locus of action was in the future, to prevent repetition of similar 
harm. Indeed, Rumsfeld suggested that ‘the case against Iraq does not depend on an Iraqi 
link to 9/11. The issue is not vengeance, retribution or retaliation- it is whether the Iraqi 
regime poses a growing danger to the safety and security of our people and the world’.
While such statements could come from any politician considering policy options, 
Washington emphasized the graver risks of not acting while others focused on the risk of 
acting. It predictably opted for victim-avoidance actions through proactive risk 
management. Both Vice President Cheney and Secretary Rumsfeld concluded that ‘the 
risks of inaction are far greater than the risks of action’.B l a i r  argued that ‘we have got
Remarks by Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, Fletcher Conference, Washington D.C, 16 
October 2002
Department of Defence (DoD) News Briefing- Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen, Myers, 03 September 2002 
Prepared Testimony before the House and Senate Armed Services Committee regarding Iraq, 
Washington D.C., 18-19 September 2002 
Vice President speaks at VFW 103^  ^National Convention, Office o f the Press Secretary, 26 Aug 2002 ; 
DoD News Briefing -  Secretary Rumsfeld, 03 September 2002
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to act on it (the risk of WMD in the hands of terrorists), because if we don’t, we will find 
out too late the potential for destruction.’^^  President Bush warned that,
‘the risk of doing nothing, the risk that somehow inaction will make the world
safer is not a risk I’m willing to take. ..I think of the risks, and calculated the costs
of inaction versus the cost of action’.
Just before invading. Bush again emphasised that ‘we are now acting because the risks of 
inaction would be far greater’. T h i s  proactive statement bore stark similarities to 
Clinton’s justification for air strikes against Kosovo in 1999 and Blair’s on striking 
Afghanistan in 2001. In 2003, the fear of ‘potential victimhood’ (in the sense of being a 
victim again) drove Bush and his ‘never again’ mindset after 9/11. At Camp David with 
Tony Blair in early February 2003, Bush noted that American ‘strategic vision shifted 
dramatically’ after September 11. ‘I realise that the world has changed and my most 
important obligation is to protect the American people from further harm’. Addressing 
the nation just before war, he declared that ‘instead of drifting along toward tragedy, we 
will set a course toward safety’. H i s  is clearly a risk manager’s safety-first mindset.
This sort of proactive thinking is by no means limited to the Bush administration 
or 2003. In December 1998, Tony Blair justified air strikes on Iraq similarly, ‘whatever 
the risks we face today, they are as nothing compared to the risks if we do not halt 
Saddam Hussein’s programme of developing chemical and biological weapons of mass 
destruction’.^  ^ There is more continuity between the Clinton and Bush Administrations 
on Iraq than normally acknowledged. Clinton’s statement on Desert Fox reflected the 
same proactive calculus: ‘heavy as they are, the costs of action must be weighed against 
the price of inaction. If Saddam defies the world and we fail to respond, we will face a 
greater threat in the f u t u r e T h e  underlying proactive premise on risk was similar. The 
difference was the increased sense of urgency after 9/11.
Tony Blair cited in Campaign Against Terrorism: A coalition update, 11 Mar 2002, http://www.number- 
10.gov.uk/output/page459 l.asp 
President George Bush discusses Iraq in National Press Conference, 06 Mar 2003, Office o f  the Press 
Secretary
^^President says Saddam Hussein must leave Iraq within 48 hours. Office o f the Press Secretary, 17 March 
2003
President says Saddam Hussein must leave Iraq within 48 hours, 17 March 2003, Office o f the Press 
Secretary
Prime Minister’s statement to the House of Commons on US/UK airstrikes on Iraq, 17 December 1998 
President Clinton’s statement on air strikes against Iraq, 16 Dec 1998, Office o f  the Press Secretary
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To prevent or preempt?
Among the case studies, Iraq stirred up greatest controversy on whether it was ‘pre­
emptive’ or ‘preventive’. This merits some discussion. ‘Prevention’ in strategic discourse 
previously meant crisis prevention or preventive deployment as an alternative to force. 
Now it implied ‘preventative’ military action to avert undesirable outcomes. Legally 
speaking, Bush’s ‘preemptive’ doctrine could qualify as ‘anticipatory self-defence’. 
However, the ‘threat from Iraq to the United States is neither specific nor clearly 
established nor shown to be imminent’: conditions under which ‘anticipatory self- 
defence’ could be invoked.^^ ‘Pre-emption’ under ‘Just War’ doctrine developed by its 
foremost proponent Michael Walzer was justifiable only if there was serious intent to 
harm, active preparations making that intent a real danger, and a situation under which 
doing nothing greatly increased the danger. The potential harm must also be of gravest 
nature: loss of territorial integrity or political independence. The mid-19^ century 
Caroline case -  where British forces sank pre-emptively an American ship helping 
Canadian rebels- and resulting diplomatic correspondence outlined the criteria accepted 
since for anticipatory action: the ‘necessity’ must be ‘instant, overwhelming, leaving no 
choice of means and no moment of deliberation’. Iraq posed no such specific urgent 
threat to the US. Instead, Saddam posed potential risks based on possible unsubstantiated 
A1 Qaeda links. The Bush Doctrine tackled potential and future risks rather than 
imminent threats. It was ‘preventive’ rather than ‘pre-emptive’.
The Pentagon defines ‘preventive war’ as ‘initiated in the belief that military 
conflict, while not imminent, is inevitable and that delay would involve great risk’. In 
contrast, ‘pre-emption’ is an ‘attack initiated on the basis of incontrovertible evidence 
that enemy attack is imminent’ If Iraq was ‘pre-emptive’, evidence was hardly 
watertight. Secondly, the definition of ‘imminence’ has shifted. Condoleeza Rice argued 
that extremists and ‘new technology requires new thinking about when a threat becomes 
imminent’. While premption previously was legitimated on a visible mobilisation of 
armies navies and air forces for attack, ‘we must adapt the concept of imminent threat to
William A. Galston, ‘Why a first strike will surely backfire’, Washington Post, 16 June 2002 
See US Department of Defense, DOD Dictionary o f Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1- 
02 (Washington D C: DoD, 12 April 2001), p. 333, 336
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today’s adversaries.’ These can use WMD without any waming.^\ In this way, 
Washington actually advanced a ‘sophisticated legal argument for the legitimacy of its 
position regarding pre-emption’ by noting international law recognises that states need 
not suffer an attack before they can take action against imminent at tack. Indeed,  
international law and the UN charter was not created to deal with new and more elusive 
dangers like terrorism or WMD but more conventional ones from states and regular 
armies that require obvious mobilisation to commit aggression.^^
Pre-emptive war has some legal sanction but not preventive war. Israel pre­
emptively struck first in 1967 with Arab troops clearly massing on its borders. Professor 
Christopher Greenwood however observed that the Israeli raid in 1981 on Iraq’s Osirak 
reactor was widely condemned, ‘not on the ground that there was no right of anticipatory 
self-defence but rather on the ground that the risk was too distant, too far in the future’.^  
It was preventive, not preemptive. Washington has a record of preventive actions against 
Iraq: Desert Storm targeted WMD facilities unrelated to liberating Kuwait; and Desert 
Fox. Lawrence Freedman argued that ‘prevention perhaps better defines what is often 
currently referred to as preemption’. Prevention confronts ‘factors’ likely to contribute to 
a threat before it has become imminent. Preemption is a more desperate strategy 
employed in the midst of crises.^^ Without convincing evidence of a Baghdad-Al Qaeda 
strategic alliance or that Iraqi aggression was imminent, Freedman concluded the 
rationale for Iraqi Freedom was preventive. Reconsidering the concept of ‘imminence’ as 
the National Security Strategy suggests, thus required recognising that prevention, not 
preemption is the key here. Francois Heisbourg similar agreed that the ‘semantics at play 
-  notably the interchangeable use of premption and prevention to summarise this new 
strategy’, required careful examination not least because they blur essential distinctions in
Dr Condoleeza Rice discusses President’s National Security Strategy, Office o f  the Press Secretary, 01 
October 2002
Walter B. Slocombe, ‘Force, pre-emption and legitimacy’. Survival, Vol. 45 No 1, Spring 2003, pl25  
Anthony Clark Arend, ‘International law and the preemptive use o f force’, Washington Quarterly, Vol. 
26 No 2, Spring 2003, p.97 
House o f Commons Select Committee 2002/2003 on Foreign Affairs Second Report, Disarming Iraq, 19 
December 2002, Line 157 
For a detailed discussion of pre-emption and prevention, see Jeffrey Record, ‘The Bush Doctrine and 
War with Iraq’, Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly,Yo\. XXXIII No 1, Spring 2003, p. 4-21; 
Lawrence Freedman, ‘Prevention, not preemption’, Washington Quarterly, Spring 2003, Vol. 26 No 2, 
p. 105
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international law.^  ^Preventative actions generally, and especially Desert Fox, fall within 
the domain of proactive risk management strategies geared toward ambiguous risks than 
compelling or imminent threats
Desert Fox created similar unease about a controversial doctrine of ‘preventive 
war’ against ‘abstract Iraqi threats’ stretching anticipatory self-defence and ‘iinminence’ 
to breaking point. Many critics berated the unauthorised enforcement of the Security 
Council’s ‘will’ and Anglo-American auto-determination of a material breach of Iraqi 
obligations. Marc Weller concluded that legalism cannot explain such actions.^^ 
International law does not recognise the right to preventative action against more or less 
abstract threats of the future, but proactive risk management does. Concern about the 
future was present in the declared purposes of air strikes. President Clinton stated the 
campaign aim to prevent reconstitution of Saddam’s WMD and ability to threaten his 
neighbours in the future. Madeleine Albright noted the difficulties of communicating, and 
comprehending the dangers because ‘it is a threat of the future rather than a present 
threat, or present act’ such as aggression.^*
While traditional approaches to counter-proliferation involved diplomatic and 
political measures, Washington even during the Clinton era was considering military 
measures against emerging WMD arsenals.^^ The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review 
advocated greater use of Precision-Guided Munitions (PGMs) in a ‘new mix’ of nuclear 
and non-nuclear capabilities. Technological advances have increased the possibilities of 
conventionally attacking enemy WMD facilities.^® Operation Desert Fox demonstrated 
this. Furthermore, ‘the right of self-defence includes a right to move against WMD 
programmes with high potential danger to the United States while it is still feasible to do 
so.'^^ Once a rogue like North Korea acquires WMD, effective action against it may be 
untenable. Iraq is comparatively more manageable. At this stage, the justifications behind
Francois Heisbourg, ‘A Work in Progress: the Bush Doctrine and its consequences’, Washington 
Quarterly, Vol. 26 No.2 , Spring 2003, p,75 
For these issues, see Marc Weller, ‘The US, Iraq and the use of force in a unipolar world’. Survival, Vol. 41, 
No. 4, Winter 1999-2000, pp81-100 
Press remarks on military attack on Iraq, 17 Dec 1998
James. J Wirtz. ‘Counter proliferation, conventional counterforce and nuclear war’. Journal o f  Strategic 
Studies, Vol. 23, N o.l, March 2000, p.5-25 
Excerpts o f leaked report available at: http://www.globalsecuritv.org/wmd/librarv/policv/dod/npr.htm 
Walter B. Slocombe, ‘Force, pre-emption and legitimacy’. Survival, Vol. 45 No 1, Spring 2003, pl25  
(italics added)
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preventive military actions from Desert Fox to the more controversial Bush Doctrine still 
chimed with outcomes predicted by the test theory.
War and the Precautionary principle
To US strategic thinkers, September 11 confirmed that the rules of the game had 
changed, with much more uncertainty, erosion of deterrence and incalculable risks in 
possible links between fraq and A1 Qaeda. The unthinkable had to become thinkable and 
acted upon. Does the precautionary principle predicted by the test theory apply here? This 
over-caution existed before Bush came to power. In 2000, State Department spokesman 
Jamie Rubin stated that US policy on sanctions was ‘prepared to err on the side of 
caution’, so as not to let any dual-use material leak through.^^ As Congressional drafters 
of the Iraq Liberation Act wrote to President Clinton in August 1999, ‘if international 
security could be assured by waiting until we find evidence that Saddam has developed 
weapons of mass destruction and responding to the threat at that time, there would have 
been no need for Operation Desert Fox.’ The whole point was that we could not wait to 
have conclusive evidence before taking military action.^^ The question of evidence and 
overcaution clearly also animated the Desert Fox campaign, though not to the same 
extent as Iraqi Freedom.
By 20Ô3 the precautionary language of environmental discourse had seeped more 
prominently into strategy. ‘Unknown unknowns’, a concept espoused by Robin Grove- 
White, (leading British advocate of the principle on environmental change) described 
lurking risks and unanticipated outcomes that we might know nothing of. This concept, 
ad verbatim, featured prominently in Donald Rumsfeld’s ruminations on Iraqi complicity 
with terrorists.^"  ^Rumsfeld described ‘known unknowns...things we now know we don’t 
know’ and ‘unknown unknowns: things we don’t know we don’t know’ -  a classic 
distinction prevalent in the risk discourse where precautionary strategies are taken to 
reduce and anticipate dangers and surprises. Speaking like a risk management gum on the 
precautionary principle, Rumsfeld argued that ‘absolute proof cannot be a precondition
James Rubin, State Department Presentation on Iraq, 29 February 2000 
Text of letter available at http://www.nci.0rg/c/c8 l 199.htm
Robin Grove-White, Panel remarks on Do we live in a culture o f  fear?, Goodenough College and 21®‘ 
Century Trust Conference on Risk, 11-12 Apr 2002, London. For Rumsfeld’s use of ‘unknown unknowns’, 
see DoD News Briefing - Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers, 12 February 2002
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for action’ and that ‘absence of evidence is not evidence of absence’, while emphasising 
the ‘catastrophic consequences of WMD attack’ The endgame boiled down to this 
dictum. Almost enshrining the Precautionary Principle in the process, the 2002 National 
Security Strategy categorically stated that where the danger is grave, there is a need for 
‘anticipatory actions even if uncertainty remains as to time and place of the enemy’s 
attack’
As both sides of the Atlantic expressed unease about the lack of evidence, 
Rumsfeld acknowledged, ‘convincing the publics of the world that there’s a need to take 
preventative action, stop something before it happens is always d i f f i cu l t .He  however 
derided those seeking perfect evidence as living ‘back in the 20**’ century and still 
thinking in pre-9/11 terms...if Congress or thé world wait for a smoking gun, we will 
have waited too long. A gun smokes after it is f i red.Precautionary risk management 
strategies lower the requirement for conditions of proof. It involves risk potentials 
characterised by relatively high degrees of uncertainty about the probability of 
occurrence and extent of damage. ‘We don’t know’ appeared to be the consensus answer 
at Congressional hearings to ascertain the nature and urgency of threat. As Anthony 
Cordesman testified, ‘we will not have a clear smoking gun’ for the ‘first pre-emptive 
war’. Quipped Senator Bob Graham, ‘the central reality is uncertainty’. The British 
Government’s first dossier also hardly provided ‘the killer fact’.^**
Yet this uncertainty drove regime change. President Bush described Saddam 
Hussein as ‘an enemy until proven otherwise’.**
Remarks at the Defence Ministers Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, NATO HQ, 06 June 2002, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020606d.htm; and DoD News Briefing, 12 Febmary 2002 
National Security Strategy o f the United States o f America, (Washington DC: The White House, Sep 
2002), Chapter V 
Remarks to the Hoover Institute, 25 February 2003
Prepared Testimony before the House and Senate Armed Services Committee regarding Iraq,
Washington D C., 18-19 September 2002 
Sen. Graham quoted in Joby Warrick, ‘In Assessing Iraq’s arsenal, the reality is uncertainty’, Washington 
Post, 31 July 2002; Cordesman quoted in James Dao, ‘Senators want to know the unknowable on Iraq, and 
time is running out’. New York Times, 03 Aug 2002 
Iraq’s weapons o f mass destruction: The Assessment o f the British Government, (London: The Stationery 
Office, 24 Sep 2002)
President Bush discusses Iraq, Office o f the Press Secretary, 10 Aug 2002
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Iraq, warned Bush,
‘gathers the most serious dangers of our age in one place...Saddam Hussein is 
harbouring terrorists and the instruments of mass destruction.. .the risk is simply 
too great that he will use them or provide them to a terror network...we have 
every reason to assume the worst, and we have an urgent duty to prevent the worst 
from occurring’.*^
Such overvigilance bore classic tenets of a precautionary principle and concern about 
omission (being blamed for not taking precautionary action). Richard Perle summed up 
cogently, ‘we cannot know for sure, but on which side would it be better to err?’ The 
war on Iraq was thus fought ‘in the subjunctive- based on a string of ifs.^ Saddam 
has usable WMD, i f  Saddam uses his UAVs to launch an attack on Washington, or as 
Bush put it, ‘secretly and without fingerprints, he could provide one of his hidden 
weapons to terrorists or help them develop their own’. This sort of thinking matched that 
of precautionary risk management strategies at this point. However, Washington also 
sought to move against Iraq now partly because of analogies drawn with 9/11 and the 
desire to avoid similar harm. This is indicative of ‘tomb-stone’ style approaches to risk 
rather than a purely ‘precautionary approach’. As suggested before, these cannot be 
strictly segregated. Nonetheless, the ‘precautionary’ aspect has gained most attention.
Post-war searches of Central Command’s top suspected WMD sites drew blanks 
and war appeared based on ‘false positives’ since the level of risk turned out less serious 
or urgent than originally thought. There was perhaps no need for such a drastic operation 
like regime change. The very same ‘precautionary’ sentiments voiced by Washington 
could have translated into more ‘minimalist’ approaches to war like inspections and 
expanded no-fly zones. Like the Kosovo campaign earlier, there were calls for inquiries 
into whether the British and American governments exaggerated the scale of dangers to 
justify war. The US 75^  ^Mobile Exploitation Force was subsequently withdrawn; private 
companies have been contracted to help the hunt by the Iraq Survey Group. The secretive 
Task Force 20 comprising the shadowy Grey Fox military unit proved equally 
unsuccessful. One should probably not expect arms caches of WMD but bits and pieces
President Bush outlines Iraqi threat, Office o f the Press Secretary, 07 October 2002
Richard Perle, ‘Why the West must strike first against Saddam Hussein’, Daily Telegraph. 09 Aug 2002
Jack Beatty, ‘In the name of God’, Atlantic Monthly, 05 March 2003
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here and there, a paper trail to be followed. Nonetheless, two mobile trailers thought to 
produce biological weapons were later dismissed as simply producing gas for artillery 
balloons. The search continued at this writing in July 2003.
Surveillance
Surveillance is the vehicle of risk-management, for investigating how things stand and a 
contributor to action in the face of uncertainty about future consequences. Iraq is a prime 
example for ‘monitoring power’. It involved formal inspections or surveillance 
operations to gather information.*^ In Iraq, intelligence gathering and surveillance was 
carried out either through covert or military-technical means such as satellites, U-2 spy 
planes and no-fly zones. A continuous monitoring and review process gauged the level of 
risk and effectiveness of management measures taken.
The ethos of constant monitoring is aptly encapsulated by naming no-fly zones 
over Iraq as Operations Northern Watch and Southern Watch. Since 1991, the United 
States averaged over 34000 sorties per year supporting the zones. These were enforced 
for more than 10 years to provide early warning of Iraqi aggression and general 
observation of the risks Baghdad posed, among other reasons like constraining Saddam’s 
freedom of action. According to Rumsfeld, no-fly zones helped ‘keep good awareness of 
what Saddam is d o i n g . I n  June 1998, the Security Council was given U-2 overflight 
photographs of sites where Iraq claimed no activity was ongoing. Satellite surveillance 
also helped monitor what constituted risks by uncovering nuclear programs, gauging their 
progress and tracking movement of components. The Director of the National 
Reconnaissance Office argued that without satellites, ‘we would know a lot less about the 
weapons programs of Saddam Hussein’, and ‘these programs would be more dangerous 
than they are today’
Surveillance served not just retrospective knowing of wrongdoing but also to 
deploy resources in advance of possible offences. As theorised, where military action is
Michael V. Deaver, Disarming Iraq: Monitoring power and resistance, (Westport : Praeger, 2001), p5, 
20
Philip Gibbons, ‘US No-fly zones: To what end?’, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy 
Watch No. 632, 01 July 2002 
Keith Hall, Remarks to the National Network of Electro-Optical Manufacturing Technologies 
Conference, 9 February 1998, Tuscon, Arizona.
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demanded as a result of monitoring, this is, implemented if necessary. During Operation 
Desert Fox, this was reflected in Tony Blair’s official statement: ‘If we have serious 
evidence from our intensive surveillance, or from intelligence, that his capability is being 
rebuilt, we will be ready to take further military act ion.Pres ident  Clinton stressed 
earlier that the US ‘would carefully monitor Iraq’s activities’ and if Saddam ‘seeks to 
rebuild his weapons of mass destruction, we will be prepared to strike him again’. B u s h  
similarly argued before 9/11: ‘we’re going to watch very carefully as to whether he 
develops weapons of mass destruction, if we catch him doing so, we’re going to take 
appropriate action’. A f t e r  9/11, National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice noted 
‘there is plenty of reason to watch Iraq’, referring to its WMD programs.^^ The Pentagon,
observed Rumsfeld, has ‘always been attentive for at least more than a decade now’
with respect to Iraq.^  ^ There is clear evidence of a monitoring ethos toward Baghdad 
given the risks it posed.
After Iraq’s nuclear programme was discovered to be broader than expected, the 
International Atomic Energy Agency adopted new protocols to better detect undeclared 
activity. With new hyperspectral sensors on commercial satellites detecting unnatural 
camouflage and chemicals in the soil and air, a new dimension of surveillance was 
added.UNMOVIC received satellite imagery of Iraq’s activities both from states and 
commercial imagery from Colorado-based Space Imaging now in colour. This served to 
maintain an up-to-date database, gather intelligence as well as assist planning for 
inspections.^"  ^Non-state actors also jumped onto the bandwagon. Japanese network NTV 
produced in May 2002 commercial images of Iraqi facilities at A1 Qaim, Tuwaitha, and 
Sharqul possibly reconstructed after Desert Fox. Even so, such images will not provide a
‘Statement by the Prime Minister on Iraq’, 17 Dec 1998
Remarks on Iraq by President Clinton to Pentagon personnel, 17 Feb 1998, Office o f the Press Secretary 
Remarks by President George W. Bush and President Vicente Fox of Mexico in Joint Press Conference, 
Office o f the Press Secretary, 16 February 2001
” Robert Kagan and William Kristol, ‘Getting Serious’, Weekly Standard, 19 November 2001 
Quoted in Kathleen T. Rhem, ‘US, Pentagon attention on Iraq is long-standing’, American Forces Press 
Service, 12 Feb 2002
Yahya A. Dehqanzada & Ann M. Florini, Secrets fo r Sale: How commercial satellite imagery will 
change the world. (Washington D C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000), p6  
"^^ Ninth Quarterly Report o f the Executive Chairman o f the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and 
Inspection Commission under Paragraph 12 o f  Security Council Resolution 1286 (1999), 31 May 2002, 
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‘smoking gun image’ showing clearly atomic bomb construction. It can only provide 
images of suspected facilities to aid risk management actions.
With weapons inspectors withdrawn in 1998, US satellites were central to 
monitoring Iraq, supplemented by commercial providers. In August 1999, US satellites 
imaged reconstruction of the Al-Kindi missile facility damaged in Desert Fox eight 
months earlier. Infrared satellites detected test flights of short-range Al-Samoud missiles. 
Lacrosse radar imaging satellites monitored Iraqi weapons storage sites, and bomb 
damage assessment. In March 2002, Washington provided the Security Council satellite 
photos of modified Iraqi trucks allegedly mounting missile launchers. In August 2002, 
satellites detected Iraqi trucks moving material from weapons facilities. Satellites are 
non-intrusive, provide wider spatial resolutions covering broader swathes of territory, and 
are less vulnerable to Iraqi fire, which has downed Predator surveillance UAVs. The 
dangers lie in misinterpretation of images and limited overfli^t times. They can best 
supplement inspectors on the ground, not replace inspections totally.
Inspections are another way to monitor risks and indeed even generated the 
information necessary for management action through airstrikes. Commentators agreed it 
was ‘much better to have UNSCOM without sanctions than to impose sanctions without 
UNSCOM’, ‘leaving Saddam’s arsenal unwatched is folly’ However, Saddam 
consistently employed ‘tactics of resistance’ involving all sorts of deception, camouflage 
and denial, ultimately expelling inspectors.^^ In March 1999, a UN panel advocated that 
‘reinforced monitoring and verification’ systems were necessary to prevent reconstitution 
of Iraqi WMD program s.Inspectors returned in late 2002 but failed to uncover the 
‘smoking gun’ Washington hoped would legitimise military action. Although regime 
change in 2003 ended any further efforts at monitoring, it appeared that the inspections 
process before it ended in 1998 provided the most reliable information for intelligence 
agencies. Seven years of inspections allegedly provided intelligence for US targeting
In May 1999, US F-15Es mistakenly bombed shepherds after analysts misinterpreted water troughs for 
missile launchers
Gregory Cause III, ‘Getting it Backward on Iraq’, Foreign Affairs, May/June 1999, p.54-65. For more 
sceptical views, see Patrick Clawson, ‘Inspections in Iraq: A test for Saddam, not a good solution for 
WMD’, The Washington Institute fo r Near East Policy, Policy Watch 590, 20 Dec 2001.
For analysis o f Saddam’s tactics, see Deaver, Disarming Iraq
John Springer, UN Panel on Iraq recommends ‘reinforced’ monitoring regime. Arms Control Today, 
March 1999
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during Desert Fox. Such surveillance operations now helped in the waging of war. ‘Once 
the inspectors were gone, it was like losing your GPS g u i d a n c e A n a l y s t s  were 
reduced to groping for fragmentary information such as reports of Baghdad’s interest in 
aluminium tubes or uranium from Niger. A more patient surveillance could have worked 
to manage Iraq. Expanding the existing low-grade air war over no-fly zones coupled with 
inspections suited a more subtle concept of war as risk management.
The utilitarian 4ess than heroic’ strategies of risk management 
Routine war
In criminology, crime is seen as an everyday risk to be managed, a routine part of life. 
Did actions against Iraq manifest this? As with recent wars over Kosovo and 
Afghanistan, war over Iraq from late 1998 to 2003 hardly affected Western societies or 
engaged passions for a noble goal. There was no grand narrative previously associated 
with ‘war’. War became routine in two senses: it was largely instrumental rather than 
existential, and almost an everyday occurrence as risk management theory prescribes. 
The fact that Baghdad hardly reacted to Desert Fox constituted management challenges 
for coalition forces placing ordnance on target, rather than real ‘combat’. The utilitarian 
approach to the operation was encapsulated in then Central Command chief General 
Zinni describing it as a ‘degrade and diminish’ tasking. These bombings were quickly 
forgotten as was the subsequent air war over no-fly zones.
For reasons previously described, no-fly zones became by default the ‘cornerstone 
of containment’ after Desert Fox.^^^ The concept emerged as a new dimension of 
containment and US air power. Cat-and-mouse tussles with Iraqi gunners from late 1998 
hardly merited any space in newspaper columns. Yet coalition fliers were firing at and 
being fired on an almost daily basis, by most accounts a definition of war. Repetitive air 
strikes became so commonplace that hardly anyone kept count. Good risk management 
should be routinely integrated into general activity, and Clinton appeared to have
For detailed analysis o f intelligence estimates on Iraq, see ‘In Sketchy data, trying to gauge the Iraqi 
threat’. New York Times, 20 July 2003
Paul K. White, ‘Airpower and a decade of containment’. Joint Force Quarterly, No. 27, Winter 2000- 
01,p.38
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succeeded. The no-fly zones became a forgotten war. The Clinton administration 
announced air strikes in a low-key manner, making Iraq seem like an everyday risk to be 
managed, as predicted by the test theory. By February 2001, ten years after the Gulf War, 
the continuity in bombing missions over Iraq reached, such a stage as to be described by 
President Bush as ‘routine’.^ ®' US naval presence in the Gulf also became ‘routine’ over 
the years. There is clear ‘routinisation’ of what used to be legitimately described as crisis 
r e s p o n s e . W a r  had became utilitarian, patient ‘housekeeping’ tasks to keep Saddam 
in order. Bombing no-fly zones after Desert Fox were not directed at Iraqi ability to 
rebuild WMD, nor was it explicitly linked to anything else. It became part of a routine of 
general management of Iraq, a ‘policing’ action straddling the boundaries of war rather 
than traditional concepts of warfare such as decisive battles. Indeed, it has been within 
the context of no-fly zones that the concept of ‘policing’ became increasingly prominent. 
‘Policing’ action is after all a routine activity in society now elided into military force to 
indefinitely manage conditions of risk and uncertainty rather than seek grand narratives 
and clear goals.
While ‘regime change’ was out of the ordinary and went against the ‘routine’ 
grain of risk management, it suggests useful lessons. Before 2003, while other major 
powers disapproved of the intermittent coalition bombings, no acrimonious major split on 
the Security Council or among NATO allies was produced in contrast to regime change. 
Indeed, other powers such as Russia and China in late 2002 were even willing to 
cooperate on getting weapons inspectors back despite the no-fly zone bombings. This 
strengthened the risk management process as a result, albeit only with the more 
unpalatable alternative of ‘regime change’ in play. Low-key ‘routine’ war might well be 
the optimum level of force for risk management if the risks in question require military 
action but are not urgent, as Iraq now turns out to be in hindsight. Taking on the 
appearance of an everyday occurrence, it does not cross the threshold of ‘maximalist’ 
force which other allies and powers might find unacceptable. Germany and France even
Remarks by President Bush and President Vicente Fox of Mexico in joint press conference. Office o f the 
Press Secretary, 16 February 2001
Thomas Barnett & Henry H. Gaffney, Jr, ‘Top ten post-Cold War Myths’, US Naval Institute 
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suggested an expansion of no-fly zones over the whole of Iraq together with inspections 
as an alternative to regime change: an implicit endorsement of their value as a risk 
management tool. Continuing with what had after all been an ongoing ‘routine’ war 
against Iraq, together with surveillance and inspections might have managed the risks 
better. This type of protracted low-level ‘war’ over the years in no-fly zones with low 
media interest and ‘virtual public consent’ and no casualties appeared most 
sustainable.'®"^
Personifying risks
Risk management should not seek to reform particular individuals or bring justice to 
them, but manage risks they pose. It entails a profoundly utilitarian moral calculus that 
effectively replaces other moral criteria such as justice, guilt or fairness. Was this evident 
in Iraq? Focusing on Saddam the individual - the so-called ‘biology’ approach'®^ - drove 
many aspects of US policy. The Clinton Administration’s Assistant Secretary of State for 
Near Eastern Affairs Edward Walker asserted in March 2000 that Iraq under Saddam 
‘cannot be rehabilitated or reintegrated as a responsible member of the community of 
nations’.*®^
Despite demonising Saddam however, in February 1998, Defence Secretary 
Cohen and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright declared that Washington was ‘not 
seeking to topple Saddam, not destroy his country’, but to ‘contain him’.'®^  Cohen further 
emphasised the goal of Desert Fox was to ‘degrade’ WMD facilities, and not ‘destabilise 
the regime’-'®* a view echoed by both Tony Blair and Bill Clinton. To be sure, 
containment was also linked confusingly to his removal. President Clinton remarked that, 
‘sanctions will be there until the end of time, or as long as he (Saddam) lasts.’ '®^ This 
ambiguity served to bolster the anti-Saddam coalition as well as satisfy domestic
An idea also raised by Francois Heisbourg, Warfare, (London: Phoenix, 1997), p.l4. ‘Virtual’ consent 
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constituents baying for his demise. Some argue that Clinton erroneously sought to 
contain Iraq and WMD rather than focus on ‘evil’ Saddam himself. Yet, mirroring recent 
trends in criminology, utilitarian risk management policies undertaken trumped any 
concern for ‘evil’ or avenging Saddam’s ‘guilt’ in gassing the Kurds. Despite the 
mounting civilian toll of sanctions, Madeleine Albright declared the cost was worth it as 
long as Saddam was contained and risks suitably managed. Demonising Saddam largely 
helped bolster support for policies to manage, rather than remove him. The overwhelming 
practical focus of policy before September 2001 was risk-management tools - air strikes 
and revised ‘smart’ sanctions.
After 9/11, the ‘evil’ tag all too often described America’s nemeses, from bin 
Laden to Condoleeza Rice describing Saddam as an ‘evil man’ who was not 
‘reformable’.^ ** Here again was an individual deemed to pose risks but did we manage 
or eliminate him? Expressing a more managemement perspective, Jessica Matthews 
contended that the Bush Administration’s newly energised efforts to oust Saddam were 
misplaced: ‘the number one problem’ should remain the risk of Saddam acquiring WMD, 
rather than Hussein h i m s e l f . T h e  Carnegie Endowment in September 2002 thus 
suggested ‘coercive inspections’ accompanied by UN-approved airmobile and armoured 
cavalry forces with air support and J-Stars surveillance planes, supporting go-anywhere 
anytime inspectors. France and Germany also suggested expanding no-fly zones to cover 
the whole of Iraq. This approach is better suited to risk management than impatient 
regime change focused on one man. Non-proliferation goals also carry more legitimacy, 
and can assist, not undermine long-term cooperation in fighting terrorism. However, 
many believed the only option was regime change: even with UN inspectors in the 1990s, 
many programs remained hidden until the 1995 defection of Hussein Kamal, Saddam’s 
son-in-law.
In a tactical shift to re-insert inspectors in autumn 2002, even ‘regime change’ 
was redefined, further complicating analysis here. Secretary Powell suggested ‘the Iraqi 
people would be better off with a different leader and regime. But the principal offence
Morton H. Halperin & Geoffrey Kemp, A report on US Policy Options toward Iraq, Council On Foreign 
Relations, June 2001
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here is weapons of mass destruction...all we’re interested in is getting rid of these 
weapons. Then you have a different kind of regime no matter who’s in Baghdad’. 
President Bush hinted that as long as Saddam disarmed and distanced himself from 
terrorists, ‘these steps would also change the nature of the regime itself and ‘signal the 
regime has changed’. W h e t h e r  Bush really meant what he said is impossible to tell. 
The aim apparently became not removing one man, despite his ‘evil’ human rights 
abuses, but eliminating WMD. On the eve of war. Bush was even willing to let ‘evil’ 
Saddam go into exile as long as the risks were subsequently reduced -  hardly the right 
moral move but a correct one from the utilitarian risk management perspective. US 
officials sought to downplay Saddam to avoid tricky questions similar to those about Bin 
Laden’s fate. Secretary Powell noted that ‘whether or not he is there at the end, and is 
found or not, is almost irrelevant’.*H ow ever by personifying the issue to the extent it 
did rhetorically- and with two ‘decapitation’ attempts and later a bounty on his capture -, 
the Bush Administration clearly targeted the Iraqi leader rather than managed him.
Reshaping the environment
On 10 March 2003, Financial Times editor Philip Stephens refiected a common view that 
the US previously policed the world. Now it sought to remould it in its image. But is this 
correct? The war went beyond traditional aims of militarily defeating an enemy. 
Wolfowitz suggested that the invasion’s strategic reordering of the region was a ‘huge’ 
consequence.**^ Democratic Iraq, so went the argument, would trigger a reverse domino 
theory- a so-called ‘demonstration effect’ through ‘shock and awe’ would rein in or 
remove regimes that breed terror through repression rather than poverty. The Bush 
Administration actually could have something of a Middle East vision, suggested Philip 
Gordon. This meant using American power to ‘reshape the Middle East’ by removing 
Hussein and promoting gradual reforms in moderate Arab states. **^  Whether this ‘grand
' Colin Powell, NBC’s ‘Meet the Press’, 20 October 2002; Interview with USA Today Editorial Board, 02 
October 2002
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strategy’ is workable is another matter. Eliot Cohen is dismissive that Washington had 
the vision: ‘I don’t think its in their nature to be grand conceptualisers’.^ ** Perhaps more 
utilitarian goals could be the reason.
Before 2003, given the difficulties of removing Saddam as discussed above, 
‘reshaping the environment’, another risk management instrument, shaped the milieu 
within which actors operate, simply reducing opportunities for offending and risks of 
harm occurring. Containment, the Clinton notion of ‘keeping Saddam in a box’ and no- 
fly zones clearly constrained his fireedom of action moving south or north rather than 
removing him outright. For much of the 1990s, sanctions, inspectors and routine bombing 
pressured Iraq to divert resources to smuggling, hiding and making reconstitution of 
WMD more difficult. UNSCOM also placed remote monitoring sensors and cameras at 
suspect sites. Operation Desert Fox aimed to degrade/diminish WMD capabilities 
because it was going to ‘make it more difficult for Iraq’ to use WMD against its 
neighbours."^ Clinton contended that Desert Fox ‘made it less likely that we will face 
these dangers in future’. T h e  importance of no-fly zones, argued Clinton, lay in the 
fact that ‘because we effectively control the skies over Iraq, Saddam has been unable to 
use his air power to repress his own people or lash out at his neighbours’.^ '^ Rather than 
militarily defeating an enemy, war now seemed geared toward reducing an enemy’s 
chances to offend in future. The combined effects of inspections. Desert Fox and no-fly 
zones re-shaped Saddam’s strategic environment, reduced the likelihood and 
opportunities for him to reconstitute WMD or commit aggression.
There was similar evidence in the Bush administration of denial of opportunities 
for Saddam to cause harm, this time with terrorists after 9/11 as the risks evolved. Colin 
Powell’s Davos speech on 26 January 2003 warned that ‘the more we wait, the more 
chance there is for this dictator with clear ties to terrorist groups including A1 Qaeda to 
pass a weapon, share technology or use these weapons again’. Iraq posed risks similar to 
North Korea, which Sandy Berger and Robert Galluci called the ‘world’s first nuclear 
Wal-Mart’ where terrorists could have easy access to WMD such as anthrax, sarin, and
Quoted in Dana Milbank, ‘For Bush, war defines presidency’, Washington post, 09 Mar 2003
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VX nerve agent. If Washington’s goal was to prevent terrorists acquiring WMD- Bush 
had identified rogue states as their ‘most likely source’- , regime change arguably 
reduced their chances despite post-war looting. Indeed Foreign Secretary Jack Straw 
suggested that one reason for action is that Baghdad, ‘if it ever saw opportunities to 
develop other terrorist networks on which it could rely on, it would do that and it would 
then be used against the West’.^ ^^  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) General 
Richard Myers similarly claimed: ‘What we're doing in Afghanistan and what we're 
doing in Iraq is in many cases the same thing: we're denying terrorists sanctuary...and 
we're denying terrorists getting their hands on weapons of mass destruction’. W a s  the 
war then about ‘reshaping the environment’ to reduce opportunities for harm than 
traditional conquest? Bush however seemed more intent on eliminating Hussein. 
Washington’s haste furthermore meant the departure of inspectors who could have 
continually reduced opportunities for Saddam to develop WMD.
Nation-tending
Judging from the post-Saddam chaos, some suggest ‘America’s postwar strategy is 
flawed because of a failure to accept the implications of its imperial role.’^^"^ The 
underlying problem is its resistance to nation-building by emphasising ‘exit strategies’ 
and ‘shrinking footprints’. These reflect however not an ‘empire’ leitmotif but minimalist 
‘nation-tending’ to reduce risks rather than effectively remake nations. Post-war 
reconstruction had little grand design. US/UK casualties from guerrilla-style attacks 
caused much domestic consternation. More importantly, Senator Richard Lugar, chairing 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee warned that ‘to leave (Iraq), as we usually do, is 
to leave a situation which is an incubator for terrorism, and we’re back where we were 
with A1 Qaeda in Afghanistan’. C o n c e r n  with the shortcomings of reconstruction 
revolved not around rebuilding Iraq per se or whether America had an obligation to foster
Formal evidence given to House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee Second Report, 
Foreign Policy Aspects of the War against terrorism’, Para 104, HC196, published 19 December 2002, 
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democracy, but simply the utilitarian argument that lawlessness would breed terrorism 
and provide terror sanctuaries.
Notwithstanding Bush’s vision of post-war Iraq as beacon of democracy, the 
motive force for war was fear about a Saddam-Qaeda alliance or prospect of nuclear­
armed Iraq. Most people‘smell that he (Bush) is not really interested in repairing the 
world. Everything is about the war on terrorism’. Virtually all of Bush’s speeches were 
about protecting America rather than visions of nation-building. ‘America as a beacon of 
optimism is gone’.*^  ^ The goal in post-war Iraq, declared General Tommy Franks, is to 
‘assure ourselves that another safe haven for terrorism and export of WMD is not 
created’. A s  predicted, rehabilitation of Iraq appeared to be done only to the extent 
necessary to keep systemic risks tolerable. Rather than America’s ‘mission’, Bush 
pointedly emphasised he had no ‘empire to extend or utopia to establish’. H e  seemed 
more intent on ‘protecting America from further harm’. This indicated a minimalist 
dystopian risk management approach of ‘nation-tending’, not a grand ‘imperial’ one. 
Although Bush implemented the maximal goal of regime change, US policy afterward 
reverted to a minimalist ethos. Indeed, in its hour of triumph, the Bush team appeared 
more ‘dull’ than heroic, the mood ‘calm and corporate methodical problem-solving’, not 
‘grand visions of a new world order’. E v e n  victory parades had to avoid 
‘triumphalism’ previously associated with victorious campaigns.
III. DEFINING SUCCESS
Non-events and the minimalist criterion for success: acceptance and patience
How would war as risk management be assessed ? Theoretically, as an ongoing process 
seeking only non-events like avoiding harm, the benchmark for ‘success’ should 
correspondingly reflect this. I do not intend to suggest how policies could have been 
better implemented or whether risk management was indeed the ‘best’ policy.
Tom Friedman, ‘Repairing the world’, New York Times, 16 Mar 2003
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Lambasting policy before 9/11 for failing simply because Saddam remained in power was 
a red herring; the more appropriate minimalist benchmark was managing risks. We still 
like to think wars end decisively and neatly with formal surrenders. Unfortunately, this 
did not happen neither during the no-fly zone air war; Desert Fox nor Iraqi Freedom.
It is undoubtedly important to assess policy in terms of national security as well as 
humanitarian implications. However, evaluating policy in positivist terms of ‘solving the 
problem’ furnishes an incomplete picture. Many argued that despite sanctions, Saddam 
had not abandoned his WMD. Rather, the question should be what if there were no 
sanctions at all?^^  ^ ‘Minimalist’ risk-management exercises are different from policy 
geared toward clearly defined goals or higher expectations. By focusing on avoidable 
harm, it emphasized preventing negative outcomes like reconstitution of WMD, rather 
than positive goals like rehabilitating Iraq or eliminating problems.
Critics pointed to Saddam’s survival but the more important thing was keeping 
Saddam contained, slowly eroding his military power and WMD capabilities and 
maintaining sanctions and inspections if possible. John Hillen lamented that containment 
‘is inconclusive, having not yielded even the glimmer of a solution to the Iraq problem 
over the past eight y e a r s P a t i e n c e  was needed, counselled Defence Secretary Cohen. 
Indeed, Americans need to abandon their penchant for complete solutions when 
sometimes managing problems is the only plausible option. Attacking WMD facilities 
‘won’t solve the problem of Iraq’s unconventional weapons, but they should reduce its 
scope’. S e n i o r  officials, to their credit, admitted it was impossible to eliminate all 
WMD, which was why they used the word ‘degrade’. Madeleine Albright emphasised 
there was no ‘silver bullet’.^ "^^  Indeed, we now have a concept of war where patience is a 
virtue and a risk management approach helps appreciate modest partial success not 
defined in terms of visible results or ‘perfect solutions’.
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Edward Luttwak might have approved, having lamented that the 1991 Desert 
Storm air campaign shifted to support the ground offensive due to a misplaced 
Clausewitzian emphasis on urgency and decisive battles, leaving Iraqi WMD facilities 
untouched. ‘The novel instrument of strategic precision air attack, slow but effective in 
cumulative results, could not fulfil its true p o t e n t i a l . T h i s  slow cumulative form of 
combat and partial results was certainly mirrored in Desert Fox and the no-fly zones. 
Furthermore, ‘policing’ operations over the no-fly zones are after all open-ended 
‘damage-limitation’ operations not designed to ‘solve the underlying problem’, achieve 
clear political goals or win ‘decisive battles’ but simply to make the situation more 
tolerable by reducing the risks.
Criticism is also overstated and fails to appreciate that policies had actually been 
‘a qualified s u c c e s s D e s p i t e  Iraqi evasion and cheating, UNSCOM destroyed 
reportedly 817 of Iraq’s 819 Scud missiles, chemical weapons, and generally made it 
more difficult for reconstitution. Sanctions also limited Iraqi military capability. A 
December 2001 National Intelligence Estimate concluded that ‘coalition bombing, IAEA 
and UNSCOM inspections significantly set back the (Iraqi WMD) effort.’*^ * However, 
the harm to Iraqi civilians cannot be discounted.
As we have seen, risk-management is about preventing and avoiding negative 
outcomes. Success is thus measured in non-events. Inevitably, this complicates outcome 
specification, for non-events obviously are not as clear-cut as removing Saddam. In 
August 1999, a bipartisan Congressional group wrote to President Clinton, lamenting 
‘continued drift in US policy toward Iraq’.'^  ^ Anthony Cordesman opined after Desert 
Fox, ‘we have not set out what we’re doing beyond degrade, we haven’t defined what 
success is.’ "^*^ However, clearly defined ‘success’ cannot be reconciled with risk-
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management. This was active military containment which did not necessarily look like 
full-scale war.
A more ‘minimalist’ yardstick of managing risks should replace the stark margin 
between success and failure. Indeed, in February 1998, the Clinton Administration 
backed away from using force to coerce Saddam to unconditionally accept inspectors. 
Instead, the bar was set even lower: military force served to simply reduce Iraqi WMD 
capacity and generally constrain Iraqi action, leaving Washington to decide when 
‘success’ had come a b o u t . I t  is hard to establish a clear marker as a result. Clinton 
repeatedly argued that sanctions had denied Saddam $120 billion that would otherwise 
have gone into WMD programs: a non-event. Although maximal goals like Saddam’s 
ouster were not met until April 2003, at least minimal ones and non-events like 
preventing Iraqi aggression were. The best that can be achieved in managing risks is that 
no harm results. Saddam had not invaded his neighbours for more than a decade. This 
was progress from a regime which had done so almost every year since 1979. Policy 
would be better off judged not in terms of ‘perfect solutions’ but rather in terms of how a 
particular risk is managed.
Even after achieving the ‘perfect solution’ deposing Saddam, Deputy Secretary 
Wolfowitz, interviewed by Vanity Fair magazine on 09 May 2003, reeled off a list of 
non-events as successes: no environmental disaster, Israel was not attacked, no urban 
warfare in Baghdad or use of WMD, Turkey did not intervene, no friendly governments 
collapsed. Unsure of its convictions or even the goal, public relief, rather than rejoicing 
normally associated with victory in war, accompanied US troops into Baghdad as the 
now customary ‘public wobble’ evaporated. The war also created the biggest non-event 
in recent times: where were Saddam’s WMD ? Without finding these weapons, did 
Saddam pose more a ‘risk’ than a concrete ‘threat’ then? Indeed, at this writing in August 
2003, the failure to find concrete proof of WMD in fact appeared to vindicate the patient 
risk management approach towards Baghdad over the years. While more convincing 
evidence may yet be found, it had appeared to produce the desired non-event by 
constraining the full reconstitution of Iraqi WMD programs and the weapons themselves. 
If so, then there was perhaps no need for impatient invasion. Just ‘plans’ for programs
Richard Haass, ‘An Iraq Attack Ensures Nothing’, Boston Globe, 15 February 1998
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alone, were rather different ffom a WMD threat touted as so ‘imminent’ that the Bush 
Administration rejected more inspections.
An Ongoing, cyclical process
On 3 March 1991, President George H.W. Bush reported to Congress that ‘aggression is 
defeated, the war is over’. However, a month before. Bush intimated to his diary: ‘it 
hasn’t been a clean end; there is no battleship Missouri surrender’. Events from late 
1998 certainly eluded easy closure since war as risk management leads to operations of 
indefinite duration to continually manage new risks or resurgent old ones. Risks cannot 
be totally eliminated. The finishing line is not easily apparent in cyclical risk- 
management processes which are ongoing and non-linear. This defied conventional 
appraisal of definitive end-goals as the measure of policy ‘success’ or conclusion of wars. 
The vague criteria for measuring progress in Desert Fox- ‘degrading and diminishing’ -  
also left open the possibility that more action would follow assessments that Baghdad 
once again could cause harm. Cabinet officials Albright, Berger and Cohen declared US 
commitment to use force against Iraq was ‘open-ended’. T o n y  Blair warned that if 
increased Iraqi WMD activity were detected, military action would result again. The 
campaign supposedly set back Baghdad’s ballistic missile program by a year.
However, bombing created more risks in the sense that any international 
consensus for inspections was now undermined irrevocably: the postulated ‘boomerang 
effect’. Iraq paradoxically became freer after the bombing to continue its WMD efforts 
without having to divert resources to hiding from inspectors, and portrayed itself as 
victim of superpower bullying. The alleged use of UNSCOM information to generate 
targets also greatly discredited the international arms control system as a cover for US 
espionage, undermining trust in international cooperation. Desert Fox thus created ‘one 
of the worst possible outcomes:’ a discredited monitoring agency unable to re-enter Iraq,
An intriguing theory has been raised by Saddam’s aides who claimed that he did in fact destroy his 
WMD but deliberately kept the world guessing to divide the international community and deter US 
invasion.
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low-intensity undeclared air war, further divided Security Council and continuation of 
sanctions with huge humanitarian impact.
Since the announced end of the 70-hour Desert Fox campaign, low profile but 
robust sorties continued over the no-fly zones against air defence assets which hardly 
seemed linked to Desert Fox goals of degrading WMD facilities. Greatest unease was 
expressed over the intermittent bombing of no-fly zones, derided as pointless with no end 
in s ight .Cr i t i cs  argued this was not ‘conclusively linked to an end game in Iraq’.'^  ^
This is an unfair assessment from the risk-management perspective, which suggests 
patient open-ended commitment and ambiguous results such as avoiding harm, not 
decisive instant solutions. Operations over no-fly zones appeared consigned to a fate of 
‘perpetual policing’ which seeks in fact to ‘avoid decisive battle’ of the Clausewitzian 
paradigm. Rather than a clear-cut political goal in mind, it served to manage a condition 
of risks and turbulence that might affect security interests. This dispensed with the 
artificial setting of maximalist goals of problem-resolution in an intractable situation such 
as Iraq when the more realistic aim should be risk management. Expectations could then 
be managed better and results judged more appropriately.
Regime change by April 2003 seemed to draw the finishing line clearly and more 
decisively in the sand. However, just as there was a ‘rolling’ start to the war, there was a 
‘rolling victory’.'"*^  There was no neat tidy end where all guns fell silent. US generals 
lolled around in Saddam’s palaces, clearly a symbol of victory. Yet there were no 
vanquished to sign formal capitulation documents which for much of the modem era, had 
defined the conclusion of wars. A month after President Bush declared the end of major 
combat in May 2003, US forces were still engaged in numerous sweeps to eliminate 
pockets of resistance north of Baghdad which had inflicted increasing US casualties. 
Disappointment and puzzlement greeted these operations as public opinion is driven by 
clean-ends and Bush’s proclamation appeared to provide that. Two months after Bush’s
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proclamation, the US ground commander in Iraq admitted ‘we’re still at war’. 
Furthermore, as President Bush declared in his dramatic landing on the carrier Lincoln on 
01 May 2003, ‘the battle of Iraq is one victory in a war on terror... and still goes on’. If 
war was about the risk of terrorists acquiring WMD, that risk was certainly not 
eliminated. Reports suggested WMD was smuggled to Syria or other groups in Iraq. The 
post-war chaos led IAEA chief Mohamed El Baradei to warn repeatedly that looting of 
WMD installations especially at Tuwaitha could mean WMD falling into terrorist hands. 
Former weapons inspector Terry Taylor worried that looting increased the original 
proliferation risk and there was a ‘real risk that certain materials could leak out’ of 
Iraq.*^° Out of work scientists might also work with other rogue states or terrorist groups. 
The world not much safer than before although much of Tuwaitha’s nuclear material was 
eventually recovered. The US invasion could also create backlash such as the May 2003 
bombings in Riyadh and Casablanca, and aid terrorist recruitment. International 
cooperation on terrorism could also be undermined although Paris and Washington later 
appeared to paper over their differences in this respect. Rather than conclusively solving 
the problem through regime change, new risks were created through the ‘boomerang 
effect’. This is certainly suggestive of the inconclusive nature of risk management.
IV. Conclusion
From the evidence presented in this chapter, risk-management provided an alternative 
explanation to recent ‘wars’ over Iraq in certain respects. Previously distinct sets of 
proliferation and stability risks posed by Baghdad during the late Clinton/early Bush 
period became interlinked after 9/11 with terrorism and created significant analytical 
difficulties for this study. Nonetheless, these dangers, it was demonstrated, were better 
understood through risk components than threat components. Policymakers were more 
concerned with risk components yet plumbed for threat-elimination instead.
While largely dissimilar in strategic context and eventual results, wars firom 1998 
until 2003 nonetheless shared several features of risk management worth highlighting. It
See Oliver Burkeman, ‘Iraqi weapons general arrested and concern grows over inspection chaos’, The 
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was anticipatory in nature, concerned with probabilistic thinking in terms of counter- 
factuals, and preventing unwanted futures. Indeed, the language and justifications used by 
both administrations were strikingly similar whether justifying Desert Fox or Iraqi 
Freedom. Contributing to anticipatory actions, aerial and satellite surveillance and 
inspections provided information on the level of risks Iraq posed, until the Bush 
Administration tired of the process. The precautionary principle was applied to the letter 
especially after 9/11. Rumsfeld sounded in particular like the archetypal risk manager. 
Bush, like Clinton, saw war as a utilitarian tool to avert harm rather than achieve grand 
visions or justice. Post-war reconstruction was confused, verging on more modest nation- 
tending, rather than nation-building. Before 9/11, Saddam Hussein was managed by 
reshaping the environment through inspections, sanctions, no-fly zones and bombing. 
This simply reduced his opportunities to cause harm, despite ostracising him throughout. 
Even regime change, argued US officials, was a measure designed to reduce 
opportunities for terrorists to acquire WMD or sanctuary from Iraq.
In evaluating risk-management, it should be seen as a ‘minimalist’ ongoing 
process of avoiding harm, not attaining positivist end goals. Thus, non-events before 9/11 
such as caging Saddam could be considered a ‘success’. The much-criticised open-ended 
nature of policing no-fly zones could receive less brickbats if understood as a non-linear 
process of management. Even with regime change, some outcomes were non-events 
indicative of an existing risk rather than a fully formed threat. Indeed, the failure to find 
WMD at this writing in July 2003 vindicated the patient risk management approach over 
the years: creating a ‘non-event’ in which preventing the reconstitution of Saddam’s 
WMD was apparently successful. There was even evidence of the ‘boomerang effect’ as 
regime change, instead of premanent solving the problem, only created new sets of risks 
with missing WMD and increased A1 Qaeda recruitment.
Before 9/11, the Bush Administration in fact ‘ended up affirming the basic course 
set by Democrats’ on no-fly zones. Containment, rather than regime change was the de 
facto policy despite rumblings to the contrary. What was an almost textbook risk 
management strategy in the late Clinton/early Bush years however turned into threat- 
elimination by 2003 under the impact of 9/11 and the drawing together of analogous but
Andrew Bacevich, American Empire, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 199
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not necessarily similar sets of risks. This revealed flaws in risk management. 
Policymakers became too impatient and escalated towards the other end of the ladder: 
threat elimination. Problematically, risk perceptions diverged even among close allies. 
Acting on the precautionary principle and worst case scenarios without rigorous 
assessment in retrospect appeared unnecessary. Linking the security risks Iraq posed, 
with those from terrorism was perhaps unwarranted in hindsight.
Yet, the language, rationale and negative ethos of Iraqi Freedom certainly bore 
classic hallmarks of risk management, even more so than Desert Fox or the no-fly zones 
operations. Warning of the ‘risks of inaction’. President Bush sought only to ‘prevent the 
worst’( the exact phrase Beck used to describe the negative mindset of Risk Society) 
while certainly making the right noises about the need for precautionary actions- all 
intrinsic components of a risk management package. After all. Bush’s emphasising the 
Iraq issue at the UN, backed by military force, had already produced the return of 
inspectors for the first time in 4 years with even France and Germany suggesting an 
expansion of no-fly zones. However, the impatient means selected- combined arms 
ground invasion and regime change- were not suited for managing risks, reflecting once 
again the need for a more subtle concept of war. Even then, rather than invalidating the 
model of risk management, the continued difficulties in finding a ‘smoking gun’- a fully 
reconstituted WMD program, weapons and/or compelling terrorist links - at this writing, 
suggested that Saddam Hussein in fact posed risks, rather than an imminent threat. A 
more patient risk management war-form - inspections, continuous surveillance and 
occasional military force where necessary, routinely policing no-fly zones to ‘reshape the 
environment’, appreciating partial results -  like that practised before 9/11 and even 
arguably, in the months before regime change, would thus have been more appropriate 
than full-scale threat-elimination. After all, no one seemed to notice the ‘small war’ 
already going on with Iraq.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Conclusion
Introduction
In this concluding chapter, the validity of the main hypotheses advanced in Chapter One 
and key summary findings of the study will firstly be re-evaluated through a structured 
cross-comparison of case study results. Some concerns were left unresolved, some 
admittedly problematic but none of which fatally undermined the hypotheses as a whole. 
The second section discusses research limitations and suggests future research avenues 
where theories developed here could be enhanced and applied. This is done by way of a 
mini-case study of NGOs and a shorter analysis of rhetorical ‘wars’ on AIDS and drugs. 
The final section provides a broad overview and recap of the study, and then suggests 
some cautionary policy-relevant lessons. This draws to a close a theoretical enterprise 
that began with a perceived need to reconceptualise war in response to real-world events.
This study has sought to highlight the relevance of concepts of ‘risk management’ 
to the ‘transformation of war debate’ as risk societies in the West and the international 
system increasingly reoriented toward concerns about ‘security risks’. The additional 
challenge it posed related to conventional understandings of war such as noble ‘heroic’ 
purposes and the desire for clearly defined outcomes in the form of surrender ceremonies. 
War as risk management instead is minimalist and involved less than heroic strategies 
without clear prospect for closure. The thesis also demonstrated that classical ‘net 
assessment’ or specific threat-based approaches of the past could not readily explain 
recent wars where the enemy’s military capability hardly posed serious challenges and 
intentions were underemphasised, misread or simply unknown. Cumulative evidence 
presented here suggested that risk-based approaches composed of probabilities and 
consequences provided a better alternative understanding of war.
Such an approach largely persisted through the change in US administrations in 
2001- the Bush White House even accentuated some aspects of risk such as the role of 
precaution in justifying war. Indeed, over Afghanistan some analysts suggest it 
‘implemented the new way of war even more completely than in Kosovo. The Clinton
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Administration at least agreed to a major post war US peacekeeping contingent'/ 
Similarly, this study found continuity where one might normally expect to see 
discontinuity.
Many compelling theses on the transformation of war and international security 
have been suggested over the past decade. It was certainly not the intention here to 
dislodge any of them from the pantheon of works deserving of study and respect. Rather 
the goal was to contribute to them. No effort has also been made here to deny that 
subjective perceptions of policy makers or bureaucratic infighting had an influence on 
policy outcomes and there are many existing analyses of such decision-making processes. 
This thesis instead adopted a broader investigative angle and sought to highlight the 
presence of recurrent patterns in warfare across different recent cases that were consistent 
with risk management strategies. By also emphasising the theoretical benefits IR can 
derive from an inter-disciplinary approach, hopefully it served to stimulate more debate 
and research on this hitherto neglected, yet increasingly significant, dimension of ‘risk 
management’ in war and International Relations.
I. Review of Summary Findings
Emphasising and highlighting the elements of ‘risk management’ in war, this study 
helped address conceptual loopholes from conventional notions of war in understanding 
contemporary warfare such as the desire for neat tidy ends and visible successes. 
Furthermore, the explanatory power of Realism does not extend to wars such as Kosovo 
and Iraq, lambasted by the likes of Henry Kissinger and Stephen Walt mainly because 
there was neither a direct or imminent threat to the United States. Utilising a ‘risk 
management’ framework developed in Chapter Three, this study highlighted certain 
aspects of recent wars that could be seen in a different light with greater explanatory 
power. The broad findings indicated that while empirical evidence surveyed in the case 
studies validated theoretical predictions to varying degrees, these reflected in the main a 
transition to war as risk management. Key characteristics were evaluated in this study and
‘ Stephen Biddle, ‘The New Way of War?’, Review Article, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81 No. 3, May/June 
2002, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20020501 faessayS063/stephen-bi ddl e/ the-new-way-of-war.html
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the findings detailed below. The two main hypotheses presented in the introduction will 
be re-evaluated in light of evidence presented. These inter-linked hypotheses were:
i) Under specific circumstances and parameters, Britain and America’s 
recent wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq bore hallmarks of risk 
management in terms of impetus for action; justification provided and 
modes of implementation; and criteria for evaluating success.
ii) Risk management features ‘fit’ better with contemporary wars than 
classical notions of war
The findings were as follows:
Impetus
i) In combination with an increasingly probabilistic culture focused on 
managing ‘risk scenarios’, the main impetus for military actions were 
‘systemic’ risks relating to globalisation such as firee flow of people and 
materials across porous borders, and the demise of Cold War constraints. 
Previous chapters highlighted the difficulties of conceptualising dangers 
purely in terms of ‘threat’ components. This is not to claim that intentions 
and capabilities were no longer relevant. Rather, this is a logical 
consequence of a post-Cold War world where classic ‘net assessment’ of 
threats in actuarial terms of counting military hardware is no longer as 
applicable: a fact acknowledged by the US National Strategy for  
Combating Terrorism. In none of the case studies did opponents pose 
serious and imminent survival threats in terms of military capabilities. 
Iraq, in particular, posed risks which did not warrant its premature 
elevation to an imminent threat requiring regime change. Intentions of 
adversaries, while still important, were misread or underemphasised in 
favour of ‘risk’ components -  probabilities and consequences. This often
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involved a combination of ‘anticipatory horizon-scanning’ for any 
possible security risks, and a desire to avoid repetition of ‘tombstone- 
style’ risks happening again.
Implementation and justifications given
ii) The proactive language of risk used in justifying wars from Kosovo to Iraq
was broadly similar. Policymakers in question, whether Bill Clinton, Tony 
Blair or George W. Bush, employed the same catch-all phrase for action, 
repeated almost ad verbatim in all the cases surveyed: ‘the risks of 
inaction outweigh the risks of action’. Probabilistic future-oriented 
‘forward thinking’ in terms of counter-factuals and alternative scenarios 
was present as theorised. In case studies surveyed, there was evidence of a 
shift from previous ‘reactive’ approaches to more ‘proactive’ ones. NATO 
became a proactive alliance over Kosovo; counterterrorism in Afghanistan 
became proactive; while ‘preventive’ military action was launched against 
Iraq as early as December 1998. This fostered an approach to war seeking 
to ‘prevent’, ‘avert’, or ‘avoid’ rather than attain ‘heroic’ noble goals 
normally associated with war. Britain and America acted to avert 
‘potential victimhood’ of some hypothesised future harm, taking 
preventive victim-avoidance strategies to avoid being a victim again at the 
hands of Milosevic, Bin Laden or Hussein.
iii) Rather than the ‘smoking gun’ that many associated with conventional 
notions of war, Iraq in 2003 represented the clearest IR case of the 
precautionary principle: in Rumsfeld’s words, ‘absolute proof cannot be a 
precondition for action’. The Kosovo campaign in 1999 also exhibited 
some indications of the principle as both NGOs and NATO preferred to 
overestimate the worst. However evidence of ethnic cleansing was more 
concrete than Saddam Hussein’s links to A1 Qaeda. As for the Afghan 
campaign in 2001, it was hardly precautionary in nature since the US had 
been attacked first on that fateful September day. Nonetheless,
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Government dossiers acknowledged they offered less than evidentiary 
proof and officials stressed the need for taking actions under the domain of 
uncertainty. Iraq and Kosovo both represented ‘false positives’ as 
precautionary actions which ultimately proved to be less than urgent or 
necessary.
iv) Continuous surveillance served as the vehicle of risk management, 
providing information necessary to anticipate and act on who or what 
constituted uncertain risks. For more than a decade over Iraq, notable 
instances were the long-term surveillance Operations Northern Watch and 
Southern Watch, which elided easily into military actions firom 1998-2003. 
However, regime change ended any further surveillance. Kosovo was 
monitored by a precursor air surveillance mission before Allied Force and 
continuously since for possible risk factors. Satellite and aerial 
surveillance provided much information on terrorist movements and 
infrastructure in Afghanistan and other potential havens elsewhere, aiding 
in targeted assassinations and air strikes.
v) War as risk management employed utilitarian ‘less than heroic’ strategies 
aimed at simply reducing systemic risks. These included the ‘routine’ 
application of force, ‘reshaping the environment’ and ‘nation-tending. 
Rather than the existential struggle previously associated with wars, war to 
manage risks became ‘routine’ in two respects -  it was largely passionless, 
instrumental and almost familiar. This was especially noted in the low-key 
daily skirmishes over Iraqi no-fly zones. Kosovo was another ‘routine’ 
war which hardly engaged the enthusiasm of Western publics. In 
Afghanistan, terrorism seemed like another everyday risk to be managed, 
just like crime.
vi) ‘Reshaping the environment’ served to reduce systemic risks by managing 
conditions of instability and turbulence, rather than previous visible
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criteria of gauging wars such as destroying enemy hardware. Most evident 
in Afghanistan, this meant shrinking zones of sanctuary and generally 
creating a less permissive environment for terrorists. The Kosovo 
campaign ultimately managed the risks in question by denying Milosevic 
freedom of action in the region although militarily speaking the campaign 
was not successful in terms of ‘tank-plinking’. Coalition air operations 
over no-fly zones prior to regime change certainly constrained Baghdad’s 
ability to harm its neighbours despite no apparent end-games associated 
with war. Regime change in 2003 could be construed as reducing 
opportunities for terrorists to gain WMD or safe haven from Iraq, although 
Washington was more concerned with eliminating Saddam.
vii) ‘Nation-tending’ was most obvious in Afghanistan. As predicted, 
Washington’s overriding goal was simply to reduce risks by making it 
inhospitable to terrorists rather than properly rehabilitate the country. Iraq 
garnered more attention but utilitarian concerns raised again revolved 
more around lawlessness breeding terrorists rather than moral obligations 
to rebuild that country. Kosovo experienced the most successful 
reconstruction due to several factors: the war and rebuilding was more 
multi-national in nature, America was willing to subcontract 
reconstruction to the UN and EU. Kosovo suggests perhaps the most 
appropriate form of multilateral nation-tending reducing the footprint of 
individual powers and managing risks in the process, without actually 
solving underlying problems. This not only lent more legitimacy, but also 
helped in stability operations notwithstanding the difficulties of coalition 
warfare and war by committee.
viii) Risks were personified in all cases: Milosevic in Kosovo, Hussein in Iraq, 
Bin Laden in Afghanistan. However, it seemed more important to reduce 
opportunities for their offending rather than focus on bringing these 
‘errant’ individuals to justice. Despite indictments for war crimes.
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Milosevic remained in power until October 2000, tolerated as long as he 
posed no serious risks. Kosovo proved the best example of this. Capturing 
Bin Laden would strike a mortal blow to A1 Qaeda but military operations 
became more focused on disrupting terrorists rather than capturing the 
‘evil one’ as Bush promised initially. ‘Prevention’ rather than ‘revenge’ or 
‘justice’ was the core utilitarian concern. As long as the risks posed by 
Baghdad were tolerable and since there were no other feasible options, 
Saddam was kept throughout the 1990s in his ‘box’ rather than removed 
despite his ‘evil’ tag. Regime change in April 2003 constituted the 
strongest counter-argument that personifying risks now meant elimination, 
not management. Yet the Bush Administration’s redefinition of ‘regime 
change’ in October 2002, suggested no matter how implausible, that it 
could conceivably live with a disarmed regime posing less risks.
Outcome evaluation
ix) ‘Non-events’ and avoiding harm were, as predicted, key criterion for 
success rather than ‘perfect solutions’ and surrender ceremonies normally 
associated with war endings. Patience, acceptance of limits and partial 
results were required. This minimalist definition was especially relevant to 
Afghanistan. Success was measured in what does not happen (terrorist 
incidents) than what does. The Kosovo campaign ended with the vague 
‘mother of all compromises’ and regional instability was largely averted. 
Successfully managing Iraq before regime change was also negatively 
defined: preventing Saddam committing aggression, or WMD
reconstitution. Even while regime change departed from the ‘minimalist’ 
script of risk management, key outcomes were non-events: where was 
Iraq’s WMD? While paper trails and more concrete evidence may yet be 
found, the failure to find a fully reconstituted WMD program and weapons 
themselves may in fact vindicate the patient risk management processes 
undertaken over the years producing the desired non-event.
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x) The ‘boomerang effect’ meant risk management was cyclical with no 
clearly-defined endpoints normally associated with war. Risks cannot be 
eliminated; only reduced and constantly managed. While risk of regional 
instability was ultimately reduced in Kosovo, more risks were initially 
created through accelerated expulsions. Attempts to root out terrorists in 
Afghanistan only dispersed the networks underground and elsewhere, 
paradoxically making them more difficult to track in a campaign without a 
finite end. Open-ended ‘police actions’ over Iraqi no-fly zones typified the 
lack of endpoints. Desert Fox created more risks by undermining 
UNSCOM inspections and Saddam was paradoxically freer to pursue 
WMD programs. Even an ostensible threat-elimination operation to 
conclusively solve the Saddam problem - regime change in 2003 - only 
created new risks, for terrorists could acquire WMD in the post-war chaos.
The theoretical framework used to explore these issues reflected the widely-held notion 
that strategic studies was essentially eclectic in nature, receptive to ideas and concepts 
from other social sciences. Furthermore, new developments in theory and the world 
meant that novel approaches were necessary. The theory adopted was not in any way 
reified by this thesis. Instead, it merely served as a useful mode of investigating 
systematically what seemed obscure or tenuous links not only between case studies but 
also the disciplines of International Relations, sociology and criminology.
II. Research limitations and future research avenues 
Networks and Netwars
In this section I suggest how risk management concepts presented earlier could be 
enhanced or modified by drawing upon two other academic perspectives on ‘war’. As 
discussed in Chapter Three, the process of risk management is multi-faceted and complex 
with so many related concepts it is impossible to utilise all of them without sacrificing 
quality for quantity. It is hoped this section helps address some gaps in the theoretical 
prism adopted in preceding case studies, as well as demonstrate its wider validity.
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Rhetorical ‘wars’ against drugs or AIDS will be discussed later. Here we address 
campaigns waged by trans-national NGO coalitions against what they perceive to be 
unacceptable situations in war that pose risks, and how states respond. Three purposes are 
served here:
Firstly, this thesis has so far advanced the notion that war is changing and needs 
to be reconceptualised. An open mind receptive to new ideas was advocated. Its basic 
premise of war nonetheless remained a rather conventional one involving use of military 
force by armies. Less conventional commentators now claim to discern an age of 
networks and ‘social netwars’.^  ‘Network-centric’ warfare has admittedly been 
fashionable in British and American military thinking. ‘Netwar’ however refers to 
emerging modes of conflict at societal levels, short of traditional military warfare. 
Protagonists involve not armies but small groups or dispersed organisations using 
network forms of organisation, strategy, and technologies attuned to the globalised 
information age. All too often, attention has centred on terrorist networks or drug cartels. 
A much-neglected positive side is trans-national NGO coalitions utilising the tools of 
globalisation to coordinate campaigns against landmines and cluster bombs.^ This mini­
case study thus seeks to extend the applicability of risk management concepts to these 
‘social netwars’ which has not yet been attempted in academic discourse.
Secondly, previous case studies have focused on managing systemic risks relating 
to globalisation. In recognition of the myriad ways risk can manifest within war, I attempt 
to revisit tactical risks arising from cluster bombs and landmines whose significance has 
admittedly been underemphasised in my case studies on Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Furthermore, these ostensibly tactical risks can now take on an almost systemic factor 
with globalisation and trans-national networks. Analysing NGO advocacy on these issues 
thus contributes a new dimension of globalisation and trans-national organisation to the 
aheady well-worn debate on tactical risks of casualties and ‘collateral damage’.
Thirdly, case studies analysed so far could be criticised for being too ‘Realist’ and 
state-centric. This had been necessary both in order to set the necessarily controlled
 ^See for example John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, ‘The Advent of netwar revisited’, in John Arquilla 
and David Ronfeldt (eds). Networks and Netwars: the future o f  terror, crime and militancy, (Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND, 2001), p.5; also Manuel Castells, The Rise o f the Network Society, (Cambridge, MA: 
Blackwell Publishers, 1996)
 ^A point made by Arquilla and Ronfeldt, ‘the Advent o f netwar revisited’
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research parameters required here, and also to address more obvious and pressing issues 
of military force today which are still largely in state hands. This is not to suggest non­
state actors such as NGOs have no role in today’s globalised security environment. NGOs 
in fact add some balance to this thesis, incorporating the ‘cosmopolitan manifesto’ and 
constructivist perspective that also characterised Beck’s work. Indeed, case studies so far 
emphasised the ‘risk’ aspect of Beck’s Risk Society. It neglected the ‘society’ aspect and 
the formation of new forms of ‘risk communities’. NGOs also comprise what Beck 
termed ‘subpolitics’ where citizen initiative groups campaign outside established politics. 
The template of risk management employed in this study has furthermore been limited to 
directly reducing risks through military means. It inevitably downplayed other risk 
management methods such as ‘risk distribution’. Risk after all also presents market 
opportunities."^ Risks are now distributed by states to ‘risk-fighting businesses’ such as 
US-based RONCO Consulting specialising in de-mining, and through cooperation with 
specialist NGO de-miners.
Two previously unexplored elements of risk management unearthed fi’om this 
mini-case study- ‘risk communities’ and ‘risk distribution’- provide theoretical 
enhancements and research potential for the future, while two selected aspects of the 
existing theoretical prism are broadly applicable- risk surveillance and concern with 
victimhood. What follows will be a brief discussion of these concepts.
Conceptual issues
The December 1997 Ottawa Convention was the first legally binding disarmament 
instrument to ban a widely deployed weapon of war: anti-personnel landmines. In March 
1999, it became the quickest major international agreement ever to enter into force. Anti­
personnel landmines (APMs) are defined in the Convention as ‘a mine designed to be 
exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, 
injure or kill one or more persons’. Britain has ratified the treaty but America has 
prevaricated. APMs cannot discriminate between combatants and non-combatants. The 
random nature of risk that remains long after the conflict is over, particularly concerned 
campaigners.
Ulrich Beck, Risk Society, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), p46
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Although not addressed at Ottawa, cluster bombs and unexploded ordnance (UXO) 
constitute additional risks in the long litany of landmine-related woes. A cluster bomb is 
a metal canister dropped from aircraft, or artillery. At pre-set times or altitudes, it releases 
sub-munitions of bomblets or minelets and are mostly used against area targets, troop 
concentrations and soft-skinned vehicles. These fall by gravity often unguided. ^  
However, not all bomblets detonate. Many ‘duds’ lie on the ground, in effect functioning 
like ‘victim-activated’ landmines. The International Committee on the Red Cross 
reported that by May 2000 in Kosovo, 151 injuries were caused by unexploded 
bomblets.^ Clearing bomblets is even more dangerous than removing landmines. This 
caused the first British fatalities in Kosovo. NATO used about 1400 cluster bombs in 
Allied Force. More than 60% were American CBU-87 bombs. 52% of all RAF bombs 
dropped were RBL755 cluster bombs. The June 1999 Human Rights Watch (HRW) 
report on cluster bombs in Kosovo, Ticking Time-bombs, sent a clear message of lurking 
risks.
Afghanistan was the most mined country in the world even before Enduring 
Freedom. HRW reported that US forces dropped approximately 1228 cluster bombs 
between October 2001 and March 2002. From October 2001 to November 2002, at least 
127 civilians as well as two deminers were killed or injured by cluster bomblets.^ US 
food packages and unexploded cluster bomblets also have a similar yellow colour which 
attract children. The NGO coalition International Campaign to Ban Landmines has called 
for Washington to stop using such weapons.
In April 2003, the UK confirmed it had used in Iraq the L20 cluster bomblet on 
the AS90 self-propelled howitzer and at least 88 airdropped cluster bombs. HRW 
charged that US forces had acknowledged dropping some 1500 air-dropped cluster 
munitions but had not provided adequate information on ground-launched clusters from
 ^General Sir Hugh Beach ‘Cluster bombs: A case for banning?’, ISIS Briefing Paper 79, February 2001, p7 
 ^ICRC figures cited in Beach, ‘Cluster bombs’, pi 1
’ See ‘Fatally Flawed: Cluster bombs and their use by the United States in Afghanistan’, Human Rights 
Watch, December 2002, available at http://hrw.org/reports/2002/us-afghanistan/
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its Multiple Launch Rocket Systems.^ Even before Iraqi Freedom, Iraq was already 
considered one of the most mine-affected regions in the world.
While previous restrictions on weapons systems were instigated by states, the 
trans-national NGO coalition, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), was 
cmcial, underlined by its receipt of the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize. However, NGO 
influence should not be overstated. Major powers such as the US, and China have yet to 
sign the treaty. Canada’s sponsorship was also crucial, retrieving the issue from the 
Conference on Conventional Weapons (CCW) where it languished among anti-ban 
powers.
Nonetheless, UN Deputy Secretary-General Louis Frechette in 1999 described the 
emergence of NGOs in the late 20* century as a phenomena as important as the rise of 
the nation-state in earlier centuries.^ The Nobel Committee on awarding the Nobel Peace 
Prize to ICBL lauded it for helping form with governments a new form of diplomacy to 
deal with global concerns. Research into NGO advocacy in security and military issues 
resulting in binding international law is minimal. NGO roles in issues such as trade and 
the environment are however relatively well documented.^® The landmines and cluster 
bombs issue is thus important for denoting a significant NGO inroad into the heart of 
state sovereignty: military methods and weapons.
Furthermore, the ICBL was a ‘seminal case of a worldwide social netwar’. 
Trans-national NGO coalitions using network-centric tactics such as ‘swarming’, anti­
globalisation protests by networked NGOs have also taken on the trappings of ‘war’ with 
the so-called ‘Battle of Seattle’ in November 1999 at the World Trade Organisation 
meeting and NGOs use of ‘media special forces’ adept at perception management.
Yet, ER theories do not satisfactorily explain the APMs issue. The notion that 
perceptions of crisis/shock engender ideational or normative change privileges the state
* See ‘Iraq: Clusters info needed from US, UK’, Human Rights Watch, 29 April 2003, 
http://hrw.Org/press/2003/04/us-uk042903.htm
’ Remarks at the 52nd Annual UN Department of Public Information and NGOs Conference, ‘Challenges 
of a Globalised World’, 17-18 September 1999, www.conferenceofiigos.org/ngomeet/dpingo.htm. 
accessed 20 April 2003
Kenneth Rutherford, ‘A Theoretical Examination of disarming states: NGOs and Anti-personnel 
Landmines’, International Politics, Vol. 37 No. 4, Dec 2000, p.472 
' ' Rutherford, ‘A Theoretical Examination o f disarming states’, p.472 
Arquilla and Ronfeld ‘The advent of netwar revisited’, p.5
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in identifying a problem. On APMs , society voiced concerns first. The standard unit of 
security is normally the state. Individual security is usually assumed subordinate to 
higher-level political structures of the state. However, as we shall see, the APMs issue 
placed ‘human security’ uppermost. Realism’s strict demarcation between domestic and 
international spheres, and neo-realism’s focus on material capabilities can hardly 
accommodate non-state actors and societal concerns about risk and probabilities 
impinging on state actions, especially in military issues.*'* Rational Choice Theory is 
deficient as it cultivates an illusion of control and understanding, induced by ‘scientific 
mathematical’ approaches and the supposedly limited number of possible outcomes. It is 
only suitable when the international scene is relatively settled, the number of actors is 
limited to states and does not include new non-state actors working from below. 
Complex interdependence theory does recognise the role of trans-national actors but 
since Keohane and Nye’s Trans-national Relations and World Politics^ the focus has 
been mostly economic or environmental. The strength of risk theory thus lies in its ability 
to analyse both states and non-state actors in the globalisation of security risks.
NGOs and globalisation o f risk
The historically specific context of globalisation created the necessary trans-national 
social space for a free-floating risk consciousness to lodge itself onto landmines and 
cluster bombs. Without a strict central organising authority, globalisation has augmented 
the role of NGOs in problems which states are unable or unwilling to address. The 
significance of global civil society lies in trans-national political networks who are in a 
sense ‘imagined communities’ challenging the state-system from b e l o w . W i t h  
globalisation, free movement of weapons, landmines and arms traders make it difficult 
for states alone to track these risks. The concern with landmine and UXO risks also had 
to do with the post-Cold War focus on internal wars rather than bipolar competition. With 
an estimated 80 to 100 million landmines scattered across 64 countries worldwide, these 
certainly pose global problems. It is thought there is one victim every 22 minutes.
Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear, (2"'* Ed), (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), p.54 
See Richard Price, ‘Reversing the Gun sights: Transnational Civil Society targets landmines’. 
International Organisation, Vol. 52 No. 3, Summer 1998, p.613 
See Anatol Lieven, ‘ Nasty Little Wars’, The National Interest, Issue 62, Winter 2000/01, p.75 
Price, ‘Reversing the gun sights’, p.613
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Information Technology (IT), central to globalisation, will be a major building 
block for ‘empowering non-state actors’ according to the US National Intelligence 
Council’s December 2000 report. Global Trends 2015, States will have less control over 
information flows and NGOs will play increasingly larger roles in international affairs 
and war. The ICBL certainly demonstrated how NGO coalitions use communications 
technologies to increase opportunities for changing state behaviour. ICBL was greatly 
helped in their day-to-day organisation and advocacy through email and its website 
although face-to-face meetings were still cmcial. Working trans-nationally with IT, ICBL 
turned a growing awareness by aid workers about landmine and UXO risks into a grass­
roots movement and then a global cause for ‘social netwar’.
The applicability of existing risk management concepts
Averting potential victimhood
According to former Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, the basic unit of 
analysis in ‘human security’ is individual human needs, not the state. Once an ostensibly 
military issue like landmines is seen in humanitarian terms, non-traditional players are 
brought into the picture, such as human rights and development NGOs. As they frame 
their concerns about military practices in ‘humanitarian’ terms, states will be hard 
pressed to justify themselves. The concept of human security is in the final analysis about 
risks to the human body. Indeed, in the 2002 Landmine Monitor Report- the flagship 
ICBL annual publication- the term ‘mine risk education’ now replaced the previously 
used ‘mine awareness’. This meant to encourage communities to behave in such a way as 
to reduce the risks from landmines.
This resonated with Risk Society’s concern with victimhood. As we have seen. 
President Clinton warned we were all ‘potential victims’ in an age of globalisation and 
mass terrorism. The post-Cold War humanitarian system has similarly been reorienting 
its focus from neutrality, to solidarity with victims. The ICBL with its images of
Ken Rutherford, ‘The landmine ban and NGOs: The role of communications technologies’, paper 
presented at conference sponsored by the Nautilus Institute, San Francisco, December 1999 
Landmine Monitor Report 2002, International Campaign to Ban Landmines, 
www.icbl.org/lm/2002/intro/mre.html
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victimhood, mainly women and children, created a surge of solidarity and campaigns on 
behalf of victims, survivors and potential victims. They spoke at ICBL conferences or 
distributed leaflets. Victims make compelling speakers, not easily ignored by 
governments. In an information age and ‘netwars’, ICBL made much use of media 
coverage, rather than traditional street protests. The high visual impact of physical 
disability served as a powerful tangible manifestation of the risks of landmines. This 
ensured constant debate and sensitised public opinion. The Ottawa Convention was also 
the first arms agreement to address victim assistance, due largely to advocacy of the 
NGO Landmine Survivors Network. The bright colours of dud cluster bomblets are also 
particularly attractive to children. ICRC claims children are more likely to be victimised 
by cluster bomblets than landmines. The prospect of a child victim is especially abhorrent 
to Risk Society.
Surveillance
Monitoring risks and assessing efforts to reduce risks is significant in the APM and 
cluster bombs issue, mirroring similar trends in earlier case studies. Treaties -even the 
Ottawa convention- do not formally give NGOs a role in monitoring procedures. ICBL 
thus took monitoring upon itself, establishing the civil-society based ‘Landmine 
Monitor’. This is especially important since Ottawa lacked robust verification provisions, 
relying more on moral norms and voluntary state reports under Article 7. Another 
important development was the rapid dissemination and gathering of information by 
NGOs on the Web, placing recalcitrant under public scrutiny. The annual Landmine 
Monitor Report on state compliance and global APM developments is readily available 
on the Internet. This eroded the state’s monopoly of information. It is ‘an unprecedented 
initiative by the ICBL to monitor implementation of and compliance with the 1997 Mine 
Ban Treaty, and more generally to assess the efforts of the international community to 
resolve the landmines crisis.’*^  If any aspects of that risk reduction effort are 
unsatisfactory, red flags are noisily raised by NGOs in the media and Internet. This is 
also why the British Mines Advisory Group and leading NGO Human Rights Watch 
(HRW) lambasted NATO use of cluster munitions in Kosovo, scrutinising and criticising
Landmine Monitor Report 2000, www.icbl.org/lm/2000/keyfindings.php3
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NATO’s targeting and weapons policies. These NGOs have also been the most Outspoken 
critics in both Afghanistan and Iraq on the use of cluster munitions, often publishing 
Web-based reports.
Theoretical enhancements and future research avenues
Risk communities
The concept of ‘risk communities’ suggests possible theoretical enhancements to the 
prism developed so far. NGOs have assumed a niche role providing organised criticism 
of imperfections of international society, and a stimulant to progress. The risk of APMs 
and cluster bombs aroused a wide panoply of concerns as it harmed the values of diverse 
groups. It is thus a prime candidate for studying trans-national NGO ‘risk communities’ 
based on the central organising principle of risk. There is a new ‘placelessness’ and 
‘distanceless’ to ideas of community supplemented by increasing awareness of global 
dangers.^®
As envisaged by the risk framework, trans-national NGO ‘risk communities’ 
coalesced around a common concern with APM risks. The ICBL united over 1,300 
diverse groups ranging from development human rights, children, peace, disability, 
veterans, environmental, arms control, religious and women’s groups in over 75 countries 
on the single issue of banning landmines and related concerns with cluster bombs. It had 
no secretariat and its major strength was the ability to cut across disciplines to present a 
united front. A steering committee set broad guidelines, which were implemented by 
member groups in different regions of the world according to their own design. While 
governments previously solicited scientific information generated by epistemic 
communities, ‘risk communities’ provide information not solicited or desired by 
governments. ICBL has no scientific authority as such but the ability to engage in moral 
proselytising through persuasion and knowledge generated by its conferences. The 
implication is that trans-national NGO advocacy may be needed on issues that states are 
unable or unwilling to address.
Anthony Giddens’s ideas cited in Michael Schechter, The Revival o f Civil Society, (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1999), p79
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The idea of ‘risk community’ is not limited to NGOs and suggests future research 
avenues. NATO has replaced its Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) - 
previously charged in the Cold War with ensuring supplies flowed from America to 
Europe through Atlantic sea lanes- with Transformation Command to help the alliance 
better address new risks such as terrorism and WMD proliferation. The debate over 
NATO going ‘out of area’ is effectively resolved as NATO led the ISAF in Kabul and 
helped Polish troops deploy to Iraq. The alliance is realigning itself from a ‘security 
community’ focused on a specific threat, towards a ‘risk community’ concerned with 
security risks, from ethnic cleansing in the Balkans to terrorism in Central Asia.
Risk Distribution
US military personnel are forbidden from removing mines as part of humanitarian de- 
mining programs. This is different from military counter-mining where mines are cleared 
in order for military missions to be completed. Distributing risks and ideas of ‘New 
Prudentialism’ in de-mining has emerged as a rather distinct corollary of state responses 
to the NGO ‘netwar’ against weapons systems posing unacceptable risk. ‘New 
Prudentialism’ progressively removes responsibility for risk protection from state 
agencies, and places it in the hand of individuals or community-based groups. The 
concept of risk becomes privatised and entrepreneurial.^^
Thus, post-Gulf War I Kuwait marked the beginning of the privatisation and 
commercialisation of de-mining. Private firms such as CMS Environmental Inc and 
Explosive Ordnance World Services were responsible for clearing the American sector of 
liberated Kuwait. This itself was a dangerous venture as 84 contract de-miners were 
killed, more than the number of American soldiers killed in combat by enemy fire.^  ^The 
Australian government similarly structures its aid to Mozambique’s de-mining 
organisations such that Australian de-miners do not actually clear the mines. Risks are 
totally undertaken by locals.^^ There is an important distinction between contract de­
Deborah Lupton, Risk, (London: Routledge, 1999), p99
See Don Hubert, ‘The challenge of humanitarian mine clearance, in Maxwell Cameron, Robert J. 
Lawson & Brian W. Tomlin (eds). To Walk without Fear: the global movement to ban landmines, 
(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998), p321 
Bill Purves, Living With Landmines: from international treaty to reality, (Montreal: Rose Press, 2000), 
pl26
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mining companies and NGO humanitarian de-miners such as British-based HALO Trust 
and Norwegian People’s Aid. The latter are generally more respected. HALO Trust is the 
first NGO to have humanitarian de-mining as its primary mission.
America’s ‘Demining 2010 Initiative’ has the explicit aim of developing public- 
private partnerships for integrated mine action. In Kosovo, there was a good mix of NGO 
and contract de-miners. These ranged from NGOs like HALO Trust to private companies 
such as RONCO Consulting, International De-mining Alliance of Canada Inc and 
European Landmine Solutions Ltd.^ "^  Donor government agencies like USAID paid the 
bills for de-miners who bid for contracts tendered for humanitarian de-mining. On 18 
August 1999, the US State Department awarded an Integrated Mine Actions Support 
(IMAS) contract to a consortium led by the RONCO Consulting Corporation, a name that 
inevitably crops up when it comes to commercial de-mining operations around the 
world.^^ British consultancies such as Bactec, and Defence Systems Limited, cleared 
landmines and unexploded cluster bombs for the UK Department for International 
Development. In April 2000, the UK MoD donated surplus army vehicles to the HALO 
Trust and Mines Advisory Group (MAG) to help their de-mining efforts. This distributes 
risks away from service personnel, outsourced to private contractors and NGOs.^^
After the Afghan campaign in early 2002, RONCO again won a five-year contract 
from the State Department to defuse unexploded US cluster bombs and landmines, 
especially from the main US airbase at Bagram and the southern city Kandahar. The 
NGOs Save the Children and HALO Trust also received funding from the State 
Department for de-mining. In fact, humanitarian demining is the single largest industry in 
Afghanistan with over 4500 deminers, indigenous employees and support staff.^^
See Landmine Monitor report 2000, available at www.icbl.org/lm/2000/report/LMWeb-25.php3
See www.roncoconsulting.com/newsarchives/june99.html
One interesting footnote to distributing risks occurred during the Kosovo air campaign itself, when 
USAID funded the NGO International Rescue Committee’s (IRC) relief flights, which NATO had declined 
to undertake - slow, low-flying risky air drops to refugees in mountains. The IRC has a history of doing 
hazardous things Governments are unwilling to do, such as delivering food under fire to Mostar and 
Gorazde.
See ‘Demining in Afghanistan’, Foreign Press Centre Briefing by Lincoln Bloomfield, Assistant 
Secretary o f State for Political Military Affairs, 18 December 2001, Washington D C; 
http://fpc.state.gov/7453 .htm
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Afghanistan also has the world’s largest demining program, given more impetus by 
recent events.
In 2002, the State Department awarded grants to the NGOs Norwegian People’s 
Aid and Mines Advisory Group for landmine detection and clearance in northern Iraq, 
Washington’s three-year plan for Iraq beginning in April 2003 included grants for NGOs 
conducting Mine Risk Education programs, and a Quick Reaction Demining Force to be 
implemented again by RONCO Consulting in A1 Hilla and Baghdad.^^ In April 2003 The 
NGO Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) was one of the first demining groups in 
Iraq after the recent war, funded by the US Government among others. Swiss Army 
professionals judged it too dangerous at that time.
The concept of risk distribution as an aspect of risk management suggests 
promising fiature research avenues. The East Timor intervention in 1999 was another 
example where the Clinton Administration ‘subcontracted’ the managing of a 
problematic situation to a willing partner (Australia) by providing it logistical and 
intelligence support. Elsewhere, the Africa Crisis Response Initiative is an effort to 
improve peacekeeping capabilities of select African nations, to lessen the risks and 
burdens imposed on US forces in the region’s problems.^^ The US private military 
company (PMC) MPRI’s role in training Croatian forces for Operation Storm in 1995 
meant it ‘effectively acted as a mechanism of US policy in the Balkans at less cost and 
lower political risk than that incurred if the US military were directly involved.
With Congressional limits on official American participation in Colombia’s drug 
wars, another PMC subcontractor DynCorp, employed mostly ex-Special Forces 
personnel to fly surveillance missions monitoring poppy production and eradication. 
These involved occasional heavy firefights with FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia) guerrillas especially since DynCorp employees piloted helicopter gunships as 
escorts when crop-dusting aircraft are attacked.^ ^  US actions in Colombia came close to 
eliding the thin line between counter-narcotics and counter-insurgency. Human Rights
See ‘The US Humanitarian De-mining Program in Iraq’, Fact Sheet, Bureau of Political Military Affairs, 
Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs, US Department o f State, Washington D C, 02 July 2003 
Andrew Bacevich, American Empire, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 158 
David Shearer, Private Armies and Military Intervention, Adelphi Paper 316, (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1998),p.62 
‘Secrecy in Colombia’, Jane's Foreign Report, 29 March 2001
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Watch complained that ‘deniability is the name of the game’ and ‘We’re outsourcing the 
war in a way that is not accountable’/^ The rise of Private Military Companies is 
generating increasing attention from IR academics and policymakers, and the notion of 
risk distribution in helping to manage both systemic and tactical risks, suggests a 
potentially fiuitful research angle to explaining this phenomenon and its particular appeal 
to governments/^
Rhetorical ‘wars’
Rhetorical ‘wars’ on drugs and AIDS also suggest wider application of the risk 
management approach. These will be briefly discussed. The ‘war’ on drugs concerned 
systemic risks conceptualised through globalisation, and probabilities rather than military 
capabilities. Afghanistan accounted for 90% of heroin on British streets as Tony Blair 
emphasised. Colombia runs the world’s largest aerial crop eradication program funded by 
Washington. Expanded interdiction and crop spraying was a proactive ‘upstreaming’ 
policy to tackle problems at source rather than retrospective rehabilitation of drug 
addicts. British warships patrolled the Caribbean conducting maritime interdiction 
patrols. This helped ‘reshape the environment’ by making it more difficult for drug 
smugglers to operate. The drugs war, like that on terror, seemed interminable and 
cyclical. One cartel eliminated was simply replaced by another, much like hydra-headed 
terror networks. Risk management concepts suggest insights to understanding this 
protracted ‘war’ without decisive battles normally associated with war.
The metaphorical ‘war’ on AIDS suggests another possible contender on which to 
apply the risk framework, laden with the imagery of war. Former US Ambassador to the 
UN Richard Holbrooke called it a ‘war that must be waged’. Secretary Powell told the 
UN in June 2001 : ‘I know of no enemy in war more insidious or vicious than AIDS.’ The 
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) report Progress o f Nations 2000 also
Quoted in Secrecy in Colombia’, Jane's Foreign Report, 29 March 2001
A recent analysis would include for example Eugene B. Smith, ‘The New Condottieri and US policy: the 
privatisation of conflict and its implications’. Parameters, Vol. XXXII No 4, Winter 2002-03, p. 104-119
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suggested a ‘war-footing’ to combat Aids. Its executive director Carol Bellamy labelled it 
‘a war of liberation’ Yet such ‘wars’ are again not amenable to Realist explanations.
Conceptual issues
Scholars such as David Fidler argued that the globalisation of disease seriously 
challenged traditional boundaries of understanding IR.^  ^ Realism is not a very useful 
framework for analysing the globalisation of public health ‘now a permanent feature of 
IR’, with its focus on unilateral state action enhancing power, military capabilities, and 
neglect of non-state actors. AIDS does not pose military threats but a related chain of 
worsening economic problems, resource struggles fuelling civil conflict, state failure and 
regional instability. AIDS is not only seen as a health and development issue but 
increasingly a strategic concem.^^ After all, as Richard Holbrooke noted on the 
challenges of AIDS, ‘post-Cold War security is about more than guns and bombs and the 
balance of power’. A I D S  and infectious diseases were subject of a National Intelligence 
Estimate on The Global Infectious Disease Threat and its implications for the United 
States in December 1999, and concerned the US National Security Council for the first 
time. Also venturing into uncharted waters, the UN Security Council passed resolution 
1308 in July 2000 against a health issue, declaring that ‘the HIV/Aids pandemic, if left 
unchecked, may pose a risk to stability and security’.
Concepts of risk management suggest more fruitful investigative approaches. 
AIDS posed security risks posed in terms of probabilities rather than military capabilities 
and intent. It needed preventive rather than reactive policies. How does one gauge 
‘intent’ of a pandemic? Indeed, ‘in implementing preventive strategies, governments 
must prepare for what are only theoretical possibilities’ when it comes to globalisation of 
infectious diseases.^^
BBC News, ‘War-footing urged to fight Aids’, 12 July 2000, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/newsid_830000/830144.stm 
David P.Fidler, ‘The globalisation of Public Health: Emerging Infectious Diseases and International 
Relations’, Indiana Journal of Global Studies, Vol. 5 No. 1, Fall 1997, 
http://www.law.indiana.edu/glsj/vol5/nol/fidler.html 
See a recent analysis by Stefan Elbe, Strategic Implications o f HIV/AIDS, Adelphi Paper 357, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press for the IISS, July 2003)
‘Ambassador Holbrooke Testifies to Congress on HIV/Aids’, 8 March 2000, USIS Washington File 
Lynn E. Davis, Security Implications o f Globalisation, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), p3
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Globalisation
AIDS as a systemic risk has also been conceptualised through globalisation. Other 
diseases such as Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome SARS) which dominated headlines 
in March-May 2003 were clearly related to jet travel in an age of globalisation. 
According to the World Health Organisation (WHO), a ‘communicable disease in one 
country today is the concern of all.’^  ^With globalisation, US interests combating AIDS 
in Africa on moral, humanitarian, economic and transnational security grounds will be 
seen in global terms.'^  ^More strategically important regions such as China and the former 
Soviet Union faced similar pandemics.
Averting Potential victimhood
The ‘war’ on AIDS also reflected the risk management approach previously outlined. 
Diseases such as AIDS could previously be seen as divine judgement or no-fault of the 
victim. With the notion of risk, the no-fault paradigm has been replaced by the at-risk 
paradigm and preventing ‘potential victimhood’. Victims are no longer blameless but are 
responsible for managing the risks they face and thus avoiding. Thus, the UN Declaration 
of Commitment on Aids in June 2001 had prevention as ‘the mainstay of our response
Surveillance
The surveillance functions of risk management have been reflected in HIV Sentinel 
programs. Disease surveillance is defined as the ‘ongoing systematic collection, collation, 
analysis of data; and the dissemination of information.. .such that action may be taken 
HIV surveillance is carried out to assess the seriousness of the situation, to monitor the 
rate of HIV spread, increase awareness of impact of the disease and to promote effective 
planning and policy. The main epidemiological tool used is HIV ‘sentinel surveillance’, 
which can provide more accurate indications of trends of HIV infection in selected
WHO Fact sheet No. 200 ‘Global infectious disease surveillance’, June 1998
See Stephen Morrison, ‘The African Pandemic Hits Washington’, Washington Quarterly, Winter 2001, 
Vol. 24 N o.l, p. 197; Solomon Benatar, ‘South Africa’s Transition in a globalising world: HIV/AIDS as a 
mirror and window’. International Affairs, Vol. 77 No. 2, April 2001, p.347-376 
UN Special Session Declaration on AIDS, 27 June 2001 
WHO Communicable Disease Surveillance and Response, 
http://www.who.int/emc/surveill/index.html#surveillance
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population groups and sites. Relatively simple and cheap, this made it feasible even in 
resource poor settings. One of the WHO’s main methods of creating a global surveillance 
system is developing a ‘network of networks’, linking together existing local, national, 
regional and international laboratories and research centres.'^  ^ This is being constructed 
with the 191 WHO member states and partners like the US Department of Defence’s 
Global Emerging Infections System.
III. Summing up: War and the management of systemic risks
What has hopefully emerged from this study is that an understanding of contemporary 
warfare based on conventional notions of warfare such as ‘heroic’ purposes and visible 
successes ending neatly in surrender ceremonies is inadequate. Risk management allows 
us to reconceptualise wars in alternative ways through ‘less than heroic’ strategies and 
non-events defined as success. Furthermore, recent wars have been disdained by leading 
Realists, mindful of the need for war only against clearly-defined threats. A focus on 
classical ‘net assessment’ of ‘threats’ is insufficient for a more complete understanding of 
World Risk Society and peculiar strategic circumstances of the 21®* century. The main 
outlines of this set of circumstances were outlined in Chapter Two: the end of the Cold 
War; American pre-eminence without existential threats on a scale posed by the Soviet 
Union; an interdependent world of globalisation and looser constraints on states, people 
and material moving across porous borders; and failed states endangering security rather 
than powerful conquering ones. It is however not only within this specific historical 
context that the concept of war as risk management recommends itself. It would also 
have to be feasible in the first place. In the cases studied here, this condition was 
satisfied. In others such as North Korea, this specific set of conditions was unfulfilled.
The evidence presented here indicated that core justifications resorted to by both the 
Clinton and Bush administrations in publicly explaining wars reflected a negative, 
minimalist, and dystopian ethos. The crucial issue in all cases, was that both Presidents 
Clinton and Bush, and Prime Minister Blair sought largely to prevent the worst, rather
WHO Fact sheet No. 200 ‘Global infectious disease surveillance’, June 1998, http://www.who.int/inf- 
fs/en/fact200.html
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than attain a good despite relatively more positive visions from London. The main 
theoretical background was described in Chapter Three:
i) A society that understands misfortune and harm in terms of avoidable risks 
rather than magic, fate or God
ii) General disillusionment with notions of ‘progress’ and greater recognition of 
limits, a negative dystopian ethos focused on avoiding harm
iii) Concern with managing risks rather than producing goods, a forward looking 
probabilistic mindset focused on averting extreme improbabilities in a future 
that is only more or less probable.
Risk, wrote Washington Post columnist Robert Samuelson, was the ‘defining 
characteristic of our era’. This claim is interesting to consider not only in the domestic 
context he described (terrorist warnings, accounting scandals and Washington snipers) 
but also the international security domain of this thesis. Risk-based approaches to IR 
suggest that risk management is the central organising principle as this study has 
demonstrated. As discussed in Chapter Three, one of the chief criticisms of the few IR 
researchers who have attempted to employ theories derived from Ulrich Beck’s Risk 
Society is their weak distinction of the differences between concepts of ‘threat’ and ‘risk’. 
This is certainly an important methodological problem and it is hoped this study has paid 
sufficient attention to this issue. Additionally, by clarifying the ‘risk-threat’ distinction, 
the thesis adds to the understanding of an increasingly important strategic issue of 
systemic risks. With Francis Fukuyama’s Our Post-Human Future, the ‘post’ prefix 
seemed to cover almost everything from post-human, post-Cold War to post-Westphalia 
and post-modern. Yet this study demonstrated also the increasing prevalence of the ‘pre’ 
prefix from ‘pre-crime’ in popular culture (Tom Cruise’s Minority Report is one notable 
example), to ‘systematic pre-detection’ in surveillance studies, to ‘pre-emptive’ surgery 
against high-risk cancers. The ‘pre’ prefix encapsulates the proactive essence of wars as 
risk management.
Inevitably, there will be those who argue that in a world of international anarchy, 
talk of ‘risks’ is simply an updated definition of a Hobbesian world of dangers and perils.
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Studying it is a pointless exercise which would yield no useful or original insights. In its 
defence, this study has clearly stated its assumptions in Chapter One, that it is time-bound 
and pertinent only to specific historical circumstances. It speaks only to this particular 
period of time where the notion of ‘risk’ has become predominant in mindsets and 
society. Life is not exactly nasty, brutish and short. Instead, it is increasingly comfortable 
as problems of weight-loss have replaced those of hunger. We seek additionally to 
manage and prevent security risks to our way of life, and not just accept undesirable 
outcomes as fated or God’s will as the world of Hobbes was inclined to. The way we 
conceptualise dangers and perils is greatly different. Furthermore, the notion of 
‘managing risks’ evokes memories of a ‘managerial’ or ‘calibrated’ approach to war long 
derided since the Vietnam War. Two points should be made here. First, the time periods 
and strategic contexts are hugely dissimilar. Second, Vietnam was seen as part of the 
overarching communist threat and thus infused with some ideological meaning. Risk 
management on the other hand, lacks such grand purposes and is largely utilitarian.
One methodological path this study eschewed was that of a ‘null hypothesis’: 
answering its questions by means of setting out what arguments could undermine the 
thesis and then going about debunking them. If it did adopt this method, would the 
Realist paradigm explain what has been attempted here? Realists such as Stephen Walt 
counselled against war on Iraq; Henry Kissinger against war on Kosovo. Clearly, leading 
Realists eschewed such wars and would not have wanted or been able to explain them 
adequately. Realism is too complicated a paradigm to go into much detail here but from 
the evidence accumulated thus far, it did not seem to provide a totally satisfying answer 
to the questions raised in this study. The analysis undertaken in this study has focused on 
the role of states and military force in addressing security risks. This might seem to 
validate Realist assumptions in IR. However, this thesis has hopefully demonstrated that 
on a deeper level. Realist premises based on concerns with survival, maximising power 
and influence, and focusing on capabilities of other states were not reflected in the 
evidence presented here. To understand the implications of a post-Cold War and 
especially post-September 11 world, the proper starting point suggested in this thesis is 
the focus on probabilistic mind-sets and minimising potentially catastrophic risks in a 
complex age of globalisation rather than neo-realism’s focus on relatively static
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distribution of capabilities among states and power-maximising. Furthermore, given the 
enemies the West has recently confronted, hard military data derived from ‘objective’ 
capabilities hardly justified war. The opinion that the current security context is 
composed of a ‘risk complexity’, of diffuse risks where presumed or possible hostile 
intent is not matched to that of capabilities or vice versa, has been reinforced and indeed 
further clarified in this study.'^ '^
Nor is it totally accurate to suggest that an ‘imperial’ mindset informed the wars 
in question. At this writing in July 2003, the previously unfashionable and politically 
incorrect discourse of ‘empire’ has been resurrected as a legitimate tool of analysis.'*  ^
Analysts from both left and right now referred to ‘American empire’ as the ‘dominant 
narrative’ of the 21®* century."*  ^However, America, noted Niall Ferguson, was an ‘empire 
that dare not speak its name’. It was in denial, and lacked an ‘imperial’ ethos or 
metaphysical narratives; its military primed for high-intensity warfighting not patient 
colonial-style nation-building. Instead, it preferred minimalist nation-tending and 
‘reshaping the environment’ simply to reduce systemic risks as we have seen from case 
studies. To many, the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s statue in Baghdad on 09 April 2003 
signified the moment when the American Republic finally became an Empire, just like 
ancient Rome. In the heat of the moment, hubris occasionally overcame more reasoned 
analyses of recent evidence presented here that could have suggested otherwise. Donald 
Rumsfeld correctly insisted to Al-Jazeera that ‘we don’t do empire’. In fact, analysts 
suggest we don’t even ‘do conquest’ anymore as an imaginable legitimate war aim."^  ^
What America does do is risk management, with its minimalist utilitarian ethos seeking 
only to ‘reshape’ environments, and ‘prevent the worst’ in Bush’s words.
Overall, enough conceptual consistency in the patterns of recent wars survived the 
change in administration in Washington in 2001, to justify the collective labelling of
Christopher Dandeker, ‘New times and new patterns of civil-military relations’, in Jurgen Kuhlman and 
Jean Callaghan (eds), Military and Society in Century Europe: a comparative analysis, (Hamburg: Lit 
Verlag, 2000), p30
A selection includes Michael Ignatieff, Empire lite: nationbuilding in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, 
(London: Vintage, 2003); Andrew Bacevich, American Empire, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2002); Niall Ferguson, Empire: the rise and demise o f  British world order and lessons fo r global 
power, (New York: Basic Books, 2003)
Joseph S. Nye, ‘Ill-suited for empire’, Washington Post, 25 May 2003
See Anna Simons, ‘The Death of Conquest’, The National Interest, Issue 71, Spring 2003, p.41-50
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these wars as ‘risk management’. This was most evident in the recourse to proactive war 
of an anticipatory nature, justifications given, and non-events defined as success on 
minimalist terms. Although evidence presented in Chapter Six does not suggest that 
regime change in Iraq was about risk management especially in the impatient and 
maximalist manner of ground invasion, the impetus, ethos and outcomes behind it closely 
parallel those of risk management. Indeed, the ‘non-events’ and ‘hollow’ victory in the 
afterglow of regime change strongly suggested ironically that risk management had been 
successful in the years before Saddam’s ouster.
On a theoretical level, case studies demonstrated the need for a dynamic inter­
disciplinary approach, with IR engaged in a constant dialogue with theoretical 
developments elsewhere in the social sciences, to better address new theoretical 
challenges and the impact of real-world developments. As far as the author is aware, this 
thesis is the first such piece systematically and specifically focused on war as risk 
management, as its contribution to the field. This study underlined how new 
understandings of war can be arrived at through the exploration of risk and risk 
management strategies previously employed mainly in the disciplines of criminology and 
sociology. For example, the notion of ‘reshaping the environment’, a crime control 
mechanism to reduce the risks of offending, has clear parallels in the idea of ‘shaping the 
international environment’ first touted in strategy documents of the late Clinton years. 
These documents clearly suggested that Washington would take a more proactive 
approach, although the element of using force was initially largely absent. It was only 
towards the end of the Clinton era that it recognised military action over Kosovo 
constituted one such example of ‘shaping’ to reduce systemic risks. The concept of 
‘shaping’ has since been employed in the Bush Administration’s February 2003 strategy 
to combat terrorism, with its full implications of using force to reduce risks by attacking 
terrorist sanctuaries in Afghanistan and elsewhere. This lent further weight to the 
contention that risk management strategies such as ‘reshaping the environment’ 
employed in crime control can be usefully applied to the study of war.
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Policy lessons
The purpose of analysis undertaken here is certainly not to claim that everything about 
recent wars could or should be conceptualised through the prism of risk management. 
The focus on implementing risk management has meant that certain aspects of these wars 
-  the role of subjective perceptions, decision-making theories such as Prospect Theory, 
hidden agendas etc- were not addressed in-depth in this study. Yet there remain certain 
useful lessons to be derived in future attempts to understand, and if possible, avoid 
‘precautionary risk management’ wars based on ‘false positives’.
The issue of perceptions has been raised often in explaining war. From the case 
studies examined, policymakers appeared to draw analogies from various different sets of 
risks, most popular of which were historical ones. In Kosovo, the analogy drawn was that 
of Hitler and appeasement and more recently Srebrenica and the failure to act. In Iraq, the 
analogy drawn was again that of Hitler and more recently September 11. These analogies, 
no doubt serving to portray politicians as learned students of history, however served no 
practical purpose in proper appreciation of the nature of risks involved. Brutal dictators 
such as Milosevic were, they were mere regional thugs as Kissinger memorably 
described him, not a Hitler with capability to fundamentally shift the balance of power. 
NATO further misread the intentions of Milosevic and how he would respond to military 
force, in its focus on worst-case scenarios for Kosovo. We need reasoned arguments 
based on more concrete evidence rather than continuously imagining worst possible 
scenarios especially over Iraq.
However, there is no sure way of getting around this problem as risks 
fundamentally involved perceptions and as the Copenhagen School will agree, politicians 
had the innate ability to ‘securitise’ issues through language and shaping the agenda. 
Policymakers, when presented with dissenting intelligence information, can shape it to 
suit their cognitive preferences. This was all too present in the post-war controversy over 
‘sexed up’ dossiers in Britain, and the infamous 16 word-sentence in President Bush’s 
January State of the Union speech where he claimed Iraq had sought uranium from Niger 
without concrete intelligence backing. Still, perhaps the starkest warning one can have for 
politicians is that a society already deficient in trusting political institutions, will turn 
even more cynical when presented with the apparent ‘false positives’ that seemed at this
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writing to propel regime change in Iraq. This would damage future resort to the principle 
in situations genuinely requiring its application. A related cautionary lesson is the 
emphasis on worst-case scenarios and the impatience policymakers had on occasion in 
dealing with the issue. Low-probability high impact scenarios such as ‘dirty bomb’ 
attacks can divert resources from more probable low-impact events like truck bombings. 
Impatience as a result of inflating the risk into an ‘imminent threat’, meant other possible 
means of risk management were sidelined. Many still maintain that weapons inspections 
and patient containment could have reduced the risks associated with Saddam Hussein’s 
Iraq without regime change and the costs in blood and treasure on both sides. More 
importantly, if policymakers can grasp the complex nature of elusive systemic risks they 
face rather than relatively straightforward threat-elimination, they could then better 
manage unrealistic public expectations of clearly decisive outcomes and end points.
Summary
The three main contributions of this thesis to IR relate to the three puzzles raised in 
Chapter One:
i) It contributes a new perspective to understanding contemporary wars which
largely eluded the explanatory power of conventional Realist theorising.
ii) It reinforces the importance of an inter-disciplinary approach to IR in
understanding the current strategic conundrum of ill-defined systemic risks.
iii) It suggests novel and more satisfactory explanatory means to approach new
aspects of warfare which defy conventional notions of war, further adding to 
the broader ‘transformation of war debate’.
This research project took three case studies of wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq and 
used a theoretical framework to systematically map and assess the presence of cross­
cutting risk management patterns in these wars.. The risk management framework
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developed in Chapter Three, largely matched predictions with empirical evidence at least 
in impetus and outcomes, although evidence indicated that implementation was not as 
patient or ‘minimalist’ as predicted in Iraq by 2003. Yet, the aftermath of regime change 
with the failure to find compelling A1 Qaeda link or fully reconstituted WMD actually 
warranted the previous more patient ‘risk management’ approach to war. That said, case 
studies presented here helped develop the concept of war as risk management, refining 
the concept in the process.
Two years after the September 11 attacks, and despite countless suggestions that 
‘everything has changed’, this study demonstrated that such suggestions are premature at 
least in the regularities and patterns of warfare uncovered here. Rather than signalling a 
complete sea change, evidence firom case studies presented in this thesis suggested that 
9/11 only consolidated what had previously been an emerging trend: war as a tool to 
manage systemic risks in terms of impetus, implementation and justification, and 
outcome evaluation.
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